Exclusive interview with Safeen Dizayee, Head of Department of Foreign Relations of IKRG

In an exclusive interview, Safeen Dizayee, Head of Department of Foreign Relations of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG), has discussed various pressing issues facing the IKRG and its broader regional relations with Dr. Esra Karahindiba for Harici. The conversation had delved into the intricate dynamics of IKRG’s relations with neighboring Türkiye and Iran, its strategic partnerships with global powers like the United States and China, and the internal political landscape within Iraq including domestic disputes and Turkmens’ presence in the administration.

Minister Dizayee also provides insights into key projects like the Development Road Project, the ongoing conflict with the PKK, and the broader implications of regional conflicts, including the situation in Gaza.

Minister Dizayee highlighted the long-standing relationship between IKRG and Türkiye, emphasizing economic and infrastructural collaborations, especially in energy. The closure of the oil pipeline through Türkiye has cost Iraq and IKRG billions, but negotiations are ongoing to resume exports. Besides, the Development Road Project aims to enhance regional connectivity from the Gulf to Europe, but Minister Dizayee brings some issues about the ideas which aim at excluding IKRG region from the route and says “the project should benefit all Iraqi regions, including their region”.

The interview also addresses the reduction of the US military footprint in Iraq and its implications for IKRG’s security. While the US withdrawal is discussed, Minister Dizayee underscores the necessity of international presence to maintain stability and counter insurgent threats, stressing the need for a new framework of bilateral relations with the United States that extends beyond military cooperation. The overall response of him is that the US withdrawal is not desired by their side.

Meanwhile, the IKRG maintains a stable relationship with China, focusing on economic and infrastructural projects. While major Chinese investments are currently more aligned with federal Iraq, the IKRG is keen on expanding this cooperation to benefit the region directly.

Minister Dizayee confirms that IKRG views the PKK’s presence in its territories as problematic once again, advocating for respect for Iraqi laws and emphasizing the need for regional cooperation with neighboring countries such as Türkiye to ensure security. The PKK’s activities are seen as detrimental to Kurdish interests in both Iraq and neighbors. Türkiye is expected to implement a wide-scale military operation in Northern Iraq this summer aiming at sweeping all the terrorist elements out, which is out by the Turkish Ministry of National Defense as the sources said “We will lock the door this summer in Northern Iraq”. Minister Dizayee was careful while responding the related question and he used a quite a diplomatic language saying “Within the context of international laws and norms, it should not be possible to have any groups to threaten the security and stability of neighboring countries. Within that context, there has to be some kind of understanding in order to defuse to situation and to come to a reasonable end that would re-establish better relations and to make sure that the region would not be used to create instability.”

Here is the full interview:

Relations with Türkiye

With Türkiye’s strategic push to become an energy conduit to Europe, what specific collaborative projects involving energy pipelines or electricity grids are being discussed between the IKRG and Türkiye? How does the IKRG view its role in Türkiye’s energy strategy affecting its own energy sovereignty and economic development?

First, we have to accept that we are neighbors with Türkiye. In 1988, our refugees ended up in camps in Muş, Mardin and Diyarbakir, and in 1991, again, a large portion of exodus over 2 million people fled, half of them to the borders with Iran and the other half to the border with Türkiye.  Therefore, this relationship is a longstanding one.

Economically today, since 2003, after the demise of the regime in Baghdad and after the embargo was lifted on Iraq, Turkish companies have been very active in KRG region in terms of infrastructure and economic development.

Türkiye is the largest partner to Iraq as a whole in terms of trade, I believe, after Germany. So, there are many reasons that we should be enjoying a good relationship with Türkiye, not to mention we have common borders, and for the our region, we also have people of the same ethnic background within the Republic of Türkiye. We have enjoyed a relationship with Türkiye for the last 30 years and more. In terms of energy, as you know, the pipeline that was used to export KRG oil since 2014 was going via Türkiye to Ceyhan. That brought extra revenue to the our government at a time when, in February 2014, the budget was cut from Baghdad, and in May of 2014, that’s when we started to export oil via Ceyhan.

For 15 months since the pipeline closed, at a loss of over 15 billion dollars to Iraq

It was extremely helpful and led to the arbitration case of Iraq against Türkiye. Currently, it has been 15 months since the pipeline has been closed at a loss of over 15 billion dollars to Iraq as a whole and to our region in particular. There are serious negotiations to revitalize that pipeline and resume the oil export from KRI, whereby everybody will benefit from it.

For sure, Türkiye has been trying in the past with Azerbaijan, the Black Sea, other countries in Central Asia, and Russia to have a transit via Türkiye and to be a hub for the distribution of energy. I believe that is still possible, whether it’s oil or gas from Iraq and also from the Gulf.

When the Development Route materializes, it can easily be utilized from Qatar, Kuwait, and even going as far as the UAE. This development route will be important for the Gulf States, Iraq, Türkiye, and of course ending up in Europe. This is a long-term project for sure, but all projects start from an idea; ideas can develop into projects, and projects can be implemented. Currently, there is no project on the power grid or such.

In the past, in the 90s, Türkiye was providing a certain amount of electricity to the province of Dohuk when electricity was cut from Saddam’s regime. Even today, some electricity has been provided to Mosul because of the lack of electricity production in Iraq. But this can also be expanded. There are talks between the federal government and Ankara regarding the supply of water, the possibility of resumption of oil, security issues, and the more recent visit of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Baghdad. A couple of dozen memorandums of understanding (MoUs) have been signed.

We hope that they can materialize because some of those MOUs bring benefits to both countries, to the people of the region, and the stability of the region. I hope that those understandings or those negotiations can be developed further into something more substantial and more concrete.

Could you detail the Development Path Project’s key initiatives planned for the next five years, particularly those aimed at enhancing the transportation and digital infrastructure within Iraq? Does the project cover IKRG, too?

This idea has been contemplated for quite some time, and we believe it will revitalize Iraq and its economy. Iraq is at a crossroads, and utilizing routes from both East to West and South to North can happen, and there is a great deal of support from the Gulf States, which can lead to easy access to European markets. And of course, with the current issues in the Red Sea and the lack of security and piracy, this can be an alternative in terms of less time taken, more cost-effective, and easy accessibility.

IKRG should also benefit from Development Road Project

Naturally, cutting through major towns and cities of Iraq, we have been discussing this with the federal government that we should benefit from it, from Kirkuk to Erbil and then to Dohuk and then entering Türkiye. But unfortunately, in Baghdad, certain ideas have been developing that the route should be diverted, not even going to Kirkuk, but not even to Mosul. It should go to the west of Mosul, west of Tigris, and then along the border with Syria, and then somewhere near entering Türkiye.

So that means a big city of 3.5 million, Mosul, which is the trade center of Iraq, will not benefit, and we will not benefit from it. So, we have been standing against this idea that the project from South to North should benefit all Iraqis, all components. It is of vital importance that we should be discussing this with Baghdad, Erbil, and Ankara to ensure that it will benefit every component, every region. Geographically, practically, and technically, it will not be possible to marginalize and sideline KRI when this route is being built.

Mosul must benefit. Our proposal is that it should be east of Mosul, meaning east of Tigris, which will get close to some of the Nineveh plains and some of the Christian communities, and then getting close to southwest of Duhok. It can still enter Ovaköy into Türkiye. So, this route is being discussed, debated, and argued, but if done properly, it will bring benefit to all area components of Iraq and all regions of Iraq. It should not be politically oriented. It should be with the intention of economic development and revitalization of the economy, benefiting every component in this region. Iraq needs such a thing after the war.

Over 44 years of detachment from the world since 1980, Iraq has been at war for eight years with Iran. Then it occupied Kuwait, followed by 13 years of embargo. And in 2003, there has been the current situation, which is ongoing. So, 44 years in the lifespan of a nation is too long to be detached from all developments. Iraq needs this vital, important project, but it has to benefit all Iraqis.

Multilateral Joint Fight Against the terrorist group PKK

Can you provide an update on any recent security collaborations or dialogues between the IKRG, the Iraqi government and Türkiye in addressing PKK activities? What measures have been effective, and what challenges remain?

Unfortunately, PKK has been a problem for the region since 1991. And of course, prior to that, since the early 80s, it has been operating inside Türkiye and also from Syria. But they’ve taken advantage of the area that has been vacant along the border, particularly the more difficult terrains in Qandil and Hakurk and other areas.

PKK has changed its route from what they claimed to serve an independent “United Kurdistan”. They seem to have changed their rotation for something totally different, which does not serve the interests of the Kurds, be it in Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, or Iran. Therefore, their agenda is totally different from the agenda of other Kurdish leaders or political parties here in Iraq.

We believe that PKK has no business in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Therefore, they should respect the laws of the country and should not create problems for our own people, settlers, villages, and remote areas. As per international norms and regulations, it is not possible to allow groups operating in a neighboring country against the security and interest of another country.

What are the IKRG’s strategies for managing the delicate balance of local Kurdish populations’ sentiments and the geopolitical necessity of cooperating with Türkiye against the PKK?

Unfortunately, PKK has become a tool in the hands and interest of others, serving other agendas and not that of the Kurds. The security issue has been discussed between Ankara and Baghdad, one of them being to what extent the federal government would be able to deliver what has been promised. I’m not sure. Because PKK’s presence for the last almost 40 years has been in these difficult terrains and rugged mountains, and what the federal government can do is questionable.

But what is important is to make sure that some of the offshoots of PKK operating under different names inside Iraq, particularly in the Sinjar area, in areas close to Kirkuk, in areas close to Garmian, the south of Garmian, should not be allowed to operate. They should not be funded as part of the local militia forces. Measures should be taken to drive them out, and probably that would be sufficient at the first stage in combating them. Apart from that, other normal and natural communication and security communication is a necessity between all neighboring countries to exchange information and to cooperate in various fields to make sure that the security and stability of the country is not being undermined.

Factionalism within Kurdish politics

What steps are being taken to address factionalism within the Kurdish political landscape, particularly in relation to power sharing and resource allocation among different Kurdish parties?

I think for any democracy and perhaps a newly born democracy, it is very normal to have differences of opinion. If all political parties think alike, it will be quite monotonous, and there would be a lack of development, lack of ideas, and lack of development in terms of projects and differences of opinion. Therefore, political parties have been functioning for quite some time in KRI but the process of democracy is relatively new. It will take some time to adjust to the process. However, since 1992, under very difficult circumstances, where we just came out of the exodus of 1991, where there was no voter registration and when there was no culture of democracy in Iraq at that time, particularly in our region, we went to the first elections in 1992. We established or formed our first parliament and our first government.

Yes, we did have internal conflicts, but we have been able to work together to be a strong base for the opposition against the former regime and became instrumental for the regime change in 2003 and major changes in Baghdad, including the reforms and the new constitution.

Yes, strength comes in unity. We have been united, but unfortunately, there are times when certain smaller party interests may diverge from the main course. Sadly, I have to also say that certain external powers may increase their influence on individuals or on political parties. Knowingly or unknowingly, there might be a discourse from the main aim and goal. However, we have a coalition government. The main political parties, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), are partners in this government, and this will be the case for the foreseeable future. The elections have been delayed due to certain positions taken by some political parties in the opposition.

At any given time when there has been an election and a particular political party did not perform well, they blamed the electoral law. So, they were calling for reform in the electoral law, which was not seen the same way by the KDP, but at the end of the day, all parties agree that there should be a reform in the electoral law, which was the case, but it took longer than expected.

Authority clashes with central Government of Baghdad

The elections were supposed to be taking place two years ago, and it is the aim and the goal that it will take place before the end of this year. One thing which saddened us greatly is the federal court in Baghdad, which has no authority because the law was passed by the regional parliament in order to provide quotas for the Turkmens and for the Christians, and the 11 seats of the quota were canceled by the federal court.

Currently, we have a 100-seat parliament, or elections will be for a 100-seat parliament, and within that, there will be five quotas for the Christians and the Turkmens to compete for only five seats. So hopefully, once this parliament is elected, there will be new legislation by the new parliament to reestablish the quota for the Christians and the Turkmens for future elections.

In terms of interest, yes, every political party has its interest to be party number one and to take over power. But no particular party, even if they become party number one can have the government; the trend or political climate in KRI is that there has to be a coalition government, which has been the case since 1992.

Elections before the end of 2024

We are aiming for elections before the end of the year. Political disputes are very normal. In the past, whenever there was a political dispute, there was armed conflict between the parties. But for the last 20 plus years, even though there have been very serious political disputes, there have always been negotiations and discussions, leading to amicable solutions. We believe that we can reach a solution that can be for the security, stability, and interest of the people of KRI.

What specific initiatives are underway or planned to improve the political inclusion and social welfare of the Turkmen community under the IKRG administration?

On the issue of the Turkmens, as I mentioned earlier, the Turkmens are a major component of our society. In 2003 and 2004, when the draft constitution was prepared in Baghdad, I was on the team of President Barzani. It was us and President Barzani who pushed for the rights of the Turkmens, Chaldeans, and Assyrians to be inserted in the constitution. Many people opposed that, but it was Masoud Barzani who pushed for that, and we made sure that the Turkmens have a presence in the parliament of KRG by setting up a quota. Unfortunately, recently this quota has been canceled by the federal court. So, our position towards these communities, including the Turkmens, is very clear. They are part of our society. They should enjoy their political, cultural, and economic rights.

I was Minister of Education from 2009 to 2012. We established schools in the Turkmen language, also in Chaldean, and in Arabic and Kurdish. So, the families here have the choice to send their kids to any of those schools. The full curriculum is either in Arabic, Kurdish, Chaldean, or Turkmen, and English for that matter. The people have been living together for millennia, and they will continue to do so. Particularly in the KRG administration, in Erbil, there is no issue or disputes between individuals because of different culture and background. Citizenship and equality before the law apply to everybody.

In addition to that, having a Turkmen minister in the cabinet, having Turkmens in the parliament, having Turkmen education, these are areas which we take pride in, and perhaps we can even improve on that. This can be developed further, but as equal citizens, we all are equal before the law. As different ethnic groups, we should all enjoy our rights as different ethnicities with different cultures and different political ideologies.

Iraqi Domestic Politics

How is the Iraq Kurdish Regional Government advocating for Kurdish interests in the ongoing debates over federalism and oil revenue sharing in the Iraqi Parliament?

It is important to remind ourselves that the new Iraq, particularly the opposition who were based in KRI at the time, are now ruling or are rulers and leaders in Baghdad. So, we in KRG actually helped them take over power, and we, as Kurd leaders in Baghdad, including the late Talabani, Masoud Barzani and others, were instrumental in rebuilding Iraq based on a federal democratic, pluralist Iraq.

The constitution that was ratified in 2005 is the best document available. Unfortunately, many articles of the constitution have not been respected or implemented. There are a couple of dozen articles which require regulation by law, but unfortunately, they have not been. The upper chamber of the federal chamber needs to be established, but it has not been established. The federal court needs to be established as per the law. So, there are many issues which need to be addressed to make sure that Iraq is indeed a new Iraq based on the constitution, which was voted on by 85 percent of the Iraqi population.

What are the IKRG’s priorities for the upcoming electoral cycle, and how do you plan to address voter concerns regarding corruption and governance?

We do have our issues. Unfortunately for us, the case is not about the individuals who is the prime minister in Baghdad and who is not. It’s about the system or lack of system. Since 2011 and 2012, Baghdad has been gearing more towards a centralized authority rather than decentralization and giving more power to provinces and regions.

Some areas like Basra and Anbar have been calling to establish their own regions, similar to that of KRI, but Baghdad has been reluctant to allow that. They have been making sure that no other regions are being formed. Centralization is in the minds of some leaders in Baghdad, where everybody should return and curtail the power of KRI, which has been granted by the constitution in terms of legislation, administration, the executive, judiciary, and in terms of economy, oil, and oil administration.

These are all issues which need to be addressed seriously, particularly Article 140 of the disputed territories, which needs to be solved. It was supposed to be implemented by the end of 2007. Unfortunately, it has not been, and the situation is more difficult than it used to be. The policy of Arabization and bringing more Arab tribes into Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Sinjar areas is ongoing.

Oil export issue is the priority

It’s affecting both the Kurds and the Turkmen communities in those areas. Prior to the formation of the current government of Prime Minister Mohammad Shia Sabbar as-Sudani, a roadmap was set and an agreement was signed that these priorities should be given attention to some of these pending issues like the oil export, the issue of the budget and salary, and the issue of Article 140, and other issues which relate to all of Iraq. But unfortunately, none of that has been met.

Prime Minister Sudani, we believe, is sincere, but unfortunately, the political parties supporting him are the ones who probably are making the final decisions. Nevertheless, we are working with Baghdad to ensure that the current government survives and can lead to more stability.

The prime objective of the KRI region is to make sure that the rights of our people that have been stipulated in the constitution are respected and met. Yes, there are certain jurisdictions, certain statuses that we have and practice, but we feel that if certain authorities or circles in Baghdad are given the upper hand, they would undermine that and take it away.

More recently, in the past year or two, they’ve been using the federal court to undermine our authority. In addition to that, there are states within states. Certain lawless militia forces are taking matters into their own hands, particularly in the Sinjar area, where an agreement was signed between Baghdad and Erbil four years ago to encourage people, IDPs, to go back to their homes. But unfortunately, because of the presence of these militias and some pro-PKK elements in that area, over 200,000 people cannot go back to their homes. These are issues that we need to talk to Baghdad about seriously. Some of those issues have been spoken to Prime Minister Sudani, and certain issues have been handled well, but it’s a process that will take some time.

There has to be sincerity and trust between us. Sometimes, unfortunately, discussions are being passed from one group to another, from technical groups to political groups, from political groups to legal groups. It’s going around in a circle without an outcome. But we will continue with our discussions. As I said, we have confidence in Prime Minister Sudani, and we will continue to support him.

China’s Expansion into the Middle East

Given China’s growing economic presence in the Middle East through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, can you discuss any ongoing negotiations or agreements between the IKRG and Chinese firms, especially in sectors such as infrastructure or energy?

China has a consulate general in Erbil. Currently, we have 26 diplomatic missions, including the P5. They have a presence here, and UN agencies also have a presence in KRI region. We do enjoy a good relationship with all of them, and we, within the Iraqi constitution, has the right to establish its international relations. And we have been doing so with various countries, and we are planning to expand even further.

With China, yes, there has been good communication and a stable relationship. Of course, every country has its own interest, and China is a big power, a global power. There are economic interests in this region, in Africa and the Middle East. And particularly in Iraq, which is trying to rebuild its infrastructure and obviously the economic or development route from east to west, which will be coming through Iraq are all on the agenda now. Part of those big projects, mega projects, are related to federal Iraq; they do not involve the KRI.

However, if any such mega projects happen in Iraq, it will be of interest to our region. Currently, there is the south to north development route, which will be cutting through the KRI directly, and that will be affecting the KRI directly.

There is a stable economic relationship with China; many business people, traders from KRI and Iraq purchase their supplies, commodities, and products from China, and like many other countries, the market in Iraq is full of Chinese products. Chinese companies in the oil sector in the south, in infrastructure, and many other fields are engaged in KRI.

They are mostly engaged in service companies to oil companies. They are not directly involved in any investment of any kind. But there is a good stable relationship. This is one of our policies to maintain a good friendly relationship with every nation, with every country. And of course, we understand that.

How does the IKRG plan to balance its economic relationships with both the U.S. and China, considering the geopolitical rivalry between these two powers?

This region has been protected by our Western friends since 1991, and during the war against ISIS again. It was the Western countries, the coalition, who helped us. So, we are not trying to draw parallels between this one and that one. Our position is to maintain good relations with everybody.

But of course, those who have been contributing, those who have been supporting more, obviously, they stand in a different position, and their presence and influence seem to be more. That’s the reality on the ground.

With the U.S. reducing its military footprint in Iraq, how is the IKRG adjusting its security strategy to mitigate any increased threats from insurgent groups or neighboring state influences?

Obviously, the United States and the Western world and any other state for that matter have short, medium, and long-term interests.

The United States, after the fall of the Soviet Union and after the first Gulf War in 1991, has had a permanent presence in this region, be it in the Gulf States or even in the our region itself. After the exodus of 1991, after the collapse of the uprising of the Shiites in the south and those of the Kurds in the north, the aftermath of the war and the reprisals taken by Saddam’s regime against Kurds; over 2 million people fled from cities, towns, and villages to the borders of Türkiye and Iran. This led to what is known as the mass exodus or the exodus of the million, which led to the Security Council Resolution 688 to be passed in order to call upon the Iraqi regime to end its oppression of its people.

A safe haven was established and then a No-Fly Zone along the 36th parallel. This region was protected by the United States primarily, with the support and participation of France and Britain and the base from Incirlik in Türkiye. There was an office called MCC (Military Coordination Center) based in Zakho, having key offices from those four countries: the United States, Türkiye, France, and Britain.

This maintained stability in the region and made sure that the regime would not move against the people, which led to the first-ever elections in the KRI in May of 1992, despite the fact that we were also enduring international sanctions on Iraq and Baghdad’s own sanctions on KRI.

From time to time, the borders with neighbors were tightened up. But we managed to survive until 2003. So, for those 12 or 13 years, this region was already under surveillance by the United States. In 2003, the KRI and its political leadership became the key part and parcel of the changes in the regime in Iraq, and the presence of U.S. forces and coalition partners in Iraq made major changes by rebuilding the country. KRG was instrumental in rebuilding the structure of the country: its military, administration, and political system, and in moving towards having a new constitution, which was ratified in 2005. So, we have become a beacon of development, progress economically, democratically, administratively, socially, and politically. This has been supported and promoted by our international friends.

“The threat of ISIS is still there”

Particularly, in 2011, after it was seen that the newly built Iraqi federal army was capable of maintaining security and stability in the country, the coalition left. We felt at that time they were leaving prematurely because the country was not yet ready.

Unfortunately, that argument was correct because three years later, in 2014, ISIS came onto the scene and managed to control a third of Iraqi territory, obliging the federal government and Prime Minister Maliki to call for an international coalition under the leadership of the United States to come back to Iraq.

Since 2014, these forces have been back in Iraq to help the Iraqi forces and also the Peshmerga to fight ISIS for over three years. This was done jointly, and the caliphate was destroyed, but the threat of ISIS is still there. The reasons that led to the creation of ISIS still exist. Many people are still internally displaced. They are displaced from their homes. Many people have fled the country and migrated. The economic situation is still dire. Therefore, the reasons are there. And there are many people, particularly smaller communities such as the Yazidis, the Turkmens, Christians, Shabaks, Kakais, Sabeans, Mandaeans, and even Sunnis in many parts, who feel very vulnerable.

“International presence is a necessity”

What specific assurances or support has the IKRG sought from remaining U.S. forces or other international partners to maintain stability in Kurdish regions?

There is an overall belief that international presence is a necessity. It’s a must to ensure that the situation returns to normalcy and the threat of ISIS is totally eradicated. There have been negotiations and talks, and the former government of Mustafa el-Kazemi engaged in what was called strategic dialogue some three or four years ago, to restructure the presence of future coalition forces, primarily those of the Americans, in Iraq.

It would be multi-dimensional, not just a military presence. In other words, the future relationship between the United States and Iraq will be based on social, political, economic, industrial, energy, finance, and security aspects. So, there have been discussions on that. More recently, when Prime Minister Sudani was in Washington, I was also part of his delegation. Discussions evolved around different committees set up to discuss various issues, topics, and fields on how the future relations of Iraq would be.

The framework has been set, but there is a need for more discussion. In July, I believe there will be more discussions on these issues to enable the committees to discuss more about these issues and the future relations and areas of cooperation.

Basically, this is the aim and goal that we are promoting, and we feel the need for coalition forces in Iraq for the foreseeable future. The structure and format may change from the previous military presence of combating ISIS, but definitely, a new structure, a new framework of bilateral relations is needed.

Some experts say that the U.S. will not withdraw but increase their presence on the contrary. What do your partners tell you about that?

The increase in presence depends on the developments in the region. As you know, the issue or the conflict between Russia and Ukraine was unexpected. The unfolding situation in Gaza, and of course, the Houthis in the Red Sea and other proxies in the area who are promoting conflict and violence under those circumstances, the United States feels that its security is at risk.

“There may be reconsideration about certain future presences of (Americans)”

Its presence and interests are being threatened. Therefore, whether they will increase the presence or not, that’s for them (the US) to decide. But for sure, these situations that have unfolded were not on the table. So, there may be reconsideration about certain future presences. And of course, with the available technology in this day and age, larger personnel may not be required. Other forms of presence may be envisaged. So basically, that’s the case with the United States. We for sure, want to see the coalition forces remain within a framework agreed upon between the federal government and the United States.

Their presence is important. It has provided security and stability, and its continuation is a must. Therefore, we need to discuss this more, and we are part of this negotiation, and we are trying to bring about a framework that would be acceptable to everybody. At the end of the day, it will be for the interest of Iraq, for the security of Iraq, for the stability of Iraq, and the stability of Iraq means stability of the entire Middle East.

Iran and Gaza…

How do you evaluate the pass away of Iranian President Reisi and top diplomat Abdullahiyan? Do you expect any foreign policy changes after the incident?

As for the accident in Iran and the loss of life of the president and the foreign minister, it was an unfortunate accident. We don’t believe it will bring about major changes in Iran. Iran’s system is such that, unfortunately, leaders or high-ranking leaders have been involved in such accidents since the early 80s.

Dozens of key leaders were assassinated or killed in a single bomb attack. Over 70 key leaders were killed, but the country continued to function.

So, we will continue to try and develop our relations with Iran. Yes, we had some sad experiences in recent months. But after a visit by our president Nechirvan Barzani to Tehran just weeks before this accident, things have been put on the right track.

After that accident, a high-level delegation, including the president and the prime minister of the KRG, went to Iran for funeral. Last week, we had a visit from the current foreign minister or the acting foreign minister. We will continue to develop our relations based on respect and mutual interest as neighbors.

Yes, it’s an obligation for all of us to enjoy good, stable relations, but of course, we also have to respect what we stand for, and we cannot accept pressures to be imposed on us. We can work together for the benefit of our peoples and the stability and security of the region. That can be done through negotiation and understanding and not through pressure and force.

What impact does the IKRG foresee the Gaza conflict having on the broader Middle East peace process, and how does this align with the IKRG’s diplomatic posture in the region?

Regarding Gaza, it’s very unfortunate that there’s a human tragedy and tens of thousands of people have been killed and hundreds of thousands have become internally displaced persons in their own country. It’s very sad to see this human tragedy. The international community owes it to them to make sure that this conflict comes to an end.

There is a solution. There is a roadmap. There is an internationally recognized solution that needs to be accepted and implemented. We sincerely hope that human conscience will overcome these greeds and conflicts. The war mongers, wherever they may be from any side, should be condemned, especially for the attacks embarked on by Hamas on Israel, killing innocent people.

But the response and the heavy-handed actions that have been taking place are also not helping the situation. In fact, it has antagonized the situation. The international community must act more and be more engaged than they already are to bring this conflict to an end. It has had a ripple effect. It has had a major impact on human conscience to see all these lives lost. Therefore, we all owe it to humanity to end this conflict as soon as possible.