Asia
Conflict among the leaders
From the recent statements and positions of Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, it appears that he has now become the “nose hair” of the Taliban, especially the leader of this group. Since Stanekzai is also a senior member of the Taliban, his statements have become the headlines of the Afghan media and beyond.
From what Stanekzai says, nothing can be understood except that the Taliban group is not unified as it appears and suffers from internal strife. A conflict that may become more intense. A new and unconfirmed news that has leaked out indicates the escalation of the conflict – Stankzai has fled to Dubai.
It is said that he was sentenced to arrest by the Taliban leader because of his statements. But with the help of other officials of this group, he managed to leave. Of course, after the publication of this news, Stanikzai announced that he was going to rest for a few days without specifying his location. His resting place is not known: Dubai or Kabul?
Of course, talk about the fragmentation of the Taliban had also been raised before, especially after Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, the former minister of refugee, was assassinated.
More importantly, the replacement of Maulvi Abdul Kabir instead of Haqqani, in which he is also not going to the Ministry of Migration while accepting this position has strengthened the speculations that the Taliban is not unified. But the thing that tore the veil of ambiguity and revealed more things and made the internal rivalry of the Taliban a matter of course in the eyes of many, is Stanekzai’s positions and what is going to happen to him.
There are some points need more considerations
First:
Stanekzai’s criticism of the Taliban leader is not new – with the difference that recently his tone has become more naked compared to the past, to the extent that he has provided many reasons for astonishment. Meanwhile, the mildness of the Taliban leader towards his statements is questionable. In the situation where the rest of the authorities of this group summarize the level of obedience to Mullah Hebatullah Akhundzadeh as “the obedience like a dead”.
So far, Stanekzai has not been arrested nor has any restrictions been placed on his work – rather, with a stronger presence than before in Taliban circles, he has criticized the behavior of his leader towards the education of girls.
Therefore, it is possible that the fight between Stanekzai and the leader is a fabrication as they want to show that there are different views within the Taliban regime, and that its owners have complete freedom in expressing their opinion and are not reprimanded for what they say.
Here, seducing the international community is the goal – it does not seem difficult. If not, considering the rigid and inflexible nature of the Taliban regime, criticism of its members against Mullah Hebatullah is apparently not possible, unless the critic wants to say goodbye to the regime or, in the most pessimistic case, to his life.
Second:
It can be the opposite of the first case – this means that the leader of the Taliban is not able to control Stanekzai. If so, then he is not alone and is definitely being led by a branch of the Taliban. It may benefit from the support of some countries, organizations and foreign personalities.
For example, every time Stanekzai has criticized his leader, Zalamy Khalilzad, the architect of the Doha agreement, has supported him by tweeting and calling it beneficial to remove the Taliban, who are called “pragmatic”. Now that Donald Trump is in the White House, Khalilzad’s statements are a “strong support” for those Taliban officials who were with him in Doha.
Therefore, when Stanekzai is not alone, it is difficult to take action to restrain him. If Mullah Hebatullah does not stop again, it will be inevitable that the tension between the Taliban will increase too much. Something that can sound the alarm of collapse.
Third:
If we look carefully, no factor can weaken the Taliban or shorten the life of this group’s regime as much as internal differences. For this reason, all Taliban officials in their speeches emphasize internal unity and unquestioning obedience to their emir (supreme leader), even Stankzai who is famous for criticizing his leader.
In his recent speech in Kandahar, Mullah Hebatullah warned Taliban members not to be afraid of foreign pressure but to avoid internal differences. Of course, when the Taliban authorities find out that criticizing their leader affects the survival of their regime, they will hold their tongues and do what the supreme leader says.
When the Taliban are caught in internal conflict, the countries that are walking with crutches in the face of this group will find a means to exert pressure. In the meantime, figures from the Taliban who are considered “practical” come to their work. Of course, the story of supporting the opposition forces of the Taliban, who call themselves democratic and alternative to this group, is not included – because in the past three years, they haven’t done even a minimum to restore their reputation and discredit their competitors.
If the internal conflict of the Taliban increases to such an extent that the disaffected members of this group leave Afghanistan willingly or by force, the work will be easier for the world – because the disaffected Taliban get a free platform abroad and regardless of internal pressure, they expose their leader to more pressure, which will have these two consequences: 1 – Mullah Hebatullah tries to obtain the satisfaction of the disaffected and facilitate their safe return to Afghanistan, which will lead to maintaining the internal unity of the Taliban, but with minimal adjustments in form and substance.
2- it does not value the disaffected, and the world paves the ground for dialogue between them and the opposing forces of the Taliban, and the space for the creation of an inclusive government opens up more than in the past. Of course, the second option seems out of reach for now, unless the number of disgruntled Taliban is added. Therefore, the Taliban will try their best to keep Stanekzai alone and not to become “nose hair”.
Fourth:
If we pay close attention, Stanekzai’s frank criticisms are out of goodwill for the Taliban. In the sense that the regime considers the life of this group to depend on Mullah Hebatullah’s change in behavior, not on his broadening the range of restrictions and prohibitions on women’s lives.
Stanekzai is not seeking to establish a comprehensive democratic government in which human rights, elections, inclusion of all ethnic groups, etc,,, are ensured, rather, it is only attached to the education of girls, because of the apparent sensitivity of Westerners on the issue. Stanekzai in his statement said that [only] banning girls from education caused the world to turn against the Taliban. That is, there is no challenge in other fields and the situation is completely as intended.
The result is that the internal conflict of the Taliban is not serious enough to make the leader of this group reconsider his behavior. More importantly, Stankzai will not do anything on his own, except to expose the conflict. In any case, we have to wait and see what the level and depth of the conflict is, what direction it will take, how much the countries are looking for profit and where the story of the Afghanistan case will reach.
Asia
China outpaces India in race for Russian crude oil supplies
China has accelerated its crude oil purchases from Russia to replace oil shipments originating from the Middle East.
According to a Reuters report based on data from energy analytics firm Kpler, China is outpacing India in the Russian oil market.
India’s crude imports from Russia’s European ports fell by approximately 30% in August.
Beijing’s increased purchases could curb India’s exports of refined petroleum products and consequently trigger a diesel and gasoline shortage across Asia.
While China previously favoured ESPO blend crude shipped from Russia’s Asian ports, the share of its purchases from Russia’s European ports, consisting primarily of the Urals grade, has climbed to 31%.
Russian crude imports by India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, dropped to 1.87 million barrels per day in August. This volume remained well below the 2.79 million barrels per day recorded in July.
Under this scenario, which poses a risk to the Asian region, India stands as the region’s largest exporter of diesel and gasoline.
However, the country’s total crude imports in August were recorded at 4.17 million barrels per day. This figure marked the lowest level since the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East.
If the tightening raw material supply prevents Indian refineries from maintaining processing throughput, a severe deficit in refined products could emerge across the Asian market starting in September.
The Times of India previously reported that India’s Russian crude imports reached their highest share since 2022 in July.
During that period, Russia supplied more than half of India’s total crude imports of just over 5 million barrels per day, delivering 2.8 million barrels per day.
At the end of July, the Russian government extended its temporary export ban on gasoline, diesel, and other fuel types until 31 January 2027.
Under the restrictions that took effect on 1 August, direct exports of diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils by refiners will be exempted starting 1 September.
Bloomberg reported in June that Russian Urals crude was being sold in India at a $3.90 discount per barrel against international benchmarks after a hiatus of more than two months.
Urals crude traded at a discount again on 29 May for the first time since mid-March.
According to The Times of India, however, this discount on Russian Urals crude had almost entirely evaporated by early August.
Asia
Japan sharpens defense posture while strengthening Turkish ties
In an extensive interview on the Harici YouTube channel hosted by journalist Elif Ilhamoglu, Asia-Pacific research specialist and journalist Mehmet Asil Gonultas provided a comprehensive analysis of East Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.
Focusing on the newly released 2026 Japanese Defence White Paper, Tokyo’s military posture, foreign policy recalibrations under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and expanding bilateral ties with Turkiye, Gonultas detailed how systemic anxieties regarding China, Russia, and North Korea are reshaping the region.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats”
Addressing the release of Japan’s updated national security strategy document, Gonultas noted that the nearly 600-page publication represents the longest and most assertive security outline produced by Tokyo to date. He underscored that the tone toward regional competitors has hardened markedly compared to previous editions.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats in this year’s document,” Gonultas said. “Regarding Russia, the text explicitly characterizes its military presence on the contested Kuril Islands as an occupation, particularly following the recent visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to one of the islands. North Korea is evaluated through the operational lens of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Pyongyang is actively refining its military capabilities, deploying personnel, utilizing drones, and gaining battle-tested experience in an active combat zone.”
Gonultas explained that the characterization of Beijing as a deteriorating security risk reflects a trajectory that has intensified steadily over recent years. “While China has been identified as a primary security concern since at least 2022, the rhetorical severity increases with every iteration. This year’s assessment is the heaviest yet, directly mirroring the firm posture of the state,” he stated.
Contrasting the current administration with former leadership, Gonultas remarked, “Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated a relatively moderate approach, maintaining that Japan and China must find ways to coexist peacefully given their geographic reality. However, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted an uncompromising stance toward Beijing even prior to assuming office.”
He noted that Beijing’s actions have reinforced Tokyo’s apprehensions: “Beijing continuously provides justification for this stance. During recent missile testings, Beijing claimed to have informed Japan in advance, but Tokyo clarified that notice was provided merely 30 minutes prior to launch, emphasizing that no formal permission was granted. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels regularly test boundaries in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese warship recently targeted a Japanese fighter jet with a guidance laser. The white paper explicitly argues that China’s actual military expenditures significantly exceed its publicly declared defense budget.”
Following the publication of the document, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense swiftly issued formal condemnations, accusing Tokyo of fanning regional tensions and reverting to historic militarism. “China reacted directly by asserting that this document reflects rising Japanese militarism,” Gonultas said. “In response, Tokyo points to China’s rapid rearmament, its inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking Japanese territory, its maritime incursions, and its anti-aircraft capabilities targeting Japanese military aviation.”
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons”
Turning to the structural and military capabilities outlined in the white paper, Gonultas clarified that Tokyo is prioritizing high-technology defense systems and diplomatic-economic integration rather than unconventional deterrence.
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Gonultas emphasized, addressing recent media speculation surrounding defense policy debates. “While domestic discussions on nuclear deterrence surfaced during the era of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, implementing such a policy remains politically impossible. Regardless of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority, strong internal factions vehemently oppose the concept. When Abe tentatively raised the question of nuclear deterrence after leaving office, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately rejected the notion. Kishida, who remains an influential parliamentary figure, reaffirmed only recently that Japan must unconditionally oppose nuclear armament.”
Clarifying recent remarks made by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi regarding the public taboo surrounding nuclear debates, Gonultas observed, “The prohibition against discussing nuclear weapons is not a formal statutory ban, but rather a deeply ingrained societal consensus. The public remains firmly opposed to even raising the topic. Defense Minister Koizumi, whose personal popularity has risen significantly among right-wing factions since taking office, uses this rhetoric largely as a political signaling strategy to consolidate his base as he positions himself for a future prime ministerial run.”
Gonultas outlined Tokyo’s actual defense investments, highlighting unmanned systems and domestic defense manufacturing. “Japan’s primary technological focus centers on advanced drone infrastructure,” he stated. “Furthermore, Japan has revised its historical restrictions on arms exports. While the constitution was previously interpreted to ban the export of lethal weaponry—limiting sales strictly to search-and-rescue or non-lethal equipment—legislative shifts now permit defensive exports, provided they are directed toward allied nations that are not actively engaged in armed conflict.”
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China”
Evaluating Tokyo’s strategic dependence on Washington, Gonultas emphasized that Japan’s defense planners view the US alliance as indispensable for national survival.
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China’s sheer scale,” Gonultas stated. “This fundamental reality forces Japanese policymakers to maintain flawless relations with Washington at all costs. Recently, when a US serviceman was implicated in an assault incident on Okinawa Island, Defense Minister Koizumi explicitly declined to criticize the US military, drawing sharp domestic backlash. Yet, this reflects Tokyo’s overriding priority: retaining the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.”
“Both the Japanese government and the general public harbour deep anxieties regarding Chinese intentions, particularly concerning a potential military move against Taiwan,” Gonultas continued. “Should China blockade or seize Taiwan, Japan’s vital maritime trade routes would be compromised at Beijing’s discretion. Aside from the United States, no regional power possesses the capacity to offer meaningful deterrence.”
Gonultas added that this strategic anxiety has intensified under the current US administration. “Japanese planners are operating under immense pressure to keep US President Donald Trump fully committed to regional security, even as Washington signals potential adjustments to its military posture, including reductions in joint exercises with South Korea,” he noted. “To build a broader network of deterrence, Tokyo is actively cultivating overlapping bilateral and trilateral security partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, India, and South Korea, aiming to anchor US power within the region.”
“Constitutional limits restrict Japanese forces to purely defensive operations”
Addressing whether growing regional friction could lead to direct military confrontations, Gonultas pointed to the legal constraints governing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
“The likelihood of Japan initiating or engaging in direct offensive conflict remains minimal,” Gonultas stated. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution explicitly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of offensive war potential. All military assets held by Japan are structured strictly for self-defense, meaning operational force can only be applied after Japanese territory sustains an explicit attack.”
“When Prime Minister Takaichi previously stated that Japan would protect Taiwan in the event of an invasion, any operational support would realistically be limited to logistics, non-combatant evacuation operations, and naval resupply missions for US forces, rather than direct front-line engagement,” Gonultas explained. “Although Takaichi favors constitutional revision, the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly pacifist and deeply attached to Article 9, driven by demographic aging, historical memory, and a profound fear of military escalation.”
“Turkiye is viewed as a reliable and capable defense partner”
Highlighting expanding diplomatic and industrial engagement between Ankara and Tokyo, Gonultas noted that defense procurement and technological cooperation have gained significant momentum.
“Following high-level diplomatic engagements, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tokyo and subsequent defense agreements signed at the SAHA EXPO defense exhibition, bilateral security cooperation has entered a concrete phase,” Gonultas said. “Japan is actively seeking to acquire drone technology. Importantly, Tokyo does not merely wish to purchase off-the-shelf equipment; it seeks technology transfers and co-production frameworks to understand manufacturing methodologies. Ankara has demonstrated a positive reception to these discussions.”
“Turkiye is viewed in Tokyo as a reliable, highly capable defense actor and a non-aggressive diplomatic mediator,” Gonultas added. “With negative public perception toward Israel reaching 80% in Japan, Tokyo has deliberately diversified its defense partnerships away from Tel Aviv, placing increased value on its historical alliance with Turkiye.”
Gonultas further observed that diplomatic coordination extends into Central Asia. “Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Eri Arfia, who is of Uyghur origin and fluent in Turkish, visited Istanbul and met with representatives of the Organization of Turkic States, expressing Japan’s interest in securing observer status,” Gonultas explained. “Tokyo views Turkiye as a vital bridge to Middle Eastern energy stability and Central Asian critical mineral supply chains.”
“Takaichi’s public approval ratings have dropped toward 50%”
Analysing domestic political dynamics, Gonultas reported that Prime Minister Takaichi faces mounting economic pressures that threaten her initial political momentum.
“While Prime Minister Takaichi entered office with approval ratings approaching 70%, recent surveys show public support dropping toward 50%, with some independent polls placing approval near 40%,” Gonultas stated. “The primary driver behind this decline is economic dissatisfaction. Despite state interventions to stabilize the yen around 170 per US dollar following energy price surges caused by the Iran conflict, living costs remain elevated.”
“Voters supported Takaichi expecting structural economic revitalization, but the administration has heavily prioritized ideological and administrative initiatives—such as designating Osaka as a secondary capital alongside its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, enacting national flag protection laws, and tightening permanent residency requirements for foreign workers,” Gonultas explained. “Although the government plans to cut consumption taxes on food items from 8% to 1%, prominent figures within her own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Prime Minister Ishiba and veteran leader Taro Aso, have publicly questioned the fiscal viability of these plans.”
Concurrently, economic authorities face severe macroeconomic challenges following joint currency interventions by the US and Japan. “While joint interventions successfully halted the chaotic depreciation of the yen beyond the 170 threshold, Japanese government bond yields recently hit 30-year highs of approximately 3%,” Gonultas noted. “To offset inflationary pressures on households, the government has facilitated a 5% average wage increase—the highest in recent decades—while coordinating with Washington to maintain exchange rate stability.”
Concluding his evaluation of Tokyo’s regional policy, Gonultas noted that despite broader regional instability, Japan continues to maintain active diplomatic communication with Tehran to safeguard energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. “Tokyo maintains functional diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its neutral diplomatic standing to support regional maritime stability and energy security,” Gonultas concluded.
Asia
Pakistan top court orders Imran Khan moved from prison to hospital
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that former Prime Minister Imran Khan must be transferred from prison to a hospital.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) announced on Tuesday that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered the transfer of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from prison to a hospital. The ruling meets a long-standing demand from his party and family, who have voiced concerns over his health.
The 73-year-old cricketer-turned-politician has been imprisoned since August 2023, following convictions in a series of cases that he maintains were politically motivated after his removal from office in 2022.
His sons had repeatedly raised concerns over the past year regarding his deteriorating health, while his lawyers stated that he had suffered significant vision loss in his right eye during his time in detention.
PTI spokesman Zulfikar Bukhari said: “This is a welcome decision. We wish this had happened earlier so that his eye and overall health would not have deteriorated this much.”
Bukhari added: “He should remain in the hospital until all doctors are satisfied.”
Khan’s spokesman Naeem Haider Panjutha stated on X that the court had directed Khan to be moved to Shifa International Hospital within 48 hours and to remain there until 16 September.
Since being ousted from power in a no-confidence vote, Khan has faced numerous legal proceedings, including cases involving state gifts and unlawful marriage. While some convictions have been suspended or overturned, appeals against others remain pending. Khan denies the charges against him.
In February, leading figures from the global cricket community, including prominent names from across the border in India, expressed “deep concerns” over Khan’s prison conditions and demanded improved treatment for him.
PTI came to power in 2018 and retains a broad support base across key provinces. However, the party was stripped of its electoral symbol ahead of the 2024 elections, forcing its candidates to contest the polls as independents.
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