The EU is once again preparing for a “military Schengen.” A “military Schengen” zone within the EU, where weapons and soldiers can move as freely as civilians, has been under discussion for years.

On November 19, the European Commission will present its latest initiative to achieve this goal by the end of the decade.

A preliminary draft seen by RFE/RL outlines two paths to accomplish this: first, spending cash on hundreds of “bottlenecks” across the continent—such as railway lines, ports, and bridges—which are considered crucial for integrating EU candidates Ukraine and Moldova into the EU’s military transport structures.

Second, it involves removing bureaucratic obstacles to ensure that differing national laws and red tape do not hinder the rapid and easy movement of military assets from one EU country to another.

In 2017, the idea of a “military Schengen” became a priority, and the European Commission prepared action plans in 2018, 2022, and 2024, but very little progress has been made.

EU diplomats, speaking to RFE/RL on condition of anonymity, said the minimal progress was not for lack of trying. They noted that the topic often tops the agenda when EU-NATO cooperation is discussed, but neither organization has ever truly embraced it.

NATO has long hoped that the EU would allocate more legislative authority and cash resources for military mobility. The war in Ukraine has further increased the urgency on all defense-related matters.

At the same time, there is frustration in the EU that NATO is too focused on spending money on expensive military equipment and far less on how to transport that equipment and make it available to other alliance members.

NATO’s goal of dedicating 3.5% of gross domestic product (GDP) to military equipment and 1.5% to non-military investments like military mobility by 2035 is a step toward partially resolving this issue.

However, as highlighted in the European Commission document, this matter remains largely under the jurisdiction of individual countries. The document states, “While member states can freely decide whether to allow foreign armed forces to pass through their territory under the scope of national security and defense, the EU must have a military mobility framework that balances military and civilian needs.”

The goal for the European Commission, whose term ends in 2029, is emphasized as “creating an EU-wide Military Mobility Area by the end of 2027 as a first step to gradually achieve a ‘Military Schengen’ in the dimensions of regulation, infrastructure, and capabilities.”

The question is whether the cash will be available this time. The last multiannual EU budget (2021-2027) allocated approximately €1.7 billion ($2 billion) for dual-use civil/military transport infrastructure, focusing on 95 projects in 21 countries. But according to the document, “the demand for EU funds significantly exceeded the available resources, and all calls were oversubscribed.”

Therefore, for the next long-term budget (2028-2034), the European Commission has proposed €17.65 billion for dual-use transport infrastructure, focusing on 500 “key projects” where military equipment needs to be moved more quickly and smoothly.

But there are doubts about whether the plan will work. Notably, member states always dilute the Commission’s initial proposal, preferring to direct EU funds to “vote-winning” sectors like agriculture, fisheries, and other social spending.

Railways are the most heavily funded mode of transport for military mobility, a trend that is likely to continue. Earlier this year, the EU agreed on four priority multimodal military mobility corridors: north, south, east, and central.

The northern corridor, connecting the Netherlands to Germany and Poland and then on to Ukraine, is the most developed.

The Commission’s document highlights the 22-kilometer railway line with a European-standard gauge that opened in September, connecting Western Ukraine with Slovakia and the rest of Central Europe.

The document also states that “preparatory work is underway for the use of the European nominal standard rail gauge on the European Transport Corridors connecting Moldova and Ukraine to EU member states.”

The idea is that the entire EU, including candidate countries, will operate with the same railway gauge in the future.

The European Commission is also willing to allocate funds for other items vital to military mobility, such as large-scale cargo air transport, dual-use ferries, and flatbed wagons for trains to carry heavy military equipment like rockets and tanks.

But the biggest change the EU can make is legislative, to facilitate the movement of soldiers and equipment. It can take up to 45 days to obtain permission for a military transport to pass from one EU country to another.

The target set by Brussels is three days. Surprisingly, the EU’s “harmonized” rules for transporting dangerous goods do not apply to military shipments, which often means that temporary arrangements must be negotiated.

This is set to change, and the European Commission plans to demand even more.

Another proposal is that permission granted for moving military equipment between member states will no longer need to be renewed annually. Permits will remain valid until canceled, and non-EU countries could also be part of this change.

The key to this will be the “European Military Mobility Enhanced Response System (EMERS),” which can be activated within 48 hours upon the proposal of the European Commission or an EU member state.

Once this system is activated during a potential military emergency, cross-border military transport will only require prior notification of the movement. Most standard procedures, except for customs formalities, could be bypassed.

All these proposals will require consensus among EU member states, and in many cases, unanimity will be necessary.