The rapid expansion of data centers powering artificial intelligence systems is increasingly triggering legal battles over environmental concerns.

According to a report by the London School of Economics (LSE) cited by The Guardian in its annual climate litigation review, non-governmental organizations, local communities, and environmental activists from Chile to Ireland and the US are seeking to block the construction and operation of data centers through the courts, citing high energy consumption, water usage, and associated climate risks.

Researchers analyzed approximately 3,600 climate lawsuits filed globally since 2015, detecting a rise in cases linked to data centers.

The legal proceedings focus on energy supply sources, the volume of water used to cool servers, and environmental pollution.

One of the earliest cases in this field was filed against a Google project in the Chilean capital, Santiago.

In 2020, local residents and municipal officials challenged a construction permit granted for a massive data center in the Cerrillos area, arguing that it threatened the water resources of a city already struggling with drought.

The court ruled that the project’s climate impacts had been inadequately assessed and ordered a review of the decision.

Environmental impacts of projects in Chile and Ireland taken to court

In Ireland, which the report’s authors describe as one of the global flashpoints of conflicts over data centers, the situation is even more acute.

According to data shared in the report, more than 20% of the country’s total electricity consumption is allocated to this sector.

Despite government plans to further expand the sector, environmental organizations are pursuing legal action against official decisions that allow new facilities to use fossil fuels for several more years before transitioning to renewable sources.

Lawsuits in the US and UK force companies to make commitments

Environmental requirements for data centers are also tightening in the US. Officials in the city of Pittsburg, California, imposed obligations on a new data center to use renewable energy and opt for recycled water for equipment cooling.

At the same time, lawsuits in several states are challenging regulatory bodies that have approved the construction of fossil-fuel-based energy infrastructure to meet growing computing capacity demands.

A project belonging to Elon Musk’s xAI company in the state of Mississippi has also faced legal pressure.

Plaintiffs argue that the company used methane generators without obtaining the necessary environmental permits, thereby violating the Clean Air Act. The US Department of Justice, meanwhile, defended the project, highlighting its economic significance.

Similar disputes are occurring across Europe.

In the United Kingdom, activists successfully secured a review of the environmental assessment report for a planned mega-scale data center project in Buckinghamshire.

Following the judicial process, official authorities acknowledged deficiencies in the approval process, while the contractor agreed to undertake additional environmental commitments.

According to the experts who prepared the study, these lawsuits demonstrate that judicial processes have become a new tool for regulating rapidly expanding digital infrastructure.

Even if projects are not halted entirely, the lawsuits force companies and official bodies to account for climate risks, transparently disclose resource consumption data, and re-evaluate their energy strategies.

As reported by The Guardian, study co-author Associate Professor Joana Setzer of the London School of Economics commented on the issue: “The issue here is not necessarily to stop development, but to prevent the lock-in of fossil fuel dependency.”

“This is an opportunity to direct highly energy-intensive projects toward renewable energy sources while we still have the chance,” Setzer added.

A joint report by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) and the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI), titled “Brazil and Russia Relations: Political Convergence and Economic Development,” states that relations between the two countries are characterized by a structural imbalance and a paradoxical gap between major political ambitions and weak commercial-economic results.

Experts from both nations approached the current economic relations through differing lenses. Russian analysts emphasized the depth and resilience of ties in certain sectors despite mounting external pressures.

Meanwhile, CEBRI experts defined the relationship as a model of “incomplete cooperation,” shaped by periodic diplomatic alignments driven by advocacy for a multipolar world order on the international stage, paired with economic ties that remain highly vulnerable to external challenges.

Brazilian experts outline structural barriers to relations

CEBRI analysts identified the collapse of the Soviet Union, the establishment of BRICS, and the conflict in Ukraine as the primary drivers of modern Russian-Brazilian relations. According to their assessment, none of these factors have enabled the parties to fully realize their cooperation potential.

Domestic instability in Russia during the post-Soviet period, combined with economic reforms in Brazil, led to a prolonged mutual distance between the two nations.

While acknowledging that the creation of BRICS offered an opportunity to deepen cooperation, the Brazilian experts stated that expectations ultimately outpaced concrete results.

Structural constraints and political shifts within Brazil prevented political consensus from translating into sustainable cooperation.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s victory in the 2022 presidential election influenced the nature of the rapprochement with Russia.

Although analyses of United Nations voting records show both countries taking similar positions—thereby reinforcing their image as advocates for a multipolar world order—the report noted that this alignment is cyclical rather than structural in nature.

The experts noted that while military operations in Ukraine have prompted Russia to seek new partners and have reinforced Brazil’s role as a pragmatic mediator in a fragmented international system, opportunities to deepen bilateral economic cooperation remain limited.

Major Brazilian corporations are unable to operate fully in the Russian market due to the risk of secondary sanctions that could be imposed by their US and European partners.

The majority of trade routes between the two countries have been disrupted by sanctions. The world’s largest maritime shipping companies, including the Swiss-Italian joint venture MSC, Denmark’s Maersk, France’s CMA CGM Group, and Germany’s Hapag-Lloyd, have refused to transport Russian cargo.

Despite an increase in trade volume, the structure of bilateral trade remains highly asymmetric. Brazilian partners noted that this situation reflects mutual economic complementarity rather than a genuine diversification of trade ties. Brazil’s exports to Russia consist predominantly of agricultural products. In recent years, soybeans accounted for 33%, meat for 28%, and coffee for 18% of these exports. Conversely, Russia’s exports to Brazil rely on a narrow group of strategic commodities, primarily diesel fuel, fertilizers, and industrial raw materials. Fertilizers constitute approximately 75% of Russian shipments to Brazil, underscoring the concentration of trade in a single sector. Brazil’s National Fertilizer Plan, adopted in 2025, aims to reduce import dependency over the next decade, which is identified as a factor that could weaken future bilateral trade flows.

According to data from Brazilian analysts, Russia was not among Brazil’s primary arms suppliers during the 2021–2025 period. Despite Brazil’s refusal to participate in anti-Russian sanctions and its decision not to send weapons to Kyiv, defense relations between the two countries have assumed a largely symbolic character since the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) between the two economies also remains marginal, according to Central Bank of Brazil data. In 2024, Russia’s cumulative FDI in Brazil was recorded at $38.73 million, representing just 0.0044% of the country’s total inbound foreign investment. During the same period, Brazil’s investments in Russia stood at $1.69 million, accounting for a mere 0.00038% of total foreign investments.

CEBRI analysts concluded that Russia-Brazil relations present a model of selective and irregular engagement, characterized by a persistent gap between political ambitions and economic outcomes. The most prominent convergence is observed in periodic diplomatic contacts, while cooperation remains limited in areas requiring institutionalization and long-term coordination. This asymmetric economic structure leads to an unequal distribution of benefits.

Divergent proposals presented to advance cooperation

Brazilian experts noted that the fundamental challenge in advancing relations lies in restructuring the pattern of economic and technological interdependence. The report stated: “The countries must move away from a model of relations predominantly based on the trade of natural resources and low-value-added goods.”

CEBRI analysts proposed the following conditions to establish a balanced and sustainable partnership:

• Diversifying bilateral trade,
• Increasing mutual investments,
• Developing cooperation in high-technology sectors,
• Strengthening engagement in the service sector,
• Expanding cooperation in more complex branches of the manufacturing industry.

This process envisions the gradual opening of the Russian economy to foreign investment, including Brazilian capital, alongside measures to facilitate the access of Brazilian products to the Russian market. Furthermore, according to CEBRI experts, increased Russian investment in Brazil’s technology sectors could strengthen Brazil’s productive potential.

In contrast, Russian analysts argue that deepening cooperation is possible by expanding commercial interaction in traditional sectors where Russia holds distinct competitive advantages. Projections indicate that Brazil’s demand for fertilizers will increase by 20% by 2030, and the role of its agro-industrial complex, which accounts for 25% of the country’s GDP, will become even more critical. Increasing the market share of Russian companies in fertilizer production and establishing full-cycle production-logistics chains could turn Brazil into a hub for expanding shipments to other Latin American countries.

Russian experts link the diversification of the export structure to the implementation of joint investment projects and the deepening of high-tech cooperation. The utilization of online e-commerce platforms to promote consumer goods by Russian small and medium-sized enterprises is also highlighting itself as a new and rapidly growing area of interaction.

Russian experts listed the most promising areas of cooperation as follows:

• Oil and gas exploration and production,
• Exploitation of uranium and lithium deposits,
• Fertilizer production and modernization of oil refining facilities,
• Agricultural trade,
• Renewable energy sources and the green economy,
• Aerospace industry and nuclear energy,
• Transportation and logistics,
• Information technologies,
• Defense industry.

Regarding the joint production of uranium and lithium in Brazil, the Brazilian government is currently conducting negotiations with the Russian company Tenex, a subsidiary of Rosatom. The report noted that Russia is prepared to share its experience in developing peaceful nuclear technology and to support the implementation of artificial intelligence, digital government services, and automation solutions across various fields. Significant potential was also identified in municipal-level interactions, including smart city technologies, as demonstrated by ongoing contacts between the municipalities of Moscow and Rio de Janeiro.

Russian analysts also pointed to the necessity of establishing alternative payment mechanisms to bypass Western sanctions. Potential options include processing payments through third countries, using national currencies in bilateral trade, and partially transitioning to the Chinese yuan for settlements on Russian exports.

Ultimately, the authors of the report concluded that the complementary nature of the two economies and their shared interest in strategic autonomy demonstrate that, despite the irregular structure of their relations, significant untapped potential remains to be realized.

NATO member states are preparing to approve the allocation of €70 billion in military aid to Ukraine at the annual leaders’ summit to be held in Ankara, Türkiye, on June 7-8.

If these resources are secured, Ukraine’s total defense spending—combining its own domestic resources and foreign aid—will approximately match Russia’s budgeted defense expenditure for this year.

Although the Russian Federation continues to spend its budgeted amounts at a faster pace, a budgetary balance will have been established on paper.

Speaking to Politico, five diplomats from alliance member states said that NATO ambassadors have largely agreed on the text of the leaders’ joint declaration, though details may still change.

According to the diplomats, the draft declaration commits NATO countries to providing €70 billion (approximately $80 billion) in military support to Ukraine.

The US, however, is not participating in this specific support program.

When this amount is added to Ukraine’s own defense and security expenditures, the total budget will reach approximately $178 billion. Three days ago, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed a law approving a 4.4 trillion hryvnia (approximately $98 billion) budget, which includes a loan from the European Union and drives defense spending to record levels.

By comparison, Russia’s official budget allocates 12.93 trillion rubles for defense.

While this amount equates to approximately $170 billion at current exchange rates, the ruble’s recent depreciation plays a role in this balance; indeed, just a month ago, the dollar equivalent of this sum exceeded $180 billion.

In contrast, according to calculations by Janis Kluge, a researcher at the Germany-based Institute for International and Security Affairs, Russia’s military spending in the first quarter of 2026 alone reached a record 5.908 trillion rubles (approximately $78 billion at the current exchange rate).

Ukraine, meanwhile, has managed to significantly increase its budget expenditures thanks to a €90 billion loan provided by the European Union. Kyiv is scheduled to receive half of this loan this year, with €31.8 billion of that portion planned to be used directly for defense spending.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, speaking on Thursday at the Ukraine Reconstruction Conference in Gdansk, Poland, announced that the first tranche of €3.2 billion was transferred today.

According to an earlier Politico report citing Ukrainian Ministry of Defense data, NATO countries had already committed $38 billion in military aid to Ukraine for this year.

In addition, Kyiv planned to request an additional $20 billion from the alliance. The Ukrainian side aims to maintain the initiative it has gained in recent months by effectively utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles across all areas, from the front line to occupied territories.

These vehicles, while cutting off Russian supply lines, also cause explosions and fires at oil refineries and defense industry facilities deep inside Russia.

Consequently, according to the draft declaration of the NATO leaders, Ukraine will receive more support than expected, potentially reaching a total of €70 billion.

According to information provided to Politico by the diplomats, the alliance will also commit to allocating at least an equivalent amount for next year.

If these plans are implemented, and with the addition of €45 billion allocated from the EU loan for the year 2027, Ukraine’s defense financing will continue to be strongly supported next year as well.