Opinion
Is Israel moving towards direct conflict with Iran instead of proxy war?

On 4 October, Israel and the United States were discussing how to respond to Iran’s second missile attack on 1 October. In particular, an attack on Iranian oil facilities was on the agenda. Iran made it clear to the US and Israel that it would no longer be limited to ‘unilateral restraint’ and that any Israeli attack would be met with ‘extraordinary retaliation’. As a result, international oil prices rose for three days in a row, to $75 a barrel for Brent and $71 a barrel for Texas crude, the longest such increase since August.
Israel’s military means are now advancing rapidly and ignoring US President Biden’s suggestions and concerns, constantly escalating the situation in the Middle East and worsening the crisis. It does not even hesitate to pay a huge price for the global economy by jeopardising the world energy supply. Israel may even decide to end its 45-year proxy war with Iran and engage in direct conflict.
In this new era, during the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the verge of a one-year peace, Iran fired 200 medium-range missiles at Israel, reigniting a potential regional crisis stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Iran claimed that the massive airstrike was carried out to avenge the deaths of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Abbas Nilfrushan, deputy head of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force. On 28 September, the Israeli Air Force dropped at least 80 depth charges on the Hezbollah headquarters in southern Beirut, immediately destroying several buildings and killing Nasrallah and Nilfrushan.
In the aftermath, Nasrallah’s body was found intact and without obvious wounds, apparently killed by the shock waves from the massive explosion. This suggests that Israeli intelligence knew Nasrallah’s whereabouts and movements very accurately, and that an intensive bombardment of the target was carried out.
On October 2, Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdullah Habib told CNN that Nasrallah’s death occurred after he had shown a willingness to approach a ceasefire. Habib explained that following calls from U.S. President Biden and French President Macron at the UN General Assembly, the Lebanese government had negotiated a ceasefire with Hezbollah. Nasrallah had accepted the ceasefire for 21 days, and this was communicated to both the U.S. and France. Iran, however, claimed that Nilfrushan died because he told Nasrallah to go to Tehran to avoid the risks.
The trees want to be quiet, but the wind won’t stop. If Lebanon confirms the above statement, it shows that the Netanyahu government does not want to see Hezbollah declare its acceptance of the ceasefire, that it has no intention of stopping its ‘Northern Offensive’ against Hezbollah, and that it is determined to escalate the conflict to target Iran. The war may even turn into an all-out war involving Lebanon, Syria and Iran. On 2 October, an Israeli air strike on a house in Damascus killed Nasrallah’s son-in-law, Hassan Karsi. Nasrallah has two daughters married to senior Hamas officials, and Nasrallah’s other son-in-law is likely to be on Israel’s hit list sooner or later, as the Netanyahu government is determined to fight Hezbollah to the death.
Hezbollah accepted the ceasefire offer and Nasrallah was killed. Is this a strange situation? No, it isn’t. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed by Israeli military intelligence in Tehran on 31 July, was also a peace leader and wanted a ceasefire in Gaza. It is the basic logic and formula of the Netanyahu government to eliminate negotiating partners, to block peace talks, to fight with super-military means, to import endless economic and military aid from the United States and to achieve a zero-sum outcome.
Since Iran’s attack used strategic strike weapons and partially penetrated Israel’s Iron Dome defence system, although it deliberately avoided casualties, it ultimately broke Israel’s strategic defence and deterrence system and increased Iran’s capacity for strategic surprise and deterrence. This increases the likelihood of a major Israeli retaliation. It is expected that Israel will not rest and will not rule out that the retaliation will go beyond the symbolic attack of 18 April, that Iranian political and military leaders, government and military units, nuclear and oil facilities, important ports and airports, etc. could become the target of the attack, and even that warplanes could be sent deep into the Iranian hinterland to carry out the attack. In short, the show of force ball is once again in Israel’s half, and it is up to Netanyahu and his war cabinet to decide.
The Netanyahu government has turned into a real war cabinet, a combination of ‘Ivan the Terrible’ and ‘Ivan the Mad’. ‘Ivan the Terrible’ refers to Ivan IV of the Russian Empire, who, out of mistrust, killed anyone he perceived as a threat, including the elderly Crown Prince; “Ivan the Madman” refers to Cold War tactics in which Soviet Union submarines risked collision at sea by making sudden manoeuvres to evade pursuit.
Instead of a ceasefire in Gaza, the Netanyahu government is rejecting the terms of the Axis of Resistance and expanding its attacks in an attempt to destroy Hezbollah, which is stronger and more flexible than Hamas. This is being done at the risk of escalating the regional conflict to the Third Lebanon War or the Sixth Middle East War, putting Israel in a protracted state of war and provoking a war between the United States and Iran.
The American political news network ‘Politico’ reported on 2 October that the Biden administration has become ineffective against the Netanyahu government, trying only to persuade Netanyahu not to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities directly, but with little room left to influence his decisions. Citing two anonymous American officials, the report noted that the Biden administration has recognised that its influence in the Middle East is diminishing and that, after a year, it is no longer able to prevent the situation – regional war – that it has been trying to stop. The current option is to limit Israel’s response, but not to stop its actions altogether.
The article also stated that the Netanyahu government has repeatedly ignored American proposals and expanded its war aims in Gaza, which has created serious domestic political pressures on the Biden government due to the growing humanitarian crisis. This has led to even stronger calls for Biden to distance himself from Netanyahu. It was stated that with the weakening of Biden’s influence on Netanyahu, his anger increased, and his phone calls began to turn into more and more ‘loud debates’. Biden told close friends that Netanyahu had no intention of reaching a ceasefire, but rather was trying to save his own political future by prolonging the conflict and at the same time trying to help Republican candidate Trump in the November elections.
Netanyahu is known to have strong personal ties and interests with Trump and his Jewish son-in-law Kushner. According to some reports, Netanyahu stayed at the Kushner family home while studying in the United States. When Trump entered the White House in 2017, he made his first official visit to Israel; recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, breaking with the policies adopted by more than 20 years of bipartisan government; terminated the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), hated by the Israeli right; presented the ‘Deal of the Century’, which sacrificed key Palestinian interests; and persuaded four Arab countries to normalise relations with Israel, abandoning the principle of ‘peace in exchange for land’.
In contrast, Netanyahu’s relationship with the American Democratic Party is highly sensitive and turbulent. Although Biden is personally close to Israel and the Jewish people, the Obama administration tried to balance Palestine and Israel, promoted reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, reached a nuclear deal with Iran despite the opposition of the Israeli right, recognised the ‘Shiite crescent’ as Iran’s sphere of influence, and had the United Nations Security Council adopt Resolution 2334 condemning Israel’s illegal settlements before the end of its term at the end of 2016.
A month before the American elections, the Netanyahu government decides to expand the scale of the Middle East war, putting the Biden government and the Democrats in a difficult situation, and raising the suspicion of winning votes for Trump and the Republican Party. The problem is that as long as Netanyahu continues to go this far, the Biden team cannot stop, even if it wants to; it follows Israel’s war policies dependently, constantly supplying it with weapons and continuing to offer strategic support. It can be said that America maintains its security commitment to Israel, but in fact America’s Middle East policy and national interests are completely under Israel’s influence.
If the Netanyahu government shows some respect to the Biden team and prevents attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities, it will reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, but will it miss the opportunity to attack Iran’s oil facilities, restrict oil revenues and drive a wedge between the Iranian people and their government? Iran is one of the leading oil producing countries in the world, although it is under US sanctions and embargoes, its actual daily production and grey exports are estimated to be around 2 million barrels. Although the oversupply situation in the world oil market is currently quite stable, the destruction of Iran’s oil facilities could lead to a major contraction in future energy supplies, especially since Russia is not expected to resume normal oil and gas exports in a few years.
More importantly, how will Iran retaliate against Israel again? After the Haniyeh incident, Iran announced that it would take revenge on Israel, and even notified Israel of predetermined targets through Hungary, but the second move has still not materialised. For Iran, the killing of Nasrallah and Nilfrushan meant that a new hatred was added to the old revenge unpaid, and it was a great humiliation for Iran that Israel went one step further. Therefore, with no chance of retreat, Tehran was forced to respond harshly and for the first time used medium-range missiles, difficult to defend and of great political significance.
Of course, regardless of whether the revenge was real or not, one should look at the effects rather than propaganda. Such a massive and shocking punitive air strike seems to have caused no serious damage to Israel, the only confirmed death being a Palestinian civilian in the West Bank who died from the debris of Iranian missiles. What an irony this is!
Iran has already announced the end of its military confrontation with Israel, which means that they are loudly presenting their ‘peace offer’. The question is that Netanyahu has now realised that Iran does not want to escalate and that America will support Israel in any case, so it is entirely up to him to decide when to attack, how small or how big. The conflict and hostility between Israel and Iran is a structural and long-term problem. Either Israel ends its illegal occupation of Arab lands, or Iran renounces the export of the ‘Islamic Revolution’; there is no other way to peace.
Prof. Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Middle East
An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.
Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’
The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.
America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans
This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.
The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.
The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.
What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?
Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.
Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.
Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.
The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate
The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.
Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.
Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart
We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.
Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.
Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.
If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.
An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.
Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.
From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.
The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.
This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.
If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.
It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
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