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48-Hour Exclusive Exploration of the Stronghold of the US-Israel Enemy ‘Houthi Forces’

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On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.

March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.

At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.

For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.

Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.

Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.

No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.

After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.

Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.

Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.

During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.

Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.

Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.

Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.

After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.

On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.

What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.

After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.

That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.

Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”

Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.

Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.

Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.

Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.

The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.

Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.

What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.

My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.

In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.

In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.

After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.

On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.

By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.

On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.

While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.

On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.

This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.

Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The Houthi War: The “Sixth Middle East War” and the Palestinian Narrative

Opinion

Central Asia strategy heats up: The EU seeks leadership, China advocates win-win cooperation

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Ma Jinting, Research Assistant Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University

The first EU-Central Asia Summit was held on April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The summit was organized under the “5+1” pattern, a dialogue mechanism between the EU and the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

The summit is a milestone of EU-Central Asia relations, further deepening the cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian countries and marking a deeper strategic partnership. The themes of the summit focused on economic cooperation and investment, geopolitical and security cooperation, climate change and regional energy cooperation, cooperation for sustainable development, as well as humanistic exchanges and medical cooperation. It was also the first time that Central Asian leaders met with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council.

Undoubtedly, both the scale and the outcome of the summit show the importance that the EU attaches to Central Asia and the determination of Central Asia to cooperate with the EU. On the one hand, the EU proposed to invest in the “Global Gateway” program, and on the other hand, Central Asia stood by the EU on hot issues. Although the substantive progress after the summit is not yet known, it can be seen that the EU is trying to realize a more sustainable layout of Central Asia through institutionalized cooperation, so as to enhance the influence of the EU in the complex international situation.

The Samarkand Declaration: a new stage in EU-Central Asia relations

Under the profound changes in the landscape of globalization and multipolarity, the deepening of cooperative relations between the EU and Central Asia is an inevitable trend. In Costa official statement to the EU Council before the summit, he said that we are living in a world of disorder and division, a viable solution for the EU is to build a strong partnership, thus promoting the prosperity and development for EU.

At present, Under the background of unilateralism, geopolitical conflicts, the international cooperation mechanism of multilateralism is increasingly important. Multilateralism emphasizes the solution of transnational problems through institutionalized international cooperation, dialogue mechanisms and rule systems, thus enhancing the EU’s influence on international issues. Therefore, the EU has taken the lead in building an institutionalized and open platform through the “5+1” conference pattern. From the perspective of the Central Asian countries, based on the concept of multilateralism,the active participation of Central Asian countries in the dialogue platform can enhance the strategic autonomy of them and maximize their national interests without relying on the big powers.

Before the summit, a relatively stable framework for the EU’s Central Asian policy had already been formed. In the political and diplomatic fields, the EU and Central Asian countries discuss cross-border governance issues such as security and counter-terrorism through the Senior Officials Dialogue mechanism. In the economic and trade field, the EU focuses on energy issues and achieve long-term economic cooperation through reciprocity. For example, the EU is Kazakhstan’s main economic and trade partner, with EU investments accounting for more than 40 percent of the state’s foreign investment by 2024. In return, Kazakhstan imports a wide range of industrial and consumer goods from the EU. In the field of people to people exchanges, the EU provides assistance to Central Asian countries in education, health, law and democracy building through the Global Gateway program. At the same time, the EU opens numbers of opportunities at universities and promotes knowledge sharing between academic institutions.

On the basis of the previous cooperation, both EU and Central Asia countries issued a joint declaration, the joint declaration following the first European Union-Central Asia summit (also called “the Samarkand Declaration”) at the summit. The Samarkand Declaration includes six main elements: first, defining the strategic partnership between the EU and Central Asia; second, advancing “the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (EPCAs); third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various areas. Third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various fields, in which the EU has said it will invest 12 billion euros; fourth, supporting the construction of intermediate corridors; fifth, strengthening security cooperation in counter-terrorism and border security; sixth, jointly addressing international issues such as climate change and water resource governance. In short, the summit upgraded the political and economic aspects of the relationship on the basis of the original cooperation mechanisms, marking an upgrade of the EU’s strategic orientation towards Central Asia. The Samarkand Declaration demonstrates the willingness of the EU and Central Asia to deepen cooperation in the face of increasing global uncertainty, and highlights the EU’s attempts to build an institutionalized system of cooperation in Central Asia.

Central Asia in great power competition: The EU’s logic and challenges of engagement

The consideration of EU on Central Asia has three main points. First, Central Asia is located in the hinterland of the Asian and European continents, and is the land transportation hub of Asia and Europe, so Central Asia is also regarded as a “strategic landmark” by the big powers. Traditionally, Central Asia has been in Russia’s sphere of influence for a long time, and Russia has maintained its influence in Central Asia through alliances. For example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a military alliance led by Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which focuses on economic development. Since the Ukrainian crisis, the EU has accelerated its strategic layout in Central Asia with the intention of weakening Russia’s influence in Central Asia. The United States, on the other hand, treats Central Asia as a fulcrum for maintaining regional stability, countering terrorism, and containing major powers. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. has begun to emphasize the role of Central Asia as a “transition region.” Meanwhile, the “Global Gateway” program intends to counterbalance China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in order to curb China’s influence in Central Asia. The “Global Gateway” program provides alternatives in the areas of infrastructure and digital connectivity to build the EU’s “Asia-Europe Corridor”.

Secondly, abundant energy resources make Central Asia highly dependent in the international community. Central Asia is one of the world’s regions rich in oil, natural gas, and rare metal resources. In particular, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have strong energy export capacity, which makes them extremely attractive to external powers. The EU-Central Asia Summit will further plan the construction of an “intermediate corridor” to enhance the complementarity of the two sides in the fields of energy and transportation.

Finally, Central Asia has a large population and a broad market. Although there is frequent trade between Europe and Central Asia, it is mainly concentrated in the natural resources. China and Russia, as important trading partners of Central Asia, have long dominated the foreign trade structure of Central Asian countries. The EU hopes to expand its share of the Central Asian market with the help of an institutionalized platform. However, the strategic autonomy of Central Asian countries has been strengthened in recent years, and it is still unknown whether the EU’s vision can be realized.

In conclusion, the EU wants to further expand its influence and appeal in Central Asia through this summit, but may have a huge gap when it comes to official policies and the real truth on the ground. In the perspective political-security, Central Asia already has a relatively deep security bundle through the construction of a military defense system with Russia. At the same time, Central Asia have close contacts with Turkey and NATO. In the perspective political and security, the influence of EU is limited. EU can only through the participation of international hotspot issues in the way to draw Central Asian countries. In perspective of the economic and trade , the EU has a certain degree of influence in Central Asia, but in the overall economic exchanges still fall behind China. For example, according to a report released by the Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan, China is Kazakhstan’s top trading partner as of 2024. In perspective the area of international, the EU emphasizes values such as the rule of law and sustainable development, but the acceptance of the values varies due to the different differences among the Central Asian countries. As a result, the EU’s overall influence in Central Asia is limited, and it is not an “external leader” in Central Asian affairs, but rather permeates its influence through specific international issues.

China: Seeking cooperation rather than confrontation

China has consistently maintained a pluralistic and open mind to multilateral relations. China Upholding the principles of multilateralism, adhering to the norms of international relations , abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

China has been actively engaged in maintaining multilateral diplomatic relations by concrete actions in the context of the Global Initiative for Development, Security and Civilization. Respecting the state of development and the diversity of civilizations in each region, China hopes to work with Central Asia, the EU and other actors to promote peace, stability and development in the international community.

From China’s perspective, China has never regarded the EU as a strategic competitor and looks forward to cooperation on international issues. In Central Asia, the foreign policy of some small and medium-sized countries follows the model of balanced diplomacy, which allows them to seek space for development. Central Asia’s active cooperation with the EU can not only ease its overdependence on big powers, but also promote the stable development of the region.

In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an open and inclusive development platform, and China is willing to explore cooperation paths with other actors, to jointly promote the sustainable development for international society. As Liu Jianchao, Minister of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, said in his speech at the Young Experts’ Club of the Upper House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, “Central Asia is located in the center of Asia and Europe, with a special and important geographic position, and broad prospects for development. China and Central Asian countries have promoted the building of a China-Central Asia community of destiny, shaping a model of regional cooperation on the world map of seeking common development, sharing peace and moving forward together.”

In recent years, based on the special geopolitical environment, the internal cooperation of Central Asian countries has significantly increased. Starting in 2018, the leaders of the five Central Asian countries have been strengthening regional identity and cooperation mechanisms by holding summit. The pattern of organizing the EU-Central Asia Summit is also a multilateral cooperation based on regional consensus. The Central Asian countries are not only in frequent contact with the EU, but also actively participate in international affairs by participating in the “Central Asia-China” and “Central Asia-US” C5+1 dialogues.Those willingness have shown their ability to take action in international affairs.

Energy development and regional stability in Central Asia have become the critical issues. How to deal with the relationship between national development and the major powers, and maintain a balance between taking sides on hotspot issues and strategic autonomy, are issues that the Central Asian countries need to address.

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Trump’s ‘harvest tour’ of the Middle East ends fully loaded

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On May 16, Middle East time, U.S. President Trump concluded a four-day official visit to three Arab countries in the Middle East. This marked Trump’s first state visit since reentering the White House, continuing his tradition of valuing the Middle East’s commercial and geopolitical significance. Although Trump unexpectedly “skipped” Israel, America’s top regional ally, this three-country trip — expected to be a “harvest tour” — proved fruitful. Whether it was selling arms, attracting investment, declaring policies, or “harvesting” enemies or strategic opponents, he achieved dazzling results. Judging solely by Trump’s success in massively “attracting funds,” the U.S. not only reinforced its military hegemony, but also showcased its outstanding geopolitical leverage and financial siphoning capabilities, making it hard for other powers or economies to keep up in the short term. In short, the United States remains the only extraterritorial power with strong shaping influence in the Middle East.

Starting May 13, Trump’s Middle East tour began in Saudi Arabia and ended with Qatar and the UAE. The entire process highlighted his “power diplomacy” and “transactional diplomacy.” These three countries are among the wealthiest in the Arab world and heavily rely on the U.S. for national security. It was widely expected that Trump would “suck in” massive amounts of money during the trip — yet the outcome still surprised many.

To ensure that wealthy but weak Gulf monarchies like Saudi Arabia continue their “ransom” policy — paying large sums to the U.S. for safety and status — Trump high-profiled his return to the White House by declaring he would dedicate his first foreign visit’s “first night” to Riyadh. Moreover, Trump invited Saudi Arabia to host the first high-level U.S.-Russia talks, giving full prestige to the host. He even suggested renaming the “Persian Gulf” to the “Arabian Gulf,” showing thorough preparation and calculated gestures.

Eight years ago, Trump’s first visit to the Gulf reaped over $115 billion in arms sales from Saudi Arabia, secured a ten-year $400 billion Saudi investment promise, and finalized a $40 billion arms deal with Qatar. On this return trip, Trump dropped his previous arrogant posture of mocking Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman at the White House. Instead, at the “Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum 2025” on May 13, he humbled himself, lavished praise, even flattery, repeatedly lauding the young host’s “greatness” and “wisdom,” which earned smiles, warm applause, and standing ovations from the de facto ruler.

U.S.-Saudi relations have entered a new honeymoon phase, arguably the highest point since the turn of the century. The key lies in benefit exchanges and petrodollar deals. On the day Trump arrived in Riyadh, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion arms deal, involving five categories of defense equipment and services from over ten American defense firms. Saudi Arabia also pledged to invest $600 billion in the U.S. to strengthen bilateral strategic ties, promote economic prosperity, and jointly aim to raise the investment total to $1 trillion in the coming months. This marked the largest arms and investment deal ever between the two nations. Saudi investments will bolster America’s energy security, defense industry, technological leadership, and access to global infrastructure and critical minerals.

Trump is very familiar with the subtle relations among the wealthy Arab neighbors — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are both rising powers in the Arab League and compete economically and politically. Qatar, previously suppressed and isolated by the duo, has remained resilient thanks to its wealth and U.S. favor — earning a reputation as the “invincible Gulf mini-power.” Trump’s deliberate inclusion of all three countries aimed to leverage Saudi Arabia to draw in Qatar and the UAE, realizing his grand goal of a “trillion-dollar harvest tour.”

Just before Trump’s visit, Qatar’s royal family bypassed U.S. legal restrictions and donated a luxurious $400 million Boeing 747-8 aircraft via the Pentagon to Trump, replacing the over 40-year-old Air Force One. During his visit to Doha on May 14, Trump flattered Emir Tamim of Qatar, describing U.S.-Qatar relations as a “loyal friendship” and saying the two sides “liked each other.” The same day, the U.S. and Qatar signed over $243.5 billion in economic cooperation agreements. This included Qatar’s purchase of 210 Boeing aircraft worth $96 billion — the largest order in Boeing’s history. Qatar also agreed to buy $3 billion worth of MQ-9B drones and anti-drone systems.

In 2017, during Trump’s first visit to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, he first supported Saudi claims that Qatar was “funding terrorism,” and soon after helped Qatar to “clear its name.” This opportunistic approach — hitting then comforting — allowed Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. air base in the Gulf, to gain strong protection by frantically purchasing U.S. arms, ultimately escaping the intense pressure and “siege” from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

With the massive “gift packages” from Saudi Arabia and Qatar as a foundation, on the 15th, Trump’s final stop was the UAE, where he facilitated the signing of cooperation agreements exceeding $200 billion. This also included a joint venture to build a data center covering 260,000 square meters with a 5GW capacity — enough to power 2.5 million Nvidia B2000 chips. In fact, as early as March this year, during a U.S. visit by UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh bin Zayed, it was already promised that the UAE would establish a 10-year investment framework worth $1.4 trillion in the United States. This means the UAE proactively and early presented its lavish “gifts” to the White House even before Trump’s Gulf tour had begun.

Trump’s Gulf tour was also a policy announcement tour. During a one-hour impromptu speech at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, Trump theatrically condemned previous U.S. administrations for interfering in the Middle East, claiming they “destroyed more countries than they built” and emphasized that the U.S. has “no permanent enemies.” He candidly stated, “some of America’s closest friends today were once countries we fought against.” Using Saudi Arabia’s development model as an example, he emphasized that “self-reliance” is more effective than “external interference.” Analysts believe that the profit-driven Trump has openly abandoned traditional U.S. value-laden interventionist diplomacy and gunboat policies, aiming instead to reshape the Middle East order through a new “mercantilist” approach.

What surprised global opinion even more was that Trump “left out” his staunch ally Israel on this trip, in order to prevent Israel’s petty calculations from interfering with broader U.S. interests, and to avoid deeper entanglement in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Gaza war quagmire. Previously, Trump had faced backlash from Arab media for his excessive favoritism toward Israel. However, given the unshakable U.S.-Israel alliance and Trump’s close personal ties with Netanyahu, Israel seemed absent from the official visit list, but Trump instinctively did not forget his old friend. He urged Saudi Arabia to quickly join the Abraham Accords to normalize ties with Israel, pushed for Syrian-Israeli reconciliation, and continued to peddle the controversial U.S. argument that Gaza could be taken over.

What truly shocked the world was Trump’s sudden public meeting with Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, urging him to normalize relations with Israel, expel “Palestinian terrorists” from Syria, and take responsibility for establishing prisons in northeastern Syria to detain jihadists. This meeting — attended in person by the Saudi Crown Prince and via video by Türkiye’s President — marked the first U.S.-Syria summit in 25 years. Furthermore, at the urging of the Saudi and Turkish leaders, Trump announced the lifting of decades-long U.S. economic and trade sanctions on Syria, officially ending 46 years of international, especially unilateral American, sanctions.

Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa can be seen as a classic example of “value-free diplomacy” and “turning enemies into friends,” as he completely disregarded Sharaa’s past as a long-wanted “terrorist” leader by the U.S., and ignored the fact that Syria’s new government is still led by the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” group, which remains listed as a terrorist organization by both the U.N. and the U.S. Trump even publicly praised this former “enemy” to American media while boarding his plane out of Saudi Arabia, calling him a “brave warrior of the past” and now a “sunny, handsome tough guy.” On the 16th, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio met with Syrian Foreign Minister Shibani in Antalya, Türkiye, clearly stating that the U.S. would help build a peaceful, stable, and Iran-free Syria.

In fact, observers familiar with Trump’s foreign policy were not surprised. As early as March 2020, during the later part of his first term, Trump abruptly abandoned the U.S.-backed Kabul government of 20 years to quickly end the Afghanistan war. He signed a withdrawal-for-ceasefire agreement with the Taliban — America’s arch-enemy — showing complete disregard for national dignity and political principles. This led to a “two-government” state in Afghanistan and soon after, Taliban regained power. Trump even shamelessly invited Taliban leaders to the White House and fired National Security Advisor Bolton on the spot for opposing the plan.

Another major outcome of Trump’s current Middle East diplomacy was that, using a “carrot and stick” approach, he forced significant concessions from the three main powers of the “Axis of Resistance”: Yemen’s Houthi forces, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and Iran. Just before Trump’s visit, with Amman mediating, the U.S. and the Houthis reached a ceasefire agreement, under which the Houthis pledged not to attack ships passing through the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Hamas announced the release of the last American hostage as a gift for Trump’s arrival — a gesture that also served as a response to Trump’s administration for not fully following Israel’s lead. On May 15, senior Hamas official Basem Naim told the media that Hamas was in direct negotiations with the United States to reach a ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza conflict… If a permanent ceasefire is achieved, Hamas could hand over control of the Gaza Strip.

Before Trump’s visit, American representatives had already held four rounds of talks with Iran in Oman’s capital Muscat. Both sides described the discussions as having made “constructive” progress. While in Riyadh, Trump once again publicly addressed Tehran, urging its leaders to choose a “new, better path” and reach a new nuclear agreement with Washington. He warned that this opportunity for a diplomatic solution “will not last forever,” and threatened, “If Iran’s leadership rejects this olive branch… we will have no choice but to apply maximum pressure and reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.”

Perhaps due to the earlier four rounds of talks revealing Trump’s intentions and bottom line, or the painful memory of the extreme pressure campaign from his first term, or the strategic failure of the “Sixth Middle East War,” or Russia’s public statement that it would not intervene in a U.S.-Iran military conflict, or observing Trump’s recent positive interactions with the Houthis and Hamas — a series of intense changes led Iran’s government to swiftly and clearly respond to Trump’s mixed diplomatic tactics.

On May 14, Ali Shamkhani, advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated to NBC that Iran was willing to reach a deal with the U.S. in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Shamkhani said Iran would promise never to develop nuclear weapons, destroy its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, agree to limit uranium enrichment to levels needed for civilian use, and allow international monitors to supervise the process.

Observers believe this was Iran’s fastest and most flexible compromise stance on the nuclear issue to date. Although Iranian negotiators previously held tough positions, Trump’s successful “harvest tour” in the Gulf, the further strengthening of U.S.-Arab ties, the historic reversal in U.S.-Syria relations, and the disunity among the “Axis of Resistance” members forced Tehran to quickly adjust its diplomatic posture and nuclear stance to avoid deeper isolation and passivity. On May 15, before leaving Doha for the UAE, Trump made it clear that the U.S. and Iran were very close to reaching a nuclear agreement and that Tehran had “to a certain extent” agreed to the terms.

In short, Trump gained substantial results from this Middle East trip. Unexpected developments revealed that his power-based and “transactional” diplomacy is reshaping regional geopolitics. Despite domestic and international challenges, America’s strategic foundation remains stable and strong. The major Gulf oil-producing states, which already invested much of their sovereign wealth in the U.S. market, continue to bet their future wealth preservation, growth, and high-tech development on the United States as their strategic ally. In contrast, their investments in other major economies are negligible — mere “pepper dust” and “drizzle” — highlighting the irreplaceable status of the U.S. as the only current superpower.

At the same time, with the steady collapse of the “Shiite Crescent,” the disintegration of the “Axis of Resistance,” the strengthening of U.S. relations with Arab countries and Türkiye, the expanding normalization under the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel, and the possible significant shift in U.S.-Iran relations this year, it is evident that a new Middle East is brewing and beginning to emerge.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Russia–Ukraine failed peace talks: The war must go on

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Nikola Mikovic, journalist

The mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse. The long-awaited peace talks between Russia and Ukraine were finally held on May 16 in Istanbul, though they failed to produce a ceasefire or a peace agreement. The question now is: what comes next?

Initially, Russian and Ukrainian representatives were scheduled to meet in the largest Turkish city on May 15. Since the Ukrainian delegation did not appear, the peace talks were postponed to the following day. Such a move could be interpreted as a diplomatic humiliation for Moscow, given that the Russian officials waited the entire day in vain for their Ukrainian counterparts. Kyiv seems to have adopted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy of being notoriously late for important diplomatic meetings. The problem for Ukraine, however, is that this approach did not yield any positive results.

According to reports, the Russian delegation has issued maximalist demands, expecting Kyiv to withdraw its troops from four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) annexed by the Kremlin in exchange for a ceasefire. Russia has also reportedly threatened to seize Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy regions. In reality, however, Moscow lacks the capacity to seize the town of Vovchansk in the Khariv region, located just 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the Russian border, let alone the entire oblast. Its rhetoric, therefore, seems like a bluff. Fully aware of this, Kyiv rejected any territorial concessions to Russia. 

Prior to the talks, Ukraine, firmly backed by European powers, insisted on an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, while Moscow wanted any potential truce to be result from the negotiations. In other words, the two sides could not even agree on the first steps, which was a clear indication that reaching a deal will be easier said than done. Still, they managed to agree on exchanging 1,000 prisoners of war each, which is the only positive outcome of the Istanbul peace talks. 

Although Russian and Ukrainian delegations are expected to continue negotiations, there is no guarantee that they will reach a peace (or at least a ceasefire) deal anytime soon. Their positions are fundamentally opposed. More importantly, neither side has achieved any of its strategic objectives on the battlefield, which effectively rules out any immediate opportunity for peace. But this is not the first time their peace talks have failed.

Days after Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian and Ukrainian representatives met in Belarus in an attempt to end Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, as Russian troops were on the outskirts of Kyiv. Ukrainian officials agreed to travel to the neighboring nation even though it is a close ally of Russia and had allowed Russian forces to use Belarusian territory for attacks on their country. Talks, however, concluded without any result.

Later rounds of talks took place in March 2022 on the Belarus–Ukraine border and in Antalya, Türkiye. Since then, Istanbul has become the major platform not only for their peace summits, but also for discussions on the grain deal – a document, signed in July 2022, under which the Kremlin effectively allows its opponent to freely exports grain via the Black Sea route. Although Türkiye undoubtedly played an important role in helping Moscow and Kyiv sign The Black Sea Grain Initiative, the 2022 peace talks in Istanbul failed to end the conflict.

The Istanbul talks in 2025 differ significantly from those held in 2022. At the time, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops only from the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, along with a de facto recognition of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. Now the Kremlin’s demands have grown, as Russia is also calling for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. More importantly, as a result of the 2022 Istanbul talks, Russia made a “goodwill gesture” by withdrawing its troops from Kyiv, as well as Sumy and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine. This time, however, the Kremlin has shown no willingness to make any serious concessions to Kyiv—at least for now.

Moscow has also demonstrated that negotiations can be conducted without Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that he does not want to negotiate with the “illegitimate” Zelensky. Therefore, any talks with Ukraine’s president would undermine Putin’s credibility, which is something he wanted to avoid at any cost. 

Zelensky, on the other hand, despite signing a decree in 2022 formally declaring negotiations with Putin to be “impossible,” openly said that he wants to meet with the Russian president. He likely aimed to demonstrate a willingness to end the conflict, while simultaneously portraying Putin as someone who “does not want to negotiate.”

The Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul even requested a meeting between the two leaders. Russia has “taken note” of Kyiv’s ambition. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Putin will agree to meet with Zelensky, at least not before his potential meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. 

In the meantime, the Ukraine war will go on. As Medinsky said, quoting Napoleon, “War and negotiations are always conducted at the same time.” Both sides will, therefore, be preparing for a summer military campaign, although they are expected to continue to create the illusion that reaching a lasting peace deal without defeating the opponent is possible.

Finally, until one of the two sides prevails, Türkiye, as a host country, will remain the winner of the peace talks. On May 8, during a telephone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump offered him to become a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. Three days later Putin, without mentioning Trump’s efforts,  acknowledged the role of Türkiye and its president in organizing the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.

Türkiye has, therefore, once again solidified its position as an influential player capable of hosting peace negotiations. That is why a new round of Russian-Ukrainian talks will almost certainly take place in Istanbul – sooner rather than later. 

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