The Trump administration is seeking new terms for US access to critical mineral and energy assets in Ukraine, broadening the economic concessions it wants from Kyiv.

According to two Ukrainian officials who spoke to the Financial Times (FT), Washington wants Kyiv to agree to more detailed provisions on who owns and controls the joint investment fund, as well as a broader scope that includes US ownership of other economic assets, such as Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.

This amounts to reopening negotiations on the mineral agreement, which has not yet been signed. Speaking at the White House on Thursday, Trump said the US wants to sign agreements on rare earth elements and minerals worldwide, but that Ukraine is a particular focus.

“We’re doing very well with Ukraine and Russia, and one of the things that we’re doing is we’re going to be signing a deal with Ukraine having to do with rare earths very shortly,” Trump said, but he did not provide further details.

Ukrainian officials said they were concerned about being forced into unfavorable terms in a broader agreement, especially after Washington temporarily suspended arms shipments and intelligence sharing with Kyiv earlier this month.

According to statements by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Trump and Zelensky discussed Ukraine’s electricity supply and nuclear power plants during their phone call this week.

“President Trump indicated that the US, with its expertise in electricity and utilities, could be very helpful in operating these plants,” the summary stated, arguing that US ownership offered the “best protection” for Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

During an online briefing with reporters on Wednesday, Zelensky told the FT that he had only discussed one nuclear facility with Trump: the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is the largest in Europe.

The facility, located on the Dnipro River 650 km southeast of Kyiv, has been under the control of the Russian military since March 2022, and its six reactors are currently in “cold shutdown” mode.

Two senior Ukrainian officials involved in the negotiations with the US regarding Ukraine’s mineral resources said that the Trump administration has not yet presented Kyiv with new terms.

“But I understand that they are working on a larger deal,” said one of the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity, like the others, due to the sensitivity of the discussions.

Following the detention of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, while the German government issued statements, the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), an influential German think tank, made a significant statement.

The Türkiye articles published in a special issue of DGAP’s journal, Internationale Politik (IP), indicate that Ankara is an “indispensable partner” for Berlin, even if it is “unpredictable.”

The articles point out that Türkiye has grown significantly in terms of power and influence over the last twenty years, particularly highlighting developments in armament and military capabilities.

IP notes that Türkiye has intervened in Azerbaijan and Libya, and also has troops in Qatar and Somalia, adding that the Turkish navy is used in the Mediterranean in the dispute with Cyprus.

Cooperation with Türkiye is particularly important for EU member states because, although the country is in close cooperation with Russia, it also “definitively positions itself” against Moscow in regions where Turkish and Russian efforts to gain influence overlap.

Günter Seufert, an IP writer, states that Türkiye participates in NATO activities aimed at limiting Russia’s influence in the Black Sea region, saying, “It supports moves to control the airspace over Romania, and Turkish troops are part of the new NATO Battle Group in Bulgaria.”

Seufert also reminds that Türkiye supplied Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles to Ukraine, emphasizing that Baykar is currently building a factory in Ukraine for drone production, while the new Bayraktar Akıncı drone model uses Ukrainian engines.

The author also suggests that Türkiye is intensifying its cooperation with “Turkic-speaking states” in Central Asia, which Russia traditionally sees as its close sphere of influence, helping some of these states to now “take independent positions from Russia in regional conflicts.”

In another article, author Hürcan Aslı Aksoy notes that, in addition to trying to use Türkiye in the power struggle against Russia, Germany and the EU benefit from Türkiye’s role as a trade center, especially as an energy hub.

The IP writer notes that Türkiye wants to further strengthen its foreign trade and position itself as “a logistical center for international value chains with its huge infrastructure projects in the transportation sector.”

At this point, Türkiye is particularly striving to “become an important place in regional energy trade” and to make itself “indispensable as an energy corridor for the supply of oil and natural gas to Europe from the resource-rich countries of Central Asia and the Middle East.”

In addition, it is pointed out that Ankara continues to be of great importance for the EU’s “refugee defense.”

According to IP, Türkiye moves “multi-dimensionally and confidently” with all kinds of cooperation partners “without sticking to a specific camp,” which means that Germany and the EU can no longer “dictate” certain things to Türkiye, which now has alternatives.

Seufert states that when German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited the country in October 2023, “we witnessed a shift in German policy from the normative to the pragmatic.”

Seufert therefore argues that “Europe’s influence over Türkiye” is rapidly decreasing and that future negotiations will “probably” be conducted “on equal terms.”

Therefore, although the German government is showing harsh reactions at the level of discourse to İmamoğlu’s detention, it does not appear to be threatening “sanctions” as in previous years. Indeed, the cover of IP’s special issue emphasizes that Türkiye, as a “partner,” may be “unpredictable,” but is nevertheless “indispensable.”

US, UK, and Turkish arms companies will be excluded from the EU’s new €150 billion defense fund unless their countries sign defense and security agreements with Brussels.

According to the Financial Times (FT), officials stated on Wednesday that the planned fund for arms spending would only be open to EU defense companies and those from third countries that have defense agreements with the bloc.

Officials added that advanced weapons systems where a third country has “design authority” (restrictions on construction or the use of specific components) or controls the end-use would also be excluded from the fund.

This would exclude the US Patriot air and missile defense platform, manufactured by defense company RTX, and other US weapons systems where Washington has restrictions on where they can be used.

This policy is seen as a victory for France and other countries that have called for a “Buy European” approach to the continent’s defense investments, amid fears caused by President Donald Trump regarding the long-term reliability of the US as a defense partner and supplier.

At least 65% of the products’ costs must be spent in the EU, Norway, and Ukraine. EU member states will not be able to spend this money on products “where the use or destination of the weapon can be controlled.”

One official said that it would be a real problem if equipment purchased by countries could not be used because a third country objected.

The UK has lobbied extensively to be involved in this initiative, particularly given its key role in the European “coalition of the willing,” which aims to strengthen the continent’s defense capabilities.

UK defense companies such as BAE Systems and Babcock International are deeply integrated into the defense industries of EU countries like Italy and Sweden.

Officials stated that if third countries like the US, Britain, and Türkiye want to participate in this initiative, they must sign a defense and security partnership with the EU.

Negotiations for such an agreement between London and Brussels have begun but have been stalled by demands for a larger EU-UK agreement that includes contentious issues such as fishing rights and immigration.

Excluding Britain and Türkiye could create significant distress for major European defense companies with close ties to manufacturers or suppliers in these markets.

When asked about his country’s position on the new EU fund rules on Tuesday, a British official said, “We stand ready to work together on European defense in the interests of wider European security, to avoid fragmentation in European defense markets, and to create legal structures that allow member states to partner with third countries.”

A senior UK defense sector official said this was a “significant concern,” adding, “We see a huge amount of opportunity, and it is right that the UK is seen as part of Europe. But if the EU and particularly France are going to play this with a transactional approach, it undermines a common and united European philosophy in terms of defense and security.”

France’s previous efforts to limit defense spending to only EU companies faced strong resistance from countries such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands, which have close ties with defense manufacturers outside the EU.

The proposal needs to be approved by a majority of EU countries. Officials said that under the plan’s terms, EU countries can spend the funds on products using components from Norway, South Korea, Japan, Albania, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Ukraine.