Diplomacy
Türkiye freezes assets of 31 Iranian individuals and entities linked to nuclear program
Türkiye has decided to freeze the assets of 16 individuals and 15 organizations stated to be linked to Iran’s nuclear program.
The decision, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and published in the Official Gazette on October 1, 2025, was based on the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The action was taken under Law No. 7262, the “Law on the Prevention of the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Ministry of Treasury and Finance will be responsible for the implementation of the decision.
The individuals and organizations whose assets have been frozen have the right to apply to the Audit and Cooperation Commission for their appeal to be forwarded to the UNSC.
Meanwhile, there is a disagreement between Western countries and Russia and China regarding the legal validity of the UN sanctions.
Western countries argue that Iran has violated its obligations under the nuclear deal and state that they have initiated the “trigger mechanism” that automatically restores UN sanctions.
In response, Russia and China emphasize that the activation of this mechanism lacks a legal basis, as the US withdrew from the agreement and the European parties failed to fulfill their commitments.
Moscow and Beijing had therefore announced that they do not recognize the interpretation that UN sanctions have been reinstated.
Who is on the list?
The annex to the decision published in the Official Gazette provides a detailed list of scientists, administrators, and critical institutions involved in various stages of Iran’s nuclear program.
The decision orders the freezing of assets of 16 individuals who are stated to have played a direct role in Iran’s nuclear activities.
Prominent among these names are experts working in fields such as uranium enrichment, reactor management, and material procurement.
— Davud Agha-Jani: Head of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz.
— Behman Asgarpour: Operational Manager at Arak.
— Seyyed Hossein Hosseini: An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak.
— Jafar Mohammadi: Technical advisor to the AEOI and responsible for the production of valves for centrifuges.
— Seyyed Jaber Safdari: Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities.
— Ghasem Soleimani: Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine.
The list also includes other senior officials involved in areas such as centrifuge component manufacturing, uranium conversion, and nuclear fuel research.
What are the targeted institutions and organizations?
Under the decision, the assets of 15 institutions and companies that form the main backbone of Iran’s nuclear program have also been frozen.
These organizations include research centers, financial structures, and supplier companies.
— Atomic Energy Organization of Iran: The main governing body of the program.
— Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International: Stated to provide financial support to Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization.
— Isfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC): An AEOI unit involved in enrichment-related activities.
— Kavoshyar Company: An AEOI subsidiary said to have attempted to procure vacuum induction furnaces and laboratory equipment for the nuclear program.
— Novin Energy Company: A company operating within the AEOI, stated to have transferred funds to organizations linked to the nuclear program.
— Tamas Company: An umbrella organization responsible for uranium extraction, enrichment, and processing activities.
The list also includes other critically important companies, such as Mesbah Energy Company, a supplier for the heavy water reactor at Arak, and Pars Trash Company, which is stated to be involved in the centrifuge program.
What is the trigger mechanism? How did the process unfold?
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries (US, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany), imposed limitations on Tehran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of severe UN sanctions.
This agreement was established on an international legal footing with UNSC Resolution 2231, adopted the same year.
The resolution included not only the lifting of sanctions but also a special provision known as “snapback.” This provision, referred to as the “trigger mechanism,” served as a safeguard, allowing for the reinstatement of all lifted UN sanctions if Iran seriously violated its obligations under the deal.
The mechanism was designed to bypass the veto power of permanent members in the Security Council. Under normal circumstances, a new vote in the Council is required to pass a sanctions resolution, and it must not be vetoed by any permanent member.
However, the snapback provision reverses the process: when one of the parties notifies that Iran is not fulfilling its obligations, the sanctions automatically return within 30 days unless a resolution to the contrary is adopted. This means that a veto from any country cannot stop the process.
Additionally, Resolution 2231 had limited the timeframe for using this right. The deadline to trigger the mechanism was October 18, 2025. After this date, the snapback option would cease to exist.
The crisis, which began with the unilateral withdrawal of the US administration under President Donald Trump from the agreement in 2018, deepened in the following years. Citing Washington’s sanctions, Iran began to increase its enriched uranium stockpiles and use advanced centrifuges.
In the summer of this year, Israel’s attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities were followed by Tehran’s announcements of retaliation. During the same period, allegations that Iran was limiting its cooperation with the IAEA raised concerns in Western capitals. In response to this situation, Europe’s three major powers—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (E3)—decided to activate the snapback mechanism.
On August 28, 2025, the governments of London, Paris, and Berlin submitted an official notification to the UN Security Council, announcing that Iran was in “significant non-performance” of its commitments under the agreement. This notification was the step that activated the trigger mechanism.
The notification initiated a 30-day process. If the Council did not pass a resolution to prevent the re-imposition of sanctions within this period, the old sanctions would automatically come back into effect. However, the likelihood of such a resolution passing in the Council was slim from the outset. Since any permanent member could block the resolution by withholding its approval, the path was clear for an automatic snapback.
By mid-September, no resolution to block the snapback had emerged from the Security Council. Consequently, around September 17, all previously lifted UN sanctions were automatically reinstated. The arms embargo, the ban on nuclear technology transfers, and travel restrictions and asset freezes on specific individuals and entities were reactivated.
The European Union also supported this step with a decision on September 29, re-implementing additional sanctions at its own level. Thus, Iran entered a new era of intensified international isolation.
Reactions from Iran, Russia, and China
The Tehran administration declared the process “legally invalid.” The Iranian Foreign Ministry described the E3’s initiative as “political and arbitrary.”
Officials argued that the mechanism was being misused and that the parties failing to fulfill their primary obligations were the US and Europe. They also showed resistance to the pressure by implying that they might restrict cooperation on IAEA inspections.
The snapback process also sparked debate in the international arena. Russia and China reacted strongly to the E3’s move.
Both countries attempted to have the snapback postponed in the Security Council. However, due to the structure of the mechanism, these efforts were unsuccessful. When the deadline expired, the sanctions automatically came into effect. Nevertheless, Russia and China announced that they do not recognize these sanctions.
Diplomacy
Defense Priorities director warns US air strategy in Middle East faces tactical limits
The collapse of a tentative memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, coupled with the diminishing strategic returns of American air power, has left the United States locked in an unsustainable, low-intensity conflict with Iran, according to Benjamin Friedman, Policy Director at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities.
Speaking in an interview on the YouTube channel Harici with host Sarp Sinan Hacır, Friedman attributed the failure of the short-lived US-Iran memorandum primarily to the Trump administration’s diplomatic missteps, vague draft language, and unrealistic expectations regarding a comprehensive settlement.
“Both sides really deserve some blame, but the Trump administration deserves the bulk of the blame for drafting an agreement that was so vague on key terms,” Friedman said, citing ambiguities surrounding the timeline for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of American commitments to restrain Israeli military operations in Lebanon.
Friedman emphasized that deep-seated mistrust in Tehran, exacerbated by repeated instances where diplomatic engagement was followed by Israeli or American military strikes, led Iranian negotiators to adopt an unyielding posture. At the same time, he noted that Iran likely miscalculated by using disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz to aggressively force leverage.
“The Trump administration remained intent on this sort of grand bargain that would restrain Iran seeking weapons development… and I think they continue to misread the Iranian willingness to sign that kind of deal,” Friedman noted, adding that Tehran viewed its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as essential despite the risk of provoking further strikes.
Expressing deep skepticism over the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough, Friedman criticized the administration’s reliance on informal envoys such as Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner over professional diplomatic channels, predicting that the baseline outcome will remain an unpredictable, episodic conflict.
“What’s more likely is a kind of on-off-again kind of war—sort of what we’re in now, where we have occasional strikes, with the United States perhaps by accident adopting the Israeli model of ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically,” Friedman said.
Addressing the efficacy of US air power, Friedman argued that military operations against Iranian targets have reached a point of diminishing returns. While early strikes successfully eliminated critical high-value assets—such as over-the-horizon radar systems that targeted anti-ship missiles—Iran’s ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities remain largely intact and operational.
He pointed to a recent strike on a base hosting US personnel in Jordan, launched from western Iran over a distance exceeding 1,000 kilometers, as evidence of Tehran’s sustained strike precision and the tactical limits of American interdiction efforts.
“The war is a failure for air power even in a tactical sense,” Friedman stated. “Initially, we looked at it and said we had a lot of success in destroying targets, but as more information came out, it turned out they had maybe more than half of their missiles and launchers survive the initial phase of the war.”
Friedman observed that the global proliferation of low-cost, high-precision guidance technology has permanently altered the strategic landscape, neutralizing the traditional invulnerability of forward-deployed US installations. “The precise effects of air power that used to be almost a monopoly of the United States… is actually making our posture in the region less sustainable,” he said, warning that similar vulnerabilities would be vastly amplified in any potential high-intensity conflict with China.
As an alternative to open-ended military engagement, Friedman suggested that Washington consider a complete military withdrawal from the region, even if it entails accepting Iranian transit fees on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. “The cost of preventing that through perpetual outbursts of warfare is much higher than just accepting it,” he noted.
Turning to regional dynamics, Friedman addressed Israel’s current absence from active strike operations against Iran, characterizing it as a calculated move to preserve its own air defense interceptors while relying on Washington to bear the operational and political burdens of containment.
On European security and the broader alliance structure, Friedman offered a critical assessment of the NATO summit in Ankara and the administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept. He described the white paper led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an effort to coerce European states into escalating defense expenditures and purchasing American hardware under the threat of reduced security guarantees, rather than executing a structured, strategic US posture adjustment.
“This is not a real US withdrawal; it’s a kind of pressure to up your loyalty in a particular way,” Friedman said, noting that major European powers such as Germany, France, and the UK lack a compelling existential incentive to construct independent, large-scale conventional war-fighting capabilities.
Regarding bilateral relations with Ankara, Friedman noted that US-Turkish tensions have eased considerably following the shift in American posture in Syria and progress toward resolving long-standing friction points, including the F-35 program and S-400 procurement. He added that while Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed frustration over Washington’s constructive engagement with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the White House has maintained its strategic course despite pressure from domestic pro-Israel lobbying groups.
Addressing internal Republican Party dynamics, Friedman highlighted the evolving public stance of Vice President J.D. Vance, whose cautious criticism of Israeli influence and emphasis on divergent national interests reflects broader ideological shifts within the conservative base.
“Vance is more representative of the shift in the Republican Party,” Friedman said. “He’s criticizing them in a limited way and saying, ‘Our interests are different.’ From the perspective of those of us who would like the United States to have a more distant relationship from Israel, it’s progress.”
Looking ahead to the upcoming US midterm elections, Friedman anticipated that a loss of congressional control by the Republican Party would severely curtail the administration’s domestic executive overreach, though its structural impact on foreign policy execution and Middle Eastern operations would remain comparatively limited.
Diplomacy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledges full support to Ukraine in meeting with Zelenskyy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Portsmouth, England.
Zelenskyy is the first world leader Burnham has met in person since taking office, with the prime minister committing to building a “firm partnership” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine.
Demonstrating their support, the two leaders toured a military base in Portsmouth where 200 Ukrainian troops are currently undergoing naval training exercises.
Burnham described his meeting with the Ukrainian president as “warm” and said he plans to visit Ukraine soon.
“We will build this together and address the various issues President Zelenskyy is facing, many of which we discussed today,” Burnham said.
The meeting follows an announcement by London that it will share intellectual property rights to assist Kyiv’s war effort.
The new prime minister announced that the UK will share the “Stone Cloak” electronic warfare system—which is fitted to drones to prevent detection—and will assist Ukraine in mass-producing the technology.
Burnham has focused primarily on domestic matters since replacing Keir Starmer, who faced criticism from elements within his own party for spending too much time abroad and focusing heavily on foreign affairs.
However, Burnham sought to signal continuity in Britain’s policy toward Ukraine. In one of his first phone calls after becoming prime minister last week, Burnham invited Zelenskyy to visit the UK “as soon as possible.”
Starmer spent his final full day as prime minister in Kyiv, where he announced £255 million in funding for Ukraine.
Speaking to Sky on Monday, Zelenskyy said his telephone conversation with Burnham had been “very good.”
The Ukrainian leader noted that Starmer had previously assured him that “the new government would maintain the policy of supporting Ukraine during the war.”
The new prime minister told the Ukrainian leader it was “no coincidence” that he was his first international visitor since moving into Downing Street.
“The purpose of this is to send a very clear message. We stand 100% with Ukraine, I personally stand 100% with you, and I will fully deliver on every commitment this country has made to Ukraine,” Burnham said.
Diplomacy
Ukraine targets first prototype of European Freyja missile defense system in early 2027
As Ukraine continues to lobby allies for new weapons capabilities to counter Russian missile strikes, the country aims to have a prototype of the Freyja anti-ballistic system, developed in partnership with European allies, ready in the first half of next year.
David Aloyan, deputy secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council and director of the Freyja project, stated—as reported by Reuters—that an international steering committee tasked with calculating research and development costs will meet for the first time in the near future.
The anti-ballistic coalition was officially established two weeks ago at a summit held in the French capital, Paris. The summit was attended by leaders of 10 European nations, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, alongside roughly 12 defense industry contractors.
Providing details on the timeline, Aloyan said: “We have an ambitious goal because we are working on a very tight schedule. We aim to have a viable prototype that can show its first practical results in the first half of next year.”
Ukraine remains chronically dependent on US-made Patriot air defense systems, which are currently the only weapons capable of reliably intercepting Russia’s hypersonic and high-velocity ballistic missiles. However, Patriot deliveries have faced persistent disruptions driven by political fluctuations, low inventory levels, and extended production cycles.
The Russian military intensified its ballistic missile strikes this month against the capital, Kyiv, and the southern port city of Odesa. Facing salvos of dozens of missiles, Ukraine was unable to destroy the majority of incoming targets due to a severe shortage of interceptor munitions.
The Ukrainian government has indicated that it is prepared to contribute a launch vehicle and an interceptor missile to the Freyja initiative. In comments made this month, President Zelenskyy remarked that the project has now become purely a “matter of testing,” expressing hope that the system will become operational within a year.
Kyiv expects its allies to provide specialized expertise and technology in advanced radars, sensors, and missile guidance and control electronics. Defense contractors participating in the project include Eurosam—the consortium behind the SAMP/T system—as well as Leonardo, Thales, and Saab.
Fire Point, the Ukrainian missile and drone manufacturer that developed the Flamingo cruise missile, announced that it will serve as the primary industrial partner for the project. The company disclosed last month that it had reached an agreement with German defense producer Hensoldt to supply the radar components required for the initiative.
The Freyja project stands out as an effort to construct a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, on which many European nations also rely. Other European air defense assets, such as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T and the German-made IRIS-T, have not yet demonstrated sufficient operational capability in intercepting ballistic missiles.
Zelenskyy likened the operational framework of the Freyja coalition to a Lego arrangement, in which defense industry leaders assemble interconnected components.
Emphasizing the flexibility of the design, Aloyan noted that manufacturers have been tasked with developing a system architecture featuring interchangeable components, stating:
“The core logic of this system is that it possesses an open architecture. If Denmark says, ‘I want a Freyja system configured with a Danish-made Weibel radar,’ that is possible. If Sweden states that it wishes to integrate a Saab system, that presents no issue either.”
Aloyan added that establishing a dedicated administrative body or fund to direct all project contributions and secure stable, continuous financing remains among the options under consideration.
The Ukrainian official stressed that direct corporate participation alongside sovereign governments would streamline bureaucracy, concluding: “The coalition must advance on practical grounds rather than political ones.”
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