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“New Syria” begins a new era of national reconstruction amid challenges

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On New Year’s Day 2025, Syrian transitional government Foreign Minister Assad Shibani arrived in Riyadh at the invitation of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, marking his first diplomatic visit. This visit is a reciprocal gesture following the Saudi delegation’s visit to Damascus last week, showcasing to the world that “New Syria” is moving away from the dark era of war and embarking on a new chapter of national reconstruction.

At the onset of the Syrian crisis 13 years ago, Saudi Arabia led the Arab League in cooperation with Western nations in an attempt to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime to dismantle the “Shiite Crescent,” which was perceived as a strategic threat. This effort failed as the rise of ISIS became the top international threat, and Russia, along with the Shiite Crescent, successfully preserved Assad’s rule. Syrian-Saudi relations hit rock bottom and only began to recover in 2023 when Saudi Arabia and Iran ended their sectarian disputes and normalized relations. However, before these ties fully normalized, the Assad regime rapidly collapsed.

As the international community subtly acknowledged Syria’s new government—especially after both the Shiite Crescent and the Resistance Axis faltered—Syria and Saudi Arabia found a historic opportunity for structural realignment. Saudi Arabia quickly became the top regional partner of the Syrian transitional government. This cooperation is mutually beneficial and logical, as neither Saudi Arabia nor the new Syrian regime are natural allies of Iran. The closeness and potential alliance between “New Syria” and Saudi Arabia, the leading Arab nation, will further consolidate Arab unity and diminish Iranian and Shiite influence.

The Syrian Foreign Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia signifies a key move by the transitional government to open a new chapter. It sends a practical message to the outside world about the desire to end war and conflict, seek internal reconciliation and stability, and rebuild national governance, society, and the economy, as well as rejoin the international community. This visit also serves as a test for the new governance and diplomatic philosophy of the leader Ahmed Shara (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), making it particularly noteworthy.

Last week, Saudi state television “Al Arabiya” aired a half-hour interview with Shara. The controversial figure, once clad in military gear, appeared in a suit, spoke elegantly, and demonstrated fluent, standard Arabic with composure and confidence. His governance ideas and strategic planning impressed viewers, but his signature beard served as a reminder of his origins linked to Al-Qaeda.

Shara reflected on his governance experience in Idlib, emphasizing that toppling Assad required not only military strength but also mobilizing civilian forces to minimize destruction and casualties. He underscored efforts to engage with the previous regime, including Assad himself, to ensure a smooth transition of power. Although Shara acknowledged that the “Idlib experience” might not fully apply to the complexities of all of Syria, the transitional government is willing to unite different factions under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, address the interests of various ethnic groups, restore order, and establish a national unity government based on constitutional reforms or a new constitution. A population census and general elections will follow to facilitate the return of 15 million displaced Syrians.

Shara acknowledged the diverse forces involved in Syria and stressed the importance of developing bilateral relations with all parties based on mutual respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This includes recognizing Syria’s historical ties with Russia and urging the U.S. to lift the “Caesar Act” sanctions to ease Syria’s economic hardships. He also highlighted the need to address Turkey’s control over northern territories but avoided more sensitive issues like the fate of the Golan Heights, relations with Israel, and complete disengagement from terrorism. However, he made it clear that ending Iran’s long-standing influence in Syria was a top priority.

As a Sunni Muslim—representing 80% of Syria’s population—Shara emphasized the role of Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states. He linked Syria’s security and stability to the Gulf’s prosperity and expressed hope that these countries would play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction and share in the benefits. Shara revealed that he had extensively studied Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and admired its economic diversification efforts. He welcomed Saudi participation in major Syrian reconstruction projects and infrastructure investments, reflecting a clear strategic direction in his choice of Saudi Arabia for his first diplomatic visit. This signaled that “New Syria” aligns with the Arab world and mainstream Sunni leadership, seeking Gulf Arab states’ support for stability and recovery.

Less than a month after the opposition coalition, led by Shara, seized power in Damascus, they initiated dialogue, reconciliation, and measures to dissolve armed factions and unify national forces. They also began negotiations with Kurdish forces in the northeast and Druze leaders. The transitional government declared that “New Syria” would not adopt the federalism favored by some Kurds but would retain a highly centralized republic.

Upon capturing Damascus on December 8, the transitional government appointed Mohamed Bashir, a technocrat widely accepted by the opposition, as Prime Minister. Former President Assad, in exile in Moscow, announced his resignation and called for a peaceful transfer of power. Diplomatic transitions occurred smoothly, ensuring the continuity of Syrian representation internationally.

To foster “New Syria’s” reconstruction, Shara announced plans to dissolve his core military force, the “Syrian Sham Liberation Army,” at a national dialogue conference, paving the way for the integration of all factions into the national army. He outlined a three-year plan for constitutional reform and a four-year timeline for general elections, prioritizing legal reconstruction and restoring order.

Although the international community was surprised by Assad’s rapid fall and remains wary of Shara’s past ties to terrorism, they pragmatically accepted the transitional government. Like Afghanistan’s Taliban, conditions for diplomatic recognition include protecting minority and women’s rights, forming an inclusive government, and severing ties with terrorism. However, unlike the Taliban, Syria’s new government has quickly engaged with the international community, highlighting Syria’s strategic importance in the region.

The Syrian transitional government faces the common tasks of all new governments in war-torn countries, namely the three major reconstructions: security reconstruction, political reconstruction, and economic reconstruction. For “New Syria,” security reconstruction is clearly the top priority, which involves achieving a genuine and comprehensive ceasefire, integrating all armed factions into the national armed forces, ending armed divisions, restoring full peace and security, and ensuring the free flow of people, goods, and particularly humanitarian supplies.

Political reconstruction, which is a more long-term and fundamental task, depends on the success of security reconstruction. This includes conducting political dialogues under the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, forming a coalition government with broad representation, and drafting or amending a new constitution through comprehensive consultation, public opinion solicitation, and the guidance of legal experts. Subsequently, nationwide elections will be organized based on the new constitution and an authoritative, reliable, and updated population census, resulting in unified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Achieving this step is expected to take three to five years.

Political reconstruction represents a fragile and sensitive transitional phase that will test the ability of various factions to compromise and reconcile their political demands, national identity, and ethnic identity. It will challenge the transitional government in managing the “dual legacy” of Arab nationalism and the Ba’ath Party ideology, which has governed Syria for over half a century. The goal is to avoid the tragic scenario seen in Iraq, where the new government, after Saddam Hussein’s fall, hastily disbanded the national defense forces and purged the Ba’ath Party, leading to nationwide chaos. If this transitional phase is not carefully navigated, “New Syria” risks falling into the kind of decade-long civil war experienced by Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, escalating into a “small world war” or “Syria War 3.0,” thereby destroying the historical opportunity to build and shape “New Syria” and plunging an entire generation back into bloodshed and conflict. During this phase, lifting the Syrian people out of hunger and poverty and enabling them to live and work in peace is crucial. This will depend not only on the wisdom and leadership of the transitional government but also on the generous assistance and strong support of the international community.

Economic reconstruction is not only an urgent task for “New Syria” but also a long, arduous mission that will follow security and political reconstruction. To some extent, it is the fundamental guarantee for the long-term stability of Syria’s security and political systems. Had the Assad regime successfully stabilized the economy, people’s livelihoods, and the military over the past four years, the opposition forces would not have been able to overthrow decades of rule in just 12 days. The failure to fundamentally address economic and livelihood issues ultimately made the Assad government the fifth “domino” to fall 13 years after the Arab Spring erupted, following the collapses of strongman regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. This outcome underscores the Assad regime’s failure to learn from the painful lessons of those countries.

The Syrian transitional government has inherited a war-torn nation in disarray and deep crisis, but it has also ushered in a new era for “New Syria.” Whether Syria can ultimately be rebuilt into an independent, free, democratic, inclusive, stable, developing nation with full sovereignty and territorial integrity will be determined by time.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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