The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.

But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.

During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.

The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.

On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.

But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?

Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.

A.—Afghanistan after 2021

One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.

In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.

This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.

The possible scenarios

What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.

These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.

Blockers

Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:

1- The presence of nationalist forces

The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.

2- International supervision

Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.

3- Resistance of Syrian citizens

A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.

These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.

– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces

The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.

This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.

In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:

1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests

– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.

– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.

– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.

2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups

The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.

3- History of confrontation between victorious groups

Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.

These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:

1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity

The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.

2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate

Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.

3- The potential for a common political process

If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.

These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.

The last: General elections

The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.

Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.

However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.

Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.

If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.

On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.

Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.

Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.

Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.

The German government has announced an 8-point plan aimed at ensuring the “safe and dignified return” of Syrian refugees following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad by armed groups, including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

In its official statement, the German Foreign Office described this plan as a roadmap toward a “free and democratic Syria.”

German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock unveiled the initiative on Wednesday, emphasizing cautious optimism. “We see a moment of hope,” Baerbock said, but warned that the situation in Syria remains “far from stable.”

To support these efforts, Germany will provide an additional 8 million euros in humanitarian aid. The plan also includes increasing Germany’s diplomatic presence in Syria, with Undersecretary Tobias Lindner appointed as Germany’s representative in the region.

Baerbock highlighted that the return of Syrian refugees must be coordinated with European partners and the United Nations (UN).

The German Foreign Office noted that achieving these returns would require creating conditions that are safe, sustainable, and comprehensive, addressing humanitarian, political, socio-economic, and security challenges.

The announcement comes amidst a wave of regional decisions following Assad’s removal. Austria has announced plans to deport Syrian refugees, while Belgium, France, Greece, and Germany have temporarily suspended new asylum applications for Syrians.

The German plan acknowledges the “good news” of Assad’s removal but cautions against the potential risks of terrorism. To mitigate these threats, the proposal suggests forming a “Friends of Syria” group comprising Arab and Western states.

However, the document notes lingering uncertainties, particularly regarding how to approach Iran and Russia, two key players in the region.

The plan emphasizes the urgency of implementing a ceasefire and negotiating a power-sharing agreement that respects Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan traveled to Israel with an agenda focused on a potential ceasefire and prisoner swap in Gaza. His diplomatic mission also included visits to Egypt and Qatar, reflecting the growing urgency of efforts to address the escalating crisis.

The Times of Israel reported that Sullivan’s meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other top officials represents a final push by the Joe Biden administration, which will leave office on 20 January, to negotiate a prisoner swap and establish a ceasefire in Gaza.

Photographs released by the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office showed senior ministers in attendance, along with Ronen Bar, head of Israel’s domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet (Shabak); David Barnea, director of the foreign intelligence agency Mossad; and Gal Hirsch, coordinator of the Prisoners and Missing Persons File. The high-level meeting underscores the critical importance of these discussions.

A Western diplomat in the region informed Reuters that Israel is nearing an agreement with the militant Palestinian group Hamas, but the deal would be narrowly scoped—involving the release of only a small number of hostages and a brief pause in hostilities.

The proposed ceasefire hinges on the Egyptian plan for a ‘Gaza without Hamas’ strategy. This plan includes a truce lasting one to two months, during which hostages would be gradually released, prolonged talks without military pressure on the ground, swift reopening of the Rafah border crossing under Palestinian Authority and Egyptian supervision, and Hamas would be required to provide a list of living hostages within several days.

Under this framework, Israel would retain veto power over individuals crossing into Egypt. In return, Cairo would secure a Palestinian commitment ensuring Hamas would not control the border crossing or Gaza itself “during the coming period.”

Hamas has reportedly accepted the plan on the condition that Gaza’s administration be handed over to a committee of local Palestinians. Egyptian officials have communicated this proposal to Israel, with Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar and Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi visiting Egypt recently. Separately, Mossad Director David Barnea held talks in Doha with Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdurrahman Al Thani.

Israeli Defence Minister Yisrael Katz conveyed to U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin during a phone call that there is a tangible chance for an agreement to free hostages, including U.S. citizens. On 4 December, Katz expressed optimism, stating, “This time we really have a chance to make a prisoner swap with Hamas.”

In parallel, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump demanded Hamas release all hostages in Gaza, warning, “Otherwise, the Middle East will turn into hell.”

Meanwhile, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution yesterday evening calling for an immediate, inclusive, and permanent ceasefire in Gaza, along with the unconditional release of hostages. The resolution, submitted by Palestine, was passed with 158 ‘yes’ votes, 9 ‘no’ votes, and 13 abstentions out of the 193-member General Assembly.