Opinion
Lone Wolf in Power: Can Shigeru Ishiba Lead Japan Out of the Quagmire?
Niu Jiarui
Research Assistant, Department of History, Shanghai University
On September 27, 2024, the result of the presidential election of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw Shigeru Ishiba triumph over the frontrunners, including the favored candidate, Sanae Takaichi, securing the majority of votes in the second round to become the 28th President of the LDP. Under Japan’s parliamentary system, the leader of the ruling party is invariably the Prime Minister. Consequently, on October 1, following the resignation of the Kishida Cabinet, Ishiba was elected by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in a joint session, garnering over 50% of the votes, thus officially assuming the role of the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan.
Who is Shigeru Ishiba? Once labeled by the media as a ‘pro-China’ figure, claiming that ‘China poses zero threat to Japan,’ Ishiba has long been known within the LDP as a ‘lone wolf,’ often at odds with various factions within the party, yet he managed a stunning reversal in the polls. Recently, during his campaign, he proposed the establishment of an Asian version of NATO, demanding equal status with the United States, demonstrating a hawkish stance. The question remains whether Ishiba’s leadership will bring new changes to Japanese politics and how it will affect Japan’s relations with China and the United States.
Will his tenure be groundbreaking or ephemeral? The coordination and protection of forces within and outside the party are key.
Ishiba’s election is seen as a result of the machinations of power brokers and factional politics within the LDP. In 2008, Ishiba’s first attempt at running for the LDP presidency ended in defeat by former Prime Minister Taro Aso. In the 2012, 2018, and 2020 elections, he faced similar failures, largely due to his poor relations within the party, often clashing with sitting prime ministers and causing political divisions, leading to his repeated losses in intra-party elections.
In this year’s election, Ishiba won the presidency with a narrow margin of 215 to Takaichi’s 194. Two factors contributed to this outcome: firstly, Takaichi’s radical policies raised concerns among conservative members within the LDP, and secondly, several key ‘kingmakers,’ such as former Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, former LDP President Fumio Kishida, and former Prime Minister Taro Aso, all endorsed candidates in the second round. After the initial round, except for Aso’s faction, most of the previously undecided factional votes flowed towards Ishiba. This shift was not only due to Ishiba’s political promises to regain the trust of his peers but also a calculated move by factional leaders to test the waters with a potentially reformist figure within the party. Despite the claim of a faction-free election, the reality is that the election was still influenced by factional politics, and Ishiba’s victory may be a trial by the factions to see if he can lead the LDP out of its current doldrums and restore public confidence. The factions remain cautiously optimistic.
On October 1st, the list of cabinet members was also announced, reflecting the compromises and concessions made by the politically weak Ishiba to various forces.
Japanese politics is essentially about interpersonal relationships, emphasizing the exchange of power and the balance of factional power. Maintaining harmony within the party requires a delicate balance of power and relationships among factions. The new cabinet lineup, which includes one member from the Kishida faction (Kochikai), two from the Aso faction (Wakate Kyokai), one from the Motegi faction (Heisei Kenkyukai), one from the Ishiba faction (Suigetsu-kai), two from the old Nishimura faction, one from the old Hayashi faction, one member from the Komeito, and 11 unaffiliated members, demonstrates a balance between experience and fresh blood, factional equilibrium, cross-factional cooperation, gender and age diversity. This reflects Ishiba’s effort to seek balance in the new cabinet.
Although Ishiba has been cautious and conservative in his actions to avoid conflicts with various parties, his position as Prime Minister remains precarious.
Recently, Ishiba has been accused of potential financial misconduct within his faction, the Suigetsu-kai, involving unaccounted-for political funds. Based on public opinion, such revelations at this time are likely to be recognized as the result of threats or hints from within the party or external forces, signaling to Ishiba to stay within his bounds.
Regardless, the new Prime Minister is immediately facing the risk of a political scandal, which could adversely affect the LDP’s upcoming House of Representatives election. Initially, the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval rating was only 51%, the lowest since 2001. It remains to be seen whether this support rate can be maintained above 50%. Whether the unstable governance can be put on the right track depends on various factors. Given the fragile position of the Ishiba administration, his policies and political direction may be determined by the party’s leadership. How Ishiba balances various forces and successfully fulfills his role as Prime Minister remains to be seen.
A Quest for Equivalence with the United States? Ishiba’s Grand Strategy May Be Difficult to Realize
Japan has long sought military self-defense and strategic protection.
Since the 1951 signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan has maintained a high degree of unity with the United States in military strategy. Alongside the external cooperation formed by the U.S. military presence and Japan’s strategic use of land, Japan has established an internal strategy to expand the scope and responsibilities of its Self-Defense Forces, while also seeking to amend the Constitution’s Article 9, which renounces war. These have long been consistent political goals of the LDP and other conservative parties.
Since the 21st century, leaders such as Yoshiro Mori, Junichiro Koizumi, Fukuda Yasuo, and Shinzo Abe have prioritized military strength as part of their policy platforms, actively promoting the revision of defense guidelines and constitutional reform. Ishiba has also taken a hawkish stance in the field of military security, advocating for the establishment of an ‘Asian version of NATO’ during his campaign and emphasizing the importance of a basic national security law and strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance.
What is Asian version of NATO? As the name suggests, it aims to establish a military organization or alliance in Asia, similar to NATO in Europe, involving the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and other Asia-Pacific countries, with rights and obligations of mutual military cooperation . Ishiba argued, ‘Today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Asia… Asia lacks a collective self-defense system like NATO, and thus has no mutual defense obligations, making it prone to war… the establishment of Asian version of NATO is indispensable.’ He emphasized that geopolitical tensions are the principal rationale behind this proposal. Concurrently, Shigeru Ishiba underscores the notion that ‘Japan is a sovereign and independent nation,’ perceiving the current Japan-U.S. relationship as inherently ‘asymmetrical.’ The advocacy for an Asian version of NATO, rooted in the discourse of regional threats, aims to augment Japan’s military standing in East Asia. It seeks to establish a dialogue mechanism of equal standing between Japan and the U.S. and extend Japan’s military strategic reach into North America, thereby augmenting Japan’s strategic influence on the global stage.
However, the reality is that there are many obstacles to the establishment of the Asian version of NATO. Due to the different relationships with China and the cultural and institutional differences between Asian countries and Europe, the NATO model is difficult to replicate in Asia.
Firstly, ASEAN countries oppose it. The Jakarta Post, as the official newspaper of Indonesia, stated that ASEAN is not interested in Japan’s ‘Asian NATO’ proposal, as this alliance is seen as an affront, as participating in such a military alliance would only escalate regional tensions. ASEAN emphasizes the establishment of a multilateral framework centered on economic benefits, which is inconsistent with Japan’s focus on military competition in East Asia, revealing Japan’s intentions for military strength in the Asian NATO proposal.
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar also clearly expressed India’s negative response. He emphasized that India has a unique historical background and diplomatic strategy and does not intend to become part of any military alliance, nor will it follow the practices of other countries. This statement sends a direct and clear message to the new Japanese Prime Minister that India seeks autonomy and independence in security and strategic cooperation and is unwilling to participate in the construction of a regional military group similar to NATO.
At the same time, the pursuit of an equal position with the United States in Asian NATO will inevitably face opposition from the United States. The concept of an Asian NATO with Japan advocating for ‘leadership under the United States and Japan’ and ‘parity with the U.S. in military terms’ is fraught with challenges, and Ishiba also stated that ‘elevating the Japan-U.S. alliance to the level of the U.S.-U.K. alliance is my mission.’ U.S. officials responsible for East Asian and Pacific affairs stated that Ishiba’s proposal to ‘establish a more formal institution’ is not yet ripe, and the United States prefers to optimize the existing cooperation framework rather than seek the creation of a new closed military alliance.
Therefore, they all have issued a warning to Ishiba, greatly extinguishing the flames of Ishiba’s Asian NATO ambitions, and the United States and ASEAN’s refusal to Japan’s proposed regional military alliance makes the strategic blueprint of Asian NATO difficult to implement.
Is Ishiba a ‘pro-China faction’ within the LDP? Ishiba’s stance on China after taking office still requires cautious observation.
Before becoming Prime Minister, Ishiba showed a ‘pro-China’ signal during his time in governance. As a Christian who empathizes with the weak, Ishiba demonstrated a rare stance on China-Japanese historical issues, acknowledging that ‘Japan should reflect on and apologize for the war,’ stating that both Chinese and Japanese people were victims of that war. Compared to the Japanese right-wing politicians who always beautify historical facts and refuse to admit the aggression of war, Ishiba’s stance within the LDP is quite pro-China, and he has long been considered by the Japanese media as a member of the ‘pro-China faction’ within the party. On the issue of China, Ishiba has emphasized that China is not a threat to Japan and has recently stressed the importance of dialogue and exchange to continuously advance strategic reciprocal relations with China.
However, as the leader of Japan, will Ishiba adhere to the political stance of his youth after taking office? On the one hand, Ishiba’s repeated appearances in the election have focused on achieving ‘Asian NATO’ as his governing goal. The establishment of a military alliance inevitably requires creating an imaginary enemy—is it China or North Korea? In this case, will China-Japanese relations deteriorate due to Japan’s military extremism? On the other hand, his demand to station U.S. troops in Guam and establish a security dialogue with the United States on an equal footing has been clearly rejected by the United States. ‘The strategy of competing with the United States’ must be implemented, does this mean that Japan’s strategy will shift, and through strengthening cooperation with China, will it achieve its cunning goals?
Japan’s security has always relied on external support. And Japan, which has long maintained a unified front with the United States, if seeking external parity with the United States, must rely on the interests and strategic support of opposing forces to maintain a close but independent alliance distance. However, in reality, Japan cannot achieve such ambitions at present. As mentioned above, the domestic situation in Japan is unstable, and the external strategy is blocked. Ishiba’s goal of Asian NATO is difficult to achieve breakthrough progress in his three-year term. Looking at the domestic situation, such as the LDP’s financial reform, the upcoming House of Representatives election, the disaster relief in Noto, and the adjustment of the economic market deflation… Japan’s domestic political ruins are in urgent need of repair, leaving Ishiba’s cabinet with little room to develop overseas forces. Therefore, on the external stance, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not loudly proclaimed the strategic shift of Japan after the prime minister’s change, and Japanese Foreign Minister Iwao Tsukuda also stated that Asian NATO should be ‘carefully considered.’
Ishiba’s softened diplomatic stance after taking office shows such a conservative handling logic: Japan’s comprehensive alliance relationship with the United States will not change, and Japan’s consistent strategy towards China will not change because of the promotion of security system expansion. Domestic affairs are prioritized over foreign affairs, and the opportunity-based security competition under the threat of the region will be temporarily shelved, with continuous planning and covert operations in the future. Faced with the situation in the East, Japan’s current statements are more conservative, avoiding focal disputes with China and the United States, while focusing on the adjustment of domestic affairs and easing diplomatic pressure. Especially for China-Japanese relations, it is also stated that ‘although there are various unresolved issues,’ there is a desire to build a constructive and stable relationship through strengthened dialogue. Therefore, whether the Japan-U.S. relationship will enter an ‘adrift’ era, or whether the hawkish stance will be implemented to the end, maintaining the Japan-U.S. alliance’s security network against China and North Korea, we cannot generalize.
Ishiba’s policy declaration behind shows Japan’s sensitivity to changes in the East Asian geopolitical landscape and the country’s anxiety about Japan’s progress, which is a struggle against the current. Under the competition of China and the United States, the Ishiba cabinet chooses diplomatic compromise, prioritizing domestic affairs, which is the consideration of Ishiba’s timing and also the inevitable result of Japan’s political environment. In such diplomatic deployment, Japan-U.S. relations and Japan-China relations will not change significantly in the future, and the direction of Japan will have to wait and see Ishiba’s future governance performance.
Opinion
Israeli elections: The driver may change, but the destination remains the same
Haider Al-Aila, Abu Al-Amir
Anyone who views the Israeli elections as a battle between the right and the left is mistaken. The so-called Israeli left, in the conventional political sense, has long ceased to be a viable electoral force. What is actually unfolding is a struggle within the Zionist camp itself: a hardline religious and nationalist right led by Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies, versus a secular and centrist right seeking to reshape the political landscape by ousting him.
Netanyahu, having mastered the art of managing the Israeli right over the years, understands that his real vulnerability lies not merely in a Likud defeat, but in the disintegration of the broader right-wing bloc. In Israel’s electoral system—which requires parties to cross a 3.25% electoral threshold to enter the Knesset and mandates a 61-seat majority to form a government—smaller right-wing factions falling below that cutoff could deprive his bloc of the seats needed to govern. Consequently, Netanyahu has spent recent weeks fighting to unify fringe parties and prevent the fragmentation of the right-wing vote.
Herein lies the central paradox of the election: while Netanyahu’s camp is far more ideologically defined than its rivals, it is also markedly more fragile. Though it unites nationalist, religious, and ultra-Orthodox factions, these groups remain deeply divided over issues such as military conscription, the balance between religion and state, judicial governance, and even Netanyahu’s personal political future.
Conversely, the opposing camp—where leadership has increasingly shifted toward Gadi Eisenkot amid the waning influence of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid—is not a cohesive ideological movement. Rather, it is a broad coalition united primarily by a singular goal: removing Netanyahu from power.
Eisenkot is attempting to appeal to the political center, the secular right, and voters eager to replace Netanyahu without abandoning the mainstream Zionist consensus on security issues and political settlements. Indeed, Eisenkot himself does not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the foreseeable future.
This captures the core reality of today’s Israeli politics: voters heading to the polls are not choosing between two fundamentally opposed visions for the Palestinian issue, but between competing approaches to governing Israel in the wake of October 7.
Netanyahu’s message to the electorate is straightforward: security demands an uncompromising, unapologetic right wing. Eisenkot, however, offers a different critique: the problem lies not in Israel’s military capability, but in the leadership that mismanaged it and failed to prevent the October 7 attacks. For him, leadership must change to restore institutional trust and state integrity. Thus, accountability for the failures of October 7 has emerged as the defining battleground of the campaign against Netanyahu.
Yet Eisenkot’s bloc harbors its own internal contradictions. It is far from a unified political movement, operating instead as a loose, pragmatic alliance of figures who lack a shared long-term agenda. To maximize their numbers, several opposition parties have already begun coordinating surplus vote-sharing agreements to minimize wasted ballots.
This dynamic brings the “Arab dilemma” to the fore.
If neither Jewish-led bloc achieves a 61-seat majority, Arab Knesset members could hold the balance of power, either by joining a governing coalition or backing one from the outside. This is no trivial variable; higher turnout among Arab citizens could decisively alter seat distribution, particularly given that their participation in previous elections fell well below the national average.
The profound irony, however, is that while anti-Netanyahu forces urge Arab citizens to turn out and “save democracy,” large segments of the Zionist establishment still refuse to treat them as legitimate governing partners. Notably, Bennett—competing fiercely against Netanyahu—has explicitly demanded a coalition restricted exclusively to Zionist parties, despite having presided over a 2021 government that relied directly on an Arab party.
Consequently, should Eisenkot’s camp require Arab support to form a government, it may secure an electoral victory tainted by political hypocrisy: Netanyahu falls, yet Arab lawmakers (such as Mansour Abbas’s bloc) are once again reduced to numerical leverage rather than genuine partners in shaping state policy.
For Palestinians, it is vital not to succumb to the illusion that Netanyahu’s downfall equates to the demise of the Israeli right or the resurrection of an Israeli peace camp. The Palestinian question runs far deeper than the name of the Israeli prime minister.
Netanyahu may fall, Eisenkot may rise, Bennett may return, and a new cabinet may be formed with different faces. Yet the overarching current within Israeli society, particularly after October 7, remains thoroughly detached from any political solution that recognizes the Palestinian right to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.
The upcoming Israeli elections are not, at their core, a contest between right and left. They are a contest between one right-wing faction that seeks to continue down the current path under Netanyahu, and another that seeks to replace the driver while keeping the vehicle on the exact same road—differing only in speed and driving style.
This is precisely where the lesson lies for the Palestinians: they must not expect a miracle from the Israeli ballot box. Genuine transformation cannot be measured merely by who occupies the Prime Minister’s Office, but by whether Israeli society is willing to confront the deeper trajectory that led to October 7 and its aftermath.
The driver may change, and the style of driving may shift, but the defining question for Palestinians remains: Will the destination ever change?
This is what Palestinians must recognize clearly. Netanyahu is neither the entirety of the problem, nor is his departure the ultimate solution. Even his rivals, who march under the banner of change, operate within a political and social paradigm that has only grown more right-wing, entrenched, and hostile toward Palestinian rights.
Opinion
Gaza exposes the myth of the “most moral army in the world”
Haider Al-Aila, Gaza

Calling the Israeli military the “most moral army in the world” is a claim thoroughly shattered by the facts on the ground and the atrocities committed against the Palestinian people. What morality can an army claim when it massacres civilians, collapses homes on top of families, loots private property, and desecrates the dead—all while its leadership projects an air of moral supremacy to the world?
Morality is not measured by slogans or military technology; it is defined by how force is applied and the degree of respect shown for human life and dignity. From this perspective, Israel’s devastating war on Gaza reveals systematic, criminal practices that cannot be justified under any pretext of security or self-defense.
When killing becomes a display of power
Among the most harrowing dimensions of this war is the relentless bombardment that turns inhabited homes into mass graves, with utter disregard for women, children, and the elderly. In the densely populated Gaza Strip, widespread strikes have decimated entire neighborhoods, burying thousands of families beneath the rubble.
Equally horrifying are the reports of mass graves uncovered near Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City and Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. These sites revealed the bodies of women and the elderly, some bearing signs of execution, binding, and stripped of clothing. Eyewitnesses documented similar mass graves near the Indonesian Hospital in northern Gaza. The United Nations has rightfully demanded independent, transparent investigations to establish accountability for these apparent war crimes.
The sanctity of the dead is a fundamental human right. Any violation of this principle demands rigorous investigation and prosecution—free from diplomatic cover or denial.
A single target as a pretext to level entire blocks
I do not speak here merely from reports; I speak as a firsthand witness in Gaza. I have watched entire residential blocks—housing vulnerable families—flattened under the pretext of targeting a single individual. Time and again, the Israeli military has tracked a target via reconnaissance drones, waited until he entered a crowded residential building, and then brought the entire structure down. In doing so, they have wiped out dozens of civilians who had absolutely no connection to the individual being pursued.
This reality raises a damning question: If an army possesses the surveillance technology to track a target with surgical precision, why wait to destroy the building while innocent civilians are inside? What crime did these families commit to pay with their lives?
Deliberately subjecting civilians to catastrophic harm without taking the legally required precautions cannot be excused by the presence of a target. It is a direct violation of International Humanitarian Law and constitutes unlawful collective punishment. These are not abstract statistics or fleeting screen images to me; they are the lived realities of families wiped out in an instant.
Looting at gunpoint
The degradation extends beyond killing and physical destruction. Human rights organizations and a 2024 UN Commission of Inquiry have documented widespread instances of Israeli soldiers looting Palestinian homes—stealing cash, gold, jewelry, and electronics.
Compounding the crime, soldiers have frequently posted videos on social media mocking the victims, showing off stolen goods, and celebrating the destruction of civilian property. Pillaging the belongings of displaced or deceased civilians is not military heroism; it is a war crime and an assault on human dignity.
The racism that precedes the bullet
These actions cannot be separated from a dehumanizing, racist discourse that treats Palestinians as subhuman and undeserving of life. When national supremacy is normalized and Palestinian lives are deemed worthless, military atrocities become the inevitable outcome. In the eyes of an indoctrinated soldier, a dehumanized population becomes an open target for slaughter, torture, and humiliation.
This is not a condemnation of Jewish people, who are not a monolith; rather, it is an indictment of the racist Zionist ideology, the brutal policies of the occupation, and all who enable or justify these crimes.
When killing becomes a hunting game
Among the most chilling accounts are videos and testimonies of snipers targeting young Palestinians as if hunting prey. Soldiers have been filmed stalking victims from fortified positions, then cheering and celebrating as their bullets hit their mark.
Killing here ceases to be an act of war; it becomes sport. What moral decay allows human death to become a source of entertainment? It strips the victim of their humanity, reducing someone with dreams, a future, and a family to mere target practice.
Technology without morality
The Israeli military boasts advanced surveillance, artificial intelligence, and precision weaponry. Yet technological superiority does not confer moral superiority, nor does it grant an army a blank check to use disproportionate force.
International Humanitarian Law mandates distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Technology merely amplifies the capacity for violence; it does not legitimize mass slaughter, nor does it grant immunity from accountability.
Internal dissent: “I can no longer bear the silence”
Cracks in the narrative have also emerged from within. A widely circulated account attributed to Israeli reserve Major Avdar Shailovsky, titled “I Can No Longer Bear the Silence” (published by the Jerusalem News Agency), recounts his refusal to remain silent about the horrors he witnessed in Gaza.
The account details the deliberate targeting of civilian gatherings, aid distribution points, and the sniping of women and children, alongside systemic mockery of Palestinian suffering. Shailovsky expressed profound remorse for his complicity and called for a rejection of the racist indoctrination driving the military. While such voices of conscience exist within Israeli society, they remain a marginalized minority against a prevailing culture of right-wing extremism that condones the occupation and the erasure of Palestinian rights.
What morality remains?
The rhetoric driving this war was made clear early on when former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant referred to Palestinians as “human animals.” Such language laid the ideological groundwork for the atrocities that followed.
Public relations campaigns cannot erase the reality on the ground in Gaza. Neither military power nor foreign diplomatic protection can hide the mass graves or silence the voices of the victims.
In Gaza, I have seen multistory towers turned into tombs and human beings reduced to collateral damage by an army that views their existence as worthless. How can there be any talk of moral superiority when the dead lie trapped under concrete, emergency responders are barred from reaching them, and a nation’s suffering is trivialized?
Gaza has not only shattered the myth of the “most moral army in the world”—it has placed the conscience of the entire international community on trial.
Opinion
Imperialism, economic power, and foreign policy
In its shortest, leanest, and simplest definition, foreign policy is the management of all manner of relations entered into with other countries. Foreign policy is a costly undertaking. It demands extensive knowledge, skill, experience, and leadership. For the price of failure is heavy, in every respect. A country’s reputation, influence, and deterrence, as well as its human resources, finances, and borders, are all directly affected by the success or failure of its foreign policy.
The program researching the costs of war at Brown University in the US (see https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/paper/overview) determined in its research that post-9/11 US attacks and invasions imposed an economic burden of $8 trillion and caused the direct or indirect deaths of more than 4.5 million people. The report also noted that, alongside the financial burden of these attacks and invasions, they displaced millions of people and exacerbated global environmental pollution.
Today, to understand the decline in US imperialism’s capacity for hegemony and its ecological dominance, one must first understand the burden borne by the US economy. For the US is no longer a country that accounts for more than half of global output, as it did in the aftermath of World War II. Its share of total production stands at around 20%. The social, class, and cultural fault lines within the country, as well as the divide between rich and poor, run exceptionally deep. The combined debt of the public sector, private corporations, and households has approached $200 trillion. The total debt of the federal government has exceeded $40 trillion (see: https://www.usdebtclock.org/world-debt-clock.html).
What does the US prioritize when lending?
The 3 largest creditors to the US, according to June 2026 data, are Japan ($1.117 trillion), the United Kingdom ($940 billion), and China ($633 billion). Israel is the country receiving the greatest amount of US economic and military aid in the Middle East, followed by Egypt. Ukraine, too, has received substantial economic and military aid, funds, and loans from the US. One must also not forget that the US lends money to its allies, including Ukraine, so that they will purchase US goods, weapons, and aircraft. The US dictates how they may use this debt. What is more, it has been doing this for years. During World War II, it lent substantial sums to its allies. Britain, for instance, was only able to pay off this debt in 2006; and Britain, alongside Israel, is one of the two strategic allies of the US. Rather than lending directly to countries undergoing economic crises, the US extends credit through the IMF and the World Bank. When lending, the US takes into account not only its economic priorities but also its strategic and geopolitical ones.
As an imperialist power, the US concerns itself with the entire world. It strives to remain effective and influential on a global scale. Yet just as the power of the US itself has waned, its allies no longer possess their former strength either, especially the Europeans. The European Union, an imperialist project, is not a global actor. There is no such cohesion, no such harmony within the European Union. Nor does it have such an objective. Furthermore, the European Union possesses neither the power, nor the will, nor the courage for this. Germany, the leader of the European Union, seeks merely to exert influence in its immediate neighbourhood: the Balkans, the Baltics, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus; that is all. And the extent to which it succeeds even in this remains open to debate. Moreover, there is not a single country in the world that desires or expects the European Union to step forward, take initiative, and project power globally in distant lands.
The methods used by imperialism
When reflecting on the relationship between imperialism and foreign policy, one should remember that the tools and methods employed by imperialism have evolved. In the 19th century, for example, imperialism resorted to cruder, more brutal, and more barbaric methods. Later, while continuing to turn to military methods and brute force, it systematically deployed economic and financial instruments, cultural hegemony, and sophisticated instruments and methods of governance, utilizing them with far greater frequency.
One of the lessons history teaches is this: every empire, every great power that grows too vast, expands too far, and stretches itself too thin also hastens its own demise. This condition is natural. It is inevitable. This holds true for the Roman Empire, just as it does for the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over immense territories stretching from the Caucasus to the gates of Vienna, and from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa. For governance and rule become increasingly difficult. For the financial burden mounts. For the bureaucracy grows cumbersome. For centrifugal tendencies come to the fore, competition among local powers far from the centre sharpens, and tensions between provincial power bases escalate. For difficulties arise in implementing necessary administrative and military reforms and in taking the required steps.
In summary, when the predicament of the US is evaluated in the light of this iron law of history, the decline in US power becomes all the clearer.
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