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The dangerous escalation and expansion of Israel’s ‘targeted killing’ policy

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Between 17 and 19 September, a series of large-scale pager and radio explosions in Lebanon killed around 100 people and injured thousands more. The dead included civilians and children. Since most of the victims of these unprecedented attacks were Hezbollah members, and since the incidents took place mainly in Hezbollah-controlled areas, such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government were almost unanimous in their view that these attacks were an organised Israeli telecommunications attack.

Following the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts, Hezbollah leaders warned that Israeli intelligence had infiltrated Lebanese smartphone networks. Hezbollah members then began using older, low-tech communication devices, often to avoid detection of their location. According to the Associated Press, non-military institutions such as Hezbollah-affiliated schools, hospitals and aid organisations were among those using such equipment.

Although Israel has traditionally maintained a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ stance, the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has led most observers to conclude that the technologically powerful Israel has infiltrated the supply chain of communications equipment and detonated pre-planted micro-bombs, taking its policy of ‘targeted killing’ to the level of war. This is seen as a move to retaliate against and deter Hezbollah.

If this is the case, it means that Israel is innovating, expanding and increasing the severity of its ‘targeted killing’ policy, which has been in place for years. By turning consumer products, especially communications devices, into weapons of mass destruction, it is further violating the laws of war, international law and humanitarian principles, and setting a bad precedent by opening a new Pandora’s box for international conflict.

Why is ‘targeted killing’ so common?

As a small country with a small population, Israel has historically favoured pre-emptive strikes and quick results. As protracted conflicts have cost Israel dearly in human and material terms, the government has been forced to use as much or more force than the other side to end conflicts. For years, Israelis lived in disarray, suffered discrimination and massacres, and the country was in a constant state of war. The consciousness of fear and crisis has become an inescapable psychological shadow, even an important feature of the national character. Decades of tense confrontation and the threat of violence have led most Israelis to regard security as the supreme value and to an extreme egocentric mentality: ‘I would rather betray the world than let the world betray me’. These factors constitute the revenge motivation behind Israel’s long-standing policy of ‘targeted killings’ and the social basis for its acceptance by most Israelis.

The policy of targeted killings reflects the consistency and relative rationality of the Israeli government’s strategy against its enemies. Internally, it can comfort victims of attacks and prevent potential threats; externally, it can ease international pressure under the pretext of ‘fighting terrorism’. In this way, it can prevent a full-scale escalation or expansion of the conflict, avoid large-scale humanitarian disasters, reduce public criticism and weaken anti-Israeli sentiment by dividing and fragmenting the enemy front. It also has the effect of deterring, dispersing and crippling the organisational structure of enemy extremist groups.

Why is ‘targeted killing’ often successful?

Israel’s methods of targeted killing are varied. They include air-to-ground missile strikes, sniper rifles, tank attacks, and the placement of remote-controlled bombs in cars, telephone booths, concrete barriers and even mobile phones. Despite occasional failures, Israel’s military intelligence units are generally able to act in a stable, precise and effective manner, seeking to minimise collateral damage. The international community is now convinced that Israel has enabled the mass and targeted detonation of micro-explosives pre-planted in pagers, radios and even solar panels. This shows that the policy of ‘targeted killing’ has not stopped over time, but has evolved.

The fact that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ is so widespread and often successful is mainly due to the following factors:

First, Israel has overwhelming overall power. Having been in a state of war for a long time, Israel’s military and intelligence services are always on high alert. Not only is it the military superpower of the entire Middle East, it is also world class in terms of equipment, technology, communications, quality of troops, quality of training and combat experience. When it comes to ‘execution’ targets, it is like using a sledgehammer to kill a sparrow. The ‘execution’ operations themselves are not only diverse, but also have a very high technological content.

Secondly, Israel’s military or intelligence services prepare in advance by planting bombs on the equipment used by the targets and detonating them by remote control if necessary. Placing remote-controlled bombs in payphones, mobile phones, telephone booths, road barriers and even fake gifts and detonating them at the appropriate time is a common method of Israeli bombing.

Thirdly, killing and bombing from a distance with tanks, helicopters, drones, rocket launchers or sniper rifles, taking advantage of asymmetry in equipment capabilities.

Fourth, approaching the target disguised as enemy civilians and carrying out the attack.

Another important factor in the success of ‘targeted killing’ is that a large number of informants act as collaborators, providing sensitive information or equipment such as mobile phones and cars to Israel’s military intelligence units. Israel’s methods of recruiting informants include blackmail, bribery and work permits. This forces some Palestinians, Lebanese or Iranians who are weak-willed and in financial difficulties to betray their national interests. According to some intelligence reports, the ‘targeted killing’ of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran by Israeli intelligence was carried out by a bought insider who tracked, positioned and planted explosives beforehand.

At one point, the Israeli government referred to the extrajudicial killing as ‘liquidation’; it later changed the term to ‘targeted killing’. Even this definition is not sufficiently clear, but for the most part it has been described as ‘active defence’ and rejected by the international and local left-wing media as ‘assassination’. But whatever the name, it was clear that such acts did not change some facts that fit the basic characteristics of assassination: the unlawful killing of an accused person without legal process, the ending of a life without direct confrontation and at a moment when the target has no chance to defend himself, and usually either denial or silence about these acts.

More than 20 years ago, the Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (ICHROT), a group of Israeli parliamentarians, lawyers and journalists, stated in a report that assassination had been part of Israel’s policy of killing prominent Palestinian figures for more than 30 years, and was not a new practice that emerged after the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This was indeed the case.

When Brigadier General Benny Gantz, the Israeli army commander in the West Bank at the time, was asked if there was a ‘cleansing policy’, he replied: ‘You said cleansing, not me. We will do whatever is necessary and we will not stop similar operations as long as there is a threat. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper al-Hayat, Rami Golzin, one of the founders of the special forces, admitted: ‘We are carrying out purges. If we had not liquidated Abu Jihad (in 1988) or other targets that needed to be liquidated, our buses would have been blown up and 17 of our sons would have been killed’.

Initially, Israeli military intelligence announced that it had ‘liquidated’ certain individuals after the assassination operations had ended. Later, however, they adopted a policy of silence, neither confirming nor denying these activities. One practice that did not change, however, was the practice of listing the ‘crimes’ of the assassination targets. Israeli military intelligence stated that the assassinations were carried out to prevent terrorist attacks by the targets. This was a typical ‘execute first, judge later’ approach.

Human rights violations and condemnation

ICHROT stressed that Israel’s assassination policy violates the right to life of the targets and contravenes fundamental principles of international and Israeli law. The most critical aspect of this policy is that an organisation or an individual can take the decision to kill another person without legal justification and carry it out without judicial approval. In addition, the ‘accused’ is often unaware of the charges against him or her and, even if accused, has no opportunity to defend himself or herself.

The organisation said that Israel’s assassination policy was intended to retaliate for Palestinian ‘terrorist attacks’ against Israeli targets or to punish those who organised them. However, these operations were often based on dubious and flawed intelligence, leading the Israeli army to act too easily, abusing its power and harming innocent people. On numerous occasions, Israeli ‘targeted killings’ have resulted in the deaths of large numbers of civilians, including innocent family members of those targeted for assassination.

Another major problem was that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ made military operations unlimited. If it is possible to kill Palestinians or Lebanese suspected of attacking Israelis, what about potential attackers? What about people of any nationality, especially citizens of Middle Eastern countries, who only verbally express support for attacks on Israeli targets? According to Israeli logic, they are all potential terrorists.

Prof Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.

Opinion

Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

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As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.

Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.

When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.

It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”

The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction

An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.

A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.

The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.

If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.

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An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

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Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.

Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’

The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.

But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.

America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans

This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.

The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.

The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.

What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?

Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.

Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.

Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.

The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate

The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.

Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.

Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart

We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.

Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.

Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.

If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.

An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.

Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.

From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.

The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.

This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.

If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.

It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.


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Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

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Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.

However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.

The US Can’t Be Bypassed

China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.

However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.

This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.

For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.

Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.

Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.

Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite

Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.

When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.

Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.

Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.

Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.

The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.

Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.

However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.

Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions

Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.

This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.

All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.

Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.

Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.

This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.

But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.

In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.

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