Diplomacy
Experts warn US-Iran war launched on ‘false premises’ risks decades of instability with no clear endgame
A panel of international affairs scholars has delivered a blunt assessment of the ongoing US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, warning that the conflict was launched on “false premises,” has no discernible strategic objective, and risks drawing major powers into a broader confrontation that could reshape the global order for decades.
Speaking during a webinar hosted by Harici Media, titled “The Middle East at a Breaking Point: Escalation Scenarios and Future Outlooks,” three analysts — from Oman, the US, and Germany — painted a picture of a region engulfed by a war none of its inhabitants chose, waged by powers whose aims remain opaque even to close observers.
The panel was moderated by Hassan Ünal of Başkent University in Ankara, who also serves as director of the New World Research Center.

“The war has been decided between Tel Aviv and Washington and we are paying the price”
Abdullah Baaboud, a member of Waseda University’s Qatari Chair of Islamic Studies and a native of Oman, opened with a sharp indictment from the perspective of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Speaking from Oman — one of Iran’s nearest neighbors — Baaboud said the war had been “decided illegally against a neighboring country” and launched under fabricated justifications.
“There are no strong excuses to enter into war,” Baaboud said. “The most powerful country in the world is conducting it with another powerful country in the Middle East. Both are nuclear powers, and they’re conducting it against a neighboring state under the false premises of nuclear arms or regime change or regional policy or missile technology.”
He noted that even the war’s architects appeared unable to articulate coherent objectives. “Even the people who created and entered into the war are not clear about their war objectives and the reasons for their war,” he said.
Baaboud revealed that Oman had been deeply involved in mediating between Washington and Tehran prior to the outbreak of hostilities — just as it had during last year’s so-called Twelve Days War. According to Baaboud, Oman’s foreign minister had indicated that Iran had agreed to virtually all US demands, going “way beyond” the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal. Tehran had accepted conditions on enrichment, stockpiling, and was prepared to discuss missile technology and regional policy. In return, Iran sought assurances that sanctions would be lifted and it would be permitted to trade freely with its neighbors.
“We were all very hopeful that this is going to avert a devastating war for the region,” Baaboud said. “And you all know what is going on now.”
He described a conflict in which not only military sites but civilian infrastructure, schools, and leadership figures had been struck. Iran, for its part, had retaliated against US bases, Israel, and Gulf states it suspected of hosting American forces. “We have become a victim of this war, not a war of our choice,” Baaboud said. Iran’s closure or attempted closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on oil installations had prompted some regional states to suspend exports, a development Baaboud warned would deliver a “huge impact on the world economy and the world energy needs.”
Looking ahead, he cast the conflict as an accelerant of the Gulf’s pivot toward Asia. “Their policies in the region are actually so perplexing for us that they are pushing us more towards Asia, towards China,” he said. The war, coming on the heels of what Baaboud described as “genocide and ethnic cleansing” in Gaza, had generated a profound crisis of confidence in the US as a strategic partner. “I think we are at a very serious inflection point where things are changing,” he warned. “It is madness, and we are paying a very high cost for this madness.”
“It’s not that difficult to manipulate President Trump”
Adam Weinstein, deputy director of the Middle East Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, offered a forensic account of the policy failures that led to the current conflagration. He traced the conflict’s origins to the unraveling of the JCPOA, noting that even the Obama administration had undermined the deal’s spirit by imposing new sanctions while removing others.
“I think the approach of the Obama administration to the JCPOA was to treat it as if it was some type of corporate contract in which you could find loopholes,” Weinstein said. The first Trump administration then “destroyed that agreement” and assassinated Qasem Soleimani, steps that drew bipartisan applause in Washington even as they moved the US closer to open conflict.
Weinstein reserved particular scorn for the Washington policy establishment’s refusal to heed warnings. “If you were in the minority of voices that warned that this was creating the conditions for a potential war, you were sort of cast aside as being prone to hyperbole and being alarmist,” he said. Even weeks before the strikes began, the prevailing mood in Washington held that the Trump administration might conduct limited operations as a “coercive negotiating tactic” but would never embark on full-scale war. “Anyone who said otherwise was kind of deemed an alarmist. I mean, that’s just a fact.”
He was equally blunt about Iran’s miscalculations. The late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Weinstein said, had fatally misjudged the nature of the administration he was dealing with — one in which provocative social media posts could tip the balance from negotiation to invasion. “The late Supreme Leader was tweeting out AI images of US ships being sunk to the bottom of the sea and threatening to use Chinese weapons against US ships,” Weinstein recounted. “With a normal administration, that would be seen as domestic rhetoric and would be ignored. But with somebody like President Trump who quite literally spends a lot of time on Twitter, that has the power to shift his decision from maybe giving negotiations a little more time to invading the country.”
On Israel’s role, Weinstein was characteristically direct. “A lot of people give the Israelis a little too much credit. They claim that the Israelis have manipulated Trump or pushed Trump into embarking on this regime change war. It’s not that difficult to manipulate President Trump,” he said. “I think they’ve done it masterfully, but it’s not that difficult of a task.”
Weinstein dismantled the notion that the Trump administration was executing a sophisticated strategy. Conservative circles, he said, had convinced themselves that the successful abduction of Venezuelan President Maduro provided a blueprint for regime change in Iran. “The problem is that Iran is not Venezuela,” Weinstein said. “The Iranian regime has been preparing for this moment and the decapitation of the Supreme Leader for decades.” Unlike Syria, there was no organized opposition figure capable of uniting a critical mass of Iranians.
The Iranian diaspora, he argued, bore partial responsibility for Washington’s miscalculations. “Diasporas don’t necessarily give the best advice. They gave terrible advice on Iraq, they gave really incorrect advice on Afghanistan,” he said. The expected mass uprising had failed to materialize because there was no unifying leader and because the regime’s repressive apparatus — the Basij and the IRGC — had deployed immediately to suppress dissent.
Weinstein described the war’s supreme irony: a president who campaigned against nation-building was now inextricably engaged in it. “When you gratuitously bomb the capital of a large country like Iran and you bomb its government facilities, whether you like it or not, now you’re in the business of nation building,” he said. “We’ve created another generational crisis.”
The new supreme leader, he noted, was “as ideological as his father” but now carried “the added chip on his shoulder that his father, mother, wife, and one of his children were killed by the United States.” Day-to-day authority, meanwhile, had passed to the IRGC. “We’ve just made things a lot worse for ourselves,” Weinstein said.
He concluded with a bitter observation about squandered opportunity. Trump, he argued, had been uniquely positioned — as an iconoclastic second-term president with an obedient party — to negotiate a comprehensive deal with Iran, even to open a US embassy in Tehran. “Instead, he chose to repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, mistakes that he spent his entire political career criticizing.”
“The unipolar world is gone — it’s really gone”
The third panelist, a German analyst identified as Mr. Rahr, situated the Iran conflict within a sweeping geopolitical framework. He warned that the war carried the risk of a broader confrontation between nuclear powers, noting that direct or indirect clashes involving the US, Israel, China, or Russia were “at least conceivable.”
Rahr identified an unspoken US strategic objective: pushing China out of the Middle East and limiting its influence over Persian Gulf energy resources. He noted that China was closely observing the military situation, “particularly the strength and weakness of American air defense systems,” and suggested that Washington’s violation of international law in attacking Iran could influence Beijing’s strategic calculations regarding Taiwan.
On Europe, Rahr delivered a withering verdict. The continent, he said, was “simply too weak and disunited to create an autonomous pole in the multipolar world.” He identified a widening rift between northern European states — Scandinavia, Germany, Poland, the Baltics — focused on militarizing against Russia, and southern nations such as Spain, Italy, and Greece, which favored normalized relations with Moscow and were “more sympathetic to the Arab point of view.”
Europe’s strategy, such as it was, amounted to waiting for a change of administration in Washington. “The only strategy which I detect today in Europe is to wait until Trump maybe will be ousted by the Democrats, another president will be in power,” Rahr said. “But this is not a strategy.”
He argued that northern European states were supporting the US war against Iran as a transactional calculation: backing Trump in the Middle East in exchange for American support against Russia in Ukraine. Europe’s growing raw materials shortage, meanwhile, was driving deindustrialization while American energy and arms industries enjoyed “an unprecedented boom.”
Rahr’s personal forecast envisioned a tripolar world order: the US with a dependent Europe, China as the dominant partner in its relationship with Russia, and a volatile Middle East where “a coalition of Islamist forces could attempt to establish a new political order.” A long-term American-Israeli security architecture in the region, he warned, “would effectively mark a return to a new Cold War era” — one he judged unsustainable.
“We’ve lived through Pax Americana — and look at the result”
During the question-and-answer session, Baaboud traced the historical arc of Gulf security from British withdrawal to what he termed Pax Americana, cataloguing the crises that followed: the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait, the invasion of Iraq, and the current conflict. He argued that the US was now positioning Israel as its regional security guarantor — a “Greater Israel” being “pushed down our throats” — after Iran and Saudi Arabia had both ceased to serve that function.
He also lamented Europe’s failure to build meaningful partnerships with the Middle East, noting that the Euro-Arab, Euro-Gulf, and Euro-Mediterranean dialogues had all collapsed. “We can’t talk about a particular European project that has been successful in this region,” Baaboud said, even as Europe remained “the most affected region by the development and the chaos in the Middle East.”
Weinstein, asked to assess how the war might end, offered a cautious and self-consciously uncertain projection. “If I had to make an educated guess, I would say that it ends in some sort of stalemate or negotiated settlement with an updated Iranian regime that is not any better on human rights or democracy but might be willing to make a few concessions to the Trump administration to stop the war,” he said. He dismissed the optimistic scenario of a democratic Iran emerging within five years as unrealistic given current conditions. “Anyone who says they know what’s going to happen in the next few years, including people in the US government, are lying,” he added.
He characterized the broader pattern as endemic to American foreign policy. “This is the US approach to the Middle East: to create seismic change and complete instability and have no idea how it’s going to end. And this is the US approach to the Middle East for the last 25 years. And we’re back at it again.”
Rahr closed the discussion by declaring the post-Cold War unipolar order defunct. “The unipolar world is gone. It’s really gone. And a new thing has to be created, probably a new Yalta,” he said. He expressed doubt that regional states would accept a Greater Israel but acknowledged the vacuum left by the war would need to be filled. “The Americans will return home after the war. The Chinese are economically intelligent. The Russians are out for the moment,” he said. “The vacuum will be filled by something which I don’t yet understand by whom, but it will be filled.”
Diplomacy
FIFA abandons $4.2 billion commercial stake sale following widespread revolt
FIFA and Gianni Infantino have backed down from plans to sell a stake in the organization’s commercial and event operations following widespread backlash.
In a statement issued late Friday night, the embattled FIFA president said:
“After carefully listening to all views, it has become clear that this project, regardless of the level of support, causes divisions that are now contrary to the interests of the objective originally established. Our goal has always been, and will always be, to unite and improve. As a result, this proposal will not be implemented.”
Infantino’s proposal met with fierce resistance from UEFA, CONCACAF, and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).
UEFA indicated that all 55 of its members would boycott FIFA competitions, including the World Cup, if the plans remained on the table.
In its statement, FIFA noted that “nobody is selling football,” and while asserting that it “acknowledges and respects the feedback and concerns expressed publicly,” emphasized that it would continue to implement suggestions.
It added that it “reaffirms its commitment to an open and democratic process of consultation.”
Shortly after FIFA issued its statement, the AFC released its own declaration of solidarity with UEFA and the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF).
Infantino subsequently suffered two major internal blows.
First, his adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned from his position, sharply criticizing the plan in a statement as “a bad deal for FIFA member associations, a bad deal for football, and a bad deal for the long-term future of the game.”
Then, FIFA Chief Operating Officer Kevin Lamour told the Associated Press that staff felt “deceived” by Infantino and that after raising the issue, he would “sleep better, even at the cost of losing his job.”
Lamour said:
“This is the project of a single person. Leaving aside that this project should not proceed… it is now time for the political leaders of world football to ask themselves the right questions and make the right decisions.”
These developments left Infantino cornered, and by Friday afternoon, numerous figures within the organization—speaking to The Athletic on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs—believed it was no longer a question of “if” the cord would be cut, but “when.”
Joshua Kushner’s venture capital firm Thrive had not withdrawn from the deal as of Friday night, but that became moot when FIFA management ultimately decided to kill the project via a public statement.
Joshua Kushner is the brother of Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of Donald Trump.
On Tuesday, world football’s governing body had announced its intention to establish FIFA Forward Enterprises (FFE), a new private entity to manage its flagship events, including the World Cup and the Club World Cup, with plans to sell a 21% minority stake in FFE to external investors.
The sale was targeted to generate $4.2 billion (£3.2 billion) in revenue. FIFA stated that this amount could be immediately distributed to its 211 member associations under a new funding stream named the “FIFA Fast-Forward Program” (FFFP).
Under the plan, FIFA’s total development funding would have exceeded $10 billion over the next four years.
Despite mounting criticism in recent days, FIFA confirmed that if member associations opposed the FFE plan but the proposal was accepted, the dissenting federations would each receive $20 million (£14.9 million) for the 2027–30 cycle, regardless of whether shares in FFE were sold to private investors (to be followed by $22 million for 2031–34 and $24 million for 2035–38).
However, had a given member association accepted the FFE proposal, it would have received $40 million for the 2027–30 period, with subsequent payouts remaining the same.
The three confederations that explicitly took a stand against FIFA’s plan represent 137 of the 211 FIFA member associations.
FIFA had stated that for the proposal to move forward, it required the approval of a majority of the 211 member associations as well as the 37-member FIFA Council, which consists of Infantino and eight FIFA vice presidents.
Strategic reactions and leadership crisis
South American football confederation CONMEBOL did not reject the plans in a statement on Friday, but noted that financial and commercial decisions “must always serve the interests of football and never take precedence over the essence of the game.”
According to a report by The Athletic, Infantino’s future leadership of FIFA was called into question during UEFA and CONCACAF meetings held on Thursday.
Infantino assumed the FIFA presidency in February 2016, succeeding Sepp Blatter, and was expected to run unopposed in the next election scheduled for March 2027.
There is also talk among European officials of putting forward Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the Qatari CEO of beIN Media, to run against Infantino.
Lise Klaveness, President of the Norwegian Football Federation, told VG: “My clear impression right now is that he has suffered a major loss of trust. We did not vote for him last time and were skeptical about this. There are many good aspects to FIFA, but if you take a lax approach to governance principles and rules, you lose trust quickly.”
Diplomacy
Defense Priorities director warns US air strategy in Middle East faces tactical limits
The collapse of a tentative memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, coupled with the diminishing strategic returns of American air power, has left the United States locked in an unsustainable, low-intensity conflict with Iran, according to Benjamin Friedman, Policy Director at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities.
Speaking in an interview on the YouTube channel Harici with host Sarp Sinan Hacır, Friedman attributed the failure of the short-lived US-Iran memorandum primarily to the Trump administration’s diplomatic missteps, vague draft language, and unrealistic expectations regarding a comprehensive settlement.
“Both sides really deserve some blame, but the Trump administration deserves the bulk of the blame for drafting an agreement that was so vague on key terms,” Friedman said, citing ambiguities surrounding the timeline for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of American commitments to restrain Israeli military operations in Lebanon.
Friedman emphasized that deep-seated mistrust in Tehran, exacerbated by repeated instances where diplomatic engagement was followed by Israeli or American military strikes, led Iranian negotiators to adopt an unyielding posture. At the same time, he noted that Iran likely miscalculated by using disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz to aggressively force leverage.
“The Trump administration remained intent on this sort of grand bargain that would restrain Iran seeking weapons development… and I think they continue to misread the Iranian willingness to sign that kind of deal,” Friedman noted, adding that Tehran viewed its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as essential despite the risk of provoking further strikes.
Expressing deep skepticism over the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough, Friedman criticized the administration’s reliance on informal envoys such as Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner over professional diplomatic channels, predicting that the baseline outcome will remain an unpredictable, episodic conflict.
“What’s more likely is a kind of on-off-again kind of war—sort of what we’re in now, where we have occasional strikes, with the United States perhaps by accident adopting the Israeli model of ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically,” Friedman said.
Addressing the efficacy of US air power, Friedman argued that military operations against Iranian targets have reached a point of diminishing returns. While early strikes successfully eliminated critical high-value assets—such as over-the-horizon radar systems that targeted anti-ship missiles—Iran’s ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities remain largely intact and operational.
He pointed to a recent strike on a base hosting US personnel in Jordan, launched from western Iran over a distance exceeding 1,000 kilometers, as evidence of Tehran’s sustained strike precision and the tactical limits of American interdiction efforts.
“The war is a failure for air power even in a tactical sense,” Friedman stated. “Initially, we looked at it and said we had a lot of success in destroying targets, but as more information came out, it turned out they had maybe more than half of their missiles and launchers survive the initial phase of the war.”
Friedman observed that the global proliferation of low-cost, high-precision guidance technology has permanently altered the strategic landscape, neutralizing the traditional invulnerability of forward-deployed US installations. “The precise effects of air power that used to be almost a monopoly of the United States… is actually making our posture in the region less sustainable,” he said, warning that similar vulnerabilities would be vastly amplified in any potential high-intensity conflict with China.
As an alternative to open-ended military engagement, Friedman suggested that Washington consider a complete military withdrawal from the region, even if it entails accepting Iranian transit fees on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. “The cost of preventing that through perpetual outbursts of warfare is much higher than just accepting it,” he noted.
Turning to regional dynamics, Friedman addressed Israel’s current absence from active strike operations against Iran, characterizing it as a calculated move to preserve its own air defense interceptors while relying on Washington to bear the operational and political burdens of containment.
On European security and the broader alliance structure, Friedman offered a critical assessment of the NATO summit in Ankara and the administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept. He described the white paper led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an effort to coerce European states into escalating defense expenditures and purchasing American hardware under the threat of reduced security guarantees, rather than executing a structured, strategic US posture adjustment.
“This is not a real US withdrawal; it’s a kind of pressure to up your loyalty in a particular way,” Friedman said, noting that major European powers such as Germany, France, and the UK lack a compelling existential incentive to construct independent, large-scale conventional war-fighting capabilities.
Regarding bilateral relations with Ankara, Friedman noted that US-Turkish tensions have eased considerably following the shift in American posture in Syria and progress toward resolving long-standing friction points, including the F-35 program and S-400 procurement. He added that while Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed frustration over Washington’s constructive engagement with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the White House has maintained its strategic course despite pressure from domestic pro-Israel lobbying groups.
Addressing internal Republican Party dynamics, Friedman highlighted the evolving public stance of Vice President J.D. Vance, whose cautious criticism of Israeli influence and emphasis on divergent national interests reflects broader ideological shifts within the conservative base.
“Vance is more representative of the shift in the Republican Party,” Friedman said. “He’s criticizing them in a limited way and saying, ‘Our interests are different.’ From the perspective of those of us who would like the United States to have a more distant relationship from Israel, it’s progress.”
Looking ahead to the upcoming US midterm elections, Friedman anticipated that a loss of congressional control by the Republican Party would severely curtail the administration’s domestic executive overreach, though its structural impact on foreign policy execution and Middle Eastern operations would remain comparatively limited.
Diplomacy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledges full support to Ukraine in meeting with Zelenskyy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Portsmouth, England.
Zelenskyy is the first world leader Burnham has met in person since taking office, with the prime minister committing to building a “firm partnership” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine.
Demonstrating their support, the two leaders toured a military base in Portsmouth where 200 Ukrainian troops are currently undergoing naval training exercises.
Burnham described his meeting with the Ukrainian president as “warm” and said he plans to visit Ukraine soon.
“We will build this together and address the various issues President Zelenskyy is facing, many of which we discussed today,” Burnham said.
The meeting follows an announcement by London that it will share intellectual property rights to assist Kyiv’s war effort.
The new prime minister announced that the UK will share the “Stone Cloak” electronic warfare system—which is fitted to drones to prevent detection—and will assist Ukraine in mass-producing the technology.
Burnham has focused primarily on domestic matters since replacing Keir Starmer, who faced criticism from elements within his own party for spending too much time abroad and focusing heavily on foreign affairs.
However, Burnham sought to signal continuity in Britain’s policy toward Ukraine. In one of his first phone calls after becoming prime minister last week, Burnham invited Zelenskyy to visit the UK “as soon as possible.”
Starmer spent his final full day as prime minister in Kyiv, where he announced £255 million in funding for Ukraine.
Speaking to Sky on Monday, Zelenskyy said his telephone conversation with Burnham had been “very good.”
The Ukrainian leader noted that Starmer had previously assured him that “the new government would maintain the policy of supporting Ukraine during the war.”
The new prime minister told the Ukrainian leader it was “no coincidence” that he was his first international visitor since moving into Downing Street.
“The purpose of this is to send a very clear message. We stand 100% with Ukraine, I personally stand 100% with you, and I will fully deliver on every commitment this country has made to Ukraine,” Burnham said.
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