Middle East
Transition from ‘non-state actors’ to interstate relations in Syria
Those who oppose normalization with Syria: The United States, the Pentagon-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is active in Idlib and Aleppo outskirts and which Turkey considers a terrorist organization, some groups within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) …
U.S. Department spokesman Ned Price said: “We do not support countries upgrading their relations or expressing support to rehabilitate the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad.” But let us note that there have been no loud objections from senior U.S. officials, senators, and European capitals. Çavuşoğlu, who is set to visit the United States on January 18, said, “The United States did not say ‘Why do you hold meetings?’ but we understand that they oppose to normalization.”
From the side of Syrian organizations, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, leader of the HTS terror coalition, released a four-minute video titled ‘We will not compromise.’ “Talks between the Syrian regime and its Russian ally with the Turkish side represent a serious deviation from our goals,” he said.
The Syrian Democratic Council, which serves as the political framework of the separatist structure in Syria (YPG/PYD/SDF), also called on the “opposition” to the Ankara-Damascus alliance to unite: “We call on the forces of revolution and opposition to oppose and destroy the alliance between Turkey and Damascus, to unite against tyranny and those who sell the blood of Syrians for their interests.”
Abdullah Gedo of the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), withing the circle of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said the Syrian opposition would be uncomfortable with taking Ankara-Damascus rapprochement to the political level.
Protests were held in many FSA and HTS-controlled settlements in the north of Syria under oath of allegiance to the so-called ‘Syrian revolution.’
The remaining “Syrian opposition”
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met with the President of the Syrian National Coalition Al-Meslet, the President of the Syrian Negotiation Commission Bader Jamous and the Prime Minister of the Syrian Interim Government Abdurrahman Mustafa. “We reiterated our support for the Syrian opposition and the Syrian people in line with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254,” he said.
It is possible to infer some sort of uneasiness from Salem Al-Meslet’s statement, “Turkey is a strong ally of the Syrian revolution and opposition forces. I expect Turkey will remain so in all international decisions on the Syrian issue, especially the Geneva Resolutions 2118 and 2254.”
Resolution 2254 calls for the formation of a “unity government” to be followed by elections. Damascus, however, is not willing to give administration space to opposition groups that are no longer able to seize the state with their armed forces.
Although adjectives such as ‘Prime Minister of the Interim Government’ are used, this political fiction has no practical equivalent in Syria. Although it seems to be one of Ankara’s main priorities for these groups to find a place in a possible Syrian peace, apparently this is not a realistic approach and that these structures are a ‘trump card’ to be discarded at a certain stage of the negotiations.
It became clear in last autumn’s SNA-HTS clashes that efforts to bring countless undisciplined groups together and turn the FSA into the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) were also in vain. Already after 2016, the role of the FSA was shaped in line with Ankara’s policy change, from overthrowing Assad to quickly fighting the PKK’s Syrian extension.
Why should Damascus share its authority with a structure that will be overthrown as soon as the TAF withdraws its support? It is clearly possible to interpret Syria’s demand for “TAF’s withdrawal from Syria” as “TAF is supporting the parallel armed force that wants to be a partner in my authority. I don’t want to share my sovereignty.”
What is Syria’s FSA plan?
A source from Damascus, who is in contact with the Syrian security bureaucracy, said that Syria raised the following demands on the FSA during the talks: “We have a clear path in the talks, we have some conditions. There are certain groups. These are no different from ISIS. We want Turkey to declare them a terrorist organization. And that won’t be easy.”
The source continued: “Turkey is not willing to make concessions from the FSA in the negotiations. Turkey is officially calling for joint action against the YPG. Damascus has no objection to this. However, Turkey also needs to take steps on certain issues.”
A report on the Middle East Eye website, based on Turkish officials, claimed that Turkey did not accept the request from Damascus to “declare some groups a terrorist organization.”
A source from Syria, who informed Harici, said that Damascus has plans for the future of the various armed groups that have rebelled against FSA and the administration, and quoted the following notes:
“One: According to Damascus, a large section of the FSA can benefit from the amnesty laws.
Two: Damascus does not expect the extradition to Syria of criminals who run criminal networks and are involved in illegal activities.
Three: FSA militants can join the 5th Corps, which was established with Russia’s guarantee of security in reconciliation negotiations with the opposition.”
Expectations from the Arab world
Stating that “the atmosphere of optimism prevails in Damascus” regarding the negotiation process, the source added that Syria is “balancing” relations with Iran and “counting days” to open up to the Arab world.
Noting that the reports of “cleaning the army” published in the Turkish press regarding the recent appointments in the Syrian army do not reflect the truth, the source said that these appointments are a routine process that is carried out every six months.
Damascus continues its ‘normalization’ tours not only with Turkey but also with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed met with Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Traffic is also heavy on the Syria-Saudi Arabia lane. It can be said that he wants to feel the support of the Arab world behind Damascus in normalization with Turkey.
The United States is doing everything to slow down the flow of the river…
In addition to the Caesar Act sanctions, Washington’s main goal, which aggravated the sanctions on Syria with the Captagon Act, is to Iraqize the Syrian state structure. It is possible to summarize what the U.S. understands by the ‘political solution in Syria’ as an autonomy in which the PYD can find a legal sphere of existence or as options for the federation where local governments are strong. It seems unlikely that Ankara will approve this plan under any circumstances.
The dismantling of Iran’s land logistics system from Iraqi territory to the east of the Euphrates and from there to Lebanon is also among the priorities of the United States and Israel. In other words, we can say that for a possible normalization, Iran will be tried to be removed from Syria and Washington will continue to tighten the sanctions until it includes autonomy.
Now, Astana partner Iran has not been involved in Ankara-Damascus meeting yet. For Tehran, which frequently give advises through official dialogues, the east of the Euphrates and the passageways are very important because they are the window to Lebanon. It is also unrealistic for Damascus to approve the proposals by pushing its foul-weather friend Iran completely out of the game. However, Syria does not want to be seen as fully engaged in Iranian politics as a state.
For now, Ankara’s operation demand has been replaced by dialogue and diplomatic traffic, which all sides are watching closely. As we get closer to the final agreement and the parameters of the possible rapprochement become clear, what lies beneath the objections and reactions will come to the surface. In this context, the year 2023 is decisive for Turkey-Syria relations. With the meeting of foreign ministers in January, the state-to-state dialogue and diplomacy line will be strengthened.
To summarize, 2023 is a candidate year for the transition from non-state actors to interstate relations. The possible resistance of the groups that do not want to lose their wartime ‘state-like’ status strengthens the possibility of opening a final bloody page in the Syrian book…
Middle East
US and Israel weigh Iran strikes after midterm vote, reports say
The US and Israeli defence ministries have drawn up plans for a fresh assault on Iran, with the envisioned offensive under consideration to launch after the US Congressional midterm elections on 3 November.
Citing sources, The New York Times reported that the blueprint anticipates a brief but intense campaign.
As military units step up their drills, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed prospective strike options with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The list of targets encompasses Iran’s nuclear sites, its energy infrastructure, and its arsenals of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.
Several officials who spoke to the newspaper argued that a new wave of attacks could deal a heavy blow to the Iranian economy, forcing the leadership in Tehran into concessions.
Conversely, other sources doubt whether a resumption of fighting would prove any more successful than the earlier campaign conducted between February and April.
That previous offensive drove energy prices higher and drained US stockpiles of interceptor missiles.
It remains unclear whether US President Donald Trump will authorise the operation.
Domestic political calculations in Israel could also influence the trajectory of the plans, given that the country faces general elections on 27 October.
While some experts speaking to the newspaper contended that Netanyahu could leverage the threat of war to form a national unity government, others pointed to the opposition’s distrust of the prime minister.
Washington fears regional spillover
The US administration also harbours concerns that the fighting could engulf the wider region. On Wednesday, the US State Department ordered non-essential government personnel and their family members to leave Saudi Arabia following attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.
A US military build-up, comprising three aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, and special forces units, is slated to be fully deployed to the region by early November.
The targets under review include the deep underground nuclear facility code-named “Pickaxe”. Trump suggested that the high-yield GBU-43/B bomb, known as the “mother of all bombs”, could be deployed against the site, though experts doubt whether the ordnance can destroy a complex buried so deeply.
For its part, Tehran is preparing for a potential escalation, threatening to broaden its target list. Retaliatory options under consideration by Iran reportedly include data centres and subsea internet cables, in addition to shipping and energy facilities.
Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to an Iranian negotiator, dismissed US hopes of wrapping up a new campaign within 72 hours as a “fantasy”. Mohammadi warned that Tehran’s response would be more severe and unpredictable.
The Financial Times previously reported that an Israeli strike on Iran set for 10 October had been called off because the US president was unwilling to risk a broader conflict ahead of the Congressional midterms.
According to that report, the Israeli military had prepared a multi-day assault on nuclear sites, Iranian government targets, power plants, and civilian infrastructure on Netanyahu’s orders. The strikes had been designed to exceed the intensity of the campaign begun in February.
Washington seeks to secure an agreement from Tehran covering both the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear programme.
“It will either be a deal or a strike,” one source told the Financial Times, adding that an operation could get under way in the coming weeks.
Another official who spoke to the paper suggested that Israeli preparations might serve as leverage to squeeze Iran in negotiations.
Axios also reported that the Pentagon had issued orders to prepare for renewed strikes, though the directive contained no specific date and Trump has yet to take a final decision.
The US and Israel launched their offensive against Iran on 28 February. Iran hit back by targeting US and Israeli assets across the region and curbing vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
Although both sides signed a memorandum of understanding in June that provided for a ceasefire and talks to lift the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, reciprocal attacks between the US and Iran have persisted.
Middle East
Netanyahu trails Eisenkot in Israeli polls despite Trump backing
As general elections scheduled for 27 October approach in Israel, the opposition camp led by former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot continues to lead Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in public opinion polls.
Survey data published in the Israeli press on 19 and 20 October reveal that the governing coalition has failed to catch the opposition, despite explicit backing from US President Donald Trump.
However, the current distribution of votes documents that neither wing can reach a governing majority on its own.
Netanyahu reaches 61 seats in Channel 14’s latest poll. He doesn’t in i24’s.
Both give him a stronger position than Kan and Maariv. Likud gets 29 seats in Channel 14, 25 in i24, 21 in Kan and 18 in Maariv.
Count the same five lists—Likud, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Otzma… pic.twitter.com/Qb0fCq0qdK
— Zvika Klein צביקה קליין (@ZvikaKlein) October 19, 2026
Neither bloc reaches the 61 seats needed to form a government
According to a survey conducted by Channel 13, if an election were held today, Eisenkot’s bloc would win 51 seats, while the Netanyahu coalition would take 50.
A Channel 12 poll indicates that the gap has widened slightly, projecting 55 seats for Eisenkot’s alliance and 51 for the governing bloc. A minimum of 61 seats is required to form a government in the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat parliament.
A key factor deadlocking the political arithmetic is the refusal by both sides to form a coalition with parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel. This stance stands as the most tangible obstacle to securing a parliamentary majority after the election.
Channel 12 data shows that overall voter turnout is expected to remain at 72%. The inclination to head to the ballot box climbs to 81% among opposition voters, compared with 74% measured among Netanyahu supporters.
The same poll notes that Eisenkot has widened his lead over Netanyahu by two further points in prime ministerial preferences.
Yashar party climbs after Gantz bows out
A survey published on the Walla news site shows that the balance shifted after Benny Gantz decided to withdraw his Blue and White party from the race. Following that move, Eisenkot’s Yashar party increased its projected tally to 23 seats, while Netanyahu’s Likud dropped by one seat to 19.
Eisenkot’s party and the “Zionist Opposition” bloc it anchors have remained atop the polls for several months.
In an earlier message of support, Trump praised Netanyahu as “a great fighting prime minister and an even greater partner for peace.” Public opinion polls document that this diplomatic and political backing has not proved sufficient to tip the preferences of the Israeli electorate in favour of the incumbent government.
Support for Ben Gvir rises among young voters
Although Netanyahu’s alliance trails in overall strength, far-right figures within the coalition appear to be expanding their grassroots base. Gauged interest in the Jewish Power party of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir is climbing, particularly among younger voters.
Speaking to a study conducted by Agam Labs, affiliated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an 18-year-old student described his shifting preference: “I used to think he was a bit crazy, but then I actually looked at what he was saying, and it all made sense.”
Another Israeli citizen stated that Ben Gvir’s push to arm West Bank settlers gave them “room to breathe.”
Ben Gvir is known for leading settler incursions into the Al-Aqsa compound and distributing military-grade rifles to tens of thousands of settlers since 7 October 2023.
Criticized for escalating violence against Palestinians, Ben Gvir has called for starving Gaza, maintaining military operations in Lebanon, and bombing Beirut. The far-right minister’s militaristic stances also find a political constituency across several opposition parties in Israel.
Middle East
Netanyahu unveils security doctrine and regional alliance map
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shared an updated security doctrine with the public ahead of general elections scheduled for 27 October.
Announced by the Prime Minister’s Office on 18 October and shaped with contributions from the National Security Council, the work includes a detailed map classifying Israel’s regional allies, adversaries, and spheres of influence.
The new doctrine aims to eliminate elements defined as threats directly through pre-emptive military interventions rather than containing them, to expand buffer zones, and to establish new regional partnerships.
Al Jazeera points out that this approach has effectively been put into practice during Israel’s recent military operations and strikes against neighbouring countries.
Regional blocs and allies classified on the map
The map presented by Netanyahu classifies not only sovereign states into blocs, but also armed groups, de facto administrations, and territories controlled by various forces.
The terms “alliance” and “friend” used on the map do not imply that formal and binding partnerships have been established with all these entities.
The “Hexagon Alliance” on the Israel-United Arab Emirates (UAE) axis and parties considered “friends” of this bloc are shown in blue and light blue shades.
This group includes Azerbaijan, Greece, southern Cyprus, the Druze in Syria’s As-Suwayda province, eastern Libya under Khalifa Haftar’s control, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, areas in Yemen held by the UAE-backed former Southern Transitional Council, and territories controlled by the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.
The “Sunni Diamond Alliance”, formed by Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, alongside peripheral actors, is distinguished by green and light green shades.
This cluster marks Azerbaijan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, areas in Yemen controlled by the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, Eritrea, Sudan, the West Bank, Jordan, the Lebanese government, Northern Cyprus, and Somalia. In Libya, both the Tripoli-based western administration and the Haftar-dominated eastern administration are shown as linked to this bloc.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance are defined in red and pink colours. Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, eastern and southern parts of Lebanon where Hezbollah is active, Ansar Allah-controlled areas in Yemen, and Hamas-administered Gaza find a place within this axis. Russia is marked on the map in pink under “friend” status to this bloc.
Orange and yellow markings are also used around NATO members, alliance partners, and actors with friendly relations with Washington. The lines also illustrate the permeability between blocs.
For instance, Azerbaijan is presented with two-toned stripes as a friend of both the Israel-UAE axis and the Türkiye-led bloc, while India stands out as the only actor classified as a “friend” to all parties.
The map in question was reportedly prepared in May by Marc Saxer and Marcus Schneider for the Germany-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which has engaged with Israeli governments since 1978.
Pre-election rhetoric of the “indispensable leader”
Netanyahu is facing voters in a bid to retain power amid ongoing corruption proceedings and continued criticism over his management of the 7 October 2023 attacks and subsequent conflicts.
According to Al Jazeera’s analysis, releasing the security doctrine and map on the eve of elections rests on Netanyahu’s strategy of establishing himself as the only capable leader who can protect Israel.
Backed by electoral support from US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu pointed during his presentation to a potential change of administration in the White House.
Arguing that an administration distant or hostile to Israel could take office in Washington within two years, Netanyahu said his country must expand its network of alliances and become an attractive regional partner because of that possibility.
Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, noted that this presentation, built on rival blocs and security corridors, deepens existential anxieties within society.
According to Hage Ali, this approach reinforces voters’ perceived need for a tough leader, and Netanyahu is attempting to rally support from populations wary of uncertainty through this reassurance.
Fierce backlash from the Israeli opposition
The publication of the document provoked reactions in Israeli domestic politics.
Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar Party and former chief of general staff, criticised the work as consisting of “two empty pages filled with slogans that have nothing to do with an actual security doctrine”.
Emphasising that the Netanyahu government was responsible for the “gravest failure and disaster in Israel’s history” on 7 October, Eisenkot said subsequent escalating regional clashes had also left every front engulfed in flames.
Eisenkot argued that the document exposes a lingering strategic vacuum, while the prime minister is reviving fears to divert attention from misleading claims in his election pledges.
Yesh Atid leader and former prime minister Yair Lapid also described the text as superficial.
“Even by Netanyahu’s current standards, which are defined by exhaustion and detachment from reality, this document looks as if it was written using a free version of an AI chatbot,” Lapid said.
Lapid added that a text consisting merely of bulleted headings cannot be deemed a doctrine, and that the effort is nothing more than an attempt to cover up the disasters caused by the prime minister.
The buffer zone model
The buffer zone concept featured in the strategy document is based on Israel establishing direct military control over cross-border territories.
Al Jazeera notes that the current occupation conditions in Gaza and southern Lebanon are practical reflections of this policy.
Mohanad Hage Ali warned that a plan based on making military control permanent could bring fresh conflicts and the risk of ethnic cleansing.
Hage Ali also noted that portraying actors such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar’s forces within the Israel-UAE axis could damage their legitimacy in the Arab world.
Arguing that this choice reflects Netanyahu’s domestic priorities, Hage Ali observed: “What Israelis think becomes more important than the reputation of your allies and the sustainability of these alliances.”
Netanyahu’s proposal for a “hexagon of alliances”, raised at the beginning of the year and covering India, Greece, southern Cyprus, and unspecified Arab, African, and Asian nations, has yet to be formalised.
While international analyses describe the initiative as a diplomatic branding exercise rather than a binding defence pact, observers recall that actors such as India prioritise commercial interests and non-alignment over rigid blocs.
Finally, Hage Ali stated that the presented map will provide propaganda material for the Tehran government and its allies, reinforcing arguments that Israel harbours regional expansion and domination ambitions.
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