Ma Xiaolin, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Mediterranean Research Institute
Zhang Lupeng, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Slavic Research Center at the Mediterranean Research Institute

On February 27, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated at the annual meeting of the Federal Security Service (FSB) that Russia and the United States are ready to re-establish cooperative relations. He noted that not everyone is pleased with the U.S.-Russia dialogue and that some are attempting to disrupt the process. On the same day, U.S. and Russian delegations held the first round of closed-door bilateral consultations in Istanbul, Turkey, lasting over six hours. The focus of the talks was the operation of embassies in each other’s countries and visa issues.

This meeting followed a series of significant events, including the phone call between the U.S. and Russian presidents on February 12 and a milestone diplomatic meeting between senior representatives of both countries in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on February 18. These developments indicate that with the advent of the Trump 2.0 era, the two major adversaries—Russia and the United States—are attempting to turn the page on the dark chapter of the Ukraine crisis and move rapidly toward the normalization of bilateral relations. Additionally, according to Bloomberg, the two countries are discussing the Arctic as a new area for economic cooperation, including joint resource extraction and the development of Arctic trade routes.

At this delicate moment of a sharp adjustment in U.S.-Russia relations, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke with Putin on the phone on February 24—the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Two days later, Xinhua News Agency published a commentary stating that the conversation between the Chinese and Russian leaders sent a “clear signal to the world” in three key aspects: “China-Russia relations are mature, stable, and resilient”; “steady advancement of cooperation in various fields”; and “timely communication on important issues.”

As U.S.-Russia relations quickly warm, U.S.-European relations become tense, and the Russia-Ukraine war potentially accelerates toward an end in 2025, several key questions arise: Will U.S.-Russia relations see substantial improvement? Will China-Russia relations be affected? How will China respond to U.S.-China and China-Europe relations? How will China maximize benefits while avoiding harm? These are new and critical choices China must confront.

The U-Turn in U.S. Diplomacy and Russia’s Strategic Relief

The Russia-Ukraine war has lasted for three years. While Russia has occupied parts of four eastern Ukrainian regions, strengthened Putin’s leadership position, improved the Russian military’s combat experience, and deepened strategic cooperation with North Korea, it has also paid a heavy price. This includes but is not limited to: damage to its international reputation, strained diplomatic relations, declining regional influence, a NATO expansion forming a C-shaped encirclement around Russia, threats to maritime security in the Black and Baltic Seas, risks to overseas military outposts, massive war expenditures, economic sanctions disrupting trade and energy exports, reduced foreign investment, significant casualties, domestic tensions, and population loss. These difficulties have created unprecedented challenges for Russia. However, Trump’s pro-Russia stance has presented Moscow with a strategic opportunity, significantly easing external—particularly U.S.—pressure.

First, Russia’s “special military operation” is expected to achieve its strategic goals. The Trump administration has essentially accepted Russia’s conditions, including Ukraine not joining NATO, halting NATO’s eastward expansion, the resignation of the Zelensky administration, suppression of Nazi influences in Ukraine, and Russia’s control over portions of the four eastern Ukrainian regions. This includes gaining substantial land, resources, and population in the Donbas region. Meanwhile, peace talks will prevent further escalation of the war, reduce external military threats to Russia, and ensure the country’s strategic security.

Through three years of military action, Russia has reinforced its influence in the post-Soviet space, blocked Ukraine’s westward integration, demonstrated its resolve and ability to defend national interests, strengthened its voice on the international stage, secured its position in the Black Sea, and maintained control over the crucial strategic stronghold of Crimea. Furthermore, the new Syrian government has shown friendliness toward Russia, agreeing to allow Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim as strategic footholds in the eastern Mediterranean.

Based on current trends, future peace negotiations will likely ensure Russia’s geopolitical interests in Ukraine, particularly its control over eastern Ukraine. Consequently, Russia’s geopolitical influence in Europe will be enhanced, positively affecting its security environment and increasing its leverage in negotiations with Western countries.

Additionally, Russia’s previously difficult situation is expected to improve comprehensively. The restoration of U.S.-Russia relations and peace talks with Ukraine could allow Russia to rebuild ties with Western nations, reduce international isolation, ease sanctions and external pressures, improve its global image, and expand diplomatic space. This, in turn, would better protect Russia’s national interests and enhance its international influence.

The Long-Term War’s Severe Impact on the Russian Economy

If Russia can collaborate with the United States to reach a peace agreement on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it may gradually lift or ease sanctions, restore normal economic and trade exchanges with other countries, and stabilize energy prices. This would alleviate economic pressure and create favorable conditions for domestic economic development.

The Trump administration has claimed that it will not only cooperate with Russia in the fields of economy, energy, and space but also support Russia’s re-entry into the G7. These policies would be beneficial for Russia’s economic recovery and growth. Recently, the continuous strengthening of the Russian ruble indicates that the market is generally confident in the Russian economy. Once the war ends, Russia will be able to redirect more energy and resources from the military sector to domestic economic development, social progress, and improving people’s livelihoods. This would promote the comprehensive development of the country and society, enhance living standards, strengthen domestic stability and cohesion, and restore the country’s overall strength.  

China-Russia Relations May Be Affected, and China Needs to Adjust Timely and Prudently 

The improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will profoundly impact the Russia-Ukraine situation and the global landscape. The Trump administration, by strengthening U.S.-Russia relations and promoting peace talks between Russia and Ukraine, may readjust the United States’ global strategic layout, focusing more resources and efforts on other key regions and areas. This could lead to increased pressure and containment efforts against China.

First, Russia’s strategic dependence on China may decrease, requiring China to adjust its expectations. The frequent high-level interactions between Russia and the U.S. suggest a trend toward normalization of bilateral relations. Russia is expected to resume cooperation with the U.S. in several areas of shared interest, including Ukraine’s future and Middle East governance, as well as in the fields of economy, energy, and space exploration. As the Trump administration relaxes restrictions on Russia, the overall Western sanctions pressure will gradually decrease, expanding Russia’s strategic space for survival on the international stage.

At the same time, this also means that Russia’s dependence on China will gradually diminish, and its strategic autonomy will increase. The previous trend of Russia’s “pivot to the East and South” may slow down. As a result, China’s initiative in cooperation with Russia may decrease, and it will have to adapt to a scenario where Russia regains greater strategic autonomy and bargaining power in bilateral exchanges.

Second, the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations will not be smooth, and China need not be overly anxious. The current interactions between U.S. and Russian leaders only indicate a trend toward easing tensions, but resuming contacts does not equate to genuine improvement in relations. U.S.-Russia relations are still in the early “ice-breaking” stage, and there is still a long way to go before full normalization. Similarly, reaching a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement will require extensive work. Therefore, it is premature to declare a U.S.-Russia “honeymoon period” or predict that the Russia-Ukraine war will soon end.

China should closely monitor U.S.-Russia interactions, maintain communication with Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and the U.S., and coordinate with key Global South countries through mechanisms such as BRICS. This would allow China to continue playing a constructive role in the Ukraine issue while safeguarding its own interests.

Third, Trump’s major policy shift toward Russia faces resistance.

1. Domestic political opposition – Trump’s policy proposals are highly controversial in the U.S., as the Democratic Party broadly supports continued assistance to Ukraine. Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace agreement could exacerbate partisan divisions and internal political struggles in the U.S., affecting the government’s decision-making efficiency and execution.
2. Impact on the U.S. military-industrial complex – A peace agreement would immediately reduce military-industrial demand, which could lead to open or covert opposition from defense contractors and military-industrial capital.

3. European dissatisfaction – Trump’s push for a Russia-Ukraine peace deal has already sparked dissatisfaction among European allies, who fear that the U.S. move will weaken NATO’s cohesion and leave Europe more vulnerable when facing Russia alone. This could lead to fractures in U.S.-Europe relations and impact traditional transatlantic alliances.

As a result, the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine conflict will also depend on the responses of the EU, Ukraine, and other involved parties—it is not solely dictated by the U.S. and Russia. The Trump administration faces constraints from the Democratic Party establishment and military-industrial interests at home, and given Trump’s unpredictable leadership style, the process of restoring U.S.-Russia relations will not be entirely smooth. Whether there will be obstacles, how significant these obstacles will be, and whether there will be setbacks remain areas worth continuous observation and attention.

Managing Complex Relations with Russia and the U.S.: China Holds the Initiative 

1. Putin is not Trump; Russia-China relations under Putin will not experience drastic swings.

In the next four years, China should focus on consolidating and strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia in the new era and enhancing communication and coordination with Russia on the Ukraine issue. As U.S.-Russia relations ease significantly, Russia’s diplomatic situation will gradually improve. However, under Putin’s leadership, Russia is unlikely to place more trust in the U.S. within just four years of Trump’s presidency than in its long-term strategic partners such as China.

Unlike Trump, who comes from a business background, Putin is a more stable and far-sighted politician who will undoubtedly make long-term, stable plans for Russia’s strategic development and national interests.

The world is generally adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward Trump’s current administration, closely observing whether his team can effectively govern the United States, suppress the Democratic establishment, build his own loyal political base, and achieve his goal of “Making America Great Again” by suppressing all competitors and consolidating U.S. global hegemony. The ultimate objective is to ensure that, four years from now, the MAGA faction can continue executing Trump’s policies and securing the interests of the Trump family.

2. China should remain strategically clear-headed and not allow the Trump administration to disrupt its pace.

China should maintain strategic clarity, stability, and direction to the greatest extent possible, avoiding falling into a strategy of attrition set by its competitors.

In recent years, a common view among China-U.S. strategic think tanks is that within the next ten years, the power balance between China and the U.S. may shift. If, by then, China’s national strength surpasses that of the U.S., Washington may adjust its stance toward China—potentially abandoning its suppression strategy and choosing to cooperate with China in governing the world.

This is, of course, the ideal scenario. However, under this logic, China would need to accelerate its development over the next decade and surpass the U.S. in various key indicators. The danger of this approach, however, is that it could lead to excessive consumption of China’s developmental potential and exhaust the nation.

During the Cold War, the U.S. used military competition to drain the Soviet Union, eventually leading to its collapse. The Reagan administration’s “Star Wars” program forced the Soviet Union into an unsustainable arms race, depleting its national strength. This was a carefully planned U.S. strategic trap.

The current China-U.S. competition is a long-term struggle involving both economic development (“charging energy”) and strategic military capabilities (“releasing energy”).

– China’s institutional advantages, economic and social potential, and cultural resilience allow it to engage in a long-term battle of endurance rather than rushing to surpass the U.S. in every aspect.

– China does not need to engage in a direct competition for dominance with the U.S., nor does it need to exhaust itself in the process.

– Instead, China should focus on preserving national potential, balancing its relationships with the U.S., Russia, and Europe, and maintaining strategic stability on the Taiwan issue.

– China should leverage soft and smart power strategies to outmaneuver its opponents while ensuring sustainable and long-term national development.

– The ultimate goal remains the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, achieved through a balanced and methodical approach to strengthening both hard and soft power.  

3. China should strengthen relations with Europe, especially restoring cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries.

Trump’s pro-Russia stance has alarmed and dissatisfied European nations. Many EU countries fear that after suffering major economic losses due to the Ukraine crisis, they will also face U.S. security blackmail.

China should take concrete measures to help the EU enhance its strategic autonomy by strengthening economic, technological, and trade cooperation and ensuring shared benefits.

– Central and Eastern European countries, in particular, are increasingly concerned about their security as Russia gains the upper hand amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.

– This presents an opportunity for China to revive the “16+1” China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation Mechanism.

– China should closely monitor these developments and strategically plan the restoration of China-Central and Eastern European cooperation.

Over the next three to four years, China should, under the framework of international norms, enhance mutually beneficial relations with Europe, boost trade exchanges, reduce tariff barriers, expand cooperation in artificial intelligence and renewable energy and strengthen people-to-people exchanges to increase China’s strategic maneuverability in Europe.

4. Strengthening and protecting China’s strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrence and national security capabilities.

China must continue developing its strategic deterrence, particularly its nuclear deterrent and overall national security infrastructure.

– Enhancing the technological advancement and ensuring the absolute security of China’s nuclear capabilities is a key pillar of national security and territorial integrity.

– Regardless of whether they belong to the Republican or Democratic Party, U.S. politicians fear Russia’s strong strategic nuclear forces. As a result, the U.S. has always been cautious when dealing with Russia.

– Ukraine, on the other hand, lost its strategic nuclear deterrence and suffered severe consequences—its national security and territorial integrity were brutally violated.

To ensure China’s long-term national security, it is imperative to maintain a robust strategic deterrence, including nuclear capabilities, and reinforce national defense to deter potential threats.

Conclusion 

1. Putin’s Russia will not abandon its long-term strategic partnership with China in favor of short-term gains from Trump’s U.S.
2. China should remain strategically patient, avoiding unnecessary exhaustion in competition with the U.S.
3. China must seize the opportunity to strengthen relations with Europe, particularly Central and Eastern European countries, amid U.S.-Russia reconciliation.
4. Strengthening strategic deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, remains a crucial safeguard for China’s national security.

By following these principles, China can effectively navigate the shifting geopolitical landscape while ensuring its long-term stability and prosperity.

The Munich Security Conference, which ended on February 17, unexpectedly turned into a “struggle session” where the United States openly criticized its European partners. Moreover, it witnessed what many saw as the “darkest hour” of transatlantic relations, as the U.S. openly negotiated with Russia over Ukraine’s future without European involvement.

In September 1938, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany reached the “Munich Agreement,” which sacrificed Czechoslovakia and paved the way for World War II. This year’s Munich Security Conference was seen by many European countries as the “Munich Conspiracy,” where the United States is backstabbed transatlantic relations and sacrificed another small European nation—Ukraine.

The internal storm between the U.S. and Europe sparked by the Munich Conference has yet to subside and is escalating into a war of words between American and European leaders, especially those of Ukraine. This rift is even exacerbating internal divisions within the United States regarding values and foreign policy. On February 23, a critical parliamentary election was held in Germany; the far-right emerged as the second-largest party. On February 24, on the third anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine war, the United States, for the first time, blocked a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia as an “aggressor.” Yesterday, French leader Macron made a rare emergency visit to the United States to repair severely damaged transatlantic relations. Next week, the British Prime Minister is also expected to visit the United States. Meanwhile, following a rapid foreign ministers’ reconciliation meeting in Riyadh, the U.S. and Russia are preparing for a summit between their presidents, potentially at the end of February.

All of this indicates that within just one month of Donald Trump’s “return to power,” he has already begun dramatically reshaping Europe’s political and geopolitical landscape, fundamentally altering transatlantic relations, and arbitrarily resetting the global balance of power and security system.

On the eve of the Munich Security Conference, Trump, newly back in office, demonstrated behavior that harmed U.S.-Europe relations and even provoked European partners. This included withdrawing from multilateral treaties and mechanisms that European allies staunchly supported, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO), and UNESCO. He also sought to acquire Greenland from NATO member Denmark, threatened European trade partners with new tariffs, encouraged European right-wing parties to seize power through Elon Musk’s influence, and pressured NATO’s European members to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Additionally, Trump increasingly pursued a unilateral approach to ending the Russia-Ukraine war as quickly as possible.

Despite European partners’ prior anticipation and precautions against “Trump 2.0,” recognizing the challenges he would bring, the political tsunami unleashed during the Munich Conference still caught them off guard, making them momentarily be stung. Christopher Heusgen, the conference chairman, was moved to tears during his farewell speech on February 16, visibly overwhelmed. Although some questioned the connection between the video of his tears and the conference, German media quoted the seasoned diplomat as describing the event as “a nightmare for Europe in some sense.”

The “European nightmare” in Munich began with a blunt barrage of criticism and lecturing from U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance during his opening speech on February 14. Regarding immigration, democracy, and other issues, Vance argued that the real threats facing Europe did not come from external forces like Russia or China but from Europe’s internal deviation from its “most fundamental values.” He repeatedly questioned whether the U.S. and Europe still shared a common agenda.

Vance also accused EU leaders of suppressing freedom of speech and religion, failing to curb illegal immigration, and singled out the UK, Germany, Romania, and Sweden for their numerous “misgovernances.” He questioned whether Europe’s current values were still worth defending by the United States. Vance’s rapid-fire, saturation-style criticism left many European leaders in attendance shocked, bewildered, deeply humiliated, and outraged, completely disrupting the usual rhythm and planned agenda of the Munich Security Conference.

Not only that, but Vance, as the newly appointed Vice President of the United States, made his first visit to Europe, disregarding basic diplomatic etiquette by refusing the official meeting invitation from the host, German Chancellor and SPD leader Scholz. Instead, he held a 30-minute private meeting with Weidel, the leader of the far-right opposition party, Alternative for Germany (AfD). Vance’s actions completed the policy and directional “closed loop” that Elon Musk had repeatedly echoed across the ocean with the AfD and Weidel, forming a chain of evidence of systematic U.S. interference in Germany’s internal affairs.

Trump’s “welcome gift” to European partners upon taking office was so crude that it plunged European leaders into a dark tunnel of complete disillusionment and bone-chilling despair. They witnessed firsthand that the U.S. delegation did not come seeking friendship and cooperation, but rather to provoke and confront; not to uphold transatlantic relations, but to create friction and expand division; not to inherit the political legacy of U.S.-Europe ties carefully maintained by Obama and Biden, but to dig up the past and overturn everything; not to continue the role of Western leadership that the U.S. had long assumed after World War II, but to shift the burden, shirk responsibility, and even sacrifice Europe and the entire West to “make America great again.”

The “darkest hour” for Europe witnessed at the Munich Security Conference was not only the “free-fall” decline of transatlantic relations and the sense of European partners losing their footing, but also the U.S.’s rapid pursuit of compromise and rapprochement with Russia, leaving its European partners behind and even treating war-torn Ukraine — which the U.S. had supported for nearly three years — as a sacrificial pawn. The U.S.’s massive “U-turn” in policy, marked by its speed, intensity, and devastating consequences, left European partners and Ukraine reeling and unable to respond.

Before the Munich conference, the Trump administration had already openly invited Russia to attend the event, aiming to facilitate direct dialogue with long-estranged European partners. Moreover, the U.S. made a series of one-sided, flattering remarks toward Moscow regarding U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia relations, including advocating for the G7 partners to readmit Russia, thus restoring the G8. U.S. Secretary of Defense Hegses also explicitly told European partners, especially Ukraine, not to harbor illusions of reclaiming territories lost since 2014, including Crimea and large areas of eastern and southern Ukraine occupied by Russia.

While European partners were busy digesting the bruising effects of Vance’s verbal onslaught and interpreting Trump’s policy shift on Russia and Ukraine, a senior U.S. diplomatic and security delegation had already held a four-hour secret meeting with the Russian delegation in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, more than 1,000 kilometers away from Munich. Foreign media revealed that the U.S. delegation included Secretary of State Rubio, National Security Advisor Waltz, and Special Representative for Middle Eastern Affairs Whitkov, while the Russian side was represented by Foreign Minister Lavrov and Presidential Assistant Ushakov.

This was the first high-level formal meeting between the U.S. and Russia since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict nearly three years ago, the second handshake between the two countries after two years of suspended direct contact, and a U.S.-initiated “ice-breaking” attempt to repair relations with Russia despite opposition from European partners, especially Ukraine. The four-point consensus ultimately reached by both sides marked a turning point in U.S.-Russia relations, signaling that Washington had moved beyond the Russia-Ukraine war and abandoned its European partners and Ukraine — the two geopolitical casualties of this conflict:

1. Both sides agreed to establish a consultation mechanism and take the necessary measures to normalize the operations of their diplomatic missions.
2. Both sides agreed to appoint senior teams to end the Ukraine conflict as quickly as possible in a lasting, sustainable, and mutually acceptable manner.
3. Both sides agreed to lay the foundation for future cooperation, which would resume once the Russia-Ukraine conflict concludes.
4. The participating teams agreed to maintain contact to ensure the negotiation process proceeds in a timely and productive manner.

Originally key players in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, European countries—especially Ukraine—have now become mere spectators in this U.S.-Russia deal that directly impacts their fate. It could even be said that Europe is not only experiencing a “darkest hour” and a “Munich Conspiracy” but is also facing a new “Yalta moment”: two great powers, the United States and Russia, are determining the course of the European battlefield, dividing the post-war geopolitical map and spheres of influence, and designing a new European security framework according to their own interests.

In a short period, European leaders have been repeatedly blindsided and betrayed by the United States, leaving them scrambling to respond. On the day the Munich conference ended—the day before the U.S.-Russia meeting in Riyadh—leaders of major European countries gathered in Paris for an emergency summit on European security. After the U.S.-Russia meeting, French President Macron again convened a European emergency summit to discuss countermeasures. Furthermore, Macron, along with British Prime Minister Starmer, planned an urgent visit to the United States, hoping to prevent the situation from becoming completely unmanageable.

The fundamental bottom line for Europe and Ukraine is that they cannot be excluded from any negotiations regarding war and peace in Ukraine. European countries, including Ukraine, are well aware of the nature of U.S. power diplomacy, which essentially operates as “table diplomacy”: *“If you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.”* For the Trump administration, the current version of “table diplomacy” is clearly not about equal, mutually accommodating negotiations—it is a situation where the White House has the final say.

With the Munich conference over, the consequences of the “Munich Conspiracy” continue to unfold. In recent days, Trump’s disdain and dismissive attitude toward Ukrainian President Zelensky have become increasingly blatant, escalating into outright personal attacks and open questioning of Zelensky’s presidential legitimacy. Trump even reversed the narrative by blaming Zelensky for provoking the Russia-Ukraine war three years ago. Previously, Trump warned Zelensky that if Ukraine did not quickly agree to a ceasefire, “Ukraine would cease to exist.” He also hinted that Ukraine would eventually become part of Russia.

Trump’s attacks on Zelensky not only shocked European leaders but also deeply wounded the national pride and patriotic sentiments of both Ukrainian officials and citizens, who condemned Trump and expressed solidarity with Zelensky. This backlash, in turn, angered Trump’s loyal followers. For example, Vance publicly warned Zelensky and other Ukrainian leaders that “retaliating against the U.S. president is foolish” and would yield no favorable outcomes.

Trump’s recent foreign policy moves and rhetoric have not only offended and alienated European partners—particularly Ukraine, the “little brother”—but have also pushed the U.S. establishment, especially Democrats, to their breaking point. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, a Democrat, delivered a harshly worded speech condemning Trump’s unfair remarks about Zelensky and Ukraine, calling them “disgusting” three times in succession. This level of open, unfiltered criticism of a sitting president’s words and actions is virtually unprecedented in U.S. congressional history.

Trump’s increasingly provocative rhetoric after the Munich conference is essentially a retaliation against European partners and Ukraine for questioning his foreign policy. Previously, Ukraine had rejected a U.S. proposal to control its mineral resources. On the day the Munich conference opened, the U.S. delegation presented Zelensky with a document requesting his signature. The document would have granted the United States ownership of 50% of Ukraine’s mineral reserves as repayment for U.S. aid and a continuation of U.S. security guarantees. Zelensky politely refused to sign, citing the need to thoroughly review the terms—and, in reality, because he was unwilling to cede half of Ukraine’s mineral wealth to the United States.

Tragically, the idea of this “resources-for-security” swap was initially proposed by Zelensky himself. However, the revised U.S. version of the agreement, delivered by Treasury Secretary Bessent on February 12, was so exorbitant that Zelensky was forced to backtrack and withdraw his offer, unwilling to hastily sign what would be seen as a humiliating treaty of subjugation that could mark him as a historical traitor to his nation.

In response to recent events, The Economist and TIME magazines independently published cover illustrations of Trump wearing a crown, with the headlines “The would-be king” and “Long Live the King!” respectively. Notably, Trump himself took these ironic covers as a compliment, with both his campaign team and the official White House social media accounts reposting the “coronation” images. This series of actions highlighted Trump’s defiant, unapologetic governing style, signaling that the world must brace for the frequent “earthquakes” his domestic and global reshaping efforts will trigger over the next four—or even eight—years.

After 452 years as a republic, the Roman Empire transitioned to an imperial system in 27 BC, when Octavian was crowned Augustus as its first emperor. However, 248 years after its founding, the United States will not become the “American Empire” simply because of Trump’s “return as king.” Still, the intense domestic and international upheaval caused by Trump 2.0 is fundamentally altering both America and the world. The greatest casualty of this seismic shift is likely to be the transatlantic relationship, which has withstood a century of trials without collapsing—until now. Perhaps the sacrifice of Ukraine is just an unfortunate beginning—a dangerous omen of what lies ahead.

The funeral of Hassan Nasrallah, former Secretary-General of Hezbollah, transformed into a demonstration of honor for the axis of resistance. Hundreds of thousands of people converged in Beirut to pay their final respects to their leader, whom they revered as “a leader, a father, a protector.”

During the ceremony, chants of “Death to Israel! Death to US!” resonated, while Israeli warplanes breached Lebanese airspace, generating sonic booms over Beirut. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said, “This is the end for those who threaten to destroy Israel and those who attack Israel. While you are mourning your leaders, we are showing you who has triumphed. We now decide when and when not to fly in the skies over Beirut.” Katz also delivered a message to Hezbollah, stating, “You will specialize in funerals; we will specialize in victories.”

The ceremony, which saw significant attendance from international delegations, served not only as an expression of mourning but also as a strategic message showcasing the organization’s power and influence. This funeral can be interpreted not just as a show of force, but also as evidence that Hezbollah’s logistical capabilities are operational once more. The meticulous planning, organization, and transportation of such a vast crowd to Beirut demonstrated that Hezbollah retains a robust mobilization capacity throughout the country. The influx of people from southern Lebanon to the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and other regions to attend the funeral clearly illustrated the organization’s widespread popular support.

How do the “new methods of resistance” under discussion within Hezbollah align with this situation?

On one hand, Naim Qassem stated that they would treat Israel’s presence in Lebanon as an occupation and combat it, while on the other, he alluded to diplomatic avenues. Hezbollah is openly supporting the Lebanese government in its recovery process to address the occupation issue through diplomatic channels.

When considering Hezbollah as it has been known for the past 40 years, it is evident that the organization can seemingly vanish at times, only to reappear unexpectedly and ubiquitously. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria undoubtedly weakened Hezbollah, severing a crucial lifeline. However, as long as Iran remains a supporter, Hezbollah can endure. A strong Iranian presence was palpable at the funeral: the representative of the Supreme Leader delivered a speech, and the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, the Foreign Minister, and other officials were in attendance. The President of Iran also issued a statement. This underscores that Hezbollah remains Iran’s most significant proxy in the region, and that both parties place considerable importance on this relationship. Iran’s influence in the region may be diminished currently, but any shift in the balance of power would have a direct impact on Hezbollah.

Why was Nasrallah’s funeral conducted five months after his death?

The fact that Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral was organized only now, five months after his passing, is directly linked to security concerns.

Nasrallah was killed in September of the previous year, during the peak of the full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah. At that time, the Israeli army was conducting almost daily bombings in Lebanon and targeting senior Hezbollah commanders in a series of assassinations.

Such a large-scale funeral would have necessitated the simultaneous gathering of Hezbollah’s top leadership and supporters, presenting an ideal target for Israel. Recognizing that the Israeli army would likely seize the opportunity to eliminate top commanders in a single strike, Hezbollah opted to postpone the funeral, holding it at a more opportune time from a security perspective.

Nevertheless, even five months later, the funeral served not only as a memorial event but also as a political message, demonstrating the organization’s strength and resolve. Hezbollah aimed to convey that it could endure even under intense attacks and that it had not forfeited popular support.

How strong is Hezbollah currently?

Hezbollah has been considerably weakened by the war, particularly concerning its weapons capabilities and leadership. Many of the organization’s top commanders have been killed in Israeli precision strikes.

Despite this, Hezbollah remains ideologically and organizationally viable. One of the primary objectives of the funeral was to demonstrate this to the world: “We are still here; we are still standing.” However, the gathering of hundreds of thousands of people does not negate the fact that the organization is grappling with serious challenges.

Firstly, there is a leadership vacuum. The new leader, Naim Qassem, who succeeded Nasrallah, lacks the same level of charisma, which may have a slightly negative impact on motivation and popular support within the organization. Financial difficulties also pose a significant problem for Hezbollah. The decline of Iran’s influence in the region, the closure of the Syrian route, and the economic burdens of the war are hindering the organization’s ability to finance itself. Considering these factors, it is evident that Hezbollah is not as strong as it once was. However, owing to its ideological strength and its influence on its popular base, its presence continues to be felt.