Middle East
Syria after Assad; A look at the future and possible scenarios
The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.
But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.
During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.
The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.
On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.
But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?
Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.
A.—Afghanistan after 2021
One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.
In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.
This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.
The possible scenarios
What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.
The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.
These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.
Blockers
Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:
1- The presence of nationalist forces
The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.
2- International supervision
Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.
3- Resistance of Syrian citizens
A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.
These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.
– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces
The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.
This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.
In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.
The possible scenarios
Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:
1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests
– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.
– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.
– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.
2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups
The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.
3- History of confrontation between victorious groups
Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.
These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.
The possible scenarios
Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:
1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity
The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.
2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate
Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.
3- The potential for a common political process
If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.
These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.
The last: General elections
The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.
Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.
However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.
Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.
If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.
On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.
Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.
Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.
Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.
Middle East
Qatar and UAE LNG tankers go dark in Strait of Hormuz to evade security risks
Qatar and United Arab Emirates liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers are turning off their transponders in the Strait of Hormuz, shifting their logistical strategies in response to ongoing military conflict in the Middle East and the closure of the strategic waterway.
According to a Bloomberg report citing industry sources and vessel-tracking data, as time and patience run thin for both nations, tankers have begun operating under radio silence to conceal their movements and secure their LNG shipments.
The report noted that neither Qatar nor Abu Dhabi, the federal emirate of the UAE, is subject to international sanctions. Despite this, state-owned QatarEnergy and Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. (ADNOC) are employing these “going dark” tactics to minimize security risks for their vessels and crews transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Vessel-tracking data revealed that in May, at least four Qatari LNG vessels and four tankers linked to Abu Dhabi-based ADNOC transited the Strait of Hormuz without transmitting tracking signals. Sources speaking to Bloomberg stated that Qatari authorities requested captains of state-owned and chartered tankers to turn off their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders when navigating around the Ras Laffan port—the world’s largest LNG export terminal—as well as when transiting or exiting the Persian Gulf.
The implemented security measures extend beyond turning off transponders. Sources reported that vessels have been instructed to transit the gulf in pairs to enhance security, and tanker captains who refused to comply with the “shadow” navigation protocols have been replaced.
Industry sources speaking to Bloomberg warned that the increase in covert transits undermines the fundamental rules of international maritime trade and transforms these shipping routes into high-risk areas.
They emphasized that until recently, every cargo in the LNG sector could be tracked in real time, but these newly adopted tactics have eliminated that transparency.
Saul Kavonic, a senior energy analyst at energy consultancy MST Marquee, commented on the situation, saying: “It is entirely natural for Persian Gulf LNG producers to try to avoid Iranian attacks and consequently adopt shadow fleet methods. This could persist as long as Iran continues to control and threaten transits through the Strait of Hormuz. This practice may continue for a long time even after a peace agreement is signed.”
Following the start of US and Israeli attacks on Iran, the Tehran government closed the Strait of Hormuz, a choke point for approximately 20% of global oil shipments and 30% of global liquefied natural gas.
After negotiations in Islamabad failed, US President Donald Trump announced on April 13 that he would impose a blockade on Iranian ports. In late May, he announced that the blockade was lifted as part of the planned peace treaty process with Tehran.
Middle East
Israeli defense exports hit record $19.2 billion fueled by regional conflicts
The Israeli Ministry of Defense has announced that international demand for military systems manufactured in the country and deployed in regional conflicts has reached unprecedented levels.
In an official statement, the ministry declared that exports of military equipment and weaponry have hit an all-time high for the fifth consecutive year.
According to the disclosed data, export volume reached $19.2 billion in 2025, representing an approximate 30% increase compared to the previous year. The figures demonstrate that the country’s defense exports have doubled over the past five years and quadrupled over the past decade.
Data shared by the ministry indicates that missile, rocket, and air defense systems secured the largest share of military sales contracts signed throughout 2025.
Sales in this sector accounted for 29% of the total trade volume. The ministry noted that the vast majority of these agreements fell into the category of “mega-contracts”—each valued at a minimum of $100 million—and that these large-scale deals constituted 53% of the total export volume.
The Ministry of Defense directly attributed this export growth to ongoing regional military operations.
The statement argued that global demand was driven by results achieved on the ground and the “combat-proven” performance of Israeli-made systems across all fronts, including the “Rising Lion” operation launched against Iran in June 2025.
Since October 7, 2023, Israel has conducted simultaneous military operations across multiple fronts in Gaza, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.
The military equipment and ammunition described as “combat-tested” in the ministry’s report continue to be deployed in active conflict zones, most notably in Lebanon.
Among the defense firms highlighted during this period is the Israel-based company Xtend, which has drawn attention for its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Systems developed by the company have reportedly been utilized in operations in Gaza and for targeted assassinations. International reports revealed that an Xtend UAV was used to locate Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, who was killed in October 2024.
Earlier in the year, Eric Trump, son of US President Donald Trump, announced that he would make significant investments in Xtend’s technology and support the company’s merger with the Florida-based JFB Construction Holdings.
Meanwhile, airstrikes and bombings conducted by the Israeli military continue to drive up civilian casualties in Gaza and Lebanon. In Lebanon alone, attacks over the past few months have claimed more than 3,400 lives. Thousands of deaths have also been reported in US-backed military operations carried out in Iran.
Studies published in the medical journal The Lancet project that the total death toll in Gaza, when including both direct and indirect fatalities, could reach hundreds of thousands.
During this period, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has supported Israel’s operations, emerged as one of the largest buyers of Israeli-origin weapons.
The Gulf nation is reported to have procured billions of dollars in military equipment from Israel over the past five years. According to US sources, the Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv administrations have established a joint fund to develop and procure new weapons systems.
On the other hand, as Tel Aviv continues to market its air defense systems globally, military tensions along the Lebanese border persist.
Hizbullah kamikaze drones have reportedly targeted Iron Dome batteries positioned at Israeli locations near the Lebanese border. The Israeli military has reportedly faced difficulties intercepting these attacks, with dozens of Israeli soldiers killed in Hizbullah strikes launched since March 2.
Middle East
Report challenges official assessments of damage from Iranian attacks on US military assets
BBC Verify, the verification unit of the BBC, published a detailed investigation on June 1 based on satellite imagery and video analysis that found Iranian retaliatory strikes had successfully hit and damaged at least 20 US military facilities across the Middle East since the start of the war launched against Iran by the United States and Israel.
The findings suggest that the scale and accuracy of Iran’s retaliatory attacks were significantly greater than previously acknowledged by US officials. Some independent analysts estimate that the number of affected bases may be as high as 28.
The military facilities targeted were reportedly spread across eight Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman.
Material losses in the region are said to include three THAAD missile defense batteries, each valued at approximately $1 billion and regarded as a cornerstone of the regional defense network.
Expert assessments also identified at least 42 aircraft that were destroyed or severely damaged, including F-35 fighter jets, MQ-9 Reaper drones and an E-3 Sentry airborne early warning and surveillance aircraft valued at $700 million.
According to military analysts, Iran achieved these results by altering its tactics. Rather than relying on large-scale, high-volume barrages, Tehran reportedly shifted to using smaller, more precise salvos concentrated on high-value infrastructure targets.
The shift in strategy was said to have exploited what was described as a degree of complacency within the US military during the early stages of the conflict.
US military commanders reportedly failed to relocate aircraft and other military assets at strategic installations such as Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia despite previous attacks on those facilities, a factor that is said to have increased losses. Commenting on the strikes, Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei declared that the Middle East was no longer a “safe place” for US bases.
The White House had previously claimed that Iran’s military capabilities had been almost entirely eliminated.
However, the Pentagon’s latest estimates place the cost of the war at $29 billion.
A substantial portion of that expenditure is reportedly being directed toward repairing heavily damaged military equipment and replenishing significantly depleted munitions stockpiles. Former military officials have warned that damaged air defense systems in the region “cannot be replaced quickly or easily.”
The heavy consumption of interceptor missiles during the conflict has also left other US facilities across the Gulf increasingly vulnerable to future Iranian precision-guided missile attacks, according to the assessments cited.
The Washington administration is also reported to have sought restrictions on satellite imagery providers in an effort to conceal the extent of the damage and limit criticism.
However, the “smoking craters” and flattened aircraft hangars featured in the BBC report appear to contradict official US assertions, illustrating what the report described as the true scale of the destruction on the ground.
Iran also announced that it struck a US air base in Kuwait with missiles and drones on Sunday night in retaliation for attacks by US forces on Iranian military targets over the weekend, which Tehran said constituted a violation of the ceasefire.
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