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Mali shut the door in France’s face

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As Mali government bans the activities of “Non-Governmental Organizations” (NGOs) which receive financial support from France, German soldiers will leave Mali by the end of 2023 at the latest.

In Mali, the government’s decision to ban the activities of NGOs backed by France came after France cut off its development assistance to Mali. Paris cited Russian security company Wagner’s presence in the country as a reason for cutting aid.

Government Spokesperson Abdoulaye Maiga said France’s claims were unfounded and were made with the aim of manipulating public opinion.

“This is a ploy to deceive and manipulate national and international public opinion with the sole aim of destabilising and isolating Mali,” Maiga said of France’s statements.

Stating that this decision of France left the people of Mali in a difficult position and was used as an element of blackmail against the administrators, Maiga emphasized that on the other hand, France provided support to terrorist groups operating on the territory of Mali.

Subsequently, Maiga announced that the activities of all non-governmental organizations in Mali, which France supports or supplies with equipment and material, were banned. It has been stated that organizations working in the field of “humanitarian aid” are also within the scope of the ban.

France had to withdraw its troops

Mali’s army, which took over the French-backed government in August 2020, established a Military Transition Council that would hold power until 2025. The first task of the transitional administration was to deport the French ambassador. After that, Mali’s government announced that the cooperation agreements in the field of defence, signed in 2014, were terminated because France violated the right of sovereignty of Mali in various ways.

France, where the new administration and the public made it very clear that they do not want themselves on the territory of Mali, withdrew its military units, which it deployed 8 years ago under the pretext of fighting terrorism, last August.

As the protests of local people against the French troops intensified, the French General Staff announced that the last battalion of the Barkhane force on the Malian territory had left the border between Mali and Niger. France had nearly 2,300 soldiers in Mali.

England is withdrawing as well

Recently, England announced it would withdraw its troops from Mali earlier than planned, citing “political instability”.

James Heappey, England’s Secretary of State for Defence, announced to lawmakers in parliament that they would withdraw about 300 British troops sent to Mali as part of the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping mission.

It’s Germany’s turn

After France and England, Germany also announced its decision to withdraw from Mali.

The German government reportedly wants to end the mandate of German troops in Mali in May 2024 as part of the United Nations (UN) Mali Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission (MINUSMA). There are currently about 1,200 German soldiers in Mali as part of the UN MINUSMA mission.

Mali’s Minister of Defence was in Moscow

While the presence Western forces in Mali that are deployed to the country under the pretext of fighting terrorism has weakened, it is noteworthy that Bamako has improved its relations with Russia since 2020.

Mali’s Military Transition Council received five planes, one military helicopter, new military equipment and devices from Russia in January 2022. Mali’s Ministery of Defence has announced that Russian military support has strengthened Mali’s reconnaissance and offensive capabilities. In August, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Mali’s President Assimi Goita met in Moscow and the two leaders agreed to improve co-operation. Following the meeting, the Russian side said it would provide military equipment as well as fuel, grain and fertilizer support to Mali.

Last day, Mali’s Minister of Defence Daoud Aly Mohammedine reportedly travelled to Moscow at the invitation of the Kremlin, and the two countries signed an agreement on co-operation in the field of security and intelligence.

Russia’s position in the region grows stronger

Russia’s position is becoming stronger, both on the basis of governments and among the people in Africa, where anti-Frenchism is rising. Unlike France, the Malian authorities stress that Russia respects their sovereignty and does not interfere in their internal affairs. While the West says that Russia has settled in the region and increased its influence through Wagner, cooperation with Russia in the military field does not give rise to a dependent relationship, according to regional officials. Russian flags also attract attention in popular actions that violently protest and expel France.

China and Turkey are also active

On the other hand, the ongoing instability and terror in the Sahel, despite years of France’s Operation Barkhane and the UN Peacekeeping Force in the region, calls into question the success and effectiveness of these operations. The belief that the West feeds terrorist organizations in order to maintain its influence in the region is dominant both among the people and among African leaders. African leaders aim to develop formulas based on their own military strength to ensure the security of the continent.

While China stands out as a priority partner in the field of trade and infrastructure for Sahel countries rich in bauxite, uranium, iron, gold and oil reserves, Turkey as well as Russia increases its influence in the region in the field of security and defense. Turkey’s defense and aviation exports to the continent increased more than five times from 82.9 million dollars in 2020 to 460.6 million dollars in 2021.

An era is ending…

France launched the Serval operation on 11 January 2013 on the grounds of ‘political instability in Mali and the fight against the activities of Al-Qaeda-linked groups and the purification of the northern territories of the Malian government (including the cities of Timbuktu and Gao) from radical terrorist organizations’. However, after France’s operation, the crises and conflicts deepened and spread to other countries rich in mines in the Sahel region (Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Eritrea).

France, which launched the Serval operation in 2013, first sent 3,000 soldiers to this country and then 1,500 in August. Despite announcing that it ended the operation on 15 July 2014, France did not withdraw troops from the country, but instead deployed them to Mauritania, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and moved its military activities to the wider Sahel region under the name of Operation Barkhane, which began in 2014.

Macron also pursued France’s Mali and Sahel policy. But since August 2020, France faces the ‘danger‘of being excluded from the region.

Although the old colonies of France achieved their political independence in the 1960s, economic and military dependence continued with new colonialism. Today, the failure and reluctance of Western powers to ‘combat’ extremist terrorism, one of the most important security problems in the region, has brought with it the need and debate of Africa to turn to its own power. On the other hand, the search for alternative international co-operation continues, but the most important expectation is that these alternative collaborations do not lead to ‘new colonialism’.

DIPLOMACY

Russia open to Syria’s BRICS membership amid leadership shift

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Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov announced that if Syria’s new government applies to join BRICS, its request would be taken into serious consideration. Speaking to TASS news agency, Ryabkov stated, “There is no doubt that we seriously consider the applications of all countries, and Syria is no exception.” However, he emphasized that BRICS would not pressure or influence Syria’s decision, saying, “We are not forcing anyone, we are not encouraging anyone to do anything, and we respect any choice.”

In October, Syria’s ambassador to Moscow, Bashar Jaafari, revealed that Damascus was actively discussing the possibility of joining BRICS. Moscow has reaffirmed its support for Syria in this pursuit, highlighting the historic ties between the two nations. The BRICS bloc, originally founded in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded in 2011 with the inclusion of South Africa. In a significant wave of growth, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates became members as of January 1, 2024.

Recent developments suggest a strategic shift in Moscow’s approach to Syria. The Kremlin has begun direct negotiations with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a key political and military entity in the region, to safeguard Russian military interests in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed contact with HTS’s political committee. Meanwhile, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani, now identifying as Ahmed Sharaa, expressed openness to redefining relations with Russia, noting the opportunity to “reconsider relations in a way that serves common interests.”

Simultaneously, the Syrian Embassy in Moscow raised the flag of the new administration, signaling readiness to follow directives from the country’s new leadership. This marks a notable pivot in the geopolitical alignment between Russia and Syria.

Former diplomat Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, highlighted Russia’s pragmatic approach. In an interview with The Guardian, he remarked, “Moscow prefers to work with those who have power and control and discards those who lose it.”

Dara Massicot, an analyst at the Carnegie Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin, noted that while Russia could extend financial, energy, or resource-based support to the new Syrian government, the coalition’s specific demands remain uncertain.

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EU sanctions Dutch oil trader for breaching Russian oil price cap

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For the first time, the European Union (EU) has imposed sanctions on a European national for violating the price cap on Russian oil exports. Nils Trost, a Dutch oil trader residing in Switzerland, faces sanctions for his involvement in breaching the $60-per-barrel price ceiling imposed by Western countries. Swiss authorities are also investigating his company, Paramount Energy & Commodities SA.

According to an EU statement, Trost’s Geneva-based company transferred its Russian oil trading operations in June 2022 to its Dubai-based subsidiary, Paramount Energy & Commodities DMCC. The EU alleges that this subsidiary regularly traded Russian crude oil at prices exceeding the established $60-per-barrel limit.

The $60 price ceiling on Russian crude oil, implemented in December 2022, was part of Western efforts to curb Moscow’s oil revenue while maintaining global supply. Under the sanctions, trade involving Western insurers and financiers must adhere to this price limit. However, Paramount’s Dubai subsidiary continued trading East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) grade oil, which typically trades at prices above the ceiling, unlike Russia’s Urals crude.

Trost has denied violating sanctions, arguing that his UAE subsidiary is legally independent and not bound by EU sanctions. Speaking to The Financial Times, he claimed that his lawyers assured him the operations of subsidiaries in the UAE are exempt from EU restrictions as long as they remain uninvolved with the European parent company. Trost also attributed the sanctions to what he described as the “machinations” of his former business partner, Gaurav Kumar Srivastava.

Swiss law allows foreign subsidiaries of Swiss companies to operate independently of Swiss sanctions. However, if direct links—such as financial transfers or managerial directives—between the parent company and subsidiaries are established, such actions could constitute a sanctions violation. The Swiss Federal Government’s Expert Group on Business Cycles (SECO) began examining the activities of Paramount and other companies in early 2023.

In the spring of 2024, SECO forwarded its findings to Switzerland’s Attorney General’s Office, recommending criminal proceedings based on two separate investigations. While the prosecutor’s office accepted one case, it rejected the other. The names of the involved companies remain undisclosed.

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Türkiye’s Moment in Europe’s Eyes: Von der Leyen’s High-Stakes Visit Amid Syria’s Turmoil

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Ahmetcan Uzlaşık, Brussels

Brussels, Dec 16, 2024 – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s upcoming visit on December 17 to Türkiye comes at a pivotal moment for Syria, a country emerging from the long shadow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As Syria faces unprecedented political shifts, von der Leyen’s discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will not only address the immediate humanitarian crisis but also shape the future of EU-Türkiye cooperation in the region.

Ahmetcan Uzlaşık

The fall of Assad’s regime has raised hopes for a new era in Syria, yet the transition brings both risks and uncertainties. Ursula von der Leyen, in a statement ahead of her visit, emphasized the importance of continued EU support for Syria’s people, saying, “The collapse of the Assad regime offers new hope for the Syrian people. But this moment of change also carries risks and brings hardship. With the situation on the ground so volatile, our help to the people of Syria is ever more important.”

Von der Leyen: “We Are Committed to Providing Essential Aid”

The European Union has swiftly mobilized to address the urgent needs of those affected by the ongoing conflict and political upheaval in Syria. The Commission announced the launch of a new Humanitarian Air Bridge operation, delivering 50 tonnes of health supplies to Türkiye from its stockpiles in Dubai. These supplies will then be transported to northern Syria to alleviate the mounting health crisis. Additionally, 46 tonnes of shelter and education materials will be delivered, with EU funding now reaching €163 million in total humanitarian aid for 2024.

“We are committed to providing essential aid, including trauma kits, medical supplies, and food parcels to over 60,000 Syrians in the north,” said von der Leyen on December 13. The EU’s expanded humanitarian efforts reflect the urgency of the situation. However, despite the scale of this intervention, questions remain about the long-term effectiveness of these efforts, as many sanctions on Syria are ongoing.

“Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU”

Von der Leyen’s visit comes at a time when Türkiye, a candidate country of the EU, increased its geopolitical importance in the region. Having long supported opposition forces against Assad, Türkiye is now portrayed in the West as one of the winners of the Syrian civil war.

Türkiye’s role in hosting over 4 million Syrian refugees has made it one of the most directly affected nations by the conflict, while it made Ankara important as an gate-keeper of migration before the eyes of European politicians. As von der Leyen prepares for her meeting with Erdoğan, the focus will likely be on reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation to manage the refugee crisis, protection of the minorities in Syria and prevent further instability that might cause another domestic conflict.

“We must work together to ensure that Syria’s territorial integrity is preserved and that the rights of all its people, especially minorities, are protected,” von der Leyen stated on 13th December.

Sophie Desmidt, Associate Director at ECDPM, emphasized that Türkiye’s role is central to the EU’s strategy. She noted that “Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU, and von der Leyen will underline this during her visit.” Desmidt also highlighted the likelihood of Türkiye leveraging its position for additional EU support, especially given its pivotal role during the migration crisis. She added, “US leadership is in lame duck mode until Trump takes office, and whether he will be a spoiler or a power broker remains to be seen. I think Erdogan is keen to assert his leadership, over Iran, which plays in the EU’s cards”.

Kaja Kallas: The challenge of EU’s new face in diplomacy

The former Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, came to the office on December 1, as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Recent statements from Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, add another layer of context to von der Leyen’s visit. Kallas has underscored the EU’s commitment to ensuring stability in the region, an issue of particular importance in light of Syria’s ongoing instability. On December 8, she tweeted, “Our priority is to ensure security in the region. I will work with all the constructive partners, in Syria and in the region.”

On December 14, Kallas emphasized the EU’s support for Syria’s political transition, stating, “Syria faces a hopeful but uncertain future. That’s why we all agreed in Aqaba on important principles: stability, sovereignty, territorial integrity, but also respect for minorities, institution build-up and unity of government that includes all the groups in Syria.”

Before going into her first Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, on December 16, Kallas announced that she had appointed “A European top diplomat” to go to Damascus and make contact with the new government and people there.

Kallas also stated that the bloc could ease sanctions on Syria if its new leadership forms an inclusive government and respects women’s and minority rights. She also noted that many EU foreign ministers urged Syria to eliminate Russian influence, including military bases, after the Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

“EU leadership wants decreased migration pressure”

Desmidt answered what might be the possible effects of the political crisis in Germany and France in the context of a leadership problem. “This will be a challenge for the time being, but pending the outcome of the German elections, things could move relatively fast. My sense is that EU leadership across the board, including the Commission, Parliament, and EU heads of state and government, and their domestic constituencies are by and large on the same page when it comes to the outcome they want to see as a result of support to Syria: decreased migration pressure on the EU.”

She added that there are other players who will contribute ideally to a joint EU action, such as António Costa, the new Council President, who will have the task of mobilizing member states around a common position, and Dubravka Šuica, the new Commissioner for the Mediterranean. Kaja Kallas, Desmidt noted, will have to demonstrate that this is a priority for her, as her profile has been strong in Ukraine and Russia. “She already took action over the weekend, traveling to Jordan to speak to representatives from the U.S., Türkiye, and Arab states,” she pointed out.

“Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks”

Desmidt reinforced this view, warning against premature disengagement. “The EU has, on many occasions, been criticized for relinquishing in practice its emphasis on human rights and democracy and has been seen by many partners outside the EU as operating on double standards—being hard-line on some regimes but more lenient towards others, especially when interests are at play.”

She noted that “Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks, but the EU should be clear on its position and interests. Closing the door to engagement with Syria’s transitional government now would also close the space for the EU to act constructively and effectively.” She drew parallels to Afghanistan, where the EU adopted a principled yet pragmatic approach to engagement with the leadership to support the people.

Looking forward, the EU faces a delicate balancing act. The potential return of Syrian refugees, combined with the need for reconstruction, will test the EU’s commitment to the region. The European Commission has already pledged to continue funding the rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure, but as von der Leyen acknowledged, this will require the cooperation of all regional players, including Türkiye.

“The reconstruction of Syria will require significant resources, and the EU is ready to play its part,” said von der Leyen. “But it is essential that we work together with our regional partners to ensure that the political transition is inclusive and sustainable.”

Desmidt noted that budget constraints and the rise of far-right parties in Europe might further complicate these efforts. “The EU won’t shoulder the cost of reconstruction alone. Partners in the region, such as the Gulf states, will need to step up. Ideally EU’s role should focus on coordinating and supporting a regionally owned process, that prioritises respectful and innovative domestic and foreign policy solutions that pave the way for Syria’s long-term reconstruction” she concluded.

Desmidt also outlined potential avenues for support, such as international donor conferences, joint reconstruction funds with the World Bank and Asian and Islamic Development Banks, and a regional peace process and plan. She also suggested the possibility of an EU Envoy for Syria. She concluded, “I fear that other conflict zones, besides the Middle East and Ukraine, will suffer from a reallocation of interests and funds, notably Africa, as the return of migrants and easing migration pressure on the EU is higher up the political priority list than, for example, Sudan or the Sahel at the moment.”

“With the new configuration in Syria, Türkiye’s Importance Has Undoubtedly Grown in Europe”

Dr. Kadri Taştan, a non-resident senior fellow in Brussels, gave a Türkiye perspective by highlighting Türkiye’s strategic position in light of Syria’s transformation.

“Türkiye’s importance has undoubtedly grown in the eyes of Europe,” he said, pointing to Ankara’s consistent support for Syrian opposition groups even during times when the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime seemed improbable. According to Dr. Taştan, this steadfast backing has placed Türkiye in a particularly advantageous position as Syria undergoes a significant transition.

“In the short term, Türkiye is the most effective and profitable country in this new configuration, especially considering its longstanding relationships with the opposition forces,” he explained.

Security and Migration are the cornerstones of EU-Türkiye Cooperation

When asked about potential areas of collaboration between the EU and Türkiye , Dr. Taştan identified two primary points of focus: security and migration.

“Cooperation between the EU and Türkiye will center on security—specifically combating terrorism—and migration,” he said. While these two areas present clear opportunities for joint efforts, Dr. Taştan expressed skepticism regarding Europe’s ability to contribute significantly to Syria’s reconstruction.

“I don’t think Europeans can provide substantial support for reconstruction. The political environment in Europe is not conducive to this,” he noted, citing the ongoing challenges faced by the EU’s leading nations. “The two locomotive countries of Europe are facing significant political instability, and the rise of populist movements makes large-scale commitments difficult.”

Dr. Taştan also emphasized that migration and refugee return programs could become a cornerstone of EU-Türkiye cooperation. He suggested that the EU might utilize civil society organizations to fund and implement these programs through Türkiye.

“The EU can finance these initiatives through Türkiye, using entities like civil society organizations to ensure the effective management of migration and the safe return of refugees,” he added.

Last Visit Sparked Controversy Over Seating Arrangement

As European Commission President prepares for her upcoming visit to Türkiye, memories of the infamous “sofagate” incident still linger. During her 2021 visit, von der Leyen was left without a chair in a meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and EU Council President Charles Michel, sparking global criticism and allegations of sexism.

The Two last saw each other during the European Political Community (EPC) Summit in Budapest, which took place in early November 2024.

As Ursula von der Leyen heads to Ankara, the stakes are high for both the EU and Türkiye in navigating Syria’s fragile transition. The visit represents a critical moment to redefine EU-Türkiye relations, balancing humanitarian aid, migration cooperation, and geopolitical strategy.

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