Opinion
The dangerous escalation and expansion of Israel’s ‘targeted killing’ policy

Between 17 and 19 September, a series of large-scale pager and radio explosions in Lebanon killed around 100 people and injured thousands more. The dead included civilians and children. Since most of the victims of these unprecedented attacks were Hezbollah members, and since the incidents took place mainly in Hezbollah-controlled areas, such as the southern suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government were almost unanimous in their view that these attacks were an organised Israeli telecommunications attack.
Following the resumption of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese conflicts, Hezbollah leaders warned that Israeli intelligence had infiltrated Lebanese smartphone networks. Hezbollah members then began using older, low-tech communication devices, often to avoid detection of their location. According to the Associated Press, non-military institutions such as Hezbollah-affiliated schools, hospitals and aid organisations were among those using such equipment.
Although Israel has traditionally maintained a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ stance, the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has led most observers to conclude that the technologically powerful Israel has infiltrated the supply chain of communications equipment and detonated pre-planted micro-bombs, taking its policy of ‘targeted killing’ to the level of war. This is seen as a move to retaliate against and deter Hezbollah.
If this is the case, it means that Israel is innovating, expanding and increasing the severity of its ‘targeted killing’ policy, which has been in place for years. By turning consumer products, especially communications devices, into weapons of mass destruction, it is further violating the laws of war, international law and humanitarian principles, and setting a bad precedent by opening a new Pandora’s box for international conflict.
Why is ‘targeted killing’ so common?
As a small country with a small population, Israel has historically favoured pre-emptive strikes and quick results. As protracted conflicts have cost Israel dearly in human and material terms, the government has been forced to use as much or more force than the other side to end conflicts. For years, Israelis lived in disarray, suffered discrimination and massacres, and the country was in a constant state of war. The consciousness of fear and crisis has become an inescapable psychological shadow, even an important feature of the national character. Decades of tense confrontation and the threat of violence have led most Israelis to regard security as the supreme value and to an extreme egocentric mentality: ‘I would rather betray the world than let the world betray me’. These factors constitute the revenge motivation behind Israel’s long-standing policy of ‘targeted killings’ and the social basis for its acceptance by most Israelis.
The policy of targeted killings reflects the consistency and relative rationality of the Israeli government’s strategy against its enemies. Internally, it can comfort victims of attacks and prevent potential threats; externally, it can ease international pressure under the pretext of ‘fighting terrorism’. In this way, it can prevent a full-scale escalation or expansion of the conflict, avoid large-scale humanitarian disasters, reduce public criticism and weaken anti-Israeli sentiment by dividing and fragmenting the enemy front. It also has the effect of deterring, dispersing and crippling the organisational structure of enemy extremist groups.
Why is ‘targeted killing’ often successful?
Israel’s methods of targeted killing are varied. They include air-to-ground missile strikes, sniper rifles, tank attacks, and the placement of remote-controlled bombs in cars, telephone booths, concrete barriers and even mobile phones. Despite occasional failures, Israel’s military intelligence units are generally able to act in a stable, precise and effective manner, seeking to minimise collateral damage. The international community is now convinced that Israel has enabled the mass and targeted detonation of micro-explosives pre-planted in pagers, radios and even solar panels. This shows that the policy of ‘targeted killing’ has not stopped over time, but has evolved.
The fact that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ is so widespread and often successful is mainly due to the following factors:
First, Israel has overwhelming overall power. Having been in a state of war for a long time, Israel’s military and intelligence services are always on high alert. Not only is it the military superpower of the entire Middle East, it is also world class in terms of equipment, technology, communications, quality of troops, quality of training and combat experience. When it comes to ‘execution’ targets, it is like using a sledgehammer to kill a sparrow. The ‘execution’ operations themselves are not only diverse, but also have a very high technological content.
Secondly, Israel’s military or intelligence services prepare in advance by planting bombs on the equipment used by the targets and detonating them by remote control if necessary. Placing remote-controlled bombs in payphones, mobile phones, telephone booths, road barriers and even fake gifts and detonating them at the appropriate time is a common method of Israeli bombing.
Thirdly, killing and bombing from a distance with tanks, helicopters, drones, rocket launchers or sniper rifles, taking advantage of asymmetry in equipment capabilities.
Fourth, approaching the target disguised as enemy civilians and carrying out the attack.
Another important factor in the success of ‘targeted killing’ is that a large number of informants act as collaborators, providing sensitive information or equipment such as mobile phones and cars to Israel’s military intelligence units. Israel’s methods of recruiting informants include blackmail, bribery and work permits. This forces some Palestinians, Lebanese or Iranians who are weak-willed and in financial difficulties to betray their national interests. According to some intelligence reports, the ‘targeted killing’ of Hamas leader Haniyeh in Tehran by Israeli intelligence was carried out by a bought insider who tracked, positioned and planted explosives beforehand.
At one point, the Israeli government referred to the extrajudicial killing as ‘liquidation’; it later changed the term to ‘targeted killing’. Even this definition is not sufficiently clear, but for the most part it has been described as ‘active defence’ and rejected by the international and local left-wing media as ‘assassination’. But whatever the name, it was clear that such acts did not change some facts that fit the basic characteristics of assassination: the unlawful killing of an accused person without legal process, the ending of a life without direct confrontation and at a moment when the target has no chance to defend himself, and usually either denial or silence about these acts.
More than 20 years ago, the Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (ICHROT), a group of Israeli parliamentarians, lawyers and journalists, stated in a report that assassination had been part of Israel’s policy of killing prominent Palestinian figures for more than 30 years, and was not a new practice that emerged after the Al-Aqsa Intifada. This was indeed the case.
When Brigadier General Benny Gantz, the Israeli army commander in the West Bank at the time, was asked if there was a ‘cleansing policy’, he replied: ‘You said cleansing, not me. We will do whatever is necessary and we will not stop similar operations as long as there is a threat. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper al-Hayat, Rami Golzin, one of the founders of the special forces, admitted: ‘We are carrying out purges. If we had not liquidated Abu Jihad (in 1988) or other targets that needed to be liquidated, our buses would have been blown up and 17 of our sons would have been killed’.
Initially, Israeli military intelligence announced that it had ‘liquidated’ certain individuals after the assassination operations had ended. Later, however, they adopted a policy of silence, neither confirming nor denying these activities. One practice that did not change, however, was the practice of listing the ‘crimes’ of the assassination targets. Israeli military intelligence stated that the assassinations were carried out to prevent terrorist attacks by the targets. This was a typical ‘execute first, judge later’ approach.
Human rights violations and condemnation
ICHROT stressed that Israel’s assassination policy violates the right to life of the targets and contravenes fundamental principles of international and Israeli law. The most critical aspect of this policy is that an organisation or an individual can take the decision to kill another person without legal justification and carry it out without judicial approval. In addition, the ‘accused’ is often unaware of the charges against him or her and, even if accused, has no opportunity to defend himself or herself.
The organisation said that Israel’s assassination policy was intended to retaliate for Palestinian ‘terrorist attacks’ against Israeli targets or to punish those who organised them. However, these operations were often based on dubious and flawed intelligence, leading the Israeli army to act too easily, abusing its power and harming innocent people. On numerous occasions, Israeli ‘targeted killings’ have resulted in the deaths of large numbers of civilians, including innocent family members of those targeted for assassination.
Another major problem was that the policy of ‘targeted killings’ made military operations unlimited. If it is possible to kill Palestinians or Lebanese suspected of attacking Israelis, what about potential attackers? What about people of any nationality, especially citizens of Middle Eastern countries, who only verbally express support for attacks on Israeli targets? According to Israeli logic, they are all potential terrorists.
Prof Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
Opinion
Iran-US negotiations: What does the Muscat meeting signify?

Following a protracted period of fluctuating relations, negotiations between Iran and the United States commenced on April 12 in Muscat, Oman. While not the first instance of dialogue between Tehran and Washington, the current geopolitical landscape imbues these talks with exceptional significance, as the fate of the Middle East hinges considerably on their outcome. Consequently, the character of these negotiations differs markedly from previous encounters.
Tehran enters this round of negotiations amidst a challenging environment: the legacy of former President Trump’s maximum economic pressure campaign persists, coupled with rhetoric hinting at potential military action against Iran. Israel’s ongoing military operations in Gaza, widely criticized and labeled by some as genocide, continue as it projects an image of success; Hezbollah appears constrained within Lebanon’s internal political dynamics; the political landscape in Damascus has shifted, potentially affecting the established support lines Iran previously relied upon for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups opposing Israel; Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are preoccupied with internal political strife; and Iran itself confronts a severe currency and economic crisis. Simultaneously, Israeli lobbying efforts reportedly seek to persuade influential US figures to support decisive action against Iran. From Israel’s perspective, Iran purportedly lacks the strategic capacity for a sustained, high-intensity conflict against it.
Despite this assessment, Iran maintains it is not negotiating from a position of weakness. Ali Larijani, advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated that a military attack on Iran would mean “gambling with the lives of American soldiers”. Iran acknowledges the potential for significant damage to its strategic infrastructure from a US or Israeli attack but warns that its retaliation would inflict severe consequences on both nations.
Iran has also articulated a broader retaliatory strategy, threatening not only direct retaliation for an attack but also targeting US troops and interests throughout the Middle East, including in allied Arab nations. Such actions could destabilize key regions, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and potentially impact maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This escalation would place the already delicate security balance in several Arab states under immense strain.
Therefore, while Iran-US negotiations are not unprecedented, the current context imbues them with exceptional significance for regional security.
From Saturday talks to Saturday negotiations!
Following several hours of indirect discussions on Saturday, both delegations reported a positive atmosphere. Accounts from both sides regarding the tenor of the talks were largely consistent, with both the Iranian chief negotiator and the White House offering favorable evaluations. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator, described the discussions with the United States as “constructive”, “promising”, and “mutually respectful”. Araghchi said, “I have explained Iran’s position with determination and a forward-looking approach. Both sides have decided to continue this process in a few days.”
Meanwhile, the White House described the initial indirect talks hosted by Oman as “entirely positive and constructive”. The White House emphasized that the parties agreed to resume negotiations the following Saturday.
A notable point reportedly emerging from the US side emphasized a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy and dialogue whenever possible.
Initial reactions from both Tehran and Washington presented a consistent and cautiously optimistic narrative. This convergence has fostered a temporary de-escalation following weeks of heightened tension and raised hopes for short-term easing of friction.
Nevertheless, the path forward remains complex and challenging. While initial signals are promising, preparedness for various outcomes is essential. The willingness to continue talks might suggest, for now, that the US is not immediately demanding Iran’s “red lines” – such as the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program or severe restrictions on its missile industry – be met as preconditions. Conversely, Iran seems prepared to offer more substantial assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, potentially including restoring uranium enrichment levels closer to those stipulated in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Barring unforeseen disruptions, it is plausible that future negotiations could address topics such as the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and reduced pressure on purchasers of Iranian oil.
Upcoming negotiation sessions, potentially scheduled for Saturdays, appear poised to be critical junctures for Iran and the broader Middle East, making the outcomes of these weekend discussions highly anticipated.
Risks
Despite the cautiously optimistic mood following the initial talks, significant risks loom over the negotiation process. Chief among these is potential opposition from Israel. Israel may view these talks as undermining its preferred strategy towards Iran and could take actions to disrupt the process. Potential disruptive actions could range from releasing sensitive intelligence on Iran’s nuclear or missile programs to covert operations or targeted provocations, such as assassinations of Iranian officials. Furthermore, influential pro-Israel lobbying efforts in Washington represent a significant factor, potentially shaping the perspectives of US negotiators—an avenue of influence less available to Iran.
Donald Trump’s potential influence and unpredictable nature also represent a significant variable. His political style often involves projecting strength and seeking public acclaim, sometimes employing confrontational rhetoric. This approach can include language perceived as condescending or insulting by negotiating partners. Given Iran’s sensitivity to perceived disrespect or arrogance from the US, such rhetoric could derail negotiations abruptly. Iran’s preference for indirect talks, while perhaps appearing strategically complex, may stem from deep-seated mistrust rooted in historical grievances concerning perceived US arrogance and past policy shifts. Therefore, alongside potential Israeli actions, the unpredictable nature of US politics, particularly concerning figures like Trump, poses a substantial risk to the sustainability of any diplomatic progress.
Internal Iranian politics present another layer of complexity. Significant diplomatic achievements could bolster the political standing of the current Pezeshkian administration. However, such success might also galvanize domestic political opposition. While the current administration under Pezeshkian and negotiator Araghchi may adopt a more cautious public approach compared to their predecessors (like the Rouhani administration and negotiator Jawad Zarif), the risk of internal efforts aimed at undermining the negotiations to discredit the government remains.
Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, noted in a recent interview, “Strangely enough, in these 40 years, whenever we have wanted to open up with various countries, there has always been some negative event either inside or outside the country.”
This historical pattern highlights the potential for similar disruptive incidents to affect the current talks.
Opinion
Trump’s “New Tariff Policy” Provokes Trade War, Hurts Himself and Others

On April 2 (EST), U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 10% “base tariff” on imports from over 180 countries and regions, effectived at midnight on April 5, with only Russia temporarily exempted. Additionally, Trump will impose personalized higher “reciprocal tariffs” on countries with the largest trade deficits with the U.S., effective from midnight on April 9. All other countries will continue under the original 10% base tariff. Trump claimed he holds the “modification authority” to raise or lower tariffs as needed. U.S. Treasury Secretary Besant also warned trade partners not to retaliate. On the same day, U.S. stock markets plummeted, with the three major indexes hitting the largest single-day drop in nearly five years, and the dollar also fell against major currencies.
If trade wars are world wars without gunpowder, then Trump has recklessly initiated an unprecedented one, pushing the U.S. into conflict with the entire world. This war concerns not only national tax revenues but also the global industrial, supply, and value chains, the rules of world trade and economic development, and even public sentiment, international relations, and the global power structure.
The Trump administration truly reflects the Republican Party’s preference for elephants, and his “new tariff policy” is like an elephant barging into the china shop of the world trade system and international relations—rampaging recklessly, ignoring friend or foe, causing massive damage, and successfully turning the U.S. into a “global enemy” and “universal nuisance” for the first time.
From an economic perspective, Trump’s tariff plan aims to force countries into new trade deals to balance trade, bring manufacturing back to the U.S., increase employment, tax revenues, and federal savings, and expand the market share of American products—all in support of “Making America Great Again.”
From a geopolitical perspective, the policy fulfills campaign promises by using economic weapons to enhance the U.S.’s bargaining position in global economics and diplomacy. Tariffs are wielded as strategic tools to coerce and weaken opponents, punish allies and partners that challenge U.S. hegemony, and suppress those with differing worldviews—all in order to maintain U.S. dominance in the international order.
Trump’s “new tariff policy” harms in three ways: harms the U.S., harms others, and harms the world.
Firstly, raising import tariffs across the board may not revive U.S. manufacturing or attract investment back home. Instead, it will raise the prices of imported goods, making American distributors and consumers pay more, especially in automobiles, electronics, and household appliances. Moreover, the policy could trigger stagflation, increase costs in agriculture and industry, weaken U.S. export competitiveness, and even lead to exclusion from global markets. Many U.S. business groups harshly criticized the policy, and more than half of public opinion polls are pessimistic. Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months from 20% to 35%, in other words, Trump is, so to speak, “shooting himself in the foot.”
Secondly, imposing heavy tariffs on goods imported from various countries into the U.S. will present enormous industrial, trade, and economic challenges—and even social and political crises—for all targeted nations. The high U.S. tariffs may force many multinational companies to withdraw from traditional low-cost countries and relocate to lower-tariff regions, leading those former hosts to suffer from industrial hollowing-out, trade marginalization, financial bubbles in stock and currency markets, and economic deterioration. This could result in national bankruptcy, social unrest, regime changes, or even armed conflict. Historical experience shows that when major economies like the U.S. shift or export their crises, it can bring disaster to developing nations.
Thirdly, Trump’s “new tariff policy” creates a crushing situation, described as “where the elephant herd tramples, no grass grows,” bringing gluttonous calamity to the world. This tariff weapon not only harms over 180 U.S. trade partners, but also disrupts global pricing, trade, labor division, value, and supply systems. It undermines the global trade loop and supply-demand market that the U.S. painstakingly built post-WWII, causing an “epic-level” disaster for the global economy. The Financial Times predicted that a global trade war triggered by Trump could result in $1.4 trillion in economic losses. If countries retaliate with 25% tariffs, the resulting depression could be on par with the Great Depression of 1930.
Trump’s policy reveals a “triple loss” for the U.S. as the world’s leading power: loss of morality, loss of norms, and loss of friends.
Imposing heavy taxes reflects moral failure—selfishness and profit-seeking at the expense of others’ well-being. It’s a modern version of Louis XV’s “After me, the flood,” and a manifestation of America’s impulsive and reckless hegemony, abandoning its professed values of freedom, equality, and fraternity, as well as its evangelical “messianic mission.”
It’s also a loss of norms. As the inheritor of Western civilization, savior in two world wars, and key architect of the post-war global order, the U.S. once stood as a model. Francis Fukuyama even called the “American dream” the “end of history.” But Trump’s policy has shattered that image—applying high tariffs indiscriminately, even starting with close neighbors like Mexico and Canada, and targeting transatlantic allies and Asia-Pacific military partners. The U.S. now acts not as a leader, but as a tyrant. The Trump administration is dismantling the Western “political idol” that stood for nearly a century.
The result is also a loss of trust and allies. In pursuit of “Making America Great Again,” the U.S. is betraying even its closest friends—be it Mexico and Canada (over fentanyl and immigration), its WWII and Cold War allies in Europe, or Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea. Even new partners like Vietnam feel betrayed. No wonder European leaders now call America “Europe’s enemy” and see “de-risking” as aimed at the U.S.; no wonder Japan’s former PM Ishiba Shigeru bitterly laments his “extreme disappointment and regret”; no wonder Vietnam feels Trump’s “charm diplomacy” has hit the rocks.
In the end, those who once admired, trusted, and followed America are now disillusioned. The U.S. has become isolated.
As Mao Zedong once said, “The first question of revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies.” In today’s global trade system, it’s clear: the U.S. has made itself the enemy of the world. Applied to today’s international relations, global economic and trade systems, and the game of global circulation, all parties would likely have to acknowledge that in the process of maintaining normal and equitable international relations and ensuring smooth, stable international trade and economic operations, the United States has already positioned itself against the entire world—becoming a “global enemy .” At least when measured by the dimension of tariff wars, America’s comprehensive hostility and antagonism toward all nations, regardless of their social systems, political structures, ideologies, or values, has reached an absurd extreme. It now operates under a doctrine of “tariffs first, money above all, America supreme.” On April 2, Trump called it “Liberation Day,” but in truth, it marks America’s turn toward new conservatism, abandonment of globalization, and potential end as a global economic leader. It is a day of disaster for the world economy—and a day of declaration for global partners preparing to resist America’s trade hegemony.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
48-Hour Exclusive Exploration of the Stronghold of the US-Israel Enemy ‘Houthi Forces’

On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.
March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.
At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.
For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.
Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.
Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.
No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.
After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.
Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.
Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.
Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.
During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.
Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.
Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.
Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.
After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.
On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.
What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.
After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.
That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.
Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.
Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”
Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.
Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.
Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.
Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.
The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.
Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.
What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.
My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.
In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.
In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.
After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.
In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.
On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.
By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.
On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.
While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.
On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.
This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.
Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
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