Perhaps the most attractive aspect of Trump is that everyone has their own Trump. He says he will ‘drain the swamp’ and gets votes from the anti-establishment. He says, ‘I’m going to cut taxes for the rich’ and gets support from the rich. On the one hand he says he will give Israel unlimited support; on the other hand he goes to the Arabs and says, ‘I will end the Gaza war’. The most interesting thing is that all these discourses are reciprocated. Unlike the Democrats, who are afraid of offending everyone and cannot say anything to anybody, he manages to reach every segment of society in this way.

This personalized Trump experience has brought the conservatives back to power. Of course, this is not just an electoral issue. As the new cabinet for the new term becomes clear, a similar equation exists in foreign policy. While some look at the appointment of Marco Rubio and say ‘look, this guy is working for the neocons’, others point to Tulsi Gabbard and rejoice ‘here’s the isolationist Trump we’ve been looking for’. However, Trump’s new term codes are based on two words: balance and obedience. The people chosen for the cabinet were chosen to satisfy both wings of the Republican Party, but more importantly to show unconditional loyalty to Trump.

The main reason for this is Trump’s big victory. Unlike in 2016, the absolute victory in this election makes it exceedingly difficult for Trump’s policies to be debated. Moreover, the MAGA crowd, which did not do well in the 2022 midterms, subsequently suppressed the party to such an extent that names like Nikki Haley or Mike Pence, who were publicly identified as neocons, disappeared during the primary process. In fact, after the elections, we realized that the party’s old-timers, like the Cheneys, did not have much of an impact on conservative public opinion. All this makes the MAGA movement the dominant party in the new cabinet.

However, there are arguments against MAGA’s dominance in this balancing act. For example, the fact that members of the Trump cabinet such as Pete Hegseth have signaled ‘continued support’ on the Ukraine issue has created the impression that the neocon wing of the party could be strong in the new administration. But it is a little more complex than that.

The wind of peace in Ukraine

As the Ukrainian war enters its third year and the tide has turned in Russia’s favor, all eyes have turned to Trump’s biggest promise, the ‘peace on day one’ plan. Of course, cabinet members’ statements on Ukraine are still confusing. So, what will Trump’s Ukraine policy be?

One of the most important aspects of Trump’s policy is his personal aesthetic. The image of himself created by his actions should be very positive. For example, Trump cannot accept Biden’s disgrace in Afghanistan. In this respect, he is more concerned with aesthetics than other politicians. In Ukraine, an environment in which Russia swallows the whole of Ukraine will not make Trump look good. If a peace process is to succeed, Ukraine cannot come to the table with weak and reluctant allies. No matter how much Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr. told Zelenskyy that ‘you have a month’s allowance left’, the Trump administration cannot take such a stance. Why should Russia negotiate peace if support for Ukraine is going to be cut anyway? For a realistic peace deal, the U.S. needs to give the impression that it will continue to provide arms support if the talks fail. Whether Trump likes it or not, the country he leads is a party to the war in Ukraine. So, he will have to balance the desire for peace with the bells of war.

The situation on the ground is working against Ukraine. Despite lowering the recruitment age to twenty-five, the manpower problems have not been solved. The U.S. is urging Ukraine to lower the age to eighteen. But the 18-25 age group is the smallest demographic group in Ukraine. Conscripting them will exacerbate Ukraine’s demographic crisis in the coming years. In addition, there is a desertion crisis in Ukrainian brigades that cannot enter the rotation. Between January 2024 and August 45,543 Ukrainian soldiers deserted. The total number of desertions since 2022 is 81,167. In other words, half of the desertions in the entire war took place in the last 8 months. These are, of course, ‘minimum’ figures. Desertions that Ukraine can keep track of. It is difficult to know the real number.

Besides, Ukraine’s Kursk adventure is not going well. While waiting for the Russian army to move its troops in a panic, they had to move their own troops to protect the Russian territory they had captured. This accelerated the Russian advance in Donbass. At 490 square kilometers, Russia gained the most territory in all but the first month of the war. This is precisely why Trump’s final withdrawal of support for Ukraine would weaken his hand in peace talks. Trump would prefer a Ukraine that has solved its manpower problem at the peace table.

A similar equation in Syria

Over the past three days, the world has been shocked by the offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups in Aleppo. The offensive resulted in the capture of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, which has been the scene of fierce clashes for more than four years during the Syrian civil war. In addition to Aleppo, the Syrian National Army (SNA) captured the Kuweires airbase to the east of the city and surrounded the Tal Rifaat region controlled by YPG-PKK elements.

The emergence of such a chaotic environment in Syria can be seen as ‘the footsteps of the Trump era’. Statements such as ‘reconsidering relations with the YPG’ in Project 2025, the Republican presidential preparation programme, as well as Trump’s desire to withdraw from Syria, raise this possibility. However, I believe that these developments are independent of the foreign policy of the Trump era. Trump has not even taken office yet and he has to prioritize domestic issues. In particular, he will seek to reduce Democratic influence in the Pentagon and the intelligence community.

In my interviews with Atlantic Council member Rich Outzen and George W. Bush-era security adviser Dov Zakheim over the past few years, I have often heard the statement that ‘west of the Euphrates, the U.S. would not be bothered’ about Turkey’s operations in Syria. The equation that has emerged today should be assessed mainly between Iran, Syria and Turkey. We need more time to observe the new U.S .policy in the region.

In conclusion, it is useful to see Trump’s foreign policy as a pendulum that will swing back and forth between MAGA and neoconservative balance in the coming years. The direction in which the pendulum will swing will be determined by Trump rather than the Pentagon. This is why other countries will try to ‘humour’ Trump in their relations with the U.S. As I said, everyone has their own Trump… Let’s see how many different Trumps the next four years will show us!

On the evening of November 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a televised address that Russian forces had conducted a coordinated strike on Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. As part of the attack, Russia tested a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile, codenamed Oreshnik, which was not equipped with a nuclear warhead. Putin accused Ukraine of using Western-supplied weapons on November 19 and 21 to target Russian military installations, escalating the conflict into what he described as a “global confrontation.” He warned that any form of escalation would prompt Russia to take decisive retaliatory measures to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity.

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Putin’s remarks indicated Russia’s intent to escalate the war further and broaden the scope of the conflict. Zelensky dismissed the accusations of using Western weapons, asserting that Ukraine had long utilized such systems in accordance with its right to self-defense under international law. Notably, Russia provided a 30-minute advance warning to the United States before the missile test. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed concern over the development, describing the test as a “troubling turn of events.”

The Oreshnik missile, capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 10, currently lacks any known countermeasure in missile defense systems. While Putin’s announcement clarified earlier Ukrainian claims about the use of intercontinental missiles with a range of 6,000 kilometers, it nonetheless sparked widespread alarm within the international community. By testing the Oreshnik missile in a combat scenario, Russia aims to signal its readiness to enforce its newly revised nuclear doctrine. This move is intended as a warning to Ukraine and NATO, underscoring Moscow’s willingness to potentially transition from a nuclear brinkmanship strategy to actual deployment, including the first use of nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine reached its 1,000th day on November 19, marked by an escalation triggered by Western support. On November 17, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly announced they would no longer restrict Ukraine from using NATO-supplied medium- and long-range missiles to target Russian territory. In response, Ukraine launched six U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) on Russia’s Bryansk Oblast, with five intercepted and one destroyed.

The Biden administration and its allies are well aware of the risks associated with loosening restrictions on Ukrainian missile capabilities. On November 20, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued an emergency closure, citing the likelihood of significant airstrikes and urging personnel to shelter in place. This precaution marked the first such measure by the U.S. since the start of the conflict, prompting similar actions by embassies from Italy, Spain, and Greece.

Although the missile strikes by Ukraine caused minimal physical damage, their symbolic challenge, potential threat, and humiliation carry significant strategic implications. Should such actions continue, Russia risks losing its frontline advantages, and the security of its mainland could deteriorate further. The ATACMS missiles, alongside the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missiles, possess ranges of 300 to 560 kilometers, placing Russia’s western border regions, occupied territories such as Crimea, and even the Black Sea Fleet within reach. If launched from Ukraine’s border areas, these weapons could potentially threaten Moscow’s outskirts.

In response to NATO’s easing of missile restrictions and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory, Putin approved a revised nuclear deterrence policy on November 19, setting unprecedented red lines for the use of nuclear weapons. According to this policy, Russia reserves the right to launch a nuclear strike if it or its ally Belarus faces significant conventional attacks threatening sovereignty or territorial integrity. The document also stipulates that any attack by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear-armed state, will be considered a joint assault, and any attack by one member of a military alliance will be treated as an attack by the entire alliance.

This evolving scenario underscores the intensifying dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and highlights the potential for further escalation into uncharted territories of global security risks.

Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship policy, long a tool of strategic intimidation, now appears to have been unsheathed, explicitly targeting nuclear-armed nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as NATO as a collective entity supporting Ukraine’s escalation of the conflict. Moscow has signaled the possibility of initiating nuclear weapon use, even without suffering a nuclear attack, citing the United States’ precedent for employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

To ensure the clarity of its nuclear messaging, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly addressed Western leaders in English, describing the conflict as entering a “new qualitative phase of confrontation against Russia.” Lavrov emphasized the role of U.S. personnel and data in enabling Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, invoking the 1945 U.S. nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historical context.

In an apparent move to prepare for potential nuclear contingencies, Russia’s Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Research Institute announced on November 18 the mass production of modular, mobile shelters known as Cube-M, capable of protecting 54 people from nuclear explosions, radiation, and other threats. On November 20, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, inspected the Sarov Federal Nuclear Center in Novgorod Oblast to review developments related to the “special military operation.”

Tensions escalated further on November 21 when Russia accused Ukraine of deploying British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles in an attack on Russia’s Kursk region. This marked Ukraine’s continued defiance of Russia’s warnings to avoid further lowering the nuclear threshold, prompting Moscow to conduct its first combat test of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile. This missile, which NATO currently lacks the capability to intercept, underscores Russia’s resolve to implement its nuclear brinkmanship strategy as more than mere posturing.

On the battlefield, Russia has made significant gains, including neutralizing Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and launching large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These measures, timed with the onset of winter, are designed to exert maximum pressure on Kyiv to force concessions. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has accelerated military aid to Ukraine, lifting restrictions on long-range missiles just weeks before a potential transition of power in the White House.

The U.S. administration’s push to expand and escalate the conflict appears motivated by a mix of strategic objectives: reinforcing Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its resistance, gaining leverage in future negotiations, and solidifying a political legacy. Additionally, the strategy may serve to undermine the potential policies of a future Trump administration, complicating any attempt to de-escalate the war. Critics, including Donald Trump Jr., have accused the Biden administration of recklessly escalating the conflict, potentially paving the way for a third world war, driven by the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Should Trump reclaim the presidency, his administration is likely to revoke Biden-era missile permissions granted to Ukraine. However, the combined effects of Biden’s policy decisions and Ukraine’s high-risk military maneuvers could provoke Russia into intensifying its attacks, potentially shifting the battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor before any Trump-led peace negotiations.

While Russia is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold unless faced with dire battlefield reversals, recent signals indicate that Moscow is prepared to follow through on its threats. These include targeting Ukraine’s key decision-making centers or, in extreme scenarios, employing tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Such measures, even with controlled destructive capacity, would echo the United States’ decision during the final stages of World War II and underline the precariousness of the current conflict.

The trajectory of this war, therefore, depends not only on military developments but also on the political calculus in Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv. Any miscalculation could lead to irreversible consequences, marking a dangerous turning point in global security.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Li Yunqi, Journalist
CGTN Radio

“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?

Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.

But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.

In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.

These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.

This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.

The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.

The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.

This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.

The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.

Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.