Diplomacy
The Economist calls for a new asylum system in wealthy nations
The renowned British magazine The Economist has proposed that wealthy countries establish a new and better asylum system, separating the right to asylum from labor migration.
Briefly mentioning the history of the UN Refugee Convention, the magazine pointed out that the number of countries adhering to this convention is steadily decreasing today.
Noting the hardening stance of the West and the convergence of views between social democrats and right-wing populists in Europe, The Economist argued that the asylum system is no longer working.
“The system designed for post-war Europe cannot cope with a world where conflicts are widespread, travel is cheap, and wage inequalities are vast,” the magazine stated, writing that approximately 900 million people wish to migrate permanently. Since it is nearly impossible for a citizen of a poor country to legally migrate to a wealthy one, most do so without permission.
The Economist said, “In the last two decades, many have discovered that asylum is a back door. Instead of secretly crossing the border as they used to, they approach border guards and claim asylum. They know that it will take years for this claim to be decided, and during that time, they can disappear into the shadows and find work.”
Arguing that “voters” are right to think the system is being abused, The Economist recalled that the majority of asylum claims in the European Union are now rejected outright.
Pointing to the “fear of border chaos,” the magazine asserted that this fear “has fueled the rise of populism” from Brexit to Donald Trump and “poisoned the debate on legal migration.”
“To create a system that provides security to those in need and also a reasonable flow of labor migration, policymakers must separate these two issues,” wrote The Economist.
Stating that approximately 123 million people have been displaced due to conflict, disaster, or persecution—a figure three times higher than in 2010, “partly because wars last longer”—The Economist argued that while all these people have the right to seek a safe life, this “safety” does not mean access to the labor market of a wealthy country.
According to The Economist, “Resettlement in rich countries can be no more than a tiny part of the solution. In 2023, OECD countries received 2.7 million asylum applications. Although this is a record number, it is very small compared to the scale of the problem.”
At this point, the magazine wrote that the option of “readmission agreements with third countries,” which EU countries in particular have been trying to implement for some time, is the “most pragmatic option.”
Under this plan, described as “offering more refugees a sanctuary close to their homes,” asylum seekers would stay in “the first safe country or regional bloc they set foot in.”
The Economist continued:
“Refugees who travel shorter distances are more likely to one day return home. They are also more likely to be accepted by hosts who are culturally closer to them and aware that they have sought refuge in the first shelter they found after fleeing a disaster. This is why Europeans have largely accepted Ukrainians, Turks have been generous to Syrians, and Chadians to Sudanese.”
Claiming that “caring for refugees in places close to their homes is often much cheaper,” the magazine pointed out that the UN refugee agency spends less than $1 per day on each refugee in Chad. “Given their limited budgets, rich countries could help far more people by adequately funding refugee agencies instead of housing refugees in first-world hostels or hiring armies of lawyers to defend their cases,” it asserted.
The magazine also called on host countries to be “generously helped” and encouraged to “allow refugees to support themselves by working,” as they are increasingly doing.
Writing that “compassionate Westerners” may feel an “urge to help” refugees arriving on their shores, The Economist claimed, “But if the journey is long, arduous, and costly, those who complete it are often not the most desperate, but the male, healthy, and relatively affluent.”
The Economist continued:
“Refugees who fled the Syrian war to neighboring Turkey represented a broad cross-section of Syrians; those who reached Europe were 15 times more likely to have a university degree. When Germany opened its doors to Syrians in 2015-16, 1 million refugees who had established a safe life in Turkey decided to migrate to Europe for higher wages. Many have led productive lives, but it is not clear why they were prioritized over other, sometimes more qualified, refugees who wanted to seize the same opportunity.”
Arguing that “voters” have made it clear they want to choose whom they accept and that this does not mean “accepting everyone who arrives and claims asylum,” the magazine made a recommendation to wealthy countries, stressing that if they want to stop such migration, they must change the incentives.
Advocating that those who migrate from a safe country to a wealthier one should not be considered for asylum and that arrivals should be sent to a third country for processing, The Economist said, “If governments want to host refugees from distant places, they can select them at the sources where the UN registers those fleeing war zones.”
Noting that deals can be made to win the cooperation of third-country governments, The Economist advised wealthy countries to act together, as the EU has begun to do, and added, “Once it is understood that those who arrive uninvited have no advantage, the number of such arrivals will fall.”
Describing this as the “politics of the possible,” the magazine suggested that this would restore order at the border, thereby creating the political space for a calmer discussion of labor migration.
Also arguing that wealthy countries would benefit from more foreign talent, the magazine suggested that most of these countries want “young labor to work on farms and in care homes,” and that a regular “flow of talent” would make both host countries and the migrants themselves more prosperous.
The Economist‘s assessment concluded as follows:
“Dealing with the backlog of irregular migrants who have already arrived will still be difficult. Trump’s policy of mass deportation is both cruel and expensive. A much better solution would be to allow those who have put down roots to stay, while securing the borders and changing the incentives for future migrants. If liberals do not build a better system, populists will build a worse one.”
Diplomacy
India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets
India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.
According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.
Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.
That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.
Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.
India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.
However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.
Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.
According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.
A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.
Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.
Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.
According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.
New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.
Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.
Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.
Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.
However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.
Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.
Diplomacy
EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor
Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.
According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.
The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.
In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.
The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.
Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.
Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road
The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.
Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.
The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.
During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.
Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact
One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.
The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.
In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.
The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.
By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.
Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.
Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.
China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.
The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.
Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition
In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.
These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.
Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.
The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.
The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.
However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.
The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership
EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.
In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.
During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.
The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.
That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.
EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
‘America First’ in Africa
The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.
In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.
An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.
For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.
Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.
Germany in Africa for the energy transition
Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”
The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”
Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.
The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.
Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.
In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.
German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.
Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.
In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.
Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.
Diplomacy
EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts
The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.
German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”
Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.
As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.
The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.
Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.
Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.
Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.
In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.
Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.
As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.
Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.
“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.
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