Diplomacy
Türkiye freezes assets of 31 Iranian individuals and entities linked to nuclear program
Türkiye has decided to freeze the assets of 16 individuals and 15 organizations stated to be linked to Iran’s nuclear program.
The decision, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and published in the Official Gazette on October 1, 2025, was based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The action was taken under Law No. 7262, the “Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Ministry of Treasury and Finance will be responsible for the implementation of the decision.
The individuals and organizations whose assets have been frozen have the right to apply to the Audit and Cooperation Commission for their appeal to be forwarded to the UNSC.
Meanwhile, there is a disagreement between Western countries and Russia and China regarding the legal validity of the UN sanctions.
Western countries argue that Iran has violated its obligations under the nuclear deal and state that they have initiated the “trigger mechanism” that automatically restores UN sanctions.
In response, Russia and China emphasize that the activation of this mechanism lacks a legal basis, as the US withdrew from the agreement and the European parties failed to fulfill their commitments.
Moscow and Beijing had therefore announced that they do not recognize the interpretation that UN sanctions have been reinstated.
Who is on the list?
The annex to the decision published in the Official Gazette provides a detailed list of scientists, administrators, and critical institutions involved in various stages of Iran’s nuclear program.
The decision orders the freezing of assets of 16 individuals who are stated to have played a direct role in Iran’s nuclear activities.
Prominent among these names are experts working in fields such as uranium enrichment, reactor management, and material procurement.
— Davud Agha-Jani: Head of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.
— Behman Asgarpour: Operational Manager at Arak.
— Seyyed Hossein Hosseini: An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak.
— Jafar Mohammadi: Technical advisor to the AEOI and responsible for the production of valves for centrifuges.
— Seyyed Jaber Safdari: Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities.
— Ghasem Soleimani: Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine.
The list also includes other senior officials involved in areas such as centrifuge component manufacturing, uranium conversion, and nuclear fuel research.
What are the targeted institutions and organizations?
Under the decision, the assets of 15 institutions and companies that form the main backbone of Iran’s nuclear program have also been frozen.
These organizations include research centers, financial structures, and supplier companies.
— Atomic Energy Organization of Iran: The main governing body of the program.
— Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International: Stated to provide financial support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization.
— Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC): An AEOI unit involved in enrichment-related activities.
— Kavoshyar Company: An AEOI subsidiary said to have attempted to procure vacuum induction furnaces and laboratory equipment for the nuclear program.
— Novin Energy Company: A company operating within the AEOI, stated to have transferred funds to organizations linked to the nuclear program.
— Tamas Company: An umbrella organization responsible for uranium extraction, enrichment, and processing activities.
The list also includes other critically important companies, such as Mesbah Energy Company, a supplier for the heavy water reactor at Arak, and Pars Trash Company, which is stated to be involved in the centrifuge program.
What is the trigger mechanism? How did the process unfold?
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries (US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), imposed limitations on Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of severe UN sanctions.
This agreement was established on an international legal footing with UNSC Resolution 2231, adopted the same year.
The resolution included not only the lifting of sanctions but also a special provision known as “snapback.” This provision, referred to as the “trigger mechanism,” served as a safeguard, allowing for the reinstatement of all lifted UN sanctions if Iran seriously violated its obligations under the deal.
The mechanism was designed to bypass the veto power of permanent members in the Security Council. Under normal circumstances, a new vote in the Council is required to pass a sanctions resolution, and it must not be vetoed by any permanent member.
However, the snapback provision reverses the process: when one of the parties notifies that Iran is not fulfilling its obligations, the sanctions automatically return within 30 days unless a resolution to the contrary is adopted. This means that a veto from any country cannot stop the process.
Additionally, Resolution 2231 had limited the timeframe for using this right. The deadline to trigger the mechanism was October 18, 2025. After this date, the snapback option would cease to exist.
The crisis, which began with the unilateral withdrawal of the US administration under President Donald Trump from the agreement in 2018, deepened in the following years. Citing Washington’s sanctions, Iran began to increase its enriched uranium stockpiles and use advanced centrifuges.
In the summer of this year, Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were followed by Tehran’s announcements of retaliation. During the same period, allegations that Iran was limiting its cooperation with the IAEA raised concerns in Western capitals. In response to this situation, Europe’s three major powers—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3)—decided to activate the snapback mechanism.
On August 28, 2025, the governments of London, Paris, and Berlin submitted an official notification to the UN Security Council, announcing that Iran was in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the agreement. This notification was the step that activated the trigger mechanism.
The notification initiated a 30-day process. If the Council did not pass a resolution to prevent the re-imposition of sanctions within this period, the old sanctions would automatically come back into effect. However, the likelihood of such a resolution passing in the Council was slim from the outset. Since any permanent member could block the resolution by withholding its approval, the path was clear for an automatic snapback.
By mid-September, no resolution to block the snapback had emerged from the Security Council. Consequently, around September 17, all previously lifted UN sanctions were automatically reinstated. The arms embargo, the ban on nuclear technology transfers, and travel restrictions and asset freezes on specific individuals and entities were reactivated.
The European Union also supported this step with a decision on September 29, re-implementing additional sanctions at its own level. Thus, Iran entered a new era of intensified international isolation.
Reactions from Iran, Russia, and China
The Tehran administration declared the process “legally invalid.” The Iranian Foreign Ministry described the E3’s initiative as “political and arbitrary.”
Officials argued that the mechanism was being misused and that the parties failing to fulfill their primary obligations were the US and Europe. They also showed resistance to the pressure by implying that they might restrict cooperation on IAEA inspections.
The snapback process also sparked debate in the international arena. Russia and China reacted strongly to the E3’s move.
Both countries attempted to have the snapback postponed in the Security Council. However, due to the structure of the mechanism, these efforts were unsuccessful. When the deadline expired, the sanctions automatically came into effect. Nevertheless, Russia and China announced that they do not recognize these sanctions.
Diplomacy
India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets
India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.
According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.
Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.
That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.
Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.
India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.
However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.
Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.
According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.
A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.
Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.
Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.
According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.
New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.
Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.
Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.
Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.
However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.
Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.
Diplomacy
EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor
Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.
According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.
The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.
In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.
The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.
Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.
Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road
The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.
Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.
The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.
During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.
Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact
One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.
The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.
In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.
The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.
By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.
Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.
Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.
China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.
The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.
Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition
In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.
These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.
Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.
The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.
The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.
However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.
The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership
EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.
In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.
During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.
The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.
That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.
EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
‘America First’ in Africa
The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.
In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.
An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.
For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.
Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.
Germany in Africa for the energy transition
Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”
The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”
Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.
The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.
Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.
In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.
German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.
Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.
In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.
Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.
Diplomacy
EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts
The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.
German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”
Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.
As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.
The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.
Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.
Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.
Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.
In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.
Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.
As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.
Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.
“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.
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