Connect with us

Europe

How Poland became Germany’s indispensable economic backyard

Published

on

Border controls between Germany and Poland are facing increasing resistance from the German economy. A major factor in this is the critical role Poland plays for German capital.

Last week, Dirk Jandura, President of the German Foreign Trade Association (BGA), stated that serious damages would occur if trucks were caught in traffic jams and Polish workers could not reach their jobs in Germany on time.

The background to this is that Poland is extremely important for German industry. The country has surpassed China to become the fourth-largest market for German companies. One of the most significant reasons for this is Poland’s position as a low-wage location for labor-intensive activities in German companies’ production chains.

German companies supply intermediate goods to the neighboring country and then re-import them for further processing. This situation also boosts exports to Germany, which constitute one-third of Poland’s total exports.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, 8.2% of all employees in Poland were dependent on exports to Germany in 2020. Poland’s dependent position in German production chains has also been stabilized with the help of EU funds.

A low-wage haven for German industry

With the end of socialist systems in Central and Eastern Europe, Western and especially German capital rapidly entered the region.

Germany played a significant role in Poland, as it did in other countries in the region. In the first phase of German-Polish economic relations after 1989, German investors participated in the privatization of state companies and opened their own factories in Poland. At that time, the focus was primarily on low production costs.

The removal of investment barriers with the EU’s eastward expansion in 2004 initiated the second phase of German capital’s spread into Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, investments in the low-wage countries of Central and Eastern Europe were used as a tool to pressure trade unions in Germany, forcing them to accept major social cuts and the restructuring of the labor market, namely the “Hartz reforms.”

The economic division of labor between Germany and Poland

Simultaneously, simple tasks in particular were moved from Germany to Central and Eastern Europe, which led to the restructuring of production and the creation of new skilled jobs in the Federal Republic of Germany.

During Poland’s integration into the German production process, this led to a division of labor between the two countries that continues to this day. This means that low-value-added activities are carried out in Poland, while high-value-added activities are performed in Germany.

While know-how, modern means of production, and consequently complex work processes developed in Germany, simple and labor-intensive activities for the supply chains of German corporate headquarters predominate in Poland, as is the case throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Poland became a lifeline for Germany during the Eurozone crisis

The financial crisis of 2008 marked the beginning of the third phase in German-Polish economic relations.

Poland was the only EU country that did not experience a recession, and this led to a further increase in German investments in Poland. In the years after 2008, the German industry’s focus on Central and Eastern Europe helped Germany increasingly recover from the Eurozone crisis.

Due to the shift to the East, Germany’s already low willingness to “share the costs of economic stability in Southern Europe” further decreased during the Eurozone crisis.

At the same time, Poland’s deep integration into German production chains was further strengthened by German investors being much more active than those from other EU countries.

The core activities of Polish factories were focused on exporting products to German companies. In this context, the Central European countries—the “Visegrad Four”: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary—have a similar export structure dominated by four sectors: the chemical industry, metal production, the electrical industry, and the automotive industry. A strong export increase has been recorded, especially in the latter two sectors.

Poland is of critical importance to the German export market

Poland’s role as a producer of intermediate goods for German industry enabled the country to surpass China last year to become Germany’s fourth-largest sales market.

The reason for this is that most of the products Germany exports to Poland are processed in Polish factories and then exported back to Germany. Poland is therefore an important intermediate stage in German production chains.

Looking at the other side of the equation, in 2024, more than 27% of Poland’s total exports went to Germany. This rate is far above that of the Czech Republic and France, which account for just over 6% of Poland’s total exports.

Poland’s economic dependence on Germany is also reflected in the fact that in 2018, almost 10% of Poland’s gross domestic product was tied to trade with Germany.

More than 7% of this figure stems from the demand of German end consumers, while 2.6% comes from deliveries to German factories.

In 2020, 8.2% of all employees in Poland, or about 1.2 million people, were dependent on exports to Germany.

Central and Eastern Europe compete for German investment

Another factor in favor of German industry is that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe compete regionally with each other to offer the most attractive investment conditions.

For example, in the mid-1990s, the Polish government established the first special economic zones, offering tax breaks for investments in structurally weak regions.

After joining the EU in 2004, the Polish Ministry of Economy launched a targeted aid program primarily for large companies. Until 2004, investment zones were determined by Warsaw. After Poland’s accession to the EU, foreign companies were able to choose their own locations.

Many companies followed their competitors or business partners, which led to a concentration of foreign companies in special economic zones that were already in a better economic position.

An example of how German companies benefit from regional competition in Central and Eastern Europe is Volkswagen’s (VW) plan to build six battery “giga-factories.”

Poland and Hungary have so far managed to outperform other candidate countries. Thanks to the competition between them, VW received the largest possible investment incentives through tax breaks, the construction of transport infrastructure, and the retraining of workers.

EU funds for Poland are actually flowing to Germany

Since joining the EU, Poland has had access to comprehensive EU funds. Most of these funds come from the EU Structural Funds, created to reduce regional disparities.

Between 2004 and 2018, Poland received just under 102 billion euros in funds. It used this money to expand road infrastructure, develop renewable energy sources, and finance environmental protection measures.

Poland is a recipient country in this context: it receives more funds than it contributes to the EU budget.

An important principle for accessing EU funds is national co-financing: Poland must contribute its own state funds to the supported projects.

Research shows that the EU’s cohesion policy has further deepened the German-Polish division of labor: German companies supply machinery, chemical products, and construction materials for EU-funded projects.

In this way, EU subsidies to Poland and the Polish state funds required for co-financing increase the profits of German companies.

In contrast, Central and Eastern European countries receive only a small share of the EU’s research and development funds. For example, 95% of the funds from the Horizon 2020 program (2014-2020) went to the EU-15 countries before the EU’s eastward expansion, especially Germany, the United Kingdom (before Brexit), France, Spain, and Italy.

The Central and Eastern European EU countries, however, received only 4.7%.

EU funds, therefore, act as a decisive lever in reproducing the existing division of labor within the EU. These funds contribute to countries like Poland remaining in a kind of “extended workbench” status for Germany.

Europe

UK faces £258bn infrastructure gap as commission urges private funds

Published

on

Every adult in Britain would need to pay an extra £590 a year in tax to fund planned public infrastructure investments worth £258 billion.

Sir John Armitt, chair of the private sector-led Public-Private Partnerships Commission, stated that delivering vital projects, such as Thames Water’s long-delayed White Horse reservoir, would require the government to increase infrastructure investment by two-thirds—equivalent to around £25 billion annually until 2030—if financed through public funds.

The crisis surrounding the early release scheme has highlighted the UK’s need for greater prison capacity, while Ofwat has warned that population growth and climate change could leave England facing a shortfall of billions of litres of water per day over the next 25 years.

Armitt, who was the final chair of the National Infrastructure Commission before it was replaced by a new agency, noted that the government’s constrained financial position means its fiscal rules would be “put in jeopardy” if the UK attempted to finance infrastructure spending through additional borrowing.

According to the report, such an approach would add approximately £7 billion to debt interest costs by 2030, £14 billion by 2035, and £23 billion by 2040.

Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves had altered the fiscal rules to treat capital investment differently from day-to-day spending.

However, the required additional borrowing would still increase overall national debt.

Armitt, who recommended the creation of an OBR-style body for infrastructure, said:

“Those who believe that taxpayers and the public sector can close this gap alone have not looked closely enough at the public finances. If debt interest were a government department, it would be the fourth-largest in Whitehall. The UK faces a fundamental choice: do we want to provide the infrastructure that the public expects and the country needs, or do we not?”

A rise in government bond yields over the past two weeks has narrowed the government’s fiscal headroom, intensifying pressure on Reeves’s successor, John Healey, to balance the public books as Prime Minister Andy Burnham targets “growth in every postcode”.

The commission’s report, delivered by consultancy Bradshaw Advisory, also revealed that the UK has the lowest level of investment among G7 nations.

The report argues that reducing the cost and delivery times of infrastructure projects requires a comprehensive overhaul of the UK planning system, along with the elimination of political risk aversion and other regulatory obstacles.

According to the findings, rail projects in the UK take 50% longer than the international average, whilst delivery timelines for nationally significant projects doubled between 2009 and 2019.

To expedite construction and mitigate the threat of bureaucracy, the report proposes the introduction of a “parliamentary approval vote” for critical national infrastructure projects. Armitt characterised the current landscape as an “appalling cycle” of legal challenges.

The commission noted that uncertainty drives up the cost of infrastructure projects by generating “over-engineered designs to withstand any potential legal challenge and repeated consultations”.

Armitt called for greater pragmatism in Whitehall regarding the role of private investors and developers, who are more efficient than the public sector at delivering infrastructure because they must generate a return on their investments.

He also argued that the available capital pool is vastly larger. UK pension funds hold trillions of pounds in assets, yet only a small fraction is allocated to infrastructure projects.

Armitt said infrastructure investors have recently raised concerns that government efforts to increase public control have dampened their appetite for investing in the UK.

Arguing that this shift would deter investors, Armitt pointed to the windfall tax imposed on North Sea oil.

Armitt added that investors, particularly pension funds, “want long-term certainty and confidence”.

A separate Oxford Economics report commissioned last week by transport groups and infrastructure investors revealed that the UK has lagged behind every major economy except Greece on investment over the past 25 years.

Jon Phillips, chief executive of the Global Infrastructure Investor Association, said:

“Private capital is mobile by nature… at a time when the German, French, and Canadian governments are actively seeking to attract international investors, the UK risks losing ground.”

A government spokesperson said they welcomed “ideas to build the infrastructure needed across the UK”:

“Over the course of this Parliament, we have made progress by publishing the 10-year infrastructure strategy, increasing public investment by £120 billion to crowd in private finance, and delivering reforms to planning, major infrastructure, and regulation to give businesses and local leaders the stability they need to make long-term decisions.”

Continue Reading

Europe

Wolfgang Streeck links German polycrisis to capitalism and AfD rise

Published

on

German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck has examined the link between the conditions driving the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the capitalist crisis, calling on the left to “stop playing games and grow up.”

Writing for New Left Review (NLR), Streeck begins by asking what it means to exist within a “polycrisis.” In his view, under an increasingly “less democratic” capitalism, the countries of the rich world face “a bundle of similar crises that have emerged more or less unnoticed.”

According to Streeck, beneath these developments lies a fiscal crisis that has finally moved to the fore. In this context, “the mounting demands placed on society by the evolution of contemporary capitalism” clash with the shrinking capacity of “democratic politics” to secure the resources required to meet them.

Streeck argues that one consequence of this dynamic is the striking rise of “new-model opposition parties that are critical of the existing order and threaten to unseat the now-ageing ruling parties of the post-war era.”

Contending that nearly all of these problems in Germany stem from a policy of “stealth austerity,” Streeck points out that public investment has been deprived of resources as a result: “Stagnant [economic] growth; under these conditions any structural change assumes a zero-sum character; the deterioration of public infrastructure, including railways, bridges, and roads; a growing housing shortage and rising urban rents; the inability of both cities and rural areas to adapt to the consequences of climate change; the lack of an immigration policy to offset an ageing population alongside a sharp decline in birth rates; the decay of the education system, especially primary schools; the indebtedness of local authorities and their diminished capacity to make necessary investments and provide basic services; rising income and wealth inequality; with those most affected being chronically low-income families, particularly families headed by single mothers; and finally, widespread anxiety about the future, driven in part by fears of cuts to basic state-provided services that are becoming increasingly difficult to finance.”

According to the author, since the 1970s an ever-widening gulf has emerged between the overhead costs of capitalism and the amount that capitalist firms are willing (or can be forced) to contribute toward covering them. The progression operates as follows: these costs arise from the necessary preconditions and consequences of capitalist production, ranging from research and development and the creation of human capital to remedying environmental destruction. Yet they also stem from the need to secure legitimacy for a mode of production in which the extracted surplus value accrues to a small class of capital owners. Every form of the social wage; that is, state top-ups to the market wages of workers, such as social security and health insurance, serves to consolidate this legitimacy. As capitalist development advances and new needs arise among workers and their families, these expenditures (such as childcare facilities or eldercare) expand. At the same time, however, the scope for levying taxes on both the working classes and the classes that profit from them reaches its limits.

Streeck writes that during the neoliberal era, in order to sustain this zero-sum game; that is, to enable both capitalists and workers to carry on, states resorted to borrowing on deregulated global financial markets. Yet as sovereign debt levels escalated, the state faced the risk of losing its “creditworthiness” in the assessment of “the markets”; doubts emerged over its ability to meet interest payments from existing revenues, and even the interest itself had to be financed through borrowing.

In Germany, this development manifests through a “reform” debate conducted “under the watchful eye of the markets,” encompassing restrictions on pensions, sick leave, and labour rights.

Alongside this, the debt tap is opened to appease NATO allies and the arms industry, and perhaps as a last resort to slow down deindustrialisation.

According to Streeck, with the fiscal crisis no longer a slow-moving one, and with no hope of bringing it and the accompanying infrastructure and social welfare crises under control in the foreseeable future, traditional centrist parties have abandoned their conventional approach of “spreading cheer and optimism.”

The same holds true for the standard democratic narrative that those dissatisfied with government policy can vote for another party at the next election; the risk that this will benefit the new “anti-systemic” opposition appears too great.

Streeck writes:

“This paves the way for the formation of a party cartel in which the main parties avoid clashing with one another. In Germany this scenario seems particularly plausible: after all, the CDU and SPD were in power almost uninterruptedly throughout the long years of ‘shadow austerity’, and largely in coalition.”

Consequently, the issue ceases to be the debt crisis, rising rents, crushing living costs, shrinking public services, or growing segments of the population turning to food banks; instead, it becomes “populism,” the AfD, and neofascism.

Streeck points out that centrist parties, or “we democrats,” use this to make closing ranks mandatory once again. The logical extension of this policy is a summons to fight “against the right” and make a final stand for “our democracy,” rather than struggling against the growing power of markets over the public: “And for the sake of this, we are asked to set aside our petty squabbles over who will be subjected first, and who spared until later, to the overt austerity demanded by subsidised capital markets.”

Streeck continues:

“At first glance; from the standpoint of the ruling political class; this certainly has its appeal. Demonstrations by all sensible people against the AfD are far preferable to demonstrations against the rising cost of living; ‘firewalls’ cost far less than insulating the walls of old apartments; reports by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are far cheaper than nurseries and schools where all children can be accommodated and educated together. Moreover, floating the idea of having a party supported by at least a third of the electorate banned by the Constitutional Court in the name of ‘militant democracy’ guarantees an exciting item on the evening news about the daily exertions of those who run the state.”

Yet Streeck believes that none of this will work, either now or in the long run. Pointing out that the current governing and political class has taken no steps to address the real problems it “wants to hide behind the AfD problem,” the sociologist says: “Even if the party is banned, trains will still not run on time, heat-related deaths will not decline, cities will not become more liveable, rents will not fall, and pensions and jobs will not become more secure.”

Streeck notes that the situation would not change if the AfD were to enter government rather than being politically or physically locked away; nevertheless, he argues that the prevailing political mentality fears giving the AfD the opportunity to fail in the face of the “polycrisis.”

Streeck believes the AfD will not be diminished by the next demonstration or the next broadcast of partisan television news. In his view, as long as the “forces of the state and democracy” exhaust themselves on a secondary battlefield such as “democracy versus populism” to divert attention from the crises unfolding under their own governance, the AfD will have an easy ride.

Reminding readers that an external enemy (Russia) has been added to the internal enemy, Streeck underlines that the two are conflated as far as possible through “conspiracy theories.”

The author notes that the drive to transform a “welfare” state into a “garrison” state and brand the AfD as the “Kremlin’s fifth column” raises the question of how a debt-laden government intends to fund raising defence spending to at least 5% of GDP: “Will it resort to even more austerity or even more borrowing, risking an ultimate rupture with the domestic population, with global financial markets, or with both?”

Arguing that the left, unlike “PR specialists,” must ask certain questions, the German author points to the following:

“How can we make capital pay the bill for the costs it imposes on society and nature? How can we prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion? How will we protect companies that provide quality jobs to people in our country from a global trading system that shows no respect for workers? How can we halt the decline in our population through immigration and better family policies? In a society in transition like ours, how will we ease the debt burden on our local authorities so that they can deliver the public services essential for everyone to lead a good life? And how must ‘our democracy’ be restructured so that it becomes a democracy for all and gives citizens the opportunity to take control of their own lives; so that they are not forced to beg for handouts from a state whose coffers are empty and will remain so for a long time to come?”

Streeck concludes his article by stating: “Playtime is over; the situation is serious, and we urgently need to grow up.”

Continue Reading

Europe

AfD’s Siegmund links German rearmament to remigration plans

Published

on

Ulrich Siegmund of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who is expected to become the next state premier of Saxony-Anhalt, has stated that they do not oppose Germany’s rearmament, arguing that arms will be required during the “remigration” process.

The issue specifically concerns a factory in the Saxony-Anhalt town of Sangerhausen. Israeli defence contractor Elbit intends to establish production facilities there, though protests against the plan have been under way for some time.

The company manufactures, among other products, the Hermes combat drone, howitzers, and rocket launchers.

According to Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Mayor Torsten Schweiger, neither drones nor ammunition will be produced in Sangerhausen.

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) had previously announced its opposition to the state becoming a defence industry hub for Israel.

Following a parliamentary group meeting, Siegmund was asked directly at a press conference about the proposed investment project.

Siegmund replied:

“Our position is very clear. We do not condemn the production of military equipment in general, because during future repatriation and deportation campaigns for migrants, we will naturally require the appropriate tools. This also applies to internal security, our own stability, and national defence. We are aware that such things do not fall from the sky.”

Siegmund also argued that a distinction exists between sending military equipment to foreign wars financed by German taxpayers and the approach they advocate.

AfD has not yet taken a final decision

Siegmund explained that the AfD is monitoring the situation in Sangerhausen and remains in contact with local political representatives.

At the same time, he noted that the economic aspects of a potential factory site should not be ignored. The party also plans to examine closely what is produced in Sangerhausen and under what conditions.

“We want to examine closely: what is produced there, and under what conditions? And do we face the risk of being drawn into foreign conflicts as a result? If so, we view this situation with great scepticism,” Siegmund said.

Siegmund also pointed to conversations he had with citizens during the election campaign. Many people, including local residents in Sangerhausen, welcomed the AfD’s stance.

However, his party has not yet reached a final decision regarding the prospective facility. “A valid decision has not yet been taken because we still do not possess all the information,” the AfD politician said.

Green light for militarisation on grounds of remigration and security

Siegmund’s remarks indicating that weapons are needed for “remigration” drew attention. The term refers to the deportation of people with an immigrant background and was coined by Austrian right-wing activist Martin Sellner. The AfD has adopted the phrase over the past few years.

Years ago, Thuringia AfD leader Björn Höcke spoke of “well-measured cruelty” in the context of deportation procedures.

AfD politicians Kay Gottschalk and Lena Kotré attended an international “Remigration Summit” held in Portugal in late May.

There, Martin Sellner of the Identitarian movement declared their aims to secure “Europe’s ethnocultural continuity”, halt all legal or illegal immigration into Europe, and remove “millions” of non-Western immigrants from the continent.

In a video recorded alongside Sellner, Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek said: “Nobody comes in, and millions go out.”

In interviews, Kotré and Gottschalk presented the mass deportation of millions of people as a panacea for the housing market, the education system, and society.

Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticised the AfD on Wednesday, stating that the concept of “remigration” amounts to nothing other than “ethnic cleansing based on skin colour and origin”.

Wagenknecht criticises “remigration”

Meanwhile, BSW, which decided unanimously to hold talks with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, has publicly announced its “red lines”.

Party founder Sahra Wagenknecht stated that she maintains clear red lines against the AfD, particularly regarding “remigration”.

In an interview with RTL and ntv, Wagenknecht said: “They will feel our strong opposition on this matter. I find it terrible that people are worried and frightened.”

Stating that it is unacceptable for “well-integrated citizens” to be affected, the BSW leader remarked: “And we will not yield on this.” She continued:

“If the AfD is truly serious about frightening people who came to our country, work here, are well integrated, pay taxes, and whose children grow up here; if they intend to tell them, ‘You do not belong here’ or convey the message, ‘We want to expel you’ [we will prevent it].”

Regarding the AfD’s election manifesto equating homosexuality with “sexual deviance”, Wagenknecht replied: “Naturally, we believe every individual should live and love as they wish, and that equality exists here, including legal equality. Anyone questioning this does not live in modern times.”

BSW does not back Siegmund for premier

Wagenknecht also dismissed claims that BSW would elect AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund as state premier in Saxony-Anhalt, stating: “We have always made what we want very clear.”

Wagenknecht argued that Siegmund had given “completely contradictory statements regarding when he wants to be state premier and when he does not”.

“One gets the impression that he himself might feel it is not such a good idea after all,” Wagenknecht said.

The BSW founder called for a “respected figure across party lines” upon whom everyone could agree and who could “bring this country a little closer together”.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey