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2025 will be a year of hard choices for Iran

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What we have seen in Iran in the past year is more than a European will see in his whole life. I read this sentence on an Iranian’s X (formerly Twitter) page a few months ago. Interestingly, on my last trip to Iran, a taxi driver said exactly the same thing and mentioned that he was tired of reading the news.

Indeed, Iran has experienced such extraordinary times in the past year that this year can be described as the longest for the country in several decades. Any one of the events Iranians experienced in 2024 would have been a historic milestone for any country. But in 2024, Iran experienced all these events together.

Perhaps the most important feature of 2024 is that the problems experienced will be carried over to 2025 without the slightest solution. This makes it uncertain whether Iranians will have a calmer year next year than they did in 2024.

So, what were the most important events in Iran last year?

Domestic politics:

Parliamentary elections:

The 12th Majlis elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran were held on 1 March 2024 and as expected, the conservatives managed to gain a majority in the Majlis. Only 40 per cent of eligible voters turned out for the election, the lowest turnout in the political history of the Islamic Republic. This was a major turning point in the political history of post-revolutionary Iran. Opponents saw it as a symbol of popular disenchantment with Iran’s current political system, while the pro-government camp interpreted it as a message of protest from the Iranian people to the government.

The disqualification of many reformists, and even critical conservative parliamentary candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, preventing them from taking part in the elections, was seen as the main reason for these political reactions. The poor economic situation was also seen as another reason.

Many believed that the 12th Parliament was designed to be the most harmonious and cooperative with the government of then President Ibrahim Raisi. The extremely low voter turnout in large cities and the higher turnout in smaller cities was interpreted as an indication of changes in the political sociology of Iranian society.

Election of the Assembly of Experts:

Simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, the Iranian people elected 88 mujtahids, whose nominations had been approved by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, to the sixth term of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-e Khobregan).

According to Article 107 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Assembly of Experts is made up of ‘qualified’ faqihs who are responsible for electing and dismissing the Leader and monitoring his conduct. Each term of this Assembly lasts 8 years and is of particular importance as it is responsible for overseeing the behavior of the Leader and, in the event of the death of the current Leader, selecting the next Leader.

Many believe that given the age of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran is likely to be elected by the members of the Assembly of Experts in its sixth term. Therefore, the Assembly of Experts elections in this term are more important than in previous terms.

Perhaps because of this importance, the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, which is tasked with approving the nominations of representatives to the Assembly of Experts, has conducted a very strict vetting process this term, rejecting the nominations of those who have previously served multiple terms in the Assembly of Experts, such as former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

It is believed that this strict vetting process was carried out in order to create a more unified structure in the Assembly of Experts and to minimize controversy and disagreement in the selection of the next Leader.

Death of the President

On 19 May, when all the news agencies were analysing the end of the political stalemate between the two neighbouring countries following the inauguration of the joint Kizil Kalesi border dam in the presence of the Iranian and Azerbaijani presidents, the news suddenly broke of the ’emergency landing of the presidential helicopter’.

An hour later, it was discovered that the communication line of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and the accompanying delegation had been cut. Also, on board the helicopter was Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahiyan, Governor of East Azerbaijan Malik Rahmati, Governor-Faqih Representative of East Azerbaijan Province Seyyed Mohammad Ali Al-Hashim, Commander of the Presidential Protection Unit and three pilots.

The rescue operation was hampered by the dense forest and poor weather conditions (rain and dense fog). Various drones, search and rescue teams and trained search dogs were used, and it took 15 hours to obtain definitive information on the condition of the President and his entourage. The news of the President’s death was finally confirmed the following morning.

The president’s death came at a time when he was seen as one of the contenders for the future leadership of Iran, and many believed that the new Majlis would give full support to his government.

On the one hand, the death has led to foreign policy uncertainties at a time of escalating tensions between Iran and Israel over events in Gaza, and on the other it has raised the possibility of an assassination attempt on the president. Although the official state reports have explained that the main cause of the helicopter crash was dense fog and bad weather conditions, the public is not convinced by the following questions Why did only the helicopter carrying the President and the Foreign Minister crash, and why was the helicopter not located for 15 hours?

Early presidential elections:

Following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, presidential elections were held with 6 candidates, based on Article 131 of the Iranian Constitution, which stipulates that “in cases such as the death, resignation, illness or dismissal of the President of the Republic, the interim Presidential Council is obliged to ensure the election of a new President within fifty days at the latest, and during this period it assumes the presidential powers except for the referendum”.

This election was also overshadowed by the process of eliminating candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution. One reformist candidate stood against 5 conservative candidates. Many prominent figures from the reformist or moderate conservative wing were disqualified and could not take part in the elections. From the reformist wing, only Masoud Pezeshkian, former Minister of Health and a member of the cabinet of Mohammad Khatami, the leading figure of the reformist movement, managed to participate in the elections.

Pezeshkian won 53.6% of the vote, defeating his ultra-conservative rival Said Jalili, and was elected president. He campaigned on promises to abolish the morality police, economic reforms and a diplomatic opening.

The reformist movement continues to support Pezeshkian’s presidency, viewing the conservative representatives in parliament as a minority elected with little public participation. However, according to the election results, Pezeshkian received the direct support of only 25% of the population. The success or failure of the Pezeshkian government will be discussed in another article.

Ongoing economic crisis:

In 2024, as in previous years, Iran continued to struggle with the economic crisis. The value of the national currency fell by 100% in one year, and the inflation rate continued to hover around 40%, according to the Central Bank. This situation has become a chronic disease of the Iranian economy. From 2020 to the end of 2024, the value of the Iranian national currency fell from 13,000 to 89,000 divisions to $1. In other words, Iranians have seen their currency depreciate by more than 600 per cent in the last five years, with a significant portion of this loss occurring in the last year. Most worryingly, there is no hope that this situation will improve.

The devaluation of the national currency and the resulting inflation and uncontrolled price increases have fueled public discontent, which has only deepened over time.

Energy crisis:

Another issue that has emerged as a major concern in Iran since the summer of this year and has been at the top of the agenda in recent weeks is the energy shortage and the inability of the country’s electricity and gas infrastructure to meet demand. Iran faced frequent electricity and water shortages this summer and repeated power cuts in the winter. The energy crisis has also resulted in air pollution due to the irregular operation of power plants, which has caused and continues to cause environmental crises.

Experts believe that the lack of infrastructure investment in the country’s energy sector, especially the heavy sanctions and mismanagement by government officials in recent years, are the main reasons for this situation. This problem is likely to become more complex in the coming year, with significant social and political consequences.

Improvement in civil liberties:

With a reformist president in power and given the significant protests in Iran last year over the headscarf issue, state repression of women’s dress appears to have decreased significantly in 2024. In recent weeks, some popular messaging apps that were blocked last year have been made available, signaling an improvement in civil liberties.

Foreign policy:

Throughout 2024, Iran’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the Gaza war. The escalation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza in the early months of the year, and their escalation into an unprecedented genocide, showed that the conflict would be protracted and would have consequences for Iran.

As the war dragged on, analyses in Iran fell into two main groups: The first group argued that Iran should not fall into Israel’s war trap. According to this group, by provoking Iran, Israel was trying to turn the war in Gaza from a confrontation with the defenseless people of Gaza into a confrontation with Iran. In this way, Israel would be able to ignore its genocidal crimes in Gaza and win the support of an international coalition from the United States and Europe by portraying itself as the victim. This group argued that Iran should engage in a minimal conflict with Israel and that Israel should not be allowed to draw Iran into a wider war. They saw Iran’s current economic difficulties, popular dissatisfaction with the government, the death of the president and internal political changes, possible attacks on Iran’s oil infrastructure and the cutting off of Iran’s main sources of income as the main reasons for avoiding war.

The second group argued that Israel had decided to destroy Iran’s influence in the Middle East and that Iran should inflict heavy blows on Israel. According to them, if Iran did not react seriously against Israel, it would pay a much higher price for this war in the future. This group believed that by inflicting heavy blows on Israel, Iran would be making a strategic choice between life and death, but that avoiding conflict with Israel would lead to an inevitable collapse in the future. This group argued that Iran was capable of striking hard blows against Israel, that Iran had demonstrated its technological capability in ballistic missile attacks, and that it could provide an important deterrent against Israel by shifting its nuclear strategy towards the production and testing of atomic bombs.

The events of the past year show that Iran has favored the view of the first group but has not refrained from some attacks against Israel.

The main developments in Iran’s foreign policy over the past year can be summarized as follows:

First military operation against Israel: The conflict between Iran and Israel has been going on at the security level or through proxy groups for the past few decades. However, on 14 April 2024, Iran finally carried out a direct missile operation in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This operation was dubbed “Operation True Promise-1”. The operation has been described as the first direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the world’s largest drone strike, and the largest missile strike in Iran’s history.

In Operation True Promise, Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles into the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. Some of these missiles are said to have penetrated Israel’s defense systems and hit important military targets such as the Nevatim airbase.

The operation was carried out in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces made it clear that the reason for this operation was that Israel had crossed Iran’s red lines and attacked the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Seven people were killed in this Israeli attack, including Mohammad Reza Zahidi, a senior commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

Iran’s mission to the UN stated that this military operation was carried out under the right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Many experts have said that this operation was not intended to harm Israel, but rather to demonstrate Iran’s ability to overcome Israel’s missile defense systems and its ability to deliver a direct blow to Israel.

Assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran:

Ismail Haniyeh, head of the political bureau of Hamas and one of its leaders, was assassinated by Israel on 31 July 2024 at 01:37 in Tehran, accompanied by his bodyguard. Haniyeh was assassinated as he was returning to an accommodation centre of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards after attending the swearing-in ceremony of Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian.

As well as being a major security disaster for the Iranian security services, it meant that Israel had crossed every possible red line. The assassination was seen as a serious loss of face for Iran.

Operation True Promise:

On 1 October 2024, Iran carried out a second missile attack against Israel, Operation True Promise-2. This attack came two months after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and in the wake of increased Israeli attacks on Hezbollah’s command center. In particular, it was carried out four days after an airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah Southern Front Commander Ali Kirki and Deputy Operations Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Abbas Nilforshan.

The operation involved the launch of 200 ballistic missiles, hypersonic Fateh and Khybershiken missiles from areas around Tehran, Kashan, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Kermanshah.

This operation was seen as a real show of Iranian strength against Israel and created an important national unity in Iranian society. Iranians, regardless of their political and ideological affiliations, saw this operation as an act of defending their national honor.

Israel’s attack on Iran:

On 26 October 2024, Israel launched three waves of air strikes on Iran under the name of “Operation Days of Penance”. These strikes continued throughout the night and into the morning in several Iranian provinces, causing limited damage according to Iranian officials. Israel said the strikes were in response to ‘months of continuous attacks’ by Iran and its proxies, as well as Iran’s rocket attack on Israel in October 2024. In this operation, 4 members of the Iranian air defense forces were killed.

Although this attack caused no visible destruction in Iran, it was seen as a new page in the history of the Iran-Israel conflict, as it was the first time that Israel had launched a direct military attack on Iranian territory.

The nuclear impasse continues:

Although the confrontation between Iran and Israel has overshadowed attention to the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran faces a dangerous reality: According to the 10-year agreement adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015, if Iran is found to be in violation of the nuclear deal, previous UN sanctions can be automatically reimposed within 60 days at the request of any permanent member if the 5+1 Commission notifies the UN Security Council.

As the 10-year term of the nuclear deal nears its end, European countries and the United States are seeking to accuse Iran of violating its nuclear commitments, thereby portraying Iran as a threat to global security and seeking to reinstate UN sanctions. A few weeks ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi described this situation as a potential crisis for Iran and warned that it could have serious consequences for Iran. (It is not a far-fetched prediction that we will hear much more in the coming months about the automatic sanctions mechanism known as the ‘trigger mechanism’ or ‘snapback’).

This situation will be further complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump as US President.

Weakening regional position:

Although Israel failed to make noteworthy progress on the ground in Lebanon and was forced to retreat, it managed to deal a major strategic blow to the Lebanese resistance and thus to Iran by assassinating the Hezbollah leadership. The subsequent departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from the political scene and the rise to power of anti-Iranian groups in Syria meant that Iran severed its land link with Hezbollah and weakened its logistical support line to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other resistance groups. These developments weaken Iran’s regional position and power and will continue to force Iran to seriously reconsider its regional policies.

Throughout 2024, Iran managed to end the year without a major crisis, although it had an eventful year in domestic politics. However, Iran faced serious crises in its foreign policy, which will lead to a future change in Iran’s regional and international policies. This political change will also mean a change in the actions of some groups associated with Iran, leading to new developments in regional dynamics.

2025 will undoubtedly be a challenging and volatile year for Iran and a year of difficult choices.

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Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia

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Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.

An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.

The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.

Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.

Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.

The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.

Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.

The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.

Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.

In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.

Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.

Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:

  1. Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
  2. Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
  3. Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
  4. Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.

The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.

Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).

Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.

Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.

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Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.

In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored

The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.

Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.

At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.

Why Egypt?

Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.

This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.

According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.

This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.

Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios

At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.

The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.

This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.

A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies

This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”

Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.

A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.

The Messages Behind the Attack

Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.

For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.

For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.

Egypt’s Official Response

The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.

The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”

Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.

This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.

Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.

The Impact on Global Energy Markets

The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.

Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.

The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.

What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?

First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.

Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.

Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.

Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.

Conclusion

The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.

References:

1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro

2- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-confirms-drone-caused-fire-two-gas-vessels-damietta-2026-07-30/

3- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-hits-gas-storage-tanker-egypts-mediterranean-port-2026-07-29/

4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html

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Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism

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Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.

The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.

Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…

The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.

Why?

Because of this:

Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.

According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.

Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.

In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.

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