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Russia-Ukraine war moves from ‘Afghanization’ to ‘Palestinianization’

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Speaking on 9 October at the Ukraine-South-East Europe Summit in Croatia, Ukrainian President Zelensky said that Ukraine has an opportunity to “promote peace and lasting stability” in the next three months and that the situation on the battlefield creates an opportunity to take decisive steps to end the conflict with Russia by 2025 at the latest. He then launched efforts to lobby for help and support from the four main members of NATO and the EU, namely Britain, France, Italy and Germany.

This was Zelenski’s most optimistic message of peace since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and with the clearest timeframe. It clearly shows that he is not only pinning his hopes on the planned second “peace summit” on the Ukrainian conflict, but also trying to prepare public opinion for the Kiev leadership to make major concessions. Many recent indications suggest that the two-year and eight-month-long direct Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the war with the indirect involvement of 32 members of NATO, in relation to the fundamental interests of the great powers and the ambiguity of US policy, are beginning to give way to the prospect of a peaceful settlement. This situation seems to be tending towards a rapid transformation from “Afghanization” to “Palestinianization” in order to prevent the war from getting completely out of control and turning into a real “Third World War”.

At the military level, the balance of victory in the war seems to have tipped even more clearly in favor of Russia. On October 3, the Russian army took control of Ugledar, Ukraine’s major military base in the Donbas, which it had operated and defended for nearly 10 years. This area was Ukraine’s major logistical support and supply center, the junction point of the Ukrainian army on the southern and eastern fronts, and had become the site of a two-year ‘meat grinder’ struggle between the two armies. The loss of Ugledar was strategically equivalent to the loss of key battle points such as Mariupol and Bakhmut.

After taking Ugledar, Russia was able not only to facilitate its advance in the Donbas region, but also to strengthen its southern land connections and railroad security to the Kerch Strait. Ukraine, on the other hand, lost important maneuvering space and strong bridgeheads in the east and south, while the Kiev leadership and its people had to feel a series of psychological, public and diplomatic defeats.

At the diplomatic level, the US elections are starting to send negative signals for Ukraine. The Biden administration is gradually reducing military aid to Ukraine, shifting from an initial approach of “do what Ukraine needs” to “do what the US can do”. Republicans, who have a 50-50 chance of winning the election, are openly saying that they are tired of supporting Ukraine and that if Trump is elected, he may reverse Biden’s policies and abandon Ukraine. Under Harris, the Democrats may even be forced to accelerate the Russia-Ukraine war by the internal divisions in America and the need to rally public opinion. In the NATO-Europe camp, discomfort with prolonging the war is growing; stocks of military equipment and ammunition are running out, the economic situation is difficult, and it is becoming a binary choice: To switch to wartime or to continue with a normal time economy?

Under the influence of this situation, the authorities in Kiev are moving towards an increasingly pessimistic picture. On the one hand, while trying to hold on to the battlefield, they have mobilized strategic reserves in a futile attempt to strike against the Russian mainland in a last ditch effort, and are even being accused by Russia of “covert use of chemical weapons disguised as smoke bombs”. On the other hand, the Ukrainian government has started to give peace signals, willing to negotiate with Russia.

On October 7, the Financial Times reported that Kiev was holding secret talks about ceding part of its territory to Russia in exchange for Ukraine joining NATO or obtaining other security guarantees. The report read as follows: “The talks are taking place behind closed doors. Under the deal, Moscow would retain de facto control over about a fifth of the Ukrainian territory it occupies, while the rest would be allowed to join NATO or receive similar security guarantees.”

At the end of March this year, Zelensky, always a hardliner, clearly weakened his position, backtracking and saying that he would accept negotiations for peace even if they could not restore the 1991 borders. In fact, the latest Financial Times report is not new information; it is perhaps the outline of an agreement generally agreed by the two sides at the beginning of the war, or perhaps the essence of the US withdrawal plan.

In August 2023, Danish media revealed that US CIA Director Burns made a secret visit to Kiev to test the possibility of getting Ukraine to give up 16 percent of its territory in exchange for an end to the war, and on August 15, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s chief of staff publicly suggested that Ukraine cede some of its territory to Russia in exchange for a license to join NATO.

These and other developments show that the games of the great powers are getting more complicated and that the new strategies for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war are accelerating the transition from “Afghanization” to “Palestinianization”. The terms “Afghanization” and “Palestinianization” are academic conceptual approaches that I adopted after the outbreak of the war, and they have been confirmed by developments on the battlefield.

First of all, the US is forcing Ukraine to become the “European version of Afghanistan”, trying to make Russia relive the historic tragedy of the Soviet Union, which for a decade was buried in Afghanistan and accelerated its collapse; while Russia is using its overwhelming comprehensive power and geographical advantage over Ukraine to make Ukraine the “European version of Afghanistan”, thus trying to make its rivals relive the strategic nightmare. In Afghanistan, they failed to conquer the Taliban for 20 years and eventually had to withdraw their troops in distress. While both sides are building a “European version of Afghanistan”, if the Russian-Ukrainian war takes the path of “Afghanization”, it will be a brutal war of consumption and stagnation. It could last three to five years in the short term and eight to ten years in the long term. This scenario is similar to what the Soviet Union and the United States and NATO experienced in two successive Afghan wars.

On the other hand, it is clear that the United States and NATO do not intend to fight a World War I and World War II-style conventional world war with Russia, because nuclear weapons and long-range delivery vehicles are sufficient to allow both sides to annihilate each other and destroy the world. The Russians, from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union, have a long history of warfare and have only accepted to cede territory in defeat. Small countries in Europe have always been allies or victims at the table of the great powers. Based on this general judgment, an outcome in which Russia will win with a huge costs but Ukraine would lose totally. Most of Ukraine seems to have been foreseeable from the beginning of the war: Russia would permanently annex Crimea and parts of southeastern Ukraine, while losing the West, and the remaining western Ukraine would perhaps join NATO. Russia would then do everything to “Russify” the annexed territories, while Ukrainian nationalist insurgents would harass Russia for a long time and try to regain the lost territories. This picture could eventually turn Ukraine into a “European version of Palestine”: First it will be divided by great power interests, then it may be dragged into a perpetual conflict of division, counter-division, occupation and counter-occupation, annexation and counter-annexation. Just like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that has been going on for more than 70 years.

Initially defending the alliance strategy and trying to rebuild the transatlantic relationship severely damaged by the Trump administration, by the end of 2021 the Biden administration rejected Russia’s demand to halt NATO’s eastward expansion and withdraw the defense line to the 1999 position, and openly declared that it would not deal with Russia’s troops by military means, encouraging desperate Moscow officials to penetrate the US undercurrents and categorically launch a “special military operation”. Subsequently, the Biden administration, through Britain, pressured Ukraine to break the ceasefire that was about to be reached between Russia and Ukraine and promised to provide support to Ukraine through NATO members. This support was reinforced by the promise to “continue to support for as long as it takes”.

Based on thousands of years of “Russophobia” and the “chilling effect” of reality, Western European countries, driven by the need to help each other, resolutely supported Ukraine in order to block Russia’s attempt to annex Ukraine. By supporting Ukraine to thwart Russia’s annexation attempts, it has made this war of comparable overall strength increasingly permanent and turned it into a proxy war. The dual strategic goals of the Biden administration are to exhaust Russia, a long-time strategic competitor, and to contain the European Union, which is trying to break free from long-term US control and realize strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence and even military self-improvement in order to maintain “Pax Americana”, i.e. US-style world hegemony.

However, politicians are often quick and forgetful, the war has started and has reached a stalemate, whether the US or the European partners are deeply aware that there is no possibility of defeating Russia on the battlefield, with its vast territory, population, strong and comprehensive national character. Moreover, it is undesirable for Europe and the United States that both the United States and Europe suffer heavily from this war and that it ultimately paves the way for a new great power game with China’s “beautiful landscape”. If the new model of the great power game avoids the ‘Afghanization’ of the Russia-Ukraine war, then this conflict will end up in ‘Palestinianization’.

Russia in particular, having learned the lessons of the war after the first half a year of failure and hardship, is rapidly seizing strategic control for victory. By 2025, it plans to increase its defense spending by 25%, launch a military mobilization plan for 133 thousands people, increase the number of active military personnel to 1.5 million and significantly increase its military production capacity. It has also reached the capacity to fire around 10,000 artillery shells per day, increased drone production six-fold and greatly expanded its inventory of hypersonic missiles.

In short, three and a half years after the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO continues to violate Russia’s “red line” to supply Ukraine with offensive weapons and even condones Ukrainian counter-attacks on Russia’s mainland; Russia is increasingly using military and even nuclear weapons to deter its rivals; and the war situation is spiraling upwards. If the war continues, even if it does not spiral out of control and trigger a ‘Third World War’, it will reopen similar wounds for the US and NATO, such as the Vietnam War, the war in Afghanistan and ultimately the blood money.

War is the mortal enemy of peace, but he who has not been through war cannot appreciate peace, and the closer the death and destruction, the easier it is to achieve peace, echoing the Chinese saying that “refuse to admit defeat until faced with overwhelming evidence; only when death is staring one in the face.”

‘Afghanization’ is certainly a tragedy for all parties to the conflict, but can ‘Palestinianization’ bring peace to Europe and the world? Shouldn’t those who caused these crises and conflicts bear their historical responsibility and public criticism?

Prof. Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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