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Who are the foreign fighters of IS-K in Afghanistan?

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Islamic State of Khorasan IS-K, also known as the Daesh terrorist group has added a large number of foreign fighters to its organization in addition to local fighters. Pakistanis, who are always considered as the main options for leadership of IS, after two periods of leadership of this branch, now they have a significant role in the Council of Lajneh. This council has the decision-making authority of IS and evaluates and finalizes the decisions of the leader of this branch.

Also, despite a number of Pakistani IS commanders being killed in Afghanistan by the Taliban, some Pakistanis are still acting governors of some provinces, including Kunar and Laghman.

At the same time, the Uzbek fighters of Jundullah have also recently joined the IS. The findings show that the Uzbek members of the Jundallah group pledged loyalty to the IS after the assassination of their leader by the Taliban. It has been said that two thousand fighters of Jundallah have joined the IS.

Meanwhile, the IS has increased its efforts to recruit more Pakistani and Uzbek fighters. The leadership of this branch of IS-K is still trying to include Uzbek fighters who are disaffected with the Taliban.

It should be mentioned that based on the presence of these fighters, the activity of IS has spread to Central Asia states and there was some rocket incident as well.

The IS group launched its branch activity in Afghanistan and the region under the name “IS-K” for the first time in 2015. The geography that IS considered for its caliphate included parts of Afghanistan, Iran and also Pakistan.

IS-K intensified its activates in Afghanistan

Currently, the activity of this group has increased and has expanded its attacks to Central Asia. The latest report of the United Nations shows that the Khorasan branch of IS currently has between four and six thousand fighters in Afghanistan.

Recently, it has been reported that due to the geography of IS-K, most of its members have Afghan citizenship and are also present in the key positions of this group.

Definitely, the key part of IS-K is made up of foreign jihadists; People who pledged allegiance to IS due to dissatisfaction with other jihadist groups, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Some of the members of al-Qaeda are also related to IS, but the question is, which groups of fighters are currently members of IS-K and what role do they play in expanding the scope of this group’s activities?

Pakistanis and the founding of IS-K till Council of Lajneh

Despite the presence of a number of Afghan fighters in the composition of IS-K, this branch was founded for the first time by the disgruntled Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.

Hafiz Saeed Orakzai, the former commander of the Pakistani Taliban, left the TTP in October 2014 due to disappointment with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and pledged allegiance to IS-K.

Orakzai worked as the leader of the Khorasan branch of IS for about one and a half years and was finally killed by US forces in August 2016.

After one year of the leadership of this group by Abdul Haseeb Logari, the leadership of IS-K again went to Pakistani fighters. At that time, Abdullah Orakzai, known as Aslam Farooqi, was in charge of the leadership of the group from April 2017 until he was finally arrested and imprisoned by the then Afghan security forces in 2020.

Since then, some resentful Pakistani Taliban fighters have been members of IS-K branch and as commanders, they have played a key role in the current IS insurgency.

Kunar is next target for IS

Even some of the “emirs” of the IS-K branch in Afghanistan are Pakistani fighters. Among these, Qari Fateh was working as the so-called “emir” of IS-K in Kunar province.

In February of this year, the Taliban announced by publishing pictures that they killed Qari Fateh in Kabul.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said at that time that Fateh was the head of intelligence and operations of IS-K in Afghanistan. The Taliban even named him as a responsible man for attacking mosques and diplomatic places.

The Taliban had once again announced in early June of this year that they killed another commander of the Daesh identified as Tarab Bajauri in Laghman province. This Pakistani commander was active as the “emir” of the Khorasan branch of the IS group in Laghman province. It has said that Bajauri joined IS along with Hafiz Saeed Orakzai.

Bajauri was known for his long history in military affairs and was among those top IS-K members that significantly spread the influence of the group in Kunar province. The Taliban called him an important member of the Khorasan IS branch in Afghanistan. Such positions of the Taliban show that Pakistani fighters are one of the main pillars of IS-K and are actively present in Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.

IS key members arrested and killed

Currently, Asadullah Orakzai is another prominent Pakistani commander of IS-K branch. He works as the leader of Daesh in Laghman and is also a member of the Council of Lajneh. According to the reports, Orakzai is in charge of this IS-K leadership council and its members decide on the activities of this group in “Khorasan region”.

Orakzai, alias Aslam Farooqi, the leader of Daesh’s so-called Khorasan Province affiliate, arrested in Afghanistan

Qari Fateh was also a key member of this council where he had a key say on the future activities of the branch in Afghanistan.

Also, Saifullah Orakzai, as one of the prominent commanders of the IS-K branch, is a member of Lajneh council.

In this way, the findings show that Pakistani fighters are active members of the IS-K branch, who are present in Afghanistan, and at least in addition to the experience of leading this branch twice, they are active as governors in the provinces and also as military and intelligence commanders.

At the same time, IS-K is trying its best to increase the number of its Pakistani fighters. This branch of IS has made the issue of the allegiance of Pakistani fighters a part of its future plan.

In this process, people who are dissatisfied with the conditions of working with the Pakistani Taliban are attracted to IS in order to expand the activities of this group in eastern Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan.

It should be mentioned that most of the Pakistani members of the Khorasan branch of IS have been attracted to this group due to dissatisfaction with their previous groups, and due to the high level of dissatisfaction, the number of Pakistani IS fighters is likely to increase.

Jundullah group joined Daesh with thousands of fighters

The findings show that the Uzbek members of the Jundallah group have also joined IS-K in the north of the country. According to the information, except for a small part of this group, most of its Uzbek commanders and fighters have joined IS in Khorasan.

IS has incorporated a branch of the Jundullah group, which consists of Uzbek fighters in northern Afghanistan. In this way, Mullah Saad, a citizen of Uzbekistan, has started working as the leader of this group in IS-K and Osama Ghazi from Uzbekistan as his deputy.

In addition to these two leaders of the Jundullah group, about two thousand fighters of this group and thousands of their supporters in the provinces of Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Faryab have also become part of IS-K.

This fundamental development took place after the Uzbek members of the Jundullah group became distrustful of the Taliban’s intentions. According to the findings, Uzbek fighters played a major role in the fall of the North to the hands of the Taliban, but after the return of the Taliban into the power, the leadership and members of Jundullah faced their indifference.

Besides this, Taliban people even assassinated some of its leaders to control this group. The information shows that Usman Ghazi, one of the Uzbek immigrants who entered Afghanistan with five thousand Uzbek citizens during the rule of Burhanuddin Rabbani almost four decades ago, later became a member of Jundallah based on Abdul Malik Rigi’s request.

At that time, Rigi was one of the leaders of Jundullah, who was active in Iran, and was executed after being arrested by the security forces of Iran.

But after the fall of the first government of the Taliban in 2001, Ghazi went to Pakistan to manage his group’s guerrilla attacks against the previous government along with the Afghan Taliban. According to the order of Mullah Omar, the founder of the Taliban, he returned to Zabul with hundreds of members of this group, and in 2016, he decided to unofficially pledge allegiance to IS in consultation with some Taliban leaders.

Jundallah joins IS to revenge against the Taliban

Apparently, this scenario was part of making a case for his removal, because Usman Ghazi was ambushed by Taliban commanders in the following weeks and was killed along with his wife and several children on the road to Zabul.

According to the findings, this action caused Osama Ghazi, his son, to go to Kandahar and Badakhshan with 150 other Jundallah members from Zabul, where his father was present, and then leave there. But he was waiting to take revenge from the Taliban until he joined IS with all the members of his group after the Taliban regained control.

Meanwhile, Daesh has used the members of Jundallah to expand its activities to Central Asia. For example, a member of this group, who was active in Faryab under the command of Salahuddin Ayubi, launched a rocket attack on Uzbekistan.

On the other hand, IS in Khorasan has increased its efforts to get allegiance from Salahuddin Ayubi, the commander of Uzbek origin and disaffected Taliban. He has a close relationship with the fighters from the north and seems to be able to connect IS with some other armed groups in Tajikistan and other parts of the northern part of the country.

Also, according to its plans to expand its activities to Central Asia, IS is seeking more contact with Uzbek fighters. This effort somehow highlights the connection of this group with some commanders and fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

This is despite the fact that Daesh has previously assigned a team responsible to monitor Tajikistan and get support from there. It should be remembered that this group, in addition to Khorasan, also pays serious attention to the Indian subcontinent.

IS has a wider plan not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan

According to the reports, the IS leadership has ordered its members in the Indian subcontinent to intensify their activities in India and Pakistan in mid-2022. Abul Hasan al-Hashemi Qureshi, the then leader of IS in Iraq, asked Sheikh Zubair Ahmad, the governor of IS in India, for positive changes in that geography.

Following the same order, Sheikh Zubair Ahmed had decided to accelerate its propaganda staff and used Telegram as a social tool to spread its propaganda activities.

IS declared a caliphate in 2014, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was considered the first leader of the group. It should be mentioned that this group has extensive activities in Afghanistan in addition to Iraq and some other Arabic countries.

These terrorist activities have been deepened after the return of the Taliban to power and have included attacks on diplomatic places and rocket attacks on Central Asian countries.

Considering the recent changes of IS and the joining of foreign fighters in the rank of Khorasan, it seems that this group has plans to exert more influence in Khorasan Province. Previously, the information showed that IS-K is also seeking to capture Kunar province, a case that has been delayed after the evaluation of the Council of Lajneh.

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China outpaces India in race for Russian crude oil supplies

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China has accelerated its crude oil purchases from Russia to replace oil shipments originating from the Middle East.

According to a Reuters report based on data from energy analytics firm Kpler, China is outpacing India in the Russian oil market.

India’s crude imports from Russia’s European ports fell by approximately 30% in August.

Beijing’s increased purchases could curb India’s exports of refined petroleum products and consequently trigger a diesel and gasoline shortage across Asia.

While China previously favoured ESPO blend crude shipped from Russia’s Asian ports, the share of its purchases from Russia’s European ports, consisting primarily of the Urals grade, has climbed to 31%.

Russian crude imports by India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, dropped to 1.87 million barrels per day in August. This volume remained well below the 2.79 million barrels per day recorded in July.

Under this scenario, which poses a risk to the Asian region, India stands as the region’s largest exporter of diesel and gasoline.

However, the country’s total crude imports in August were recorded at 4.17 million barrels per day. This figure marked the lowest level since the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East.

If the tightening raw material supply prevents Indian refineries from maintaining processing throughput, a severe deficit in refined products could emerge across the Asian market starting in September.

The Times of India previously reported that India’s Russian crude imports reached their highest share since 2022 in July.

During that period, Russia supplied more than half of India’s total crude imports of just over 5 million barrels per day, delivering 2.8 million barrels per day.

At the end of July, the Russian government extended its temporary export ban on gasoline, diesel, and other fuel types until 31 January 2027.

Under the restrictions that took effect on 1 August, direct exports of diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils by refiners will be exempted starting 1 September.

Bloomberg reported in June that Russian Urals crude was being sold in India at a $3.90 discount per barrel against international benchmarks after a hiatus of more than two months.

Urals crude traded at a discount again on 29 May for the first time since mid-March.

According to The Times of India, however, this discount on Russian Urals crude had almost entirely evaporated by early August.

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Japan sharpens defense posture while strengthening Turkish ties

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In an extensive interview on the Harici YouTube channel hosted by journalist Elif Ilhamoglu, Asia-Pacific research specialist and journalist Mehmet Asil Gonultas provided a comprehensive analysis of East Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.

Focusing on the newly released 2026 Japanese Defence White Paper, Tokyo’s military posture, foreign policy recalibrations under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and expanding bilateral ties with Turkiye, Gonultas detailed how systemic anxieties regarding China, Russia, and North Korea are reshaping the region.

“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats”

Addressing the release of Japan’s updated national security strategy document, Gonultas noted that the nearly 600-page publication represents the longest and most assertive security outline produced by Tokyo to date. He underscored that the tone toward regional competitors has hardened markedly compared to previous editions.

“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats in this year’s document,” Gonultas said. “Regarding Russia, the text explicitly characterizes its military presence on the contested Kuril Islands as an occupation, particularly following the recent visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to one of the islands. North Korea is evaluated through the operational lens of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Pyongyang is actively refining its military capabilities, deploying personnel, utilizing drones, and gaining battle-tested experience in an active combat zone.”

Gonultas explained that the characterization of Beijing as a deteriorating security risk reflects a trajectory that has intensified steadily over recent years. “While China has been identified as a primary security concern since at least 2022, the rhetorical severity increases with every iteration. This year’s assessment is the heaviest yet, directly mirroring the firm posture of the state,” he stated.

Contrasting the current administration with former leadership, Gonultas remarked, “Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated a relatively moderate approach, maintaining that Japan and China must find ways to coexist peacefully given their geographic reality. However, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted an uncompromising stance toward Beijing even prior to assuming office.”

He noted that Beijing’s actions have reinforced Tokyo’s apprehensions: “Beijing continuously provides justification for this stance. During recent missile testings, Beijing claimed to have informed Japan in advance, but Tokyo clarified that notice was provided merely 30 minutes prior to launch, emphasizing that no formal permission was granted. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels regularly test boundaries in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese warship recently targeted a Japanese fighter jet with a guidance laser. The white paper explicitly argues that China’s actual military expenditures significantly exceed its publicly declared defense budget.”

Following the publication of the document, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense swiftly issued formal condemnations, accusing Tokyo of fanning regional tensions and reverting to historic militarism. “China reacted directly by asserting that this document reflects rising Japanese militarism,” Gonultas said. “In response, Tokyo points to China’s rapid rearmament, its inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking Japanese territory, its maritime incursions, and its anti-aircraft capabilities targeting Japanese military aviation.”

“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons”

Turning to the structural and military capabilities outlined in the white paper, Gonultas clarified that Tokyo is prioritizing high-technology defense systems and diplomatic-economic integration rather than unconventional deterrence.

“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Gonultas emphasized, addressing recent media speculation surrounding defense policy debates. “While domestic discussions on nuclear deterrence surfaced during the era of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, implementing such a policy remains politically impossible. Regardless of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority, strong internal factions vehemently oppose the concept. When Abe tentatively raised the question of nuclear deterrence after leaving office, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately rejected the notion. Kishida, who remains an influential parliamentary figure, reaffirmed only recently that Japan must unconditionally oppose nuclear armament.”

Clarifying recent remarks made by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi regarding the public taboo surrounding nuclear debates, Gonultas observed, “The prohibition against discussing nuclear weapons is not a formal statutory ban, but rather a deeply ingrained societal consensus. The public remains firmly opposed to even raising the topic. Defense Minister Koizumi, whose personal popularity has risen significantly among right-wing factions since taking office, uses this rhetoric largely as a political signaling strategy to consolidate his base as he positions himself for a future prime ministerial run.”

Gonultas outlined Tokyo’s actual defense investments, highlighting unmanned systems and domestic defense manufacturing. “Japan’s primary technological focus centers on advanced drone infrastructure,” he stated. “Furthermore, Japan has revised its historical restrictions on arms exports. While the constitution was previously interpreted to ban the export of lethal weaponry—limiting sales strictly to search-and-rescue or non-lethal equipment—legislative shifts now permit defensive exports, provided they are directed toward allied nations that are not actively engaged in armed conflict.”

“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China”

Evaluating Tokyo’s strategic dependence on Washington, Gonultas emphasized that Japan’s defense planners view the US alliance as indispensable for national survival.

“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China’s sheer scale,” Gonultas stated. “This fundamental reality forces Japanese policymakers to maintain flawless relations with Washington at all costs. Recently, when a US serviceman was implicated in an assault incident on Okinawa Island, Defense Minister Koizumi explicitly declined to criticize the US military, drawing sharp domestic backlash. Yet, this reflects Tokyo’s overriding priority: retaining the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.”

“Both the Japanese government and the general public harbour deep anxieties regarding Chinese intentions, particularly concerning a potential military move against Taiwan,” Gonultas continued. “Should China blockade or seize Taiwan, Japan’s vital maritime trade routes would be compromised at Beijing’s discretion. Aside from the United States, no regional power possesses the capacity to offer meaningful deterrence.”

Gonultas added that this strategic anxiety has intensified under the current US administration. “Japanese planners are operating under immense pressure to keep US President Donald Trump fully committed to regional security, even as Washington signals potential adjustments to its military posture, including reductions in joint exercises with South Korea,” he noted. “To build a broader network of deterrence, Tokyo is actively cultivating overlapping bilateral and trilateral security partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, India, and South Korea, aiming to anchor US power within the region.”

“Constitutional limits restrict Japanese forces to purely defensive operations”

Addressing whether growing regional friction could lead to direct military confrontations, Gonultas pointed to the legal constraints governing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

“The likelihood of Japan initiating or engaging in direct offensive conflict remains minimal,” Gonultas stated. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution explicitly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of offensive war potential. All military assets held by Japan are structured strictly for self-defense, meaning operational force can only be applied after Japanese territory sustains an explicit attack.”

“When Prime Minister Takaichi previously stated that Japan would protect Taiwan in the event of an invasion, any operational support would realistically be limited to logistics, non-combatant evacuation operations, and naval resupply missions for US forces, rather than direct front-line engagement,” Gonultas explained. “Although Takaichi favors constitutional revision, the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly pacifist and deeply attached to Article 9, driven by demographic aging, historical memory, and a profound fear of military escalation.”

“Turkiye is viewed as a reliable and capable defense partner”

Highlighting expanding diplomatic and industrial engagement between Ankara and Tokyo, Gonultas noted that defense procurement and technological cooperation have gained significant momentum.

“Following high-level diplomatic engagements, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tokyo and subsequent defense agreements signed at the SAHA EXPO defense exhibition, bilateral security cooperation has entered a concrete phase,” Gonultas said. “Japan is actively seeking to acquire drone technology. Importantly, Tokyo does not merely wish to purchase off-the-shelf equipment; it seeks technology transfers and co-production frameworks to understand manufacturing methodologies. Ankara has demonstrated a positive reception to these discussions.”

“Turkiye is viewed in Tokyo as a reliable, highly capable defense actor and a non-aggressive diplomatic mediator,” Gonultas added. “With negative public perception toward Israel reaching 80% in Japan, Tokyo has deliberately diversified its defense partnerships away from Tel Aviv, placing increased value on its historical alliance with Turkiye.”

Gonultas further observed that diplomatic coordination extends into Central Asia. “Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Eri Arfia, who is of Uyghur origin and fluent in Turkish, visited Istanbul and met with representatives of the Organization of Turkic States, expressing Japan’s interest in securing observer status,” Gonultas explained. “Tokyo views Turkiye as a vital bridge to Middle Eastern energy stability and Central Asian critical mineral supply chains.”

“Takaichi’s public approval ratings have dropped toward 50%”

Analysing domestic political dynamics, Gonultas reported that Prime Minister Takaichi faces mounting economic pressures that threaten her initial political momentum.

“While Prime Minister Takaichi entered office with approval ratings approaching 70%, recent surveys show public support dropping toward 50%, with some independent polls placing approval near 40%,” Gonultas stated. “The primary driver behind this decline is economic dissatisfaction. Despite state interventions to stabilize the yen around 170 per US dollar following energy price surges caused by the Iran conflict, living costs remain elevated.”

“Voters supported Takaichi expecting structural economic revitalization, but the administration has heavily prioritized ideological and administrative initiatives—such as designating Osaka as a secondary capital alongside its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, enacting national flag protection laws, and tightening permanent residency requirements for foreign workers,” Gonultas explained. “Although the government plans to cut consumption taxes on food items from 8% to 1%, prominent figures within her own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Prime Minister Ishiba and veteran leader Taro Aso, have publicly questioned the fiscal viability of these plans.”

Concurrently, economic authorities face severe macroeconomic challenges following joint currency interventions by the US and Japan. “While joint interventions successfully halted the chaotic depreciation of the yen beyond the 170 threshold, Japanese government bond yields recently hit 30-year highs of approximately 3%,” Gonultas noted. “To offset inflationary pressures on households, the government has facilitated a 5% average wage increase—the highest in recent decades—while coordinating with Washington to maintain exchange rate stability.”

Concluding his evaluation of Tokyo’s regional policy, Gonultas noted that despite broader regional instability, Japan continues to maintain active diplomatic communication with Tehran to safeguard energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. “Tokyo maintains functional diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its neutral diplomatic standing to support regional maritime stability and energy security,” Gonultas concluded.

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Pakistan top court orders Imran Khan moved from prison to hospital

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The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that former Prime Minister Imran Khan must be transferred from prison to a hospital.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) announced on Tuesday that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered the transfer of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from prison to a hospital. The ruling meets a long-standing demand from his party and family, who have voiced concerns over his health.

The 73-year-old cricketer-turned-politician has been imprisoned since August 2023, following convictions in a series of cases that he maintains were politically motivated after his removal from office in 2022.

His sons had repeatedly raised concerns over the past year regarding his deteriorating health, while his lawyers stated that he had suffered significant vision loss in his right eye during his time in detention.

PTI spokesman Zulfikar Bukhari said: “This is a welcome decision. We wish this had happened earlier so that his eye and overall health would not have deteriorated this much.”

Bukhari added: “He should remain in the hospital until all doctors are satisfied.”

Khan’s spokesman Naeem Haider Panjutha stated on X that the court had directed Khan to be moved to Shifa International Hospital within 48 hours and to remain there until 16 September.

Since being ousted from power in a no-confidence vote, Khan has faced numerous legal proceedings, including cases involving state gifts and unlawful marriage. While some convictions have been suspended or overturned, appeals against others remain pending. Khan denies the charges against him.

In February, leading figures from the global cricket community, including prominent names from across the border in India, expressed “deep concerns” over Khan’s prison conditions and demanded improved treatment for him.

PTI came to power in 2018 and retains a broad support base across key provinces. However, the party was stripped of its electoral symbol ahead of the 2024 elections, forcing its candidates to contest the polls as independents.

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