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Torkham border closure causes irreparable economic losses to Pushtoons across the border 

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The Frequent closure of Torkham, an internationally recognized most important crossing point between the two neighbouring countries is not only fuelling already deteriorated diplomatic relationships, but also causing irreparable economic hardships for millions of Pushtoons living on the two sides of Pak-Afghan border.

For instance, in the recent past, Torkham was again closed for all sorts of bilateral trade and pedestrian movements since last Friday.  which causes millions of US dollars losses to national exchequer on Pakistan sides and also losses to  commonners.

Besides conflicting stances, reasons from both sides on the closure, the legal status of Durand-Line itself causes harm to the long-term relationships between the two sides. Like predecessors, Pakistan’s powerful military establishment’s blue-eyed Taliban calling themselves Emirate Islami Afghanistan are also reluctant to recognize the Durand Line as a permanent border or an international border between the two countries.

Similarly, Pakistan expects that the Emirate Islami Afghanistan will follow Islamabad’s stance on the issue of terror and must force the banned TTP to come to a halt.

In the wake of continuous tension at Torkham, especially,  its closure for bilateral trade had disappointed the Afghan traders. Since Torkham remained the hub of Afghan transit and bilateral trade with Pakistan or former British India, the volume of trade was declining, Passing or clearance from 4000 to 5000 goods trucks from both sides now reduced to 250 and 300 vehicles.

Almost all of these goods trucks are loaded with perishable locally produced items like fruits, vegetables, poultry, meat, etc. However, from Afghanistan, side coal and soft stone are imported to Pakistan. Coal is consumed in Pakistan power generating units and other industrial units whereas Soft Stone is exported to China, where it is used in cosmetics and other value-added products. But now the situation is taking other drastic turns when Afghan traders and investors are preparing other trade routes like Bandar Abbas of Iran and different Central Asian Republics.

What is the  Durand Line and when the agreement was signed

The Durand Line Agreement was signed in 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand and Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman Khan to establish the buffer between Afghanistan and British India. The agreement was intended to improve diplomatic relations and trade between the two countries. The agreement was signed on November 12, 1893, in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Durand Line has served as the official border between the two nations for more than one hundred years, but it has caused controversy for the people who live there. When the Durand Line was created in 1893, Pakistan was still part of British India.

No one can deny the fact that soon after signing of the Durand Line King Amir Abdul Rahman Khan on the second day had refused to recognise the Durand Line Agreement by saying, he was betrayed. Since then , no ruler of Afghanistan enabled the Line to recognise the Durand Line as a permanent border between the former British and Afghanistan. On such ground, it was no other than Afghanistan, which had refused to endorse Pakistan’s plea for UN membership. On such grounds after partition of the subcontinent, Pakistan and Afghanistan emerged as hostile towards each other, thus making hard days and nights if no other than Pushtoons and Baluch’s who are  living along the Pak-Afghan border. From both sides, powerful spy masters initiated efforts for fuelling tension between the two neighboring countries through one or the other ways.

Afghanistan, especially the PUSHTOONS, remained a major hurdle before the forward policies of the British rulers in the region. Landing in the South Asian part of India, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa somewhere in the third quarter of 19th century, the colonial rulers were ahead with the worst kind of resistance in almost all parts and parcels, now almost linked with each other in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In connection with its Forward policies or intentions in the region, the British rulers made convinced Amir Dost Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan to retreat from Peshawar and its adjacent areas somewhere in 1845-46 but Afghan rulers made reversed the decision when Pushtoons like other Indians from all over the world embarked on Independence War called GHADAR in 1857. Despite Afghanistan’s support, the Independence War ended meaningless, and British Rulers initiated further steps for disintegrating the Pushtoons.

In 1865, the first ever agreement was signed with the Afridis of Khyber, and in light of its fruitful outcomes, the Gandamak Agreement signed with the Afghan government and elders. Prior to Durand Line, the Gandamak Agreement may be considered the beginning of Pushtoons’ disintegration or division. Though Afghans are disagreeing, before partition of the subcontinent, the British rulers reaffirmed its stance on Durand Line through 1905 Kabul and 1919 Murree (Rawalpindi) Agreements. Murree or Rawalpindi’s 1919 agreement led to declaring Afghanistan as a sovereign, independent, and autonomous state, and it also led to the ending of the third Anglo Afghan War.  But with the passage of time, no any ruler, leader, or politician enabled to recognise the Durand Line as permanent international border between the two countries.

Almost all tribesmen belonging to British rulers demarcated tribal maintained cordial relations with both the neighboring countries, except Kabul-Islamabad 

Though the British Colonial rulers, while debating the post-Durand Line reaction and opposition, assured Afghans that Pushtoons having lands and relations across the border will be given access. However, after partition, Pakistani authorities hesitated to honor such assurances, and its powerful military establishment initiated acts and actions against all those who remain on good terms with the government in Kabul. Almost all tribesmen belonging to British rulers demarcated tribal districts have maintained cordial relations with both the neighboring countries. But the prolonged war in Afghanistan, especially internal conflict amongst the Afghans and landing of US led allies in the wake of situations erupted with the 9/11 tragedy, had made the task easy for Pakistan.  Sensing terror across the Pak Afghan border to almost the world community, the US extended financial and technical support for fencing the Durand Line. Even the US had agreed to return the Taliban into power, but Pakistan’s dreams of getting recognition of Durand Line couldn’t materialise. Now Pakistan, through one or the other ways, presses Taliban to bow before its prolong wish-which is no other than recognition of Durand Line and terminating of politico-diplomatic links with India,

Despite mis-trust and hostile attitudes towards each other, the Torkham border never closed for a single day until 2013 when Afghanistan remained in government of rulers like Zahir Shah— Hamid Karzai Even this important crossing point was in full fledged operation during war time against the former Soviet Union. Fencing of Durand Line has not only encouraged Pakistan of further building up pressure against Afghanistan to follow its line on issues like  Durand Line, Kabul-New Delhi links, sanctuaries to banned TTP and even ensure smooth transit trade services with Central Asian Republics.

Though Pakistan had jubilated the return of its loyal or blue-eyed Taliban into power in mid of August 2021. On such grounds, people from trade and business circles have also attached great hopes. But the outcomes remained very disappointing. The one-time trade volume up to five billion US dollars ( in 2005-2006) now declined to 600 to 700 million US dollars. Frequent closure or suspension of bilateral trade with Afghanistan is making millions of people throughout the region. Now the situation is worsening day by day which will definitely be harmful to the interests of both countries.

Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Ghani Baradar and Pakistan’s PM was in Uzbekistan when Torkham border closed

Both Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Afghanistan Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar were on a Uzbekistan visit when Torkham closed on Friday night. The purpose of both the dignitaries was the same, strengthening bilateral relations with the Central Asian Republic, but it could be hard for any of two, ignoring each other’s interests. Zahid Ullah Shinwari, former President of Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industries, is right in his stance on the issue of Torkham closure. He says that “Pakistani authorities are putting at stake for one to two billion US dollars but ignoring over three billion US dollars consumer market in neighboring Afghanistan.”

Ironic, almost politico-religious leaders are unanimously in favor of cordial and friendly relations with Afghanistan, but none of them are able to do so. It is no secret now that power and authorities in Pakistan rest with the military establishment-which has been monitoring ups and downs across the border in Afghanistan for a long time. Outcomes of such monitoring are before each and every one. Despite rendering a lot, Pakistan is now a friendless state in war devastated Afghanistan. Even almost Afghans, even linked or associated with Taliban and Jehadis like Gulbadin Hekmatar, are not hating Pakistan. On such grounds, policy makers within corridors of Rawalpindi-Islamabad need to revisit its own policies and pinpoint the anomalies, which, instead of creating/finding friends, lead to the earning of hate and hostilities.

Similar  was the situation in the 1970s when late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was governing Pakistan and Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan was the occupant of  Qasar-i-Gul Khana at Kabul. Both of them held  two rounds of meetings in June and July 1976. The last one was on the eve of Non Alignment Summit at Islamabad. During these meetings, both had agreed for a consensus mechanism with top priority of settling the Durand Line issue forever. Similarly agreed in indirect or telephonic contacts between Shaheed Benazir Bhutto and late Dr. Najib Ullah in mid of 1990. But mysterious elements didn’t allow all these four to go forward in such a noble cause. Still, the issue of Durand Line is a political one and could easily be settled through political ways and means. Powerful Junta in Pakistan must realise that Zia Ul Haq made strategic depth policies that couldn’t yield  positive outcomes, therefore, political leadership may be given a chance to settle all sorts of issues with Afghanistan and other neighboring and regional countries. Settling all such issues and entering into trustworthy relations with neighboring countries seems much more in the interests of Pakistan rather than others.

Asia

Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets

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Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.

Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.

The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.

The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.

Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.

The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.

Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.

The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.

Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.

The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.

Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.

Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.

Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.

According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.

This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.

The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:

“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”

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Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions

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Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.

Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.

China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.

Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.

The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.

It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.

However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.

Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.

Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.

On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.

The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.

Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.

Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.

Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.

Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.

According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.

Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.

The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.

A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.

These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.

Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.

Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.

Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.

Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”

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China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers

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China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.

China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.

In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.

The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.

Financial sector stability

China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.

China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.

“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.

Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.

Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan

Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.

The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.

Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.

Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.

Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.

Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.

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