Opinion
Lone Wolf in Power: Can Shigeru Ishiba Lead Japan Out of the Quagmire?
Niu Jiarui
Research Assistant, Department of History, Shanghai University
On September 27, 2024, the result of the presidential election of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw Shigeru Ishiba triumph over the frontrunners, including the favored candidate, Sanae Takaichi, securing the majority of votes in the second round to become the 28th President of the LDP. Under Japan’s parliamentary system, the leader of the ruling party is invariably the Prime Minister. Consequently, on October 1, following the resignation of the Kishida Cabinet, Ishiba was elected by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in a joint session, garnering over 50% of the votes, thus officially assuming the role of the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan.
Who is Shigeru Ishiba? Once labeled by the media as a ‘pro-China’ figure, claiming that ‘China poses zero threat to Japan,’ Ishiba has long been known within the LDP as a ‘lone wolf,’ often at odds with various factions within the party, yet he managed a stunning reversal in the polls. Recently, during his campaign, he proposed the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, demanding equal status with the United States, demonstrating a hawkish stance. The question remains whether Ishiba’s leadership will bring new changes to Japanese politics and how it will affect Japan’s relations with China and the United States.
Will his tenure be groundbreaking or ephemeral? The coordination and protection of forces within and outside the party are key.
Ishiba’s election is seen as a result of the machinations of power brokers and factional politics within the LDP. In 2008, Ishiba’s first attempt at running for the LDP presidency ended in defeat by former Prime Minister Taro Aso. In the 2012, 2018, and 2020 elections, he faced similar failures, largely due to his poor relations within the party, often clashing with sitting prime ministers and causing political divisions, leading to his repeated losses in intra-party elections.
In this year’s election, Ishiba won the presidency with a narrow margin of 215 to Takaichi’s 194. Two factors contributed to this outcome: firstly, Takaichi’s radical policies raised concerns among conservative members within the LDP, and secondly, several key ‘kingmakers,’ such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, former LDP President Fumio Kishida, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, all endorsed candidates in the second round. After the initial round, except for Aso’s faction, most of the previously undecided factional votes flowed towards Ishiba. This shift was not only due to Ishiba’s political promises to regain the trust of his peers but also a calculated move by factional leaders to test the waters with a potentially reformist figure within the party. Despite the claim of a faction-free election, the reality is that the election was still influenced by factional politics, and Ishiba’s victory may be a trial by the factions to see if he can lead the LDP out of its current doldrums and restore public confidence. The factions remain cautiously optimistic.
On October 1st, the list of cabinet members was also announced, reflecting the compromises and concessions made by the politically weak Ishiba to various forces.
Japanese politics is essentially about interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the exchange of power and the balance of factional power. Maintaining harmony within the party requires a delicate balance of power and relationships among factions. The new cabinet lineup, which includes one member from the Kishida faction (Kochikai), two from the Aso faction (Wakate Kyokai), one from the Motegi faction (Heisei Kenkyukai), one from the Ishiba faction (Suigetsu-kai), two from the old Nishimura faction, one from the old Hayashi faction, one member from the Komeito, and 11 unaffiliated members, demonstrates a balance between experience and fresh blood, factional equilibrium, cross-factional cooperation, gender and age diversity. This reflects Ishiba’s effort to seek balance in the new cabinet.
Although Ishiba has been cautious and conservative in his actions to avoid conflicts with various parties, his position as Prime Minister remains precarious.
Recently, Ishiba has been accused of potential financial misconduct within his faction, the Suigetsu-kai, involving unaccounted-for political funds. Based on public opinion, such revelations at this time are likely to be recognized as the result of threats or hints from within the party or external forces, signaling to Ishiba to stay within his bounds.
Regardless, the new Prime Minister is immediately facing the risk of a political scandal, which could adversely affect the LDP’s upcoming House of Representatives election. Initially, the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval rating was only 51%, the lowest since 2001. It remains to be seen whether this support rate can be maintained above 50%. Whether the unstable governance can be put on the right track depends on various factors. Given the fragile position of the Ishiba administration, his policies and political direction may be determined by the party’s leadership. How Ishiba balances various forces and successfully fulfills his role as Prime Minister remains to be seen.
A Quest for Equivalence with the United States? Ishiba’s Grand Strategy May Be Difficult to Realize
Japan has long sought military self-defense and strategic protection.
Since the 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has maintained a high degree of unity with the United States in military strategy. Alongside the external cooperation formed by the U.S. military presence and Japan’s strategic use of land, Japan has established an internal strategy to expand the scope and responsibilities of its Self-Defense Forces, while also seeking to amend the Constitution’s Article 9, which renounces war. These have long been consistent political goals of the LDP and other conservative parties.
Since the 21st century, leaders such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo, and Shinzo Abe have prioritized military strength as part of their policy platforms, actively promoting the revision of defense guidelines and constitutional reform. Ishiba has also taken a hawkish stance in the field of military security, advocating for the establishment of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ during his campaign and emphasizing the importance of a basic national security law and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.
What is Asian version of NATO? As the name suggests, it aims to establish a military organization or alliance in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe, involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and other Asia-Pacific countries, with rights and obligations of mutual military cooperation . Ishiba argued, ‘Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Asia… Asia lacks a collective self-defense system like NATO, and thus has no mutual defense obligations, making it prone to war… the establishment of Asian version of NATO is indispensable.’ He emphasized that geopolitical tensions are the principal rationale behind this proposal. Concurrently, Shigeru Ishiba underscores the notion that ‘Japan is a sovereign and independent nation,’ perceiving the current Japan-U.S. relationship as inherently ‘asymmetrical.’ The advocacy for an Asian version of NATO, rooted in the discourse of regional threats, aims to augment Japan’s military standing in East Asia. It seeks to establish a dialogue mechanism of equal standing between Japan and the U.S. and extend Japan’s military strategic reach into North America, thereby augmenting Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.
However, the reality is that there are many obstacles to the establishment of the Asian version of NATO. Due to the different relationships with China and the cultural and institutional differences between Asian countries and Europe, the NATO model is difficult to replicate in Asia.
Firstly, ASEAN countries oppose it. The Jakarta Post, as the official newspaper of Indonesia, stated that ASEAN is not interested in Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, as this alliance is seen as an affront, as participating in such a military alliance would only escalate regional tensions. ASEAN emphasizes the establishment of a multilateral framework centered on economic benefits, which is inconsistent with Japan’s focus on military competition in East Asia, revealing Japan’s intentions for military strength in the Asian NATO proposal.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also clearly expressed India’s negative response. He emphasized that India has a unique historical background and diplomatic strategy and does not intend to become part of any military alliance, nor will it follow the practices of other countries. This statement sends a direct and clear message to the new Japanese Prime Minister that India seeks autonomy and independence in security and strategic cooperation and is unwilling to participate in the construction of a regional military group similar to NATO.
At the same time, the pursuit of an equal position with the United States in Asian NATO will inevitably face opposition from the United States. The concept of an Asian NATO with Japan advocating for ‘leadership under the United States and Japan’ and ‘parity with the U.S. in military terms’ is fraught with challenges, and Ishiba also stated that ‘elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is my mission.’ U.S. officials responsible for East Asian and Pacific affairs stated that Ishiba’s proposal to ‘establish a more formal institution’ is not yet ripe, and the United States prefers to optimize the existing cooperation framework rather than seek the creation of a new closed military alliance.
Therefore, they all have issued a warning to Ishiba, greatly extinguishing the flames of Ishiba’s Asian NATO ambitions, and the United States and ASEAN’s refusal to Japan’s proposed regional military alliance makes the strategic blueprint of Asian NATO difficult to implement.
Is Ishiba a ‘pro-China faction’ within the LDP? Ishiba’s stance on China after taking office still requires cautious observation.
Before becoming Prime Minister, Ishiba showed a ‘pro-China’ signal during his time in governance. As a Christian who empathizes with the weak, Ishiba demonstrated a rare stance on China-Japanese historical issues, acknowledging that ‘Japan should reflect on and apologize for the war,’ stating that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of that war. Compared to the Japanese right-wing politicians who always beautify historical facts and refuse to admit the aggression of war, Ishiba’s stance within the LDP is quite pro-China, and he has long been considered by the Japanese media as a member of the ‘pro-China faction’ within the party. On the issue of China, Ishiba has emphasized that China is not a threat to Japan and has recently stressed the importance of dialogue and exchange to continuously advance strategic reciprocal relations with China.
However, as the leader of Japan, will Ishiba adhere to the political stance of his youth after taking office? On the one hand, Ishiba’s repeated appearances in the election have focused on achieving ‘Asian NATO’ as his governing goal. The establishment of a military alliance inevitably requires creating an imaginary enemy—is it China or North Korea? In this case, will China-Japanese relations deteriorate due to Japan’s military extremism? On the other hand, his demand to station U.S. troops in Guam and establish a security dialogue with the United States on an equal footing has been clearly rejected by the United States. ‘The strategy of competing with the United States’ must be implemented, does this mean that Japan’s strategy will shift, and through strengthening cooperation with China, will it achieve its cunning goals?
Japan’s security has always relied on external support. And Japan, which has long maintained a unified front with the United States, if seeking external parity with the United States, must rely on the interests and strategic support of opposing forces to maintain a close but independent alliance distance. However, in reality, Japan cannot achieve such ambitions at present. As mentioned above, the domestic situation in Japan is unstable, and the external strategy is blocked. Ishiba’s goal of Asian NATO is difficult to achieve breakthrough progress in his three-year term. Looking at the domestic situation, such as the LDP’s financial reform, the upcoming House of Representatives election, the disaster relief in Noto, and the adjustment of the economic market deflation… Japan’s domestic political ruins are in urgent need of repair, leaving Ishiba’s cabinet with little room to develop overseas forces. Therefore, on the external stance, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not loudly proclaimed the strategic shift of Japan after the prime minister’s change, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwao Tsukuda also stated that Asian NATO should be ‘carefully considered.’
Ishiba’s softened diplomatic stance after taking office shows such a conservative handling logic: Japan’s comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States will not change, and Japan’s consistent strategy towards China will not change because of the promotion of security system expansion. Domestic affairs are prioritized over foreign affairs, and the opportunity-based security competition under the threat of the region will be temporarily shelved, with continuous planning and covert operations in the future. Faced with the situation in the East, Japan’s current statements are more conservative, avoiding focal disputes with China and the United States, while focusing on the adjustment of domestic affairs and easing diplomatic pressure. Especially for China-Japanese relations, it is also stated that ‘although there are various unresolved issues,’ there is a desire to build a constructive and stable relationship through strengthened dialogue. Therefore, whether the Japan-U.S. relationship will enter an ‘adrift’ era, or whether the hawkish stance will be implemented to the end, maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance’s security network against China and North Korea, we cannot generalize.
Ishiba’s policy declaration behind shows Japan’s sensitivity to changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape and the country’s anxiety about Japan’s progress, which is a struggle against the current. Under the competition of China and the United States, the Ishiba cabinet chooses diplomatic compromise, prioritizing domestic affairs, which is the consideration of Ishiba’s timing and also the inevitable result of Japan’s political environment. In such diplomatic deployment, Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations will not change significantly in the future, and the direction of Japan will have to wait and see Ishiba’s future governance performance.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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