Opinion
Normalization with Syria is both easy and very difficult
It should be noted with concern that the talks between the deputy foreign ministers of Türkiye and Syria scheduled for March 15-16 in Moscow, which were supposed to pave the way for normalization between Ankara and Damascus, have been postponed. Based on the media reports, it is possible to conclude that the postponement was due to statements made by Syrian President Assad to the Russian press.
In this statement, Assad underlined two issues in particular. The first is Türkiye’s withdrawal from Syrian territory, which it controls, and the other is Ankara’s refusal to support groups seen as terrorists by the Damascus government. If we really want to normalize relations with Syria, we need to consider these demands.
GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY
First, it is very useful to make this analysis by putting ourselves in the position of the Syrian and Damascus governments and then focusing on what we want to achieve with normalization with this country. For example, how long do we want to stay in the territory we control in Syria? If we are not opposed to these territories coming under Syria’s full and effective sovereignty, and if it is only a question of timing or timetable, the problem can be overcome. For example, why is it not possible for the Syrian state to gradually appoint administrators to the lands we control and to integrate these lands into its administrative system within the framework of a certain calendar when an agreement is signed with the Damascus government in line with our expectations from Syria (return of asylum seekers and joint fight against terrorism)? More precisely, why not consider signing another agreement with the government in Damascus to cede these territories to Syria’s direct and effective sovereignty once we have reached a compromise with Syria on issues such as the return of asylum seekers and the updated implementation of the Adana Agreement?
Accordingly, once a common ground on the asylum seekers and the Adana Agreement is found, Türkiye would sign an agreement committing to cede these territories to Syria’s direct sovereignty, and a timetable could be set for how this would happen gradually. While Turkish security forces maintain a presence in those areas, Syria could appoint administrators, teachers, doctors, and other civil servants there, and the Damascus government could also consider sending teams to liaise with Turkish security forces. As a result, the process of integrating the public institutions and administration in these regions under the de facto control of Türkiye into the Syrian system and the registration of border crossings by Turkish and Syrian customs officials could be initiated. Trade between the two countries would be recorded and taxed. During such a transition, Turkish security forces would gradually leave the region, at which time the Adana Agreement, already updated, would come into effect and Türkiye’s most important security concern would be addressed. Syria, on the other hand, could reincorporate its territory into its sovereignty. It may be possible to develop a complete win/win strategy.
IF OUR GOAL IS NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM SYRIAN TERRITORY…
If our goal is not to withdraw from the territories we control, then the scenarios are different, and it is already impossible to return asylum seekers and to fight terrorism jointly with Syria on the basis of the Adana Agreement. If our aim is to impose a political solution on Syria, as some of our senior officials insisted until recently after President Erdoğan announced his intention to normalize relations with Syria and meet with Assad after his meeting with Putin in Sochi on August 6, 2022, all this brainstorming should be discarded. According to these senior officials, who use the highly offensive and toxic word ‘regime’, the way to reconcile/normalize with Syria is to bring a new constitution to this country. In other words, we seem to want a named or unnamed federal constitution that changes the constitution of the country in a national-unitary structure and replaces it with autonomous regions. Until recently, the same senior officials were even talking about reconciling the ‘regime’ and the ‘opposition’.
Apart from the fact that such an expectation is not at all compatible with the realities in both the field and the international arena, it can be observed at first glance that it does not serve Türkiye’s national interests. For example, if instead of transferring the territory we control directly to the effective sovereignty of the Syrian state, we want to keep it under the effective control of the groups that we call the Syrian National Army (SMO) and act together with us, we will transform this country into a federation that includes autonomous regions, even if it is possible, let alone Syria or even Russia will not accept it. Wouldn’t we then be playing into the hands of groups in Idlib that we also consider terrorists and, more importantly, the PKK/PYD terrorists who, together with the U.S. forces, are carrying out large-scale ethnic cleansing in the east of the Euphrates and seizing the region? Because a Syria with autonomous regions is the final solution that both groups ultimately want, at least for now. What national interests does such a result serve in Türkiye? We have to ask this question openly and answer it from the point of view of national interests, because the future of certain groups that have emerged as a result of the mistakes, we made during the war, has come to take precedence over the national interests of Türkiye.
There is no national interest to be gained from the Turkish media’s psychologically motivated treatment of the issue, such as ‘Assad has put forward unacceptable conditions for the summit’, because the idea of ‘let’s actually take Aleppo, let’s be on the safe side’ lies behind that logic. And in fact, it reflects a mindset that does not want to compromise with Syria, which it sees as Assad. A mindset that laments, ‘If Russia had not been so involved, we would have overthrown this Assad regime long ago’… Accordingly, it is a way of thinking that assumes it is possible and right to impose at least some conditions on the Assad regime, which we have failed to overthrow, and that it is possible and right for us to exert constant pressure on the ‘regime’ through the SMO, to which we will de facto hand over the administration of the territories we control…
THE HEAVY PRICE OF NOT WITHDRAWING FROM SYRIA
However, when we analyze them carefully, they all contain seriously dangerous and harmful elements for Türkiye’s national interests. Although not possible under the current conditions, if the SMO will become the security forces of the regions we currently control when we force Syria out of its current national-unitary structure and force it into a federation with autonomous regions, HTS and PKK/PYD will position themselves as security forces in Idlib and PKK/PYD regions that will turn into autonomous regions. In such a scenario, Türkiye will not be able to gain any benefit, and this state structure will pave the way for the disintegration of Syria in the next step, because it can be said that Syria, which the Western world, especially the U.S., does not want to remain within its current borders and favors its division into three if possible, will not survive in the medium term and its division into independent states according to federal borders will be inevitable.
After all, in an international environment where the federal structures of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have disintegrated one after another, and where the disintegration of states such as Spain and even the United Kingdom (UK) seems quite possible, it is inconceivable that a federal Syria, which would be the scene of provocations and power struggles by the U.S. on the one hand and Israel and other states on the other, would survive. Well, even if the SMO-controlled territories of a disintegrating Syria want to join Türkiye, can it be a reasonable and logical policy for Türkiye’s national interests to pave the way for the PKK/PYD to become an independent state in this way? It cannot be because Türkiye needs neither land nor additional population. In such a scenario, it should be noted that it is quite predictable the Arab world, which is increasingly normalizing its relations with Syria, will react and act together against Türkiye, which has seized or is trying to seize the territory of an Arab state. In such a case, it is highly likely that the UN Security Council would unite against Türkiye.
What needs to be done is to pave the way for the Erdogan-Assad summit as soon as possible. We need new thinking for reconciliation and normalization, discarding the ideas that underpin old wrong and destructive policies. Two agreements with Syria on the return of refugees and the joint fight against terrorism should be signed before the quadrilateral leaders’ summit including the participation of Russia and Iran. When updating the Adana Agreement, in addition to the PKK, the PYD, YPG and all their derivatives should be included in the text, and jihadist groups, which Syria considers terrorist organizations – some of which we also consider terrorist – can be added to that text. In addition, a timetable for withdrawal will be agreed upon, with Türkiye guaranteeing that it will hand over the Syrian territory under its control to the effective sovereignty of the Damascus government. It would be much more appropriate to concentrate on the extraordinary investment, reconstruction and trade-economic benefits that such a reconciliation of the two states would bring to both sides, and to try to secure Syria’s recognition of the TRNC based on the normalization of relations. On the contrary, every attempt and every delay will continue to impose a huge financial burden on both the current government and the state/nation.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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