Opinion
Reviewing the Halfway Progress of the Trump Administration’s Trade War
On July 31, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung confirmed that a trade agreement had been reached with the United States. U.S. tariffs on Korean automobiles will be reduced to 15%, and Korea will not further open its rice and beef markets to the U.S., but it has pledged to invest $350 billion in U.S.-controlled investment projects.
On the same day, the Trump administration agreed to extend the tariff agreement with Mexico for 90 days. Meanwhile, it threatened to impose a 25% tariff on India starting August 1 and announced it would not extend the final deadline for negotiations with other trade partners. Although the U.S. has not yet reached new agreements with major trading partners such as Mexico, Canada, India, and China, the trade war—considered epic in scale—can be said to be halfway through, with the Trump administration appearing to have won a superficial victory. However, there remain many uncertainties in the subsequent implementation.
Three rounds of the China-U.S. trade war have concluded without a final solution. On July 29, China and the U.S. concluded their third round of talks in Sweden. China’s Ministry of Commerce representative and Vice Minister Li Chenggang announced that, after a day and a half of negotiations, the trade teams from both countries had in-depth, candid, and constructive exchanges on major issues of mutual concern, based on the consensus reached during the June 5 call between the two heads of state. Li also emphasized that both sides would continue to promote the timely extension of the mutually suspended 24% tariffs and China’s countermeasures. The China-U.S. economic and trade teams will maintain close communication to promptly exchange views on trade issues and continue to promote stable and healthy development of bilateral trade relations.
On May 12, China and the U.S. held the first round of talks in Geneva and achieved a major initial result of “mutual tariff cancellation”: the U.S. promised to cancel 91% of the tariffs imposed under two executive orders on April 8 and 9; China reciprocated with a 91% cancellation; both sides agreed to suspend the 24% tariff for 90 days, retaining only 10% tariffs. This result provided a much-needed cooling down of the China-U.S. trade war that had flared up when Trump returned to office.
On June 12, the two sides completed the second round of talks in London, but no specific content was disclosed. The media only emphasized that the two sides had reached a consensus in principle on measures to implement the consensus of the leaders’ phone call and consolidate the results of the Geneva trade talks. The third round of talks held in Stockholm also did not yield any substantive breakthroughs, and both sides remain in a stage of bargaining and haggling.
While China-U.S. trade negotiations are moving forward with difficulty, the Trump administration has successfully broken through three major trade negotiation barriers within ten days, particularly reaching agreements with the EU and Japan, which can be considered symbolic victories. This has also created new pressure for China and other trading partners who have yet to compromise.
On July 28, the U.S. and the EU announced a comprehensive new trade agreement with a baseline tariff rate of 15%, covering key goods such as automobiles, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. The EU pledged to purchase $750 billion worth of energy products from the U.S. and added a $600 billion investment plan. This agreement marks a major compromise from the EU.
Previously, on July 23, the U.S. had reached a similar agreement with Japan, stipulating a uniform 15% tariff on most Japanese goods exported to the U.S., and Japan committed to a $550 billion investment in the U.S.
Although the U.S.-EU and U.S.-Japan tariff battles appear to involve mutual compromise, the U.S. has clearly benefited. For the EU, the 15% rate is significantly higher than the previous average of 4.8%, but lower than the punitive 30% the U.S. had threatened or the briefly implemented 20% rate. This “comprehensive uniform tariff” applies to most EU-manufactured goods, including automobiles that previously faced tariffs as high as 27.5%. For key sectors like pharmaceuticals, the U.S. also agreed to rates below 15% and retained the option for future interventions.
For Japan, although the 15% baseline tariff rate is slightly higher than the previously briefly implemented 10%, it is far lower than the 25% proposed by the U.S. before July. This tariff rate stabilizes Japan’s core automobile industry, which accounts for about one-fourth of its exports to the U.S., and has strategic significance for consolidating Japan’s manufacturing, especially the production and export of automobiles and auto parts.
The U.S. has obtained massive import or investment commitments from Europe and Japan. The EU has pledged to purchase over $750 billion in energy products from the U.S. in the coming years, mainly including liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear fuel. In addition, the EU has committed to an extra $600 billion investment in the U.S., covering infrastructure, energy system integration, and key industrial chain restructuring. Notably, the EU will also expand its military procurement from the U.S.
Japan has committed to a $550 billion investment plan in the U.S., covering sectors such as manufacturing, automotive supply chain expansion, infrastructure, and high-tech cooperation. In the automobile sector, Japan is accelerating localized production capacity in the U.S. to stabilize its strategic access to the American market.
The U.S. has further opened up the European and Japanese markets. Although the U.S.-EU agreement establishes a unified baseline tariff rate, several “zero-for-zero” exception lists were set, including aircraft and parts, semiconductor equipment, key raw materials, certain agricultural products, and specific chemicals.
Japan will also further open its market, especially for U.S. automobiles, rice, and certain agricultural products. This move responds to Trump’s longstanding complaint that “American products can’t enter the Japanese market.” Although Japan has not reduced tariffs on U.S. goods in this round of negotiations, by adjusting non-tariff barriers and loosening import quotas, it has in effect provided greater market access for U.S. goods. At the same time, Japan has retained regulatory authority over sensitive domestic industries, seeking policy flexibility within its concessions.
In 2024, the top ten U.S. trade partners by total trade volume are: Mexico, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (China), Vietnam, the United Kingdom, and India. Before securing Japan, the EU, and South Korea, the U.S. had already handled the UK, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Considering that EU members such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, Italy, and France are the 11th to 15th U.S. trade partners, the Trump administration’s trade war has already conquered half the battlefield. Only four tough “bones” remain: Mexico, Canada, India, and China.
Some therefore judge that “Trump has won big,” especially with his trade victories over the EU and Japan. However, legally speaking, the U.S.-EU trade agreement still needs approval from the legislative bodies of the 27 EU member states. So whether this agreement can allow the Trump administration to laugh to the end is still uncertain.
First, almost the entire political and public sphere in Europe is criticizing the new U.S.-EU agreement, especially in France and Germany. French Prime Minister Bérou called the 27th a “dark day” for Europe; far-right leader Le Pen said the EU had suffered a “political, economic, and moral defeat,” signing a “surrender document”; far-left leader Mélenchon called it a “total concession to Trump”; former PM de Villepin said the agreement was “unequal” and likened it to “tribute.” French officials in charge of industry and trade called the trade “unbalanced” and demanded a new round of negotiations. Germany’s Export Association said the deal poses a “survival threat” to many German traders; the Federation of German Industries criticized the EU for making “asymmetrical compromises.”
In addition, the Swedish finance minister accused the new U.S.-EU agreement of harming Sweden’s economy. Spain’s El País said the agreement reinforced U.S.-EU tariff inequality. Hungarian PM Orbán even mocked that Trump “ate EU Commission President von der Leyen for breakfast.” The European Parliament’s trade committee chair Bernd Lange slammed the deal as a “biased” transaction…
On the 28th, the European Commission issued a document stressing that the “handshake deal” between Trump and von der Leyen has no legal effect. The U.S. and EU have not finalized a formal agreement, especially around key points of divergence such as food standards, digital regulations, energy, investment, and steel and aluminum tariffs.
Although the opposition in Japan is not as fierce as in Europe, public opinion has still criticized the Ishiba government for sacrificing the rice bowl to protect the car wheel. Most benefits from the investment in the U.S. are seen to favor the American side. The latest poll by Kyodo News shows that about 78% of the public is dissatisfied with the agreement, with only 11% expressing support. Analysts believe the new U.S.-Japan agreement not only damages Ishiba’s political prestige and the LDP’s ruling foundation but also reminds Japanese society of the long nightmare triggered by the signing of the U.S.-Japan “Plaza Accord”—namely, Japan’s lost decade of growth.
Secondly, the implementation of U.S. terms may also be constrained by domestic political and legal challenges. The U.S. Federal Court of Appeals is about to hear a lawsuit concerning the legality of Trump’s taxation powers, and its ruling may shake the legal foundation of Trump’s foreign trade agreements. The U.S.-EU agreement fails to clarify the tariff treatment of American goods exported to Europe, showing that serious asymmetry still exists. The U.S.-Japan agreement has left the American auto industry dissatisfied, believing that it has not substantially improved the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, and the long-standing structural industrial contradictions between the U.S. and Japan remain unresolved.
Thirdly, although Europe and Japan have increased their investment in the U.S., reshoring of U.S. manufacturing faces structural bottlenecks. The Trump administration is vigorously promoting direct investment in the U.S. by Europe, Japan, and other allies—especially in key sectors like semiconductors, automobiles, batteries, and clean energy—to accelerate manufacturing reshoring and restructure the supply chain. However, in practical terms, this strategy faces structural bottlenecks in many aspects such as talent, culture, and regulatory systems, making it difficult to absorb the systemic costs of converting investments in the short term. The most fundamental constraint is the severe shortage of skilled labor in U.S. manufacturing. The gap in engineers and technicians directly limits the implementation of production lines. Cultural differences further intensify friction. The highly efficient execution systems of multinational companies are not suited to the loosely decentralized American management style, creating structural bottlenecks from construction to operation and weakening overall investment returns.
In summary, countries such as Canada, Mexico, and India will face increasing pressure from the U.S. and be forced to fight alone in confronting America’s all-around hegemonic coercion. The outlook for China-U.S. trade negotiations is also not optimistic and is bound to face difficulties arising from the U.S. shift from “comprehensive attack” to “focused attack,” including the Trump administration’s return to the full-pressure tactics of its version 1.0 era.
This week, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plans to issue a travel health advisory to China due to a rise in “chikungunya virus cases” in China. At the same time, the Republican-controlled U.S. House and Senate announced that a congressional delegation would visit Taiwan in August. This comes right after the Trump administration refused the Taiwan regional leader’s transit passage, a maneuver reflecting both duplicity and inconsistency in U.S. Taiwan policy. It also sends an implicit warning to China: if it doesn’t make concessions at the trade negotiating table, the U.S. will open its geopolitical “Pandora’s box” and unleash a full array of tactics to disrupt China.
From a global and strategic perspective, China-U.S. relations—especially trade relations—are “too big to fail” and serve as the core links of the global industrial, trade, and value chains. China-U.S. trade volume is enormous, with high interdependence, strong economic complementarity, and significant structural differences. With many friction points, deep policy gaps, and strong competitiveness, the China-U.S. trade negotiations are bound to become the biggest, most difficult, and ultimately decisive battleground.
China remains the largest source of goods for the U.S., the biggest market for multinational investment and profits, and the largest consumer market for agricultural products. China not only possesses a vast domestic circulation market, but also retains tremendous external circulation potential. It also has multiple leverage points in its games with the U.S., Europe, and Japan. As the Trump administration secures agreements with other trade partners, it is likely to gain confidence and raise its demands, even using trade negotiations and geopolitical tools alternately or simultaneously to pressure China into making major concessions.
Given these trends, China must maintain strategic clarity, confidence, composure, endurance, and resilience. It must engage with the Trump administration using great wisdom, flexible strategies, and a combination of tactics—negotiating persistently, fighting without breaking ties—in order to ultimately defeat the Trump administration’s blind self-confidence, empty rhetoric, and excessive demands, and force it to recognize reality and accept a relatively fair and balanced bilateral trade agreement, achieving a truly win-win China-U.S. outcome.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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