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How Poland became Germany’s indispensable economic backyard

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Border controls between Germany and Poland are facing increasing resistance from the German economy. A major factor in this is the critical role Poland plays for German capital.

Last week, Dirk Jandura, President of the German Foreign Trade Association (BGA), stated that serious damages would occur if trucks were caught in traffic jams and Polish workers could not reach their jobs in Germany on time.

The background to this is that Poland is extremely important for German industry. The country has surpassed China to become the fourth-largest market for German companies. One of the most significant reasons for this is Poland’s position as a low-wage location for labor-intensive activities in German companies’ production chains.

German companies supply intermediate goods to the neighboring country and then re-import them for further processing. This situation also boosts exports to Germany, which constitute one-third of Poland’s total exports.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, 8.2% of all employees in Poland were dependent on exports to Germany in 2020. Poland’s dependent position in German production chains has also been stabilized with the help of EU funds.

A low-wage haven for German industry

With the end of socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, Western and especially German capital rapidly entered the region.

Germany played a significant role in Poland, as it did in other countries in the region. In the first phase of German-Polish economic relations after 1989, German investors participated in the privatization of state companies and opened their own factories in Poland. At that time, the focus was primarily on low production costs.

The removal of investment barriers with the EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 initiated the second phase of German capital’s spread into Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, investments in the low-wage countries of Central and Eastern Europe were used as a tool to pressure trade unions in Germany, forcing them to accept major social cuts and the restructuring of the labor market, namely the “Hartz reforms.”

The economic division of labor between Germany and Poland

Simultaneously, simple tasks in particular were moved from Germany to Central and Eastern Europe, which led to the restructuring of production and the creation of new skilled jobs in the Federal Republic of Germany.

During Poland’s integration into the German production process, this led to a division of labor between the two countries that continues to this day. This means that low-value-added activities are carried out in Poland, while high-value-added activities are performed in Germany.

While know-how, modern means of production, and consequently complex work processes developed in Germany, simple and labor-intensive activities for the supply chains of German corporate headquarters predominate in Poland, as is the case throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Poland became a lifeline for Germany during the Eurozone crisis

The financial crisis of 2008 marked the beginning of the third phase in German-Polish economic relations.

Poland was the only EU country that did not experience a recession, and this led to a further increase in German investments in Poland. In the years after 2008, the German industry’s focus on Central and Eastern Europe helped Germany increasingly recover from the Eurozone crisis.

Due to the shift to the East, Germany’s already low willingness to “share the costs of economic stability in Southern Europe” further decreased during the Eurozone crisis.

At the same time, Poland’s deep integration into German production chains was further strengthened by German investors being much more active than those from other EU countries.

The core activities of Polish factories were focused on exporting products to German companies. In this context, the Central European countries—the “Visegrad Four”: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—have a similar export structure dominated by four sectors: the chemical industry, metal production, the electrical industry, and the automotive industry. A strong export increase has been recorded, especially in the latter two sectors.

Poland is of critical importance to the German export market

Poland’s role as a producer of intermediate goods for German industry enabled the country to surpass China last year to become Germany’s fourth-largest sales market.

The reason for this is that most of the products Germany exports to Poland are processed in Polish factories and then exported back to Germany. Poland is therefore an important intermediate stage in German production chains.

Looking at the other side of the equation, in 2024, more than 27% of Poland’s total exports went to Germany. This rate is far above that of the Czech Republic and France, which account for just over 6% of Poland’s total exports.

Poland’s economic dependence on Germany is also reflected in the fact that in 2018, almost 10% of Poland’s gross domestic product was tied to trade with Germany.

More than 7% of this figure stems from the demand of German end consumers, while 2.6% comes from deliveries to German factories.

In 2020, 8.2% of all employees in Poland, or about 1.2 million people, were dependent on exports to Germany.

Central and Eastern Europe compete for German investment

Another factor in favor of German industry is that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe compete regionally with each other to offer the most attractive investment conditions.

For example, in the mid-1990s, the Polish government established the first special economic zones, offering tax breaks for investments in structurally weak regions.

After joining the EU in 2004, the Polish Ministry of Economy launched a targeted aid program primarily for large companies. Until 2004, investment zones were determined by Warsaw. After Poland’s accession to the EU, foreign companies were able to choose their own locations.

Many companies followed their competitors or business partners, which led to a concentration of foreign companies in special economic zones that were already in a better economic position.

An example of how German companies benefit from regional competition in Central and Eastern Europe is Volkswagen’s (VW) plan to build six battery “giga-factories.”

Poland and Hungary have so far managed to outperform other candidate countries. Thanks to the competition between them, VW received the largest possible investment incentives through tax breaks, the construction of transport infrastructure, and the retraining of workers.

EU funds for Poland are actually flowing to Germany

Since joining the EU, Poland has had access to comprehensive EU funds. Most of these funds come from the EU Structural Funds, created to reduce regional disparities.

Between 2004 and 2018, Poland received just under 102 billion euros in funds. It used this money to expand road infrastructure, develop renewable energy sources, and finance environmental protection measures.

Poland is a recipient country in this context: it receives more funds than it contributes to the EU budget.

An important principle for accessing EU funds is national co-financing: Poland must contribute its own state funds to the supported projects.

Research shows that the EU’s cohesion policy has further deepened the German-Polish division of labor: German companies supply machinery, chemical products, and construction materials for EU-funded projects.

In this way, EU subsidies to Poland and the Polish state funds required for co-financing increase the profits of German companies.

In contrast, Central and Eastern European countries receive only a small share of the EU’s research and development funds. For example, 95% of the funds from the Horizon 2020 program (2014-2020) went to the EU-15 countries before the EU’s eastward expansion, especially Germany, the United Kingdom (before Brexit), France, Spain, and Italy.

The Central and Eastern European EU countries, however, received only 4.7%.

EU funds, therefore, act as a decisive lever in reproducing the existing division of labor within the EU. These funds contribute to countries like Poland remaining in a kind of “extended workbench” status for Germany.

Europe

China’s critical mineral restrictions challenge EU defence expansion plans

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The European Union’s plans to expand its defence capabilities are being hindered by China’s export controls and sales restrictions on critical raw materials.

In response, EU leaders are urging member states to accelerate efforts to diversify supply chains.

According to Nikkei Asia, the European Commission announced last week that it would propose new legislation requiring companies across the bloc to broaden their supplier base in an effort to address economic imbalances, although it did not explicitly name China.

The war in Ukraine and growing uncertainty over Washington’s security guarantees have pushed European governments to increase military spending and defence production.

At the same time, according to a report published in May by Joris Teer, a policy analyst at the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), China accounts for at least 70% of global mining or refining activity in 17 of the 34 materials classified as critical by the EU. Eight of those 34 materials are currently subject to Chinese export controls.

“China is undermining Europe’s rearmament efforts,” Teer wrote. “Simply by activating this tool, China has already increased its leverage and demonstrated both the capability and willingness to restrict supply whenever it chooses.”

The Aerospace, Security and Defence Industries Association of Europe also warned that geopolitical developments and intensifying global competition for critical raw materials are further underscoring the need to strengthen European supply chains.

The organisation represents more than 4,000 companies, including Britain’s BAE Systems, France’s Thales and Germany’s Rheinmetall.

European defence manufacturers are pursuing a range of strategies, including vertical integration, recycling, diversification and stockpiling.

Rheinmetall told Nikkei Asia that it has “no dependencies” and is “well prepared” regarding critical minerals.

A company spokesperson said: “Rheinmetall has stockpiled key raw materials sufficient for several years. We have also implemented IT systems that allow us to centrally monitor and precisely manage raw material consumption across the entire group.”

Analysts, however, caution that stockpiling alone will not be sufficient. Maria Shagina, a researcher at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said: “Stockpiling serves as an important buffer against sudden disruptions, but on its own it is unlikely to mitigate structural damage over the long term.”

Shagina added that replacing the volume and diversity of critical minerals controlled by Beijing with alternative sources would take years.

In 2024, the EU enacted the European Critical Raw Materials Act, aimed at rebuilding domestic supply chains for such minerals.

The legislation sets 2030 targets for domestic extraction, processing and recycling while limiting dependence on any single third-country supplier to 65%.

A €3 billion ($3.5 billion) fund was established last year to accelerate strategic projects.

Nevertheless, the European Court of Auditors has noted that the 2030 targets are not legally binding and that the EU remains far from achieving them.

Industry groups argue that policy inconsistencies could further slow progress.

The Cobalt Institute, which represents a sector vital to jet engines, advanced batteries and defence alloys, warned that proposed EU chemicals regulations risk undermining the industry.

“Europe has one foot in and one foot out,” said Michael Blakeney, head of government and public affairs at the London-based institute. “It says the right things, but its actions are inconsistent.”

Europe’s efforts are unfolding alongside a more aggressive US strategy to secure critical mineral supply chains.

Shagina said:

“The US is investing more capital to secure and expand capacity, taking greater financial risks and, in some cases, acquiring equity stakes. Europe, by contrast, is generally more cautious, which places it at a relative disadvantage in the competition for critical minerals.”

In April, the EU signed an agreement with the United States to coordinate supplies of critical minerals. Although some member states initially resisted over concerns that the deal could weaken the bloc’s strategic autonomy, they authorised the Commission in early June to join the US-led “Pax Silica” initiative, which coordinates investment and export-control policies.

Teer urged Europe to use ongoing US-EU-Japan negotiations as the nucleus of a broader coalition aimed at making critical mineral production outside China financially viable through state support, minimum-price mechanisms and supply rules.

“Particularly important are countries that either produce raw materials or possess significant mineral deposits, such as Malaysia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Brazil and Indonesia, as well as countries like India with large pools of skilled labour,” he said.

Teer also argued that the EU should activate its Anti-Coercion Instrument, which allows the bloc to impose tariffs and restrictions in response to economic pressure on countries outside the union, in order to deter China from introducing further restrictions.

A European Commission spokesperson said the bloc had “long been aware of the risks associated with the EU’s dependence on critical raw materials.”

“The objective is clear: to anticipate disruptions early and reduce the EU’s vulnerabilities while strengthening our industrial and defence capacities,” the spokesperson said.

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Four European countries move to make citizenship harder to obtain

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European countries are increasingly tightening their citizenship rules. Most recently, the Norwegian government has drafted legislation that would raise the minimum residency requirement for citizenship from three years to seven.

The proposed amendments to the citizenship law were presented by the Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.

Under the draft legislation, stateless individuals born in Norway, as well as those who arrived in the country as children, would be required to reside in Norway for at least five years before becoming eligible for citizenship.

The government also plans to increase residency requirements for foreign nationals who are married to or cohabiting with Norwegian citizens.

Language requirements are set to become more demanding as well. The proposal would raise the required level of spoken Norwegian proficiency from A2 to B1. The new rules would apply to applicants aged between 18 and 67.

Commenting on the changes, Minister of Labour and Social Inclusion Kjersti Stenseng said: “Obtaining and holding Norwegian citizenship should be a privilege.”

The government argues that simplifying administrative procedures while simultaneously tightening eligibility criteria will help reduce the country’s large backlog of pending applications and shorten processing times.

Norway is the latest European country to announce revisions to its citizenship rules.

In Finland, the minimum residency requirement for citizenship was increased from five years to eight years on October 1, 2024.

The country also plans to introduce a mandatory citizenship test for applicants aged between 18 and 64 from the beginning of 2027.

Finnish Interior Minister Mari Rantanen said: “The introduction of a citizenship test is the final component of a comprehensive reform aimed at making citizenship requirements more stringent.”

Sweden has also approved a similar reform. Beginning in June 2026, the standard residency requirement for citizenship will increase from five years to eight years. Authorities are also introducing a financial self-sufficiency requirement for applicants and expanding the scope of security screenings.

Explaining the rationale behind the changes, Migration Minister Johan Forssell said: “It was possible to become a citizen after living in the country for five years without knowing a single word of Swedish, learning anything about Swedish society, or even having one’s own source of income.”

The most far-reaching changes have been implemented in Portugal. Portuguese President Antonio Jose Seguro has signed legislation raising the minimum residency requirement for citizenship from five years to 10 years.

For citizens of the European Union and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the requirement has been set at seven years.

The residency period will now be calculated from the date a residence permit is granted rather than from the date a citizenship application is submitted. The new rules will also affect the children of immigrants.

Previously, children could obtain citizenship one year after birth if their parents held residence permits. Under the new rules, at least one parent must have legally resided in the country for a minimum of five years.

The law also introduces a mandatory examination covering Portuguese history, culture, values and social structures.

Migration policies are tightening across the European Union as well. On June 17, the European Parliament approved legislation allowing irregular migrants whose asylum applications have been rejected but who cannot be returned to their countries of origin to be deported to third countries.

The new EU rules permit the establishment of migrant detention centres outside the bloc’s borders. African countries are reportedly among the options being discussed for such facilities.

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SpaceX warns EU satellite spectrum plan could disrupt connectivity in Ukraine

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SpaceX has sharply criticised a European Union plan to restrict access to satellite spectrum, arguing that the proposal risks degrading connectivity in Ukraine and disrupting emergency communications services.

In a document shared with European officials and reviewed by the Financial Times, SpaceX warned:

“This proposal significantly increases the likelihood that Europeans will be deprived of direct-to-device satellite services, or that new European operations will create global interference issues, including for emergency services such as those operating in Ukraine.”

In a proposal unveiled in May, the EU recommended reserving part of the spectrum band used for direct satellite-to-smartphone connectivity for European operators, thereby limiting the frequencies available to US and Chinese providers.

The 2 GHz frequency band in question is currently used by two US companies, Viasat and EchoStar.

SpaceX argued that the EU plan prioritises “an operator’s country of establishment over economic, technical and regulatory realities.”

When the proposal was announced, EU technology chief Henna Virkkunen defended the move, saying the bloc wanted to “increase European capacity in this sector.” She added that other parts of the frequency band would remain open to international operators, arguing that prioritising European providers was justified.

Other participants involved in discussions over the proposal said some EU officials were specifically seeking to limit Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network.

Europe’s initiative follows a warning from Washington. In March, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) cautioned that it could take retaliatory measures if the EU chose to favour European satellite operators over alternatives such as Starlink.

At the time, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr told the Financial Times: “Some of the discussions in Europe regarding satellite sovereignty concern us. If Europe decides to move down that path, then, as you know, we will have to consider reciprocal measures.”

The European Commission’s proposal has not yet entered formal negotiations with EU member states or the European Parliament.

A source close to SpaceX said the company remained hopeful of influencing the outcome of the process, given concerns raised by both businesses and several European governments.

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