On 23 February, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) emerged as the leading party, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured second place in the early federal elections. These results highlighted a stark division between eastern and western Germany.

As the European Parliament (EP) elections last June demonstrated, the AfD has solidified its position as the strongest party in eastern Germany, where it garnered 32% of the votes—nearly one in three voters supported the party. For instance, in Saxony, Maximilian Krah, a controversial AfD candidate, is expected to win his constituency with over 40% of the vote.

“I look forward to watching the self-destruction of the CDU live in the Bundestag soon. Merz is leading his party into a loose state, and it’s called the Afghanistan coalition,” Krah told Euractiv in a written statement.

It remains unclear whether Krah’s victory will be sufficient for him to enter the Bundestag under Germany’s new election procedure. Additional local constituency victories could secure more seats for the AfD based on its initial vote share in Saxony.

In western Germany, the CDU/CSU declared victory as the clear leader, securing 30.8% of the vote. The AfD surpassed the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to become the second-largest party in the west, with 17.7% of the vote.

In addition to the CDU’s success in some eastern constituencies, the SPD and the Greens also won in certain western regions. However, the biggest surprise came from Berlin, where Die Linke (The Left Party) emerged victorious with nearly 20% of the vote.

After years of decline, Die Linke , which had been polling at just 3% a few months ago, benefited from the focus on immigration policy and the question of how to deal with the AfD during the final stages of the election campaign. A significant portion of the SPD and Green voter base quickly shifted to Die Linke . Thousands of new members have registered in recent weeks, boosting the party above the 5% threshold; current estimates place it between 8% and 9%.

During the campaign, Die Linke initially aimed for three direct mandates, as surpassing the 5% threshold was considered nearly impossible. In the end, the party won several constituencies outright, including four in Berlin: Ines Schwerdtner in Berlin-Lichtenberg, Gregor Gysi in Treptow-Köpenick, Pascal Meiser in Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, and Ferat Koçak in Neukölln. Neukölln marked the first “western constituency” won by the party.

Until recently, no one in the party seriously expected Meiser to win the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg constituency. Former Thuringian Prime Minister Bodo Ramelow won the Erfurt-Weimar-Weimarer Land II constituency, while Sören Pellmann retained the Leipzig II constituency.

While Die Linke remained below its previous peaks in eastern German states, repeating its relatively poor 2021 performance with minor improvements, it made significant gains in western Germany, where it had performed disastrously in recent state elections. Notably, the party exceeded 5% in Bavaria.

The overall trend reflects a shift in the center of gravity of Die Linke’s electorate toward the west. The party achieved above-average results in university towns where the Greens had previously excelled. For example, in the Münster constituency, Die Linke won 12.5% of the second votes (+7.5 percentage points), in Bonn 12.5% (+7), and in Heidelberg 10.1% (+5.3).

The Sahara Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), founded by Die Linke defectors, disappointed. After major successes in three state elections in eastern Germany in September 2024 and subsequent entry into two state governments, the BSW steadily declined in polls. Some polling organizations consistently underestimated the party by three or four percentage points, which may have influenced voters. The Forsa poll published just before the election showed the BSW at around 3%, prompting strong reactions from the party, which described it as a form of “disinformation.”

At approximately 82.5%, turnout was significantly higher than in 2021 (76.4%) and reached its highest level since the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990.

Demographically, Die Linke achieved surprising success among first-time voters, leading with 27%. Among young women in urban areas, support for Die Linke reached 34%, followed by the Greens with 22% and the SPD with 12%. Among older men in rural areas, the CDU led with 42%, followed by the AfD and SPD with 18% each.

Voting patterns among economically disadvantaged voters were as follows: AfD 37%, CDU 18%, SPD 12%, Die Linke 11%, Greens 7%, and BSW 7%. The AfD increased its share in this segment by 18 points compared to the 2021 federal elections.

The AfD also gained ground among workers and employees. In 2021, the CDU received 20%, the SPD 26%, and the AfD 21%. In contrast, yesterday’s elections saw the AfD receive 38%, the CDU 22%, and the SPD 12%.

This trend is reflected in other survey questions: 75% of AfD voters expressed fear of being unable to pay their bills due to rising prices, compared to 60% of Die Linke voters. While the overall average is 53%, CDU, SPD, and Green voters are below this figure: 46%, 43%, and 28%, respectively.

Whereas in 2022 only 39% of German voters considered the economic situation bad, this figure has risen to 83%, with 96% of AfD voters sharing this view.

The Greens tend to attract upper-income voters, while the AfD, Die Linke , and to a lesser extent the CDU/CSU seem to draw support from lower-income groups.

Regarding the source of the AfD’s votes, “non-voters” constitute the largest group: 1,830,000. This is followed by the CDU (830,000), the FDP (750,000), the SPD (630,000), Die Linke (90,000), and the Greens (70,000). Only 60,000 votes shifted from the AfD to the BSW, indicating that right-wing and left-wing parties with anti-immigration rhetoric, particularly in eastern Germany, have distinct voter bases and that there was no significant shift from the AfD to the “left.”