Asia
The fate of Afghanistan’s Marshal Dostum’s palace
The private palace of Afghanistan’s Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum that was one of the main centers of power in the northern region of Afghanistan for the past 30 years, now has been turned into a military base.
Dostum used this palace, which is located in the city of Sheberghan, to show his power both during the civil wars and as his vice president during the democratic government.
Now after the fall of the previous government in the hands of the Taliban and the escape of powerful figures including Marshal Dostum, what is the fate of his place now?
Confrontation of two old enemies after 20 years
The city of Sheberghan fell to the Taliban on 14 August 2021. Now the Taliban have turned Dostum’s palace into a military base.
Taliban Deputy Defense Minister, Mullah Mohammad Fazel Mazloum, ordered the Taliban forces in this city to turn Dostum’s palace into a military base.
Mullah Fazel is one of the Taliban commanders who surrendered to forces loyal to Dostum in 2001. At that time, Mullah Fazel was the chief of staff of the Taliban.

A picture taken at that time showed Mullah Fazel next to Dostum. In that picture, Mullah Dadullah, another Taliban commander, is also seen next to Mullah Fazel.
This picture was apparently taken inside a war castle in the west of Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital city of Balkh province. After this meeting, Dostum handed over Mullah Fazel as a prisoner of war to the US forces who had just arrived in Afghanistan.
Mullah Fazel was imprisoned in Guantanamo for many years. In 2014, he was one of the five senior Taliban members who was released from Guantanamo prison and transferred to Qatar by the Americans.
Since then, Mullah Fazel became one of the main figures of the political office of the Taliban in Qatar. After 20 years, Dostum and Mullah Fazel met during the Moscow meeting in March 2021.
Reportedly, during the meeting Mullah Fazel went on a violent confrontation with Dostum inside the hall where they met in Moscow. Mullah Fazel called Dostum “traitor and murderer,” according to sources.
In response to Fazel, Dostum left the meeting and did not attend other scheduled meetings the other days.
Mullah Fazel’s return to Dostum’s palace
Now, Mullah Fazel is once again the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Taliban. In this capacity, he once again traveled to northern Afghanistan and the city of Shaberghan, the center of power of Dostum. During this trip, he went to Dostum palace and renamed it “Qasr Mellat” (Nation Palace). But people do not have access to this palace.
In 2021, when the Taliban captured the city of Shaberghan, an image of one of the members of the Taliban, who was wearing the military uniform of Dostum, became public.
A number of social media users shared this image and considered it a sign of the escape of former powerful officials and figures.
While the Taliban have renamed Dostum’s palace to Nation Palace, the residents of Shaberghan told Amu that the Taliban do not allow people to enter this palace.
“The Taliban only allow their forces to enter this palace,” a resident of Jawzjan told Amu on condition of anonymity.
“Many of the palace gates and shutters are broken, and the seats that were used for the conference are filled with dirt, and no one is paying attention to the palace. Almost all the equipment and supplies of the palace are being destroyed,” he added.
How was Dostum palace built?
The palace of Dostum was built 30 years ago at a huge cost in the span of three years. In response to the question of how much money was spent to build this palace, Bashir Ahmad Teyenj, one of the close aides to Dostum, said: “The national movement was very greedy at that time, and there was no calculation of how much money was spent.”

Mr. Teyenj furthered: “This palace was built between 1993 and 1996. To build this palace, the revenue from the ports of Aqeena and Hayratan has been used.”
At that time, the forces loyal to Dostum were in control of these two important ports.
Marshal Dostum at that time was one of the parties involved in the civil wars, which controlled large parts of the northern provinces of Afghanistan.
Dostum’s palace was built on 15 acres of land. According to Teyenj, inside this palace there is a mosque, nine small halls and a large conference hall that can accommodate more than 4 thousand participants.
In an interview with Amu, Mr. Teyenj also claimed that all the equipment of this palace was “stolen” by the Taliban.
The article is translated from Amu tv.
Asia
Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets
Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.
Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.
The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.
The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.
Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.
The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.
Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.
The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.
Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.
The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.
Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.
Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.
Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.
According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.
This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.
The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:
“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”
Asia
Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions
Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.
Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.
The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.
China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.
Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.
The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.
It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.
However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.
Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.
Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.
On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.
The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.
Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.
Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.
Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.
Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.
According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.
Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.
The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.
A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.
These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.
Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.
Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.
Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.
Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”
Asia
China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers
China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.
China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.
In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.
The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.
Financial sector stability
China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.
China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.
“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.
Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.
Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan
Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.
The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.
Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.
Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.
Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.
Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.
-
Europe4 days agoGermany’s CDU drafts tougher citizenship rules to counter AfD
-
Russia1 week agoWhat to know about Russia’s upcoming State Duma elections?
-
Europe2 weeks agoMarine Le Pen leads all 2027 French presidential scenarios, poll shows
-
Europe1 week agoGerman industrial bosses push for return to 40-hour working week
-
Diplomacy1 week agoGeoffrey Roberts sees Ukraine war concluding within coming months
-
Middle East1 week agoIran expands deterrence as Gulf strikes expose US munitions limits, analysts say
-
Russia2 weeks agoRussia warns NATO over Arctic militarisation and conflict risks
-
Asia1 week agoBOJ faces critical rate decision as US presses for faster hikes
