On the first anniversary of the Israeli genocide in Gaza, the possibility of a direct confrontation between Iran and Israel is now on the world’s agenda. Israel’s attack on Lebanon, the escalation of Netanyahu’s inhumane activities and Israel’s destructive actions in Lebanon have become a new page of events in the Middle East over the past year, and we still see Israel’s war machine advancing on this battlefield. However, the Iranian issue could lead to a new type of conflict, and the regional and global implications of this war will be profound.

One year after Israel’s attack on Gaza and the historic genocide, and with the war spilling over into Lebanon – aimed at destroying the Lebanese Hezbollah, one of Iran’s main allies in the Middle East – what is the analytical situation in Iran, and how do ordinary citizens and public opinion assess the situation?

Ordinary citizens are worried, but united against the external enemy

Iran has gone through a difficult social, economic and political period in recent years. The events surrounding the rise in petrol prices, which led to violent demonstrations in some cities, and the events that followed with the death of Mahsa Amini are considered to be one of the most important turning points in Iran’s social history in recent years. The sudden and suspicious death of President Ebrahim Raisi and the sudden change in the ruling wing were also among the issues that preoccupied Iranian society last year. In addition to these events, chronic inflation and economic stagnation, the continuous devaluation of the national currency, rising prices and falling incomes are among the deep crises in Iran’s social environment. Growing income inequality, rising unemployment and dwindling hopes for a better quality of life in the future have placed a heavy psychological burden on Iranian society. In such an environment, the prospect of war looming over the country seems alarming at first glance. When the threat of war is added to the existing economic and social crises, it can be expected that these crises will deepen or that social conflicts will erupt in the country. Based on this analysis, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu addressed the Iranian people in a video message in recent weeks, trying to put psychological pressure on society and the government by drawing attention to the current problems in Iran.

Contrary to this initial perception, however, it is clear from the wider Iranian society and people’s reactions on social media that the sense of national consensus and unity has increased across the country as the war approaches. The attendance of millions of Tehranis at Friday prayers, where Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a sermon after a four-year hiatus, is a clear indication of this sense of national unity. The missile attacks on Israel by the Iranian armed forces and their reverberations around the world have both increased the Iranian people’s sense of national pride and honor and reduced their worries about how their state would respond to a possible attack by Israel.

Israel’s inhumane behavior in Gaza and Lebanon has also drastically changed the Iranian public’s view of the war. Compared to a year ago, Israel now has no credibility among the Iranian people, and they have developed a sense of disgust at the atrocities committed by Israeli forces in Gaza and Lebanon. This disgust manifests itself in the form of support for the Iranian state in any action against Israel. The last time the Iranian people experienced this disgust and support for the government was in 2014 and 2015. In those years, ISIS committed the most brutal crimes against humanity in Syria and Iraq, which led the Iranian people to support the armed forces in their cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria, making Qassem Soleimani a historic national hero for Iran. For the Iranian people today, Israel is not much different from ISIS in 2014.

One of the most important effects of the tensions between Israel and Iran has been to discredit and even destroy the opposition abroad in the eyes of the Iranian public. Over the past year, the Iranian opposition group abroad has become a supporter of Israeli crimes in Gaza and, with the escalation of tensions between Iran and Israel, a supporter of Israeli military aggression against Iran. This small but vocal group claims that the Israeli attack on Iran is actually directed against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that this attack poses no danger to the Iranian people. With this rhetoric, this group belittles and ridicules the humanitarian feelings of the Iranian people as well as their nationalistic feelings. Therefore, one of the consequences of the year-long war in Gaza for Iran can be seen as the erosion of domestic support for the Iranian opposition abroad.

The elite community is divided: Defence or offence

The Iranian political elite, and especially the strategic analysts, have been going through turbulent times, especially in the last year and after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran. The current discourse among Iranian analysts can be divided into two groups: those who approach the war situation in the region from a tactical perspective and those who see the current situation as the result of some strategic actions. Both groups draw different roadmaps for the future, depending on their approach to events.

According to the pro-minimal intervention group, Iran should not fall into Israel’s trap of escalation and its responses should be calibrated so as not to lead to a direct war and serious conflict with Israel, while providing deterrence. This is because a direct conflict between Iran and Israel would trigger a war between Iran and the United States, which could create an uncertain future for the region and the country. According to this group, Iran should allow Hamas and Hezbollah to fight Israel on their own and manage the situation in such a way that the conflict eventually ends in a ceasefire. While it is possible that Iran could provide support to prevent Hezbollah’s defeat, too much support would create unnecessary costs for Iran. Moreover, this group sees the possibility of Israeli damage to Iran’s oil infrastructure and Iran’s inability to repair it in the short term due to sanctions as one of the main reasons for a minimalist approach to intervention.

On the other hand, some Iranian analysts believe that ignoring a major war in the region that could have strategic consequences and adopting a minimalist approach to the current situation is strategic blindness. According to this group, Iran is engaged in a major war, and whether or not Iran strengthens its position on the battlefield will not change the intensity of the war; it will only affect Iran’s interests.

This group argues that Iran should immediately move from a position of reacting to Israel’s military actions to a more active and entrepreneurial stance. As long as there is a constant reaction to Israel, the power to control tensions will remain in the hands of Tel Aviv and the Israelis will continue to be able to manage the field through various shocks. According to this group, Hezbollah is a strategic asset of Iran and Iran cannot and should not give up this asset. Giving up its strategic assets means cutting off its own hand and arm, and the counter-front will only stop by destroying all existential aspects of Iran.

According to these analysts, Israel has convinced America that the best way to reduce the strategic power of Russia and China is to create chaos in the Middle East, weaken Iran’s strategic power and intimidate Middle Eastern countries. America is therefore prepared to support Israel for a long time to continue this war. They argue that Iran should not wait for Israel’s actions and should prevent Israel’s next moves in advance by attacking Israel’s security and economic infrastructure. Therefore, some analysts believe that Iran is considering an attack on Jordan as an option to damage American forces in the region and Israel’s military security system.

This group of analysts believes that the transfer of the war to Iran could become an opportunity and an advantage for Iran. This is because Israel has been waging a security war against Iran for the past two decades and has carried out numerous assassinations and sabotage against Iran’s strategic installations. Iran has always been weak in this security war because of its lack of resources and technology and because it does not have the intelligence support of the Mossad. But now that the conflict has shifted from a security war to a military war, Iran has gained considerable power and initiative and should use this opportunity to pacify Israel in the future. Otherwise, Israel will compensate for its military weakness with security sabotage in the post-war period.

On 4 October, Israel and the United States were discussing how to respond to Iran’s second missile attack on 1 October. In particular, an attack on Iranian oil facilities was on the agenda. Iran made it clear to the US and Israel that it would no longer be limited to ‘unilateral restraint’ and that any Israeli attack would be met with ‘extraordinary retaliation’. As a result, international oil prices rose for three days in a row, to $75 a barrel for Brent and $71 a barrel for Texas crude, the longest such increase since August.

Israel’s military means are now advancing rapidly and ignoring US President Biden’s suggestions and concerns, constantly escalating the situation in the Middle East and worsening the crisis. It does not even hesitate to pay a huge price for the global economy by jeopardising the world energy supply. Israel may even decide to end its 45-year proxy war with Iran and engage in direct conflict.

In this new era, during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the verge of a one-year peace, Iran fired 200 medium-range missiles at Israel, reigniting a potential regional crisis stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Iran claimed that the massive airstrike was carried out to avenge the deaths of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Abbas Nilfrushan, deputy head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. On 28 September, the Israeli Air Force dropped at least 80 depth charges on the Hezbollah headquarters in southern Beirut, immediately destroying several buildings and killing Nasrallah and Nilfrushan.

In the aftermath, Nasrallah’s body was found intact and without obvious wounds, apparently killed by the shock waves from the massive explosion. This suggests that Israeli intelligence knew Nasrallah’s whereabouts and movements very accurately, and that an intensive bombardment of the target was carried out.

On October 2, Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Habib told CNN that Nasrallah’s death occurred after he had shown a willingness to approach a ceasefire. Habib explained that following calls from U.S. President Biden and French President Macron at the UN General Assembly, the Lebanese government had negotiated a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Nasrallah had accepted the ceasefire for 21 days, and this was communicated to both the U.S. and France. Iran, however, claimed that Nilfrushan died because he told Nasrallah to go to Tehran to avoid the risks.

The trees want to be quiet, but the wind won’t stop. If Lebanon confirms the above statement, it shows that the Netanyahu government does not want to see Hezbollah declare its acceptance of the ceasefire, that it has no intention of stopping its ‘Northern Offensive’ against Hezbollah, and that it is determined to escalate the conflict to target Iran. The war may even turn into an all-out war involving Lebanon, Syria and Iran. On 2 October, an Israeli air strike on a house in Damascus killed Nasrallah’s son-in-law, Hassan Karsi. Nasrallah has two daughters married to senior Hamas officials, and Nasrallah’s other son-in-law is likely to be on Israel’s hit list sooner or later, as the Netanyahu government is determined to fight Hezbollah to the death.

Hezbollah accepted the ceasefire offer and Nasrallah was killed. Is this a strange situation? No, it isn’t. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed by Israeli military intelligence in Tehran on 31 July, was also a peace leader and wanted a ceasefire in Gaza. It is the basic logic and formula of the Netanyahu government to eliminate negotiating partners, to block peace talks, to fight with super-military means, to import endless economic and military aid from the United States and to achieve a zero-sum outcome.

Since Iran’s attack used strategic strike weapons and partially penetrated Israel’s Iron Dome defence system, although it deliberately avoided casualties, it ultimately broke Israel’s strategic defence and deterrence system and increased Iran’s capacity for strategic surprise and deterrence. This increases the likelihood of a major Israeli retaliation. It is expected that Israel will not rest and will not rule out that the retaliation will go beyond the symbolic attack of 18 April, that Iranian political and military leaders, government and military units, nuclear and oil facilities, important ports and airports, etc. could become the target of the attack, and even that warplanes could be sent deep into the Iranian hinterland to carry out the attack. In short, the show of force ball is once again in Israel’s half, and it is up to Netanyahu and his war cabinet to decide.

The Netanyahu government has turned into a real war cabinet, a combination of ‘Ivan the Terrible’ and ‘Ivan the Mad’. ‘Ivan the Terrible’ refers to Ivan IV of the Russian Empire, who, out of mistrust, killed anyone he perceived as a threat, including the elderly Crown Prince; “Ivan the Madman” refers to Cold War tactics in which Soviet Union submarines risked collision at sea by making sudden manoeuvres to evade pursuit.

Instead of a ceasefire in Gaza, the Netanyahu government is rejecting the terms of the Axis of Resistance and expanding its attacks in an attempt to destroy Hezbollah, which is stronger and more flexible than Hamas. This is being done at the risk of escalating the regional conflict to the Third Lebanon War or the Sixth Middle East War, putting Israel in a protracted state of war and provoking a war between the United States and Iran.

The American political news network ‘Politico’ reported on 2 October that the Biden administration has become ineffective against the Netanyahu government, trying only to persuade Netanyahu not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities directly, but with little room left to influence his decisions. Citing two anonymous American officials, the report noted that the Biden administration has recognised that its influence in the Middle East is diminishing and that, after a year, it is no longer able to prevent the situation – regional war – that it has been trying to stop. The current option is to limit Israel’s response, but not to stop its actions altogether.

The article also stated that the Netanyahu government has repeatedly ignored American proposals and expanded its war aims in Gaza, which has created serious domestic political pressures on the Biden government due to the growing humanitarian crisis. This has led to even stronger calls for Biden to distance himself from Netanyahu. It was stated that with the weakening of Biden’s influence on Netanyahu, his anger increased, and his phone calls began to turn into more and more ‘loud debates’. Biden told close friends that Netanyahu had no intention of reaching a ceasefire, but rather was trying to save his own political future by prolonging the conflict and at the same time trying to help Republican candidate Trump in the November elections.

Netanyahu is known to have strong personal ties and interests with Trump and his Jewish son-in-law Kushner. According to some reports, Netanyahu stayed at the Kushner family home while studying in the United States. When Trump entered the White House in 2017, he made his first official visit to Israel; recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, breaking with the policies adopted by more than 20 years of bipartisan government; terminated the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), hated by the Israeli right; presented the ‘Deal of the Century’, which sacrificed key Palestinian interests; and persuaded four Arab countries to normalise relations with Israel, abandoning the principle of ‘peace in exchange for land’.

In contrast, Netanyahu’s relationship with the American Democratic Party is highly sensitive and turbulent. Although Biden is personally close to Israel and the Jewish people, the Obama administration tried to balance Palestine and Israel, promoted reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, reached a nuclear deal with Iran despite the opposition of the Israeli right, recognised the ‘Shiite crescent’ as Iran’s sphere of influence, and had the United Nations Security Council adopt Resolution 2334 condemning Israel’s illegal settlements before the end of its term at the end of 2016.

A month before the American elections, the Netanyahu government decides to expand the scale of the Middle East war, putting the Biden government and the Democrats in a difficult situation, and raising the suspicion of winning votes for Trump and the Republican Party. The problem is that as long as Netanyahu continues to go this far, the Biden team cannot stop, even if it wants to; it follows Israel’s war policies dependently, constantly supplying it with weapons and continuing to offer strategic support. It can be said that America maintains its security commitment to Israel, but in fact America’s Middle East policy and national interests are completely under Israel’s influence.

If the Netanyahu government shows some respect to the Biden team and prevents attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, but will it miss the opportunity to attack Iran’s oil facilities, restrict oil revenues and drive a wedge between the Iranian people and their government? Iran is one of the leading oil producing countries in the world, although it is under US sanctions and embargoes, its actual daily production and grey exports are estimated to be around 2 million barrels. Although the oversupply situation in the world oil market is currently quite stable, the destruction of Iran’s oil facilities could lead to a major contraction in future energy supplies, especially since Russia is not expected to resume normal oil and gas exports in a few years.

More importantly, how will Iran retaliate against Israel again? After the Haniyeh incident, Iran announced that it would take revenge on Israel, and even notified Israel of predetermined targets through Hungary, but the second move has still not materialised. For Iran, the killing of Nasrallah and Nilfrushan meant that a new hatred was added to the old revenge unpaid, and it was a great humiliation for Iran that Israel went one step further. Therefore, with no chance of retreat, Tehran was forced to respond harshly and for the first time used medium-range missiles, difficult to defend and of great political significance.

Of course, regardless of whether the revenge was real or not, one should look at the effects rather than propaganda. Such a massive and shocking punitive air strike seems to have caused no serious damage to Israel, the only confirmed death being a Palestinian civilian in the West Bank who died from the debris of Iranian missiles. What an irony this is!

Iran has already announced the end of its military confrontation with Israel, which means that they are loudly presenting their ‘peace offer’. The question is that Netanyahu has now realised that Iran does not want to escalate and that America will support Israel in any case, so it is entirely up to him to decide when to attack, how small or how big. The conflict and hostility between Israel and Iran is a structural and long-term problem. Either Israel ends its illegal occupation of Arab lands, or Iran renounces the export of the ‘Islamic Revolution’; there is no other way to peace.

Prof. Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.

On 28 September, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) claimed to have killed Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah during a raid on the armed group’s headquarters in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah confirmed this a few hours later. Immediately afterwards, Iran’s official media reported that the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Abbas Nilforoushan, had also been killed in the ongoing Israeli air strikes on Lebanon. The deaths of Nasrallah and Nilfruzan are a turning point in the disastrous consequences for Hezbollah forces and the IRGC of Israel’s “Northern Offensive” offensive, which lasted for several days, and in Israel’s adventurous challenge to the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance”. It is a serious test of the ability of the “Axis of Resistance” to develop a climate.

Described by Israel as a central element of the “Iranian axis” and by Western scholars as the “beating heart of Hezbollah”, the 64-year-old Nasrallah is the most important non-state actor and regional player who has led the organisation for 32 years and transformed it into a well-armed, political and cross-border fighting force, non-state actors and regional players. Some commentators have even claimed that Nasrallah has dedicated his entire family to Hezbollah’s cause and resistance against Israel, that two of his sisters married senior Hezbollah officials, that his eldest son died at the hands of Israel and his body was confiscated, and that a daughter was buried with him this time.

Nasrallah has performed at least four “miracles” in the Middle East political arena: By resisting and harassing Israel, he enabled Hezbollah to force Israel to end its 18-year illegal occupation of southern Lebanon in May 2000, essentially realising the unity of the country’s sovereignty and territory; only parts of the territory, such as the Shab’a farms, remained under Israeli control as part of the Golan Heights. In 2006, he commanded the Hezbollah forces that inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli army in the mountain warfare in southern Lebanon, forcing the latter to achieve a ceasefire. After 2011, he facilitated Hezbollah’s first overseas operation, helped Damascus in its efforts to crush the subversive intentions of the West and the Arab League, and was a key force in the “Russia+Shia Arc” that contributed to the defeat of ISIS. He has been on Israel’s “death list” since 1992, but as a “master of survival” he has managed to escape death for a third of a century.

However, Nasrallah was eventually hunted down and liquidated by Israel. Coming on the heels of the world-shaking wave of “pager wars” and “radio wars” that Israeli intelligence successfully conducted against Hezbollah cadres, this result shows that Israel has finally gained the upper hand in the intelligence war, despite the fact that Hezbollah had the best of everything possible and Nasrallah’s whereabouts were never clear. Israel has achieved superiority in the intelligence war, in cyber and technological warfare, and even in conventional air strikes and counter-air strikes. This fact alone shows that Israel, as a military, technological and scientific powerhouse, has overwhelming superiority over Hezbollah, the militia of a less developed country, and has achieved military superiority by avoiding all-out war and repeating the same mistakes in ground attacks.

According to Israeli media reports, the Israeli Air Force bombing of the Hezbollah headquarters and the killing of Nasrallah was personally approved by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York. This alone shows that Israeli military intelligence did not lack the opportunity and capability to physically eliminate Nasrallah, but rather had to choose the most opportune time and think in order to achieve the best results.

The timing of Nasrallah’s elimination, at a moment of “summit” when Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah is entering a heated phase and world leaders are gathered at the United Nations and Netanyahu is directly in front of the largest and most influential audience, is not only a “show-off” for Israel’s superior intelligence and operational capability, but also a double challenge to the international community and the “axis of resistance”: To justify and defend Israel’s continuation of the war, disregarding the fact that it is wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes and condemned by the international community for its “belligerence and bloodthirstiness”.

In his speech on the 27th, Netanyahu emphasised: “I had not planned to come here this year; my country is struggling to survive. However, after hearing the lies and slander against my country from many speakers on this podium, I decided to come here to present the facts.” At the beginning of his speech, applause erupted from the pro-Israel group in the hall, while more participants left the hall in protest.

Netanyahu singled out the United Nations and Lebanon as two areas of interaction, telling Iran and the “axis of resistance” that Israel is determined to fight to the end and will not accept a ceasefire in Gaza if its enemies abandon their multi-front offensive. In his speech, he accused the Iranian-led forces of encircling Israel on seven fronts and of being behind many of the problems in the region. Netanyahu also threatened Iran, saying that “there is no place in Iran that Israel’s long arm cannot reach, and this applies to the entire Middle East.”

A senior Israeli official told the British Daily Telegraph that the purpose of Netanyahu’s visit to the General Assembly was to soften the blow of Israel’s air strike on Hezbollah headquarters. Observers believe that Netanyahu’s approval of the major military operation during the UN General Assembly session was intended to show the international community that Israel is strong enough to challenge the Iran-led “axis of resistance”.

The Israeli bombing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran at the end of July was deliberately timed to coincide with the inauguration of Iran’s new president, in order to humiliate and challenge the Iranian authorities. Hamas lacked the strength to avenge Haniyeh’s death, Iran lacked the motivation to repay its blood debt to its Palestinian partners, and Hezbollah avenged Haniyeh’s death and that of Hezbollah leader Fuad Shoukour, who was killed by the Israeli army at almost the same time, by stepping up its attacks against Israel. In a sense, Iran’s restraint and hesitation in the aftermath of the Tehran assassination showed Israel that it has no intention of escalating the conflict and expanding the cycle of retaliation, but Israel has no intention of showing weakness and blaming Iran for Hezbollah’s intensified attacks.

Indeed, the death of the Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Abbas Nilforushan, on the battlefield in Lebanon shows the reality of Iran’s ties with Hezbollah and that Israel does not care whether Iran retaliates or not. Israel’s contempt for the “axis of resistance” in general, and for Iran in particular, is even more open this time, and Iran is cornered: Instead of avenging the death of its long-time ally Nasrallah, Iran must pay a blood debt to its own general Abbas Nilforushan. If nothing is done, Iran’s influence and appeal in the “axis of resistance” camp will be seriously weakened and it will even be seen as a “paper tiger” in the geopolitical game of the entire Middle East.

Following the deaths of Nasrallah and Nilforushan, various media outlets, citing alleged Iranian officials, reported that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei had been transferred to a safe location inside the country and that security measures had been tightened. Such reports are illogical and irrational, and more resemble an information and public opinion war created by Israel to damage Iran’s image. This is because, at least for the time being, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei will not be targeted by Israel for removal. At Haniyeh’s funeral on 1 August, Khamenei was reported to have looked up at the sky and feared a drone attack. All these so-called reports denigrating the Iranian leader are in fact designed to create panic and probe Iran’s lower limit in the face of Israel’s constant humiliation.

In any case, Nasrallah’s death is a severe blow to the Lebanese Hezbollah, which is struggling to choose and train a new leader, and it is doubtful who will be able to openly lead the battered Hezbollah and its armed forces in this period of crisis. Nilforushan’s death is a blow to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, but does Iran have the courage to attack US targets with missiles, as it did after the assassination of Soleimani? Will it symbolically attack Israel with missiles and drones, as it did after the bombing of its diplomatic offices in Syria?

If Iran fulfils its previous promises of revenge and retaliates in addition to the deaths of Nasrallah and Abbas Nilforushan, this will inevitably trigger an escalation of direct conflict with Israel. If Iran continues to make verbal threats, its geopolitical credibility will be severely undermined, which will mark a turning point for the “Axis of Resistance”: A coalition that is no match for Israel and, in particular, a new era in which the United States and other Western countries are determined to defend Israel’s security, while Arab countries generally remain on the sidelines.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not changed, the Lebanese-Israeli conflict has not changed, the Syrian-Israeli conflict has not changed and even the Iranian-Israeli conflict has not changed in essence, but the world has changed and the Middle East has changed.

Prof Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.