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Türkiye freezes assets of 31 Iranian individuals and entities linked to nuclear program

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Türkiye has decided to freeze the assets of 16 individuals and 15 organizations stated to be linked to Iran’s nuclear program.

The decision, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and published in the Official Gazette on October 1, 2025, was based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The action was taken under Law No. 7262, the “Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Ministry of Treasury and Finance will be responsible for the implementation of the decision.

The individuals and organizations whose assets have been frozen have the right to apply to the Audit and Cooperation Commission for their appeal to be forwarded to the UNSC.

Meanwhile, there is a disagreement between Western countries and Russia and China regarding the legal validity of the UN sanctions.

Western countries argue that Iran has violated its obligations under the nuclear deal and state that they have initiated the “trigger mechanism” that automatically restores UN sanctions.

In response, Russia and China emphasize that the activation of this mechanism lacks a legal basis, as the US withdrew from the agreement and the European parties failed to fulfill their commitments.

Moscow and Beijing had therefore announced that they do not recognize the interpretation that UN sanctions have been reinstated.

Who is on the list?

The annex to the decision published in the Official Gazette provides a detailed list of scientists, administrators, and critical institutions involved in various stages of Iran’s nuclear program.

The decision orders the freezing of assets of 16 individuals who are stated to have played a direct role in Iran’s nuclear activities.

Prominent among these names are experts working in fields such as uranium enrichment, reactor management, and material procurement.

— Davud Agha-Jani: Head of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.

— Behman Asgarpour: Operational Manager at Arak.

— Seyyed Hossein Hosseini: An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak.

— Jafar Mohammadi: Technical advisor to the AEOI and responsible for the production of valves for centrifuges.

— Seyyed Jaber Safdari: Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities.

— Ghasem Soleimani: Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine.

The list also includes other senior officials involved in areas such as centrifuge component manufacturing, uranium conversion, and nuclear fuel research.

What are the targeted institutions and organizations?

Under the decision, the assets of 15 institutions and companies that form the main backbone of Iran’s nuclear program have also been frozen.

These organizations include research centers, financial structures, and supplier companies.

— Atomic Energy Organization of Iran: The main governing body of the program.

— Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International: Stated to provide financial support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization.

— Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC): An AEOI unit involved in enrichment-related activities.

— Kavoshyar Company: An AEOI subsidiary said to have attempted to procure vacuum induction furnaces and laboratory equipment for the nuclear program.

— Novin Energy Company: A company operating within the AEOI, stated to have transferred funds to organizations linked to the nuclear program.

— Tamas Company: An umbrella organization responsible for uranium extraction, enrichment, and processing activities.

The list also includes other critically important companies, such as Mesbah Energy Company, a supplier for the heavy water reactor at Arak, and Pars Trash Company, which is stated to be involved in the centrifuge program.

What is the trigger mechanism? How did the process unfold?

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries (US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), imposed limitations on Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of severe UN sanctions.

This agreement was established on an international legal footing with UNSC Resolution 2231, adopted the same year.

The resolution included not only the lifting of sanctions but also a special provision known as “snapback.” This provision, referred to as the “trigger mechanism,” served as a safeguard, allowing for the reinstatement of all lifted UN sanctions if Iran seriously violated its obligations under the deal.

The mechanism was designed to bypass the veto power of permanent members in the Security Council. Under normal circumstances, a new vote in the Council is required to pass a sanctions resolution, and it must not be vetoed by any permanent member.

However, the snapback provision reverses the process: when one of the parties notifies that Iran is not fulfilling its obligations, the sanctions automatically return within 30 days unless a resolution to the contrary is adopted. This means that a veto from any country cannot stop the process.

Additionally, Resolution 2231 had limited the timeframe for using this right. The deadline to trigger the mechanism was October 18, 2025. After this date, the snapback option would cease to exist.

The crisis, which began with the unilateral withdrawal of the US administration under President Donald Trump from the agreement in 2018, deepened in the following years. Citing Washington’s sanctions, Iran began to increase its enriched uranium stockpiles and use advanced centrifuges.

In the summer of this year, Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were followed by Tehran’s announcements of retaliation. During the same period, allegations that Iran was limiting its cooperation with the IAEA raised concerns in Western capitals. In response to this situation, Europe’s three major powers—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3)—decided to activate the snapback mechanism.

On August 28, 2025, the governments of London, Paris, and Berlin submitted an official notification to the UN Security Council, announcing that Iran was in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the agreement. This notification was the step that activated the trigger mechanism.

The notification initiated a 30-day process. If the Council did not pass a resolution to prevent the re-imposition of sanctions within this period, the old sanctions would automatically come back into effect. However, the likelihood of such a resolution passing in the Council was slim from the outset. Since any permanent member could block the resolution by withholding its approval, the path was clear for an automatic snapback.

By mid-September, no resolution to block the snapback had emerged from the Security Council. Consequently, around September 17, all previously lifted UN sanctions were automatically reinstated. The arms embargo, the ban on nuclear technology transfers, and travel restrictions and asset freezes on specific individuals and entities were reactivated.

The European Union also supported this step with a decision on September 29, re-implementing additional sanctions at its own level. Thus, Iran entered a new era of intensified international isolation.

Reactions from Iran, Russia, and China

The Tehran administration declared the process “legally invalid.” The Iranian Foreign Ministry described the E3’s initiative as “political and arbitrary.”

Officials argued that the mechanism was being misused and that the parties failing to fulfill their primary obligations were the US and Europe. They also showed resistance to the pressure by implying that they might restrict cooperation on IAEA inspections.

The snapback process also sparked debate in the international arena. Russia and China reacted strongly to the E3’s move.

Both countries attempted to have the snapback postponed in the Security Council. However, due to the structure of the mechanism, these efforts were unsuccessful. When the deadline expired, the sanctions automatically came into effect. Nevertheless, Russia and China announced that they do not recognize these sanctions.

Diplomacy

Greece’s Marinakis says paying Hormuz transit fees beats enduring Red Sea shipping crisis detour

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Evangelos Marinakis, one of Greece’s leading shipowners, has announced that he is prepared to pay up to $200,000 per transit to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to civilian maritime traffic.

Speaking to the Financial Times, Marinakis stated that paying a transit fee would be a far better option for him than having the strait closed to navigation.

As the chairman of Capital Maritime Group, which controls a fleet of 185 vessels including approximately 35 tankers, Marinakis emphasized that shipowners have been forced to use alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope for years due to attacks launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea, a detour that has generated substantial additional costs.

The Greek shipowner indicated that paying a transit fee of $100,000 or $200,000, depending on the size of the cargo or the vessel, is far more reasonable than enduring the current logistical challenges. He added that such payments could offset all the losses experienced so far.

Following US strikes on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Tehran administration had introduced transit fees of up to $2 million for certain vessels transiting the waterway.

In May, Iran announced the establishment of a state agency tasked with managing the Strait of Hormuz. It was stated that the institution in question would provide real-time updates regarding maritime activities in the waterway.

Ebrahim Azizi, the chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, had noted that only commercial vessels and countries cooperating with Iran would be able to benefit from the facilities provided under this “professional mechanism.”

US President Donald Trump has explicitly opposed the imposition of transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement on the matter, Trump said, “We want the strait to be open. We do not want any transit fees to be charged. This is an international waterway.”

On the other hand, the draft text of a planned 60-day ceasefire extension agreement between the parties stipulates that the Strait of Hormuz will remain open without any transit fees being demanded.

According to the draft details reviewed by Axios, the US in return commits to lifting the blockade it has imposed on Iranian ports. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, announced that the management of the Strait of Hormuz has been excluded from the scope of the agreement with the US, asserting that the issue will be addressed solely by littoral states.

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Pashinyan promises aid to farmers hit by Russian import restrictions

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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pledged compensation for Armenian farmers affected by restrictions on exports to Russia.

According to Sputnik Armenia, Pashinyan made the announcement during an election campaign meeting in the Gegharkunik region.

Speaking at the event, Pashinyan said the subsidies would be designed to offset losses incurred by producers.

The prime minister also acknowledged that some Armenian products had failed to meet required quality standards, adding that such companies would receive support aimed at improving product quality.

Addressing alternative markets for Armenian exports, Pashinyan said several Armenian business delegations were already engaged in negotiations abroad.

He added that Armenia had received offers for the purchase of roses as well as fresh fruits and vegetables.

Pashinyan argued that Armenia’s agricultural output was not particularly large, describing this as an advantage under current circumstances. According to the prime minister, “a respected supermarket chain in Europe” would be capable of selling the entire volume of these products on its own.

Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) imposed temporary restrictions on imports of stone fruits and grapes from Armenia effective July 2.

The ban covers cherries, sour cherries, apricots, plums, peaches and nectarines, among other products.

On the same day, a temporary suspension was also introduced on certification procedures for live fish shipments from Armenia. Russian authorities had previously restricted the entry of flower products originating from Armenia into the Russian market.

In addition, Russia’s Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) halted the import of all consignments of Jermuk mineral water from Armenia.

In a statement, the agency said levels of bicarbonate, chloride and sulfate ions in the mineral water exceeded established limits and could mislead consumers regarding the product’s medicinal properties.

The Russian regulator argued that the growing number of violations stemmed from the abolition of Armenia’s Agriculture Ministry and the transfer of its responsibilities to the Economy Ministry.

Rosselkhoznadzor further stated that Armenia’s Economy Ministry was experiencing structural problems and was unable to adequately perform the supervisory functions assigned to it.

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Diplomacy

Zelenskyy urges US to grant Ukraine license to produce Patriot missiles

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he has asked the United States to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture missiles for the Patriot air defence system.

In a post on social media platform X, Zelenskyy argued that current US production of missile defence interceptors is insufficient and could contribute to crises in different parts of the world.

“Producing 60-65 missiles a month is nothing compared with the challenges we face today. This is no secret, and Russia knows it as well,” Zelenskyy wrote. “We need to expand production. As I requested from the previous US administration, I am asking the current administration to grant Ukraine a license to produce Patriot missiles.”

Zelenskyy said US companies possess advanced technologies that are not available in Ukraine, while Kyiv could contribute its extensive battlefield experience in return.

He also argued that granting such a license would benefit not only Ukraine, but also the Middle East and any country Washington chooses to support.

Washington pledges to maintain defence support

Zelenskyy’s remarks came a day after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on May 30 that Washington would continue supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and ensure military shipments to Kyiv continue.

“We want them to be able to defend themselves, and we will find a way to help them do that,” Hegseth said.

Several days earlier, Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force, warned that the country’s air defence forces were experiencing a shortage of missiles.

“Due to certain supply problems, we are practically at starvation levels when it comes to missiles today,” Ihnat said.

Concerns persist over air defence missile stocks

In April, Zelenskyy warned that Ukraine’s stockpile of air defence missiles could be exhausted at any moment.

He said that under current conditions, air defence missiles were more critical for Ukraine than the air defence systems themselves.

Highlighting what he described as a critical shortage of Patriot missiles, Zelenskyy said: “We are facing a deficit now that could hardly be worse.”

Concerns that Ukraine could face a severe shortage of US-made air defence missiles had previously been reported by Reuters.

The situation was expected to worsen as the United States and its allies depleted significant portions of their arsenals during tensions with Iran, a point Zelenskyy also underscored.

In a separate statement in January, Zelenskyy said Ukraine lacked sufficient missiles for both US- and European-made air defence systems.

The Ukrainian leader said he had been forced to personally secure every package of missiles from European countries and the United States.

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