EUROPE
‘Unprofitable’ nickel and the colonial legacy in New Caledonia

Violent protests in Nouméa, the capital of the French overseas territory of New Caledonia in the South Pacific, which have left five people dead, have alarmed the French government.
While Paris declared a state of emergency in the region, blaming “external forces” for the unrest, the island’s indigenous population argues that the new law in the French National Assembly will reduce indigenous representation.
“The proposal to reopen the electoral institution is nothing more than a return to the settler-colonial strategy,” New Caledonian Kanak Senator Robert Xowie, a member of the French Senate, told Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin in March.
A brief history of colonialism
When New Caledonia was recognised as part of the Second Empire in 1853, European settlers flocked to claim indigenous land and set up independent cattle farms.
This low-tech agricultural economy was eventually fuelled by colonial ambitions to turn New Caledonia into a sugar island, similar to the plantations of the Caribbean and Mauritius.
Wealthy planters from Réunion, another French overseas territory in the Indian Ocean, moved in due to crop shortages and invested heavily in sugar cane plantations south of New Caledonia’s capital, Noumea.
These landowners brought with them thousands of ‘indentured labourers’ of Indian, Vietnamese and Chinese origin. Together with the indigenous Pacific Islanders, the Kanaks, these immigrants formed the underclass of New Caledonian colonial society. As landowners and bureaucrats working in France, they would work to enrich wealthy French landowners who were not part of the archipelago society.
The aim of the French white settler landowners was to send their profits to the settler colony in Australia in the hope of ‘economic mobility’ in Europe. New Caledonia as a colony therefore only functioned for the white settlers in the exploitation of natural resources.
How did the self-determination process work?
In the 1980s, when New Caledonia was rocked by violence, including assassinations and kidnappings that left dozens dead, tripartite agreements were finally reached between independence supporters, French supporters and the French government, recognising the Kanaks as the indigenous population of New Caledonia and launching a process of self-determination.
The Nouméa Agreement of 1998 promised that the French Republic would devolve more political power to New Caledonia and its original inhabitants, the Kanaks, over a twenty-year transition period and provided for independence referendums.
The referendums were held in 2018, 2020 and 2021. Although these votes were in favour of ‘staying with France’, the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS), a coalition of pro-independence parties, had called for the vote to be postponed and for the Kanaks not to participate, arguing that ‘lockdown’ measures and traditional mourning ceremonies during the pandemic had prevented a proper campaign. In 2021, turnout in the referendum was 43.8 per cent.
Protests against the proposed reform of the region’s electoral body, which independents say will weaken the representation of the indigenous Kanak population, are fuelled by deep economic turmoil in the region.
New Caledonia’s wealth is largely derived from its struggling mining sector. With almost 30 per cent of the world’s reserves of nickel, an important material for making stainless steel and batteries for electric vehicles, New Caledonia was expected to play a major role in Europe’s race to catch up with China for critical raw materials.
However, nickel production in the region has fallen sharply and foreign investors have begun to leave the archipelago. The industry suffers from export restrictions imposed by the New Caledonian authorities and high energy costs, making nickel production much more expensive and less profitable than in Indonesia and other Asian competitors.
Huge gap between Kanaks and Europeans
According to the 2019 census, 41.2 per cent of New Caledonia’s population identifies as Kanak and 24.1 per cent as European, with the former group facing significant socio-economic challenges, including lower wages and higher poverty rates.
For example, according to a 2014 study, in 2009 a young non-Kanak was seven times more likely to have a tertiary education than a young Kanak.
A 2012 statistic showed that only 3 per cent of Kanaks had completed tertiary education, compared to 23 per cent of the rest of the population, while the unemployment rate among young native Kanaks was 38 per cent, four times higher than the rest of the population.
In 2010, one in five jobs paid less than two-thirds of the minimum wage in mainland France, and the proportion was much higher in agriculture, domestic work and hotels and restaurants, where part-time work is common.
These low wages must be seen in the context of the very high prices in New Caledonia. With a minimum wage of 78.5 per cent of the French level and prices 34 per cent higher, the purchasing power of minimum wage earners was 59 per cent of the metropolitan level, and even 50 per cent for agricultural workers.
More strikingly, among the regions that make up New Caledonia, the poverty rate reached 52 per cent in the Loyauté Islands, compared to 9 per cent in the Southern Province. In 2014, the employment rate was 65 per cent in the Southern Province, 52 per cent in the Northern Province and 40 per cent in the Loyauté Islands. It should also be noted that the Kanak population in Loyauté is 94.6 per cent.
The collapse of nickel
Despite hundreds of millions of euros in French subsidies, the nickel industry continues to collapse, with production in the first quarter down 32% on the same period last year.
French officials warned in 2023 that New Caledonia’s three main nickel processing plants could soon close, increasing unemployment on the island by 50%.
As protests grow, major investors such as Switzerland’s Glencore and France’s Euramet are either pulling out or refusing to invest further.
Last year, the government came up with a new plan to bail out the industry with subsidies of up to 200 million euros to lower energy prices. But instead of easing tensions, the new ‘Nickel Pact’ was criticised by the New Caledonian independence movement as a ‘colonial pact’ that would give too much power to local authorities.
After months of negotiations, New Caledonia’s representatives blocked ratification of the pact, which is still on ice.
The pact was an attempt by French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire (who visited New Caledonia on a fact-finding mission in November 2023) to provide around 200 million euros in emergency aid, on condition that New Caledonia’s nickel industry commits to deep reforms to reduce production costs and possibly find new markets in Europe.
The Kanaks argue that the pact in its current form does not ask for enough commitment from the nickel industry companies and also requires New Caledonia to find more than $65 million to finance a cost-cutting electricity scheme, which would require the introduction of new taxes and thus increase the burden on the local population.
No more colonial mining
The mining sector in New Caledonia still bears the mark of colonialism. Considered the cheapest and most aggressive method of extraction, “open-cast” mining was favoured by mining companies for its simplicity, and its immediate environmental damage was ignored. So much so that 330 mines were opened over a period of time on an island 30 times smaller than France, where only 256 mines were open at the height of the coal mining boom.
In the 1930s, the indigenous Kanaks were moved to reservations covering only 10 per cent of their ancestral land in an attempt to increase the availability of mineral rights without harming the cattle industry.
Currently, the mining industry on the island is controlled by three major companies. The largest is SLN, a subsidiary of the French metallurgical company Eramet. The Koniambo nickel plant is operated by Glencore, which is majority-owned (51%) by the Northern Province, where the plant is located. The Brazilian mining consortium Vale operates a large hydrometallurgical plant in the Southern Province.
EUROPE
Huawei lobbying investigation leads to searches at EP offices in Strasbourg

According to two officials knowledgeable about the matter who spoke to POLITICO, police authorities conducted searches in two offices belonging to European Parliament (EP) political assistants in Strasbourg.
Police had previously sealed the offices on March 13, the same day authorities raided more than 20 addresses in Belgium and Portugal as part of an investigation into alleged corruption within the EP benefiting Huawei. Officials confirmed on Thursday that these offices were searched.
One of the officials confirmed that the search in Strasbourg was part of the investigation into Huawei’s lobbying activities.
Members of Parliament and their assistants have offices in the institution’s building in Brussels, where regular parliamentary activities take place, and at the official seat in Strasbourg, France, where plenary sessions are held.
Two offices in Brussels were sealed and searched earlier this month and have since been returned to their occupants.
According to judicial documents seen by POLITICO, Belgian prosecutors are investigating whether Huawei made illegal payments to commission an open letter signed by eight European parliamentarians defending the interests of the Chinese tech giant.
The Belgian prosecutor’s office announced that four individuals are accused of corruption and forming a criminal organization, and one person is accused of money laundering.
A parliamentary assistant to Italian center-right MEP Fulvio Martusciello was arrested in Italy on March 20. According to the institution’s press services, the assistant has been suspended by Parliament. It is alleged that Martusciello’s office in 2021 spearheaded the effort to promote the letter under investigation.
A Huawei spokesperson previously stated that the company “has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption or other misconduct and is always committed to complying with all applicable laws and regulations.”
EUROPE
Leaked draft reveals German coalition disagreements on key policies

Until last Sunday, the CDU/CSU, which emerged as the leading party from the early federal elections, and the SPD, which came in third, negotiated the coalition agreement in 16 working groups.
Despite the intended confidentiality, many of the final documents were leaked to the media. Numerous proposed changes within the documents indicate that the parties are still far from reaching an agreement on many points.
The policy agendas under negotiation include migration; heating, energy, and climate; compulsory military service and military equipment; transportation, construction, and housing; citizen’s income; and finance.
Migration
Migration is one of the most hotly debated topics. Although CDU leader Friedrich Merz has announced a transformation in migration policy, the SPD is unwilling to follow suit on all points.
There is agreement that police at Germany’s permanently controlled borders should be able to turn back asylum seekers “in coordination” with neighboring countries, but what this precisely entails remains unclear.
Furthermore, Algeria, India, Morocco, and Tunisia will be quickly categorized as safe countries of origin, making it harder to obtain asylum. Immigrants who commit serious crimes will be deported.
Another clear decision is that no new admission programs will be opened for foreigners in vulnerable situations. Existing ones, such as for Afghans, will be terminated “as much as possible.” Individuals with subsidiary protection status will also not be allowed to bring their families from their home countries, though this affects only about a third of temporarily recognized refugees.
According to the final report of the migration working group, deportations to Afghanistan and Syria are planned, “starting with criminals and individuals at risk,” even though the new rulers in Syria are persecuting minorities.
Several minor measures have been agreed upon to deport more people more quickly. For instance, legal counseling before deportation will be abolished; previously, those legally rejected could still be legally represented.
In the future, the Federal Police will also be able to request detention to prevent those required to leave the country from absconding. Previously, only immigration authorities could do this.
Heating, energy, and climate
Although the CDU/CSU wants to view the new government’s energy policy as a “new beginning,” many points already agreed upon seem like a continuation of initiatives started by the traffic light coalition government that collapsed last year.
The likely CDU-SPD government does not intend to change the cornerstones of climate and energy policy: the commitment to climate neutrality by 2045, the coal phase-out by 2038, emissions trading, the expansion of renewable energy sources, and the use of hydrogen.
The construction of numerous new gas-fired power plants planned by the coalition government will also proceed. However, the early phase-out of coal power generation by 2030, once desired by the Greens, will be canceled.
The ‘Black-Red’ government now wants to permanently reduce the price of electricity by at least five cents per kilowatt-hour by lowering the electricity tax and grid fees. Energy-intensive industrial companies will also receive relief through an industrial electricity price, but this will cost the state billions.
How the expansion of electricity grids will proceed is unclear. The CDU/CSU wants to prioritize the construction of high-voltage overhead lines, which are cheaper but more exposed than underground cables. The SPD prefers underground cables to prevent protests.
The CDU/CSU wants to “exploit the potential for conventional gas production in Germany” and hopes for a breakthrough with new-generation nuclear power plants.
It also demands a quick review of whether recently decommissioned nuclear power plants can be reactivated, although experts have serious doubts about this. The SPD opposes all of these points.
Leaders also seem poised for difficult discussions regarding the long-debated heating law. The CDU/CSU wants the law repealed as announced but wishes to continue the “heating subsidy.” The Social Democrats only want to amend the law and make the subsidy socially graduated.
There is apparent agreement on climate money, but this too will likely remain theoretical. They state they want to return the revenue from the CO₂ price to citizens, but conditional on introducing “non-bureaucratic and socially graduated relief and subsidies for housing and mobility.” Despite billions in new debt, there is no money for a lump-sum payout.
Compulsory military service and the Bundeswehr
Discussions about the future of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) are also ongoing. The working paper of the Foreign Relations and Defense Working Group shows consensus that the Bundeswehr must become stronger “short-term, decisive, and sustainable.”
Investments could be rapidly initiated through a “Bundeswehr Infrastructure Acceleration Act,” but this law has been in effect since 2022, and bureaucracy remains the biggest obstacle to the swift procurement of weapons and equipment.
The CDU/CSU therefore wants to remove some powers from the Koblenz Procurement Office and appoint an agency for this purpose. They also aim for a “multi-year investment plan,” because a single legislative period is considered too short for arms development and procurement.
The CDU/CSU also wants to reactivate compulsory military service. The SPD opposes this, favoring voluntary service for all and a “broad societal debate” on its introduction.
Transportation, construction, and housing
Regarding transportation, there is only one point of disagreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU: the speed limit on highways. The SPD wants a limit of 130 kilometers per hour, while the CDU/CSU rejects any limit.
On the other hand, there is clarity on the future of the Deutschlandticket (the subscription ticket for buses and trains) beyond 2025. There was initial resistance within the CDU/CSU, but an agreement has now been reached to continue the subscription. However, the price will increase “gradually and with social responsibility” starting in 2027.
The new coalition partners plan to fully utilize the special infrastructure fund for their plans to renovate the railway network: the SPD succeeded in increasing investments and establishing an infrastructure fund with a binding, long-term financing commitment for the railways.
Money from the special fund will also flow into the current renovation concept for busy high-speed train lines, thereby freeing up budget funds for neglected secondary lines.
At the same time, the future government partners are opening up a new financing gap of 5 billion euros for the railway. Until now, the road network had cross-financed the rail network with the help of revenue from truck tolls. In the future, however, financing cycles within a transport sector will remain closed, and truck tolls will flow to Autobahn GmbH.
From a climate policy perspective, air transport seems to be regressing. The likely new federal government wants to reverse the increase in the air traffic tax and continue supporting regional airports, which are often unprofitable.
However, there is at least some relief for local public transport: the SPD managed to ensure that federal regionalization funds primarily flow into local transport.
The SPD also achieved a victory in housing. The rent freeze, unpopular with the CDU/CSU, will be extended for another two years.
Citizen’s Income implementation
It has been agreed that the Citizen’s Income (Bürgergeld), introduced by the coalition government, will be renamed the “new basic income.”
Job centers will receive more money for administration. Conditions will be tightened. Accordingly, every unemployed person must “actively strive to find work.”
Sanctions will be applied “faster, simpler, and less bureaucratic.” Benefits for those who persistently refuse work will be completely cut, in line with the Karlsruhe jurisprudence.
The citizen’s allowance, which Ukrainians also receive and which the state sometimes grants without sanctions, had previously sparked heated debates about fairness.
Public finance
Negotiators have barely agreed on financial details. The CDU/CSU and SPD were able to gain some breathing room in the federal budget by relaxing the debt brake for defense spending. However, the additional fiscal leeway is limited, and the list of expensive election promises both parties want to implement is long.
Ultimately, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the solidarity surcharge (additional tax) legal on Wednesday. This means the federal government will retain annual revenues of 13 billion euros.
The main point of contention is what is possible regarding taxes. For example, it is argued that there isn’t enough money for broad income tax cuts. The SPD wants to increase the tax burden on high earners. This could increase federal revenues, but it is doubtful whether the CDU/CSU will agree to tax increases.
The CDU/CSU particularly wants to reduce the corporate tax from the current 30% to 25%. However, the SPD is only prepared to do this from 2029 and only wants to reduce it by one percentage point.
There is agreement on making investments in Germany more attractive. Depreciation rules are planned to be improved so that investment costs can be deducted from taxes.
EUROPE
F-35 debate intensifies across Germany and Europe

The debate over a potential withdrawal from the US F-35 fighter jet program is heating up in Germany and other European countries.
The background to this is that the jet can only be used with the approval of the US government, and restrictive provisions, for example regarding spare parts and software, make it impossible to escape dependence on the US in military operations with the F-35.
In Berlin, former “transatlanticists” in particular are pushing for withdrawal from the F-35 procurement program to achieve military independence.
Last week, a copy of the purchase agreement for the 35 F-35 fighter jets that Berlin decided to procure in March 2022 was leaked to the German magazine Stern. Details of the framework conditions for the purchase, which will cost €8.3 billion, thus emerged.
This purchase is being handled as part of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, which is subject to strict rules. The F-35 purchase agreement grants Washington the authority to “terminate or suspend performance in whole or in part” without further notice “if required by the national interests of the US.” This means the US can unilaterally change the delivery time and quantity at any time. Contractual penalties are generally not provided for in the FMS procedure; legal recourse is excluded.
Once an F-35 fighter jet is delivered, no further modifications are permitted; spare parts and regularly required software updates are only available from the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin. According to the wording in the purchase agreement, “The customer is not authorized to carry out repair and maintenance work beyond the unit maintenance level.” This already guarantees that the German Air Force’s F-35s will only fly when the US administration wants them to.
Furthermore, the F-35’s basic software is kept secret. Therefore, it is impossible to check whether the jet can be influenced externally, but many assume this is possible. Data generated during operation, and especially during any mission, is collected and subsequently stored on Amazon Web Services, making it easily accessible to US authorities.
Finally, the US Foreign Assistance Act allows the US to “monitor the end-use” of the F-35 “at any time.” A “well-informed” source told the magazine Stern, claiming, “Targets, routes, indirectly tactics… US technicians are always on the plane.” An insider with “intelligence service knowledge” also explicitly confirmed this to the magazine, stating that “all mission planning is monitored in the US.”
Since last week, calls have been growing louder in Europe to avoid procuring F-35 jets if possible, or to withdraw from the agreement if a contract has already been signed. This was triggered on the one hand by the Trump administration’s decision to prohibit Ukraine from using US satellite data, and on the other hand by Washington’s continued efforts to acquire the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.
For example, Danish conservative MP Rasmus Jarlov stated on X that he now regrets supporting Denmark’s decision to purchase 27 F-35 jets for its air force. Jarlov said, “I can imagine a situation where the US demands Greenland from Denmark and threatens to disable our weapons.” Jarlov argued that Copenhagen would then no longer be in a position to defend itself, making the purchase of US weapons “a security risk we cannot take.” He contended that Denmark will invest heavily in armaments in the coming years and should avoid American weapons wherever possible.
Some NATO countries are now considering abandoning the F-35. For example, Canada plans to withdraw from the F-35 purchase, but has already paid for 16 fighter jets due to be delivered early next year. According to Defense Minister Nuno Melo, Portugal, which previously planned to buy the US fighter jet, is also changing its mind. The French company Dassault Aviation has now offered to supply Rafale jets to the Portuguese government.
The Rafale is a fourth-generation fighter jet, unlike the fifth-generation F-35, but it is cheaper and requires no US components, thus offering independence from the US. French President Emmanuel Macron argued on March 16 that European countries should, in principle, switch from the F-35 to the Rafale; furthermore, the new Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system could be used instead of the US Patriot air defense system.
One challenge stems from the fact that a number of European NATO countries, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, already possess F-35 jets. Many other countries, including officially neutral Switzerland, have placed binding orders for the aircraft.
Conflicting voices are also rising in Germany. Former “transatlanticists” in particular are distancing themselves from the F-35 procurement. Former Airbus CEO Thomas Enders, now president of the influential think tank German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), said last week, “Nobody needs the F-35”; Enders added that he “would be the first to cancel it under these new geopolitical conditions.” CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter also called for a “review of existing contracts with the US,” such as the F-35 purchase agreement, stating, “It is now absolutely essential to look for alternatives.”
Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, however, favors continuing with the F-35 purchase. One of the reasons he cites for this is nuclear sharing, whereby German Air Force fighter jets could drop US nuclear bombs in a war scenario. Observers note that dropping US nuclear bombs is already only possible on orders from Washington, making it irrelevant whether the F-35s could be paralyzed by the US as long as they are available solely for nuclear sharing. However, nuclear sharing itself is no longer considered secure.
Berlin has already transferred approximately $2.42 billion to Washington for the F-35 and has begun costly modifications at Büchel Air Base, where the US fighter jets are to be stationed.
-
EUROPE4 days ago
F-35 debate intensifies across Germany and Europe
-
EUROPE1 week ago
Europe plans for US absence in NATO with 5-10 year strategy
-
ASIA2 weeks ago
China’s AsiaInfo expands with DeepSeek-powered AI
-
EUROPE1 week ago
French defense industry gears up for war amid EU strategic autonomy push
-
AMERICA1 week ago
Trump’s tariffs drive Nvidia to invest heavily in US manufacturing
-
DIPLOMACY6 days ago
Trump’s proposed fees on Chinese ships threaten US maritime industry
-
DIPLOMACY2 weeks ago
US, Britain, and Türkiye excluded from EU armament fund
-
ASIA1 week ago
India shelves $23 billion plan to rival China’s factories