Targeting the Afghanistan minister for refugees and one of key members of the Haqqani network has generated a stock of questions. Since the return of Taliban into power Khalil Haqqani become third most important figure targeted by suicide bomber inside his most guarded ministerial complex at Kabul. In the wake of prolonged links, Pakistan is likely to face decline in its influence in war devastated Afghanistan.

Not only it claimed but even Taliban high command has blamed the Islamic States (IS) also called Daeesh terrorist for carrying out suicide attack against Khalil Haqqani. However, common men and analysts as well are in hunt of answers to queries pertained to honouring of IS militants on the soil of Afghanistan. It is no more secret that almost all hardline Islamists organs and individuals including al-Qaeda, Daeesh and others are benefitting no other than US lead allies. Rebellion against Syrian president Bashar Asad after Libyan leader Col Gaddafi has confirmed brain behind such so called Islamist groups. Whatever might be by Persian (Islamic Republic of Iran) establishment designs but its patronised Hammas and Hezbollah doing has made more strengthen US puppet Israel in the Middle East. 

Through different jihadic period, Pakistan has established unbeatable influence across Afghanistan.

Reaction of Kandaharis within Emirate Islami over murdering of Khalil Haqqani in a suicide attack is not encouraging. Not even a single top leader of Emirate Islamic turned up to the funeral of Khalil Haqqani which confirms rifts within Taliban ranks. Only foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi and Maulvi Abdul Kabir both from South-Eastern zone were amongst those who attended funeral or last rites of Khalil Haqqani who had accredited himself as pioneer of suicide bombers in the region. 

Rifts within Taliban ranks are not new but lingering on since mid of August 2021 last. At that time, Taliban high command had made up its mind for monopolising the government set up but opposed by none other than Khalil Haqqani. Even former Pakistan ISI chief Lt Gen (Retd) Faiz Hameed had also extended help to Khalil in this respect. Sirajuddin Haqqani who is leading the family and notorious Haqqani Network and less experienced and he was always guided by uncle Khalil Haqqani to right directions. Now when Khalil Haqqani is no more therefore Sirajuddin Haqqani would definitely face hardships.

Through different jihadic, militant and other individuals, Pakistan has established unbeatable influence across Afghanistan. Earlier, this influence has sustained first ever set back when the US established direct links with the Emirate Islami through Qatar. However, Pakistan succeeded in recovering such losses to some extent by exploiting geo-politico locations. But now the sudden death of Khalil Haqqani is likely to end Pakistan influence in Afghanistan as Khalil after his elder brother Jalaluddin Haqqani was considered most loyal and obedient to Rawalpindi-Islamabad.

All those played pivotal roles in the “Great Game” either lost their lives or end up in exile.

In the wake of recent developments in Syria, the US has confirmed its main role in Islamic world not only for safeguarding its own geo-strategic economic interests but also for making Israel safe and sound. On such ground, US lead allies are interested in further confining Russia to its own international border. Like hard line Islamist groups and individuals of Syria, US spy agencies eyeing and hopeful of a due role from al-Qaeda and IS lead Asian Islamic groups, camping across Afghanistan and its border regions along with Pakistan.

No one can deny the fact that Haqqanis are witnesses to prolonged war on the soil of Afghanistan. Almost all the eyewitnesses of this war have been eliminated. Khalil’s brutal killing is also considered in sequence or part of the move in progress against eyewitnesses of war on the soil of Afghanistan, declared a Great Game by former President Dr Najibullah little before signing of the Geneva Accord in 1988. All those who played pivotal roles in this great game have either lost their lives or are now unable to live inside the country with honour and peace.

The Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi with his Turkmenistan counterpart Rashid Murdov, had visited the construction site of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project near the common border between the two countries. During the visit, they reviewed the operational affairs of the TAPI pipeline, where both the officials discussed laying the railway track, optical fiber transfer and visa and transportation facilities.

Spokesman for the Afghan Foreign Ministry Hafiz Zia Ahmad said that the discussions “extended beyond the TAPI pipeline project to include the expansion of the railway, the construction of railway warehouses in Torghundi, the deployment of fiber optic networks, and the facilitation of visa issuance and transportation services.”

The Turkmen Foreign Minister provided a comprehensive briefing on the progress of the TAPI pipeline, the acceleration of construction activities, and the next steps in the Project, Zia said in a statement.

The $7 billion TAPI project will bring natural gas to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India

The $7 billion Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline, also known as Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, is a natural gas pipeline being developed by the Galkynysh – TAPI Pipeline Company Limited with the participation of the Asian Development Bank. The pipeline will transport natural gas from the Galkynysh Gas Field in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan and then to India. The official work on the project was opened on 13 December 2015 in Turkmenistan and the practical work in Afghanistan began on 11 September 2024.

The pipeline will have a capacity to carry 33 billion cubic meters of gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India through Afghanistan’s provinces of Herat, Farah, Helmand and Nimroz.

It is worth mentioning that the much-delayed project was first signed in 2010 but the work has been put on hold due to technical and financial complications. The work was also stalled due disagreement between the archrivals Pakistan and India. However, the four countries Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India agreed to work on the TAPI pipeline project

However, the work on the Afghan side remained stuck due to war and the Taliban’s war against the foreign forces and the Afghan regime in that time backed by the US. However, the Taliban resumed work on the TAPI following their victory and the escape of the then Afghan President Ashraf Ghani following the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan after 20 years of presence.

Taliban spokesman Zia Ahmad, said that Muttaqi and Murdov reaffirmed their commitment to expediting the TAPI project, expanding railway infrastructure, improving energy and transport services, and enhancing broader economic cooperation. He furthered that the technical teams will continue their engagements in Kabul and Ashgabat to achieve these objectives.

On 11 December, the Shanghai University, Institute of International Studies and the Center for Turkish Studies held a forum to discuss developments in Syria and the Middle East.

The forum discussed the changing situation in Syria and its impact on the balance of power in the region, the role of actors such as Türkiye, and the impact of Trump’s return to the White House on the political situation in the region.

Academics, researchers and students from different disciplines from more than 10 universities attended the forum.

Professor Guo Changgang, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and one of the university’s leading global experts, delivered the opening speech of the forum. Professor Guo emphasised that an important mission of regional studies is to play the role of a think tank. In this context, a special discussion session entitled “Theory and Practice of Regional Country Studies” was organised at the meeting. This session was not limited to the basic concepts of regional country studies, but instead focused on the specific “practice” and “case” analyses of this field.

Professor Guo pointed out that Donald Trump’s policy towards Türkiye in his first term directly led to the collapse of the Turkish Lira, and Türkiye is still unable to get out of this financial and economic quagmire. He also emphasised that Trump’s China policy in his first term triggered a trade war and China is still facing sanctions from the Biden administration. Therefore, he emphasised that Trump’s return to power would create great uncertainty for both China and Türkiye. Therefore, in the context of Trump’s second term, “it is particularly necessary to discuss China-Türkiye relations and Türkiye’s diplomatic issues,” he said.

The forum also included a round table discussion on the current situation in Syria and Türkiye for about 1.5 hours.

In this section, the speakers emphasised that the sudden changes in Syria were caused by three main factors:

1. Economic factors: Bashar al-Assad’s government faced Western sanctions and embargoes, while reduced economic aid from Russia and Iran led to economic crises and rapidly rising prices, allowing rebel forces to advance without effective resistance.
2. External factors: Iran, Russia and Hezbollah’s “foreign aid” to the Syrian government has decreased, while subversive interventions by actors such as Türkiye, the US, Israel and Ukraine have increased.
3. Military factors: Syrian government forces have undertaken military reforms and reduced the number of low-level officers. In response, the rebels gained experience in fighting abroad and started to use new tactics with drones.

Predictions that Syria will drill

Academics predict that the political transition in Syria will be challenging. Discussions on the establishment of a secular or religious state, a republic or a federal structure, and issues such as an Arab-led structure or Kurdish autonomy could lead to new tensions over power-sharing between Sunnis, Alawites and Kurds.

It was also pointed out that there is a risk of a new conflict in Syria. The danger of conflicts both between the organisations themselves and between Türkiye and Kurdish organisations was pointed out.

On the other hand, it was stated that Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Israel, based on their strategic interests, may actively cooperate with HTS, which overthrew the government of Bashar al-Assad.

Conflicts between the US and Russia, Russia and Turkey, Iran and Israel, Iran and Israel, Türkiye and the Gulf Arab states, and tensions between secularism and religion, terrorism and counter-terrorism were predicted to continue.

Some academics emphasised that it is uncertain whether Syria will resemble the Iraq or Libya model, but that it could become a new area of competition between the great powers. Others argued that international and regional rivalries have diminished since 2011 and that the Syrian crisis is unlikely to spread beyond the country.

Türkiye’s situation: Big gains or new challenges?

The debate on this topic centred on Türkiye’s role in the changes in Syria. Some noted that the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government made Türkiye a “big winner”. At a time when the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” is in decline and Israel’s negative image is spreading, Türkiye has gained a strategic advantage. It was also noted that the decline in the overall influence of extra-regional powers in the Middle East has also created an advantageous situation for Türkiye

The speakers agreed that China should establish closer relations with Türkiye.

However, some academics argued that despite the gains Türkiye has made, it faces the fear of a “counter-move” and that its problems have only just begun.

The problems Türkiye may face in the future were listed as follows:

• Will it invest more in the reconstruction of Syria, or will it not be able to afford to do so (due to lack of funds) and leave the process alone?
• How will he coordinate relations between Syria and the West?
• How will it address the concerns of other parties?

It was also mentioned that Türkiye might be dragged into a more passive position on the Syrian issue in the future.

Middle East policies under Donald Trump

It was stated that the Middle East will face a new test with the return of Donald Trump to the White House in January.

It was noted that the Middle East policies of the Donald Trump 2.0 era will be influenced by Trump’s general goals based on the “America First” principle, the continuation of the Middle East policies of the 1.0 era and current developments.

While it was emphasised that Trump’s general goal was to revitalise the economy and international position by applying the “America First” principle, it was assessed that in the Middle East, this meant reducing direct military expenditures, but strengthening a strategy against Russia and China, and preventing economic cooperation and high-tech projects.

It was noted that Trump’s “three axes” policy from the 1.0 era is likely to continue: The suppression of forces obstructing US domination, the weakening of actors supporting Iran and the “axis of resistance”, and the fight against the “Islamic State”. Three moves were envisaged in this direction: Support for Israel, rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and furthering the alliance strategy.

While Trump’s pro-Israel bias is expected to end the current conflict cycle quickly and in favour of Israel, it is unlikely to offer a just solution to the Palestinian issue.

As for Iran, a new policy of “maximum pressure”, tougher economic sanctions and possible military threats were foreseen.
Scholars at the meeting noted that Trump’s Middle East policy in the 2.0 era presents both challenges and opportunities for China.

China can strengthen its security and economic ties in a targeted manner, open up new areas, and diplomatically increase its efforts on regional hot topics and play a mediating role.