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Transition from ‘non-state actors’ to interstate relations in Syria

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Those who oppose normalization with Syria: The United States, the Pentagon-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is active in Idlib and Aleppo outskirts and which Turkey considers a terrorist organization, some groups within the Free Syrian Army (FSA) …

U.S. Department spokesman Ned Price said: “We do not support countries upgrading their relations or expressing support to rehabilitate the brutal dictator Bashar al-Assad.” But let us note that there have been no loud objections from senior U.S. officials, senators, and European capitals. Çavuşoğlu, who is set to visit the United States on January 18, said, “The United States did not say ‘Why do you hold meetings?’ but we understand that they oppose to normalization.”

From the side of Syrian organizations, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, leader of the HTS terror coalition, released a four-minute video titled ‘We will not compromise.’ “Talks between the Syrian regime and its Russian ally with the Turkish side represent a serious deviation from our goals,” he said.

The Syrian Democratic Council, which serves as the political framework of the separatist structure in Syria (YPG/PYD/SDF), also called on the “opposition” to the Ankara-Damascus alliance to unite: “We call on the forces of revolution and opposition to oppose and destroy the alliance between Turkey and Damascus, to unite against tyranny and those who sell the blood of Syrians for their interests.”

Abdullah Gedo of the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), withing the circle of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said the Syrian opposition would be uncomfortable with taking Ankara-Damascus rapprochement to the political level.

Protests were held in many FSA and HTS-controlled settlements in the north of Syria under oath of allegiance to the so-called ‘Syrian revolution.’

The remaining “Syrian opposition”

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met with the President of the Syrian National Coalition Al-Meslet, the President of the Syrian Negotiation Commission Bader Jamous and the Prime Minister of the Syrian Interim Government Abdurrahman Mustafa. “We reiterated our support for the Syrian opposition and the Syrian people in line with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254,” he said.

It is possible to infer some sort of uneasiness from Salem Al-Meslet’s statement, “Turkey is a strong ally of the Syrian revolution and opposition forces. I expect Turkey will remain so in all international decisions on the Syrian issue, especially the Geneva Resolutions 2118 and 2254.”

Resolution 2254 calls for the formation of a “unity government” to be followed by elections. Damascus, however, is not willing to give administration space to opposition groups that are no longer able to seize the state with their armed forces.

Although adjectives such as ‘Prime Minister of the Interim Government’ are used, this political fiction has no practical equivalent in Syria. Although it seems to be one of Ankara’s main priorities for these groups to find a place in a possible Syrian peace, apparently this is not a realistic approach and that these structures are a ‘trump card’ to be discarded at a certain stage of the negotiations.

It became clear in last autumn’s SNA-HTS clashes that efforts to bring countless undisciplined groups together and turn the FSA into the ‘Syrian National Army’ (SNA) were also in vain. Already after 2016, the role of the FSA was shaped in line with Ankara’s policy change, from overthrowing Assad to quickly fighting the PKK’s Syrian extension.

Why should Damascus share its authority with a structure that will be overthrown as soon as the TAF withdraws its support? It is clearly possible to interpret Syria’s demand for “TAF’s withdrawal from Syria” as “TAF is supporting the parallel armed force that wants to be a partner in my authority. I don’t want to share my sovereignty.”

What is Syria’s FSA plan?

A source from Damascus, who is in contact with the Syrian security bureaucracy, said that Syria raised the following demands on the FSA during the talks: “We have a clear path in the talks, we have some conditions. There are certain groups. These are no different from ISIS. We want Turkey to declare them a terrorist organization. And that won’t be easy.”

The source continued: “Turkey is not willing to make concessions from the FSA in the negotiations. Turkey is officially calling for joint action against the YPG. Damascus has no objection to this. However, Turkey also needs to take steps on certain issues.”

A report on the Middle East Eye website, based on Turkish officials, claimed that Turkey did not accept the request from Damascus to “declare some groups a terrorist organization.”

A source from Syria, who informed Harici, said that Damascus has plans for the future of the various armed groups that have rebelled against FSA and the administration, and quoted the following notes:

“One: According to Damascus, a large section of the FSA can benefit from the amnesty laws.

Two: Damascus does not expect the extradition to Syria of criminals who run criminal networks and are involved in illegal activities.

Three: FSA militants can join the 5th Corps, which was established with Russia’s guarantee of security in reconciliation negotiations with the opposition.”

Expectations from the Arab world

Stating that “the atmosphere of optimism prevails in Damascus” regarding the negotiation process, the source added that Syria is “balancing” relations with Iran and “counting days” to open up to the Arab world.

Noting that the reports of “cleaning the army” published in the Turkish press regarding the recent appointments in the Syrian army do not reflect the truth, the source said that these appointments are a routine process that is carried out every six months.

Damascus continues its ‘normalization’ tours not only with Turkey but also with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed met with Syrian Leader Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. Traffic is also heavy on the Syria-Saudi Arabia lane. It can be said that he wants to feel the support of the Arab world behind Damascus in normalization with Turkey.

The United States is doing everything to slow down the flow of the river…

In addition to the Caesar Act sanctions, Washington’s main goal, which aggravated the sanctions on Syria with the Captagon Act, is to Iraqize the Syrian state structure. It is possible to summarize what the U.S. understands by the ‘political solution in Syria’ as an autonomy in which the PYD can find a legal sphere of existence or as options for the federation where local governments are strong. It seems unlikely that Ankara will approve this plan under any circumstances.

The dismantling of Iran’s land logistics system from Iraqi territory to the east of the Euphrates and from there to Lebanon is also among the priorities of the United States and Israel. In other words, we can say that for a possible normalization, Iran will be tried to be removed from Syria and Washington will continue to tighten the sanctions until it includes autonomy.

Now, Astana partner Iran has not been involved in Ankara-Damascus meeting yet. For Tehran, which frequently give advises through official dialogues, the east of the Euphrates and the passageways are very important because they are the window to Lebanon. It is also unrealistic for Damascus to approve the proposals by pushing its foul-weather friend Iran completely out of the game. However, Syria does not want to be seen as fully engaged in Iranian politics as a state.

For now, Ankara’s operation demand has been replaced by dialogue and diplomatic traffic, which all sides are watching closely. As we get closer to the final agreement and the parameters of the possible rapprochement become clear, what lies beneath the objections and reactions will come to the surface. In this context, the year 2023 is decisive for Turkey-Syria relations. With the meeting of foreign ministers in January, the state-to-state dialogue and diplomacy line will be strengthened.

To summarize, 2023 is a candidate year for the transition from non-state actors to interstate relations. The possible resistance of the groups that do not want to lose their wartime ‘state-like’ status strengthens the possibility of opening a final bloody page in the Syrian book…

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Israeli envoy warns red line crossed over Turkish moves in Syria

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Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Yechiel Leiter, stated that Tel Aviv received clear intelligence showing Türkiye planned to expand its military presence in Syria significantly, an action Israel deemed the crossing of a “red line.”

Speaking to The Jerusalem Post, Leiter said: “We are not looking for an escalation or a war with either Türkiye or Syria. But a red line was crossed.”

His remarks follow an Israeli air strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Idlib, Syria, which drew swift criticism from both the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Leiter continued:

“This was seen as a blatant Turkish violation of the understandings. Those who needed access to the intelligence received it. Those who needed to know what was going to happen knew. We made it clear that this was contrary to our understandings, and that is why Israel acted as it did.”

According to Leiter, the failure to heed these warnings led Israel on Tuesday to strike the Abu al-Duhur airbase, where Turkish forces were allegedly expected to arrive.

Syrian officials stated that the airbase was targeted by at least eight strikes, whilst subsequently released satellite imagery revealed damage to the runways.

Leiter stated that the Turkish move contradicted understandings reached during the Biden administration between Israel and the administration of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, which “froze the existing situation” in the country.

According to Leiter, these understandings were reaffirmed during a meeting held in Paris in January 2026, attended by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, Leiter, then-National Security Council head Gil Reich, and Netanyahu’s military secretary Roman Gofman (now director of Mossad).

Leiter continued:

“This freeze means we do not act as long as the Turks do not act, and they do not force us to withdraw. It is also important to understand: whilst we maintain a security zone of only 78 square miles [approximately 202 square kilometres] in Syria, the Turks have, over the past few years, slowly annexed 3,500 square miles in northern Syria—roughly 5% of the country’s territory.”

According to The Jerusalem Post, with the exception of Tom Barrack, the US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye, senior US officials did not condemn the Israeli strike in Syria.

“The administration’s policy is that the previously agreed freeze should continue; that is why even Trump did not condemn the strike,” Leiter said.

Despite the tensions, Leiter emphasised Israel’s understanding that Syria is not seeking an escalation or war.

“It is clear to us that the Syrians do not want a confrontation with us. That is why we tell the Turks not to create conflict. There are multiple indications that the move planned by Türkiye was imposed on the Syrians,” the ambassador said.

Leiter argued that this apparent discord was also evident in the conflicting statements issued by Türkiye and Syria following the strike:

“Whilst Syrian Foreign Minister Shaibani acknowledged that a Turkish delegation was in Syria a few days before the strike, the Turks denied this. They need to resolve this matter between themselves.”

Leiter did not rule out a return to direct talks with Syria, as conducted in the past, but said conditions must be suitable.

“Negotiations can be resumed. We want to continue the face-to-face dialogue we previously conducted with the Syrians,” Leiter said.

Leiter added that Israel is not seeking a conflict with Türkiye and remains open to dialogue with Ankara.

“We are certainly open to dialogue with them, but judging by statements from senior officials in the country, they would prefer to wipe Israel off the map,” the Israeli diplomat said.

Alleging that Türkiye hosts Hamas leaders and “channels funds” to Hezbollah and Hamas, Leiter argued that it was inappropriate at this juncture for “Türkiye to begin expanding its influence in Lebanon and Syria.”

Leiter continued:

“Under current conditions, Türkiye cannot be a force that helps bring calm to the region. If only we could return to the state of relations between Jerusalem and Ankara from several decades ago. Back then, we would have been open to Türkiye’s influence in the region. But in an environment where Türkiye funds terrorist organisations, an increase in its regional influence makes no sense.”

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UAE halts trade with Iran after reported ballistic missile attack

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has suspended commercial and economic relations with Iran after announcing that Tehran launched two ballistic missiles towards the Gulf state on Tuesday.

The UAE Ministry of Defence stated that air defence systems detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards its territory.

The incident is considered Tehran’s first direct attack targeting the Gulf country since May.

The event prompted emergency telephone alerts to be sent to residents across the UAE.

The Ministry of Defence stated that assessments indicated the missiles targeted maritime traffic, adding that one missile fell into the sea outside UAE territorial waters and the other landed within territorial waters.

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs later announced that “in light of regional tensions that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial relations, and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”

Iran denied any involvement in the missile attacks. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness and undermines ongoing efforts to strengthen trust among regional countries.”

The missile strikes occurred after a period in which the UAE and Tehran had sought to reduce tensions between the two countries.

The bulk of Tehran’s military retaliation targeted neighbouring Gulf states, which Iran accused of facilitating US-Israeli attacks.

The UAE bore the heaviest brunt of Iran’s attacks against US allies in the Gulf, sustaining nearly 3,000 missile and drone strikes.

Exhibiting the most hawkish stance against Tehran among its Gulf neighbours, the UAE responded with dozens of strikes against Iran.

However, tensions between the UAE and Iran eased following a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran in June.

After the agreement began to unravel in early July, Iran largely redirected its attacks towards Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.

In recent months, the UAE reactivated diplomatic and economic channels with Iran while simultaneously strengthening its military ties with Israel and the US.

Tuesday’s missile strikes threaten to disrupt the atmosphere of normalisation that had returned to the UAE.

While Dubai’s financial district was once again filling with bankers, certain commercial activities between the emirate and Iranian ports had resumed.

Furthermore, several Iranian flights to the UAE had quietly resumed.

UAE authorities had also begun permitting the return of approximately 20,000 Iranians holding UAE residency permits who were outside the country when the war began.

UAE officials have repeatedly emphasised that the country seeks to avoid being drawn further into a broader regional war.

Nevertheless, efforts to de-escalate tensions between the UAE and Iran have come under increasing strain in recent weeks.

This month, the UAE accused Iran of attacking vessels belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in the Strait of Hormuz.

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US considers land blockade on Iran involving Türkiye and neighbours

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To date, the US has imposed sanctions on thousands of Iranian individuals and legal entities; however, the Tehran administration continues to bypass these restrictions by rapidly establishing new structures to replace those that have been blocked.

In an assessment citing expert opinions published by the Reuters news agency, the current situation was likened to a game of whack-a-mole.

Whack-a-mole is known as a game of agility and reflexes based on the concept of hitting plastic figures with a mallet as they pop up unexpectedly from their holes.

Speaking to the agency, experts outlined other options that Washington could deploy to increase pressure on Tehran and raise the efficacy of sanctions.

Potential measures include restrictions targeting independent Chinese refineries, known as “teapots,” which account for a quarter of China’s oil refining capacity.

China purchases more than 80% of the oil exported by Iran, and these refineries process the vast majority of those shipments. Nevertheless, these facilities have limited ties to the US financial system, rendering them partially protected against secondary sanctions.

Another option on the table is increasing pressure on major Chinese banks. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has applied secondary sanctions to small firms based in China and Hong Kong accused of executing billions of dollars in transactions for Iranian oil.

The agency has also warned two large banks, though it has not yet included them on its sanctions list.

While taking steps against major banks could deter other financial institutions, such actions carry the risk of Beijing enacting retaliatory measures. Washington seeks to avoid such tension ahead of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in September.

Experts are also evaluating the possibility of enforcing a land blockade with the participation of Iran’s neighbours: Iraq, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia.

The Trump administration holds various leverage mechanisms against such nations, including Pakistan, which is requesting a $10 billion swap line, and Türkiye, which seeks to rejoin the F-35 program. Analysts express, however, that implementing such a blockade on the ground and generating the expected pressure inside Iran would be difficult.

Trump has repeatedly voiced threats to impose secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran; however, the US Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for such measures.

On the other hand, a anti-Russia “crushing” sanctions bill passed by the Senate includes new restrictions on Iran and grants Trump tariff authority.

This bill must also pass a vote in the House of Representatives; however, the text faces opposition from both Democrats and certain Republican lawmakers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in mid-August that Trump would disclose new measures designed to raise Iran’s economic isolation to an unprecedented level.

Stating that the US President had instructed the re-establishment of the maximum economic pressure policy against Tehran, Bessent said, “We have moved from Epic Fury to Economic Fury.”

Following Bessent’s statements, Bloomberg noted that Tehran has learned to manage the consequences of a naval blockade and thousands of restrictions. According to the agency’s analysts, the principal obstacle facing Washington is the close economic relationship between Iran and China; indeed, Beijing secures more than 90% of Iranian oil exports. Sanctioning the entities facilitating these purchases would directly reduce Tehran’s oil revenues, yet the US is avoiding this step for now.

Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted. On August 11, Iran conveyed its conditions for lifting the blockade in the strait to the US through intermediaries.

Tehran’s conditions included an end to threats and military actions, the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, compensation for damages, and the release of frozen assets.

On August 14, Trump claimed that following the end of the war with Iran, he would declare the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory. Responding to these statements, the Iranian Foreign Ministry warned that the Strait of Hormuz could not be seized “by a tweet, an aircraft carrier, an executive order, or a campaign speech.”

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