Iran, already facing setbacks in its foreign policy due to the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, now confronts a significant test in its domestic politics. Protests over mandatory hijab requirements have erupted in the past, yet conservatives remain steadfast in pushing forward a contentious law imposing harsher penalties for violations of the national dress code. If enacted, the proposed legislation may intensify societal tensions and deepen chaos.

The Hijab and Chastity Law, passed by the conservative-led Majlis and ratified by the Constitutional Protection Council, is set to reach moderate President Masoud Pezeshkian on December 13. This law threatens to rekindle domestic unrest in a nation already strained by external conflicts.

Initially approved by the Iranian Parliament in September 2023 and subsequently endorsed by the Constitutional Protection Council in September 2024, the law now awaits Pezeshkian’s signature. According to Iranian law, Pezeshkian has five days to either approve or reject the legislation. If he declines to sign, the Speaker of Parliament is authorized to enact the law. However, Pezeshkian’s administration may choose not to implement it, potentially creating institutional discord and exacerbating legal uncertainty.

Currently, dress code violators face penalties ranging from 10 days to two months of imprisonment or fines up to $10. Under the proposed 70-article law, reported by The Financial Times, these penalties escalate significantly, with fines ranging from $200 to $2,000 for initial offenses and imprisonment for repeat violations.

The legislation introduces stringent enforcement mechanisms:

Persistent non-payment of fines may result in restrictions such as the suspension of passports or driving licenses and limitations on social media and banking access.

Celebrities promoting non-compliance could face fines starting at $13,000.

Surveillance technologies, including cameras managed by intelligence and defense ministries, would replace morality police in monitoring dress code adherence.

Businesses, residential complexes, and transport operators are obligated to share CCTV footage with law enforcement and report violations. Failure to comply could lead to punitive actions.

President Pezeshkian expressed reservations about the feasibility of the law, stating, “There are uncertainties about this law, which is not easy to implement. We must not act in a way that undermines national solidarity.”

Criticism has emerged from various quarters: Political analyst Saeed Laylaz described the law as “literally impossible to implement” and “irrational.” Conservative cleric Mohsen Gharavian emphasized the lack of public support for the legislation, arguing that unenforceable laws should be reviewed. Masoumeh Ebtekar, former vice president for women and family affairs, warned that implementing such a divisive policy could “deepen societal rifts and erode trust.”

In a recent address broadcast on Syrian state television, Mohammed al-Bashir, appointed by the interim Syrian government after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led forces entered Damascus, announced his leadership of the interim administration until March 1. Bashir emphasized the administration’s priorities: ensuring security, maintaining stability, and providing basic services to the population.

Bashir, a Syrian engineer and politician, has been serving as the Prime Minister of the Syrian Salvation Government—an entity established by HTS in Idlib—since January 13, 2024. Before his appointment as Prime Minister, Bashir held the position of Minister of Development and Humanitarian Affairs.

During his speech, Bashir stated, “Today, we held a cabinet meeting with a team from the Salvation Government in Idlib and its surroundings and the government of the ousted regime.” The appearance of two distinct flags behind him drew considerable attention: the green, black, and white flag used by opponents of Assad throughout the civil war, and a white flag inscribed with the word tawhid, typically associated with Sunni Islamist factions in Syria.

Despite the HTS leadership’s assurances regarding religious minorities and a general amnesty for Syrian soldiers, reports of executions targeting civilians and soldiers have surfaced.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) executed civilians and soldiers while forcibly displacing approximately 30,000 families in Manbij—a region previously controlled by the PKK/YPG.

Additionally, SOHR confirmed that ISIL militants captured military deserters in the desert regions during the collapse of Assad’s rule. In the Sukhna area of the Homs desert, 54 individuals were executed by ISIL forces.

Syria is one of the centers of gathering of people and extremist Islamic jihadist groups that have been fighting against each other for at least a decade with the support or opposition of the government under the leadership of Bashar Assad. These groups played a significant role in the emergence and suppression of ISIS and also in the Syrian civil wars and all its consequences.

The fall of the government of the Assad family, which had become a full-fledged dictator, and his treatment of some of his opponents was extremely disappointing and far from human values, has so far brought a smile to the faces of a large number of Syrian citizens and hope for change among some political circles. But can the opposition of Assad, led by the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), bring the broken ship of this country to a safe shore where there is peace in the shadow of democratic values? This is a question that time will answer.

According to independent evaluations and the opinion of some security experts, proxy groups and foreign mercenaries played the same role as the army and internal opposition forces in supporting and opposing the Assad government. In this article we attempt to make briefly investigate the future of proxy and mercenary jihadist groups on both sides of the front and what role these groups will play in the future of Syria and to what extent they will affect the security of the Middle East and the international region.

Who are the foreign jihadist forces?

At outset, Assad’s supporters:

The government led by Bashar Assad, which was effectively overthrown on December 8, 2024, had various supporters, including governments (Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran) and proxy mercenary groups. In this article, how governments support official channels will not be discussed, but proxy groups will be emphasized.

Militant groups composed of foreign citizens were mainly created, equipped and supported under the leadership of the Quds branch of the Revolutionary Guards of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The four important groups that seriously supported the Assad government in the civil war and the fight against ISIS include the Fatemiyoun Army, the Zainabiyoun Army, the Hosseinyoun Army, and Hezbollah.

Fatemiyoun army

“Lashkar Fatemiyoun”, based on the information published by the commanders and the group itself, consisted of Afghan immigrant citizens who were looking for jobs in different sectors such as construction, stone cutting, etc. before joining this group in Iran. The living conditions for Afghan immigrants in Iran were getting worse day by day due to various reasons, including economic pressures on the Iranian government and society and the unofficial anti-immigrant policy of the Iranian government and citizens.

Although some of the Iranian media close to the Iranian government stated that the presence of these people was spontaneous among the members of the Mohammad Corps (which was created to fight the Soviet Union forces in Afghanistan) and claimed that this group was formed to defend the shrine of Hazrat Zainab. There are reports that show that with the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, especially the emergence of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Iran, using economic compulsions and occasionally using religious motives, tried to recruit people from among the Afghan immigrants and formed the Fatemiyoun Army to fight.

Fatemiyoun, whose number is not precisely known, is still present in the Middle East and is known as an important proxy military capacity of Iran. However, as seen in the recent clashes and the attack by the HTS, no fronts have been reported from this group. Some videos of the presence of members of this group in Syria were published on social networks, but Fatemiyoun has not reported any kind of resistance or support to the Assad government. Reports indicate that Iran has transferred all members of this group to Iraq.

It is noteworthy that during the entire period of activity of this group, there was no official and confirmed report of their presence in Afghanistan, and the security forces of the previous government of Afghanistan did not record any anti-government and security activities by the members of this group inside Afghanistan.

Zainebiyoun Brigade or Zainbyoun’s army

Lashkar Zainbyoun is composed of Pakistani citizens, which was formed under the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards to fight against ISIS and support the Assad government. The recruitment of the members of this group was different from the members of Fatemiyoun. Unlike Fatemiyoun, whose members were recruited from among Afghan immigrants living in Iran, members of Lashkar Zainbyoun were mainly recruited from Pakistani citizens, especially from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Karachi and Lahore regions.

The government of Pakistan declared this group as a banned terrorist group and arrested several of its important members in the last two years. The information published on social networks shows that the people applying for membership in Lashkar Zainbion should be between 15 and 35 years old and they are supposed to be paid 120,000 Pakistani rupees per month, which was equivalent to 1,200 US dollars in 2015.

This group also played a prominent role in the war against Daesh in Syria and Iraq alongside the government and proxy forces, but like Fatemiyoun, no resistance or support to the Assad government was reported in the recent conflicts in Syria. Due to the fact that the members of this group are known as a terrorist group, they will no longer be able to return to their country.

Hosseiniun army, Azerbaijani Armed Forces

Hosseiniyon group, consisting of citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan, under the leadership of Tawheed Ebrahimi (Ibrahim Bailey), a Shia cleric trained in Mashhad seminary, was active in Syria along with other proxy groups of Iran.

This group also played a serious role in the war against ISIS along with other government and proxy forces in Syria and Iraq. Similar to other groups, it has always been used to secure the interests of  Iran and the Syrian government.

Due to its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan has monitored the activities of this group inside its country as an illegal armed group and has arrested a number of its members.

There are reports that show that no reaction or resistance was observed from this group in the recent conflicts in Syria, and the leader of this group is currently inside Iran, according to Iranian media reports.

Syrian Hezbollah

Although some analysts claim that the members of this group are Syrian citizens, the available information shows that a large part of the members of this group were Lebanese citizens. This group, like other proxy groups, played an important role in defending the Assad government during the civil war and the war with ISIS, but no reaction has been reported from it in the recent conflicts that led to the fall of the Assad government.

Now, the opponents of Assad’s regime

The opposition front of Assad is also made up of a large gathering of Sunni extremist Islamists. Along with groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the current ruler of Syria, Jaysh al-Watani and others, a significant number of citizens of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uighurs from China and Pakistan are actively present.

Although these groups did not independently have separate organizations and fronts from HTS, like Assad’s supporters and proxy groups of Iran, extensive information in the mass media shows that foreign citizens played a significant role in Tahrir al-Sham’s rise to power and the fall of the Assad government.

These groups mainly include the following outfits.

Citizens of Afghanistan

Simultaneously with the advance of the Tahrir al-Sham group in Syria, many videos and visual and textual information about the presence of Afghan citizens with the members of Tahrir al-Sham were published. These citizens, who mainly spoke Pashto, published messages of congratulations and happiness in front of their compatriots in front of the Assad government, which in many cases referred to that government as “apostate”. These videos and images were widely reproduced by Taliban members and supporters on social networks.

Citizens of Pakistan

Pakistani citizens, especially residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, were also widely present in support of Assad’s opponents. Many videos and pictures of the presence of these people were published on social networks.

In the Pashto language, they called the successive victories of their train mates “Jihad against the “apostate” and even said in a strong tone in one of the videos: “I will kill every Shiite I catch.” There is no exact information on the exact number of Pakistani citizens who were present with the HTS group, but the activity and moment-to-moment dissemination on social networks shows that the presence of these people was significant.

Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad

This group is made up of citizens of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who have been in northern Syria for a few years alongside Jabhat al-Nusra and Tahrir al-Sham, and even some of its members have been with ISIS. The members of this group, to show their presence and power, informed their progress moment by moment while wearing regular military uniforms.

This group was included in the list of terrorist organizations by the United Nations Security Council and the United States Department of State two years ago due to its subversive activities and connection with terrorist organizations such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Imam Bukhari Jammat

Although most of the activities of members of Imam Bukhari’s Jammat have been reported in Afghanistan and this group is considered one of the allies of the Taliban, some reports have reported the presence of members of this group, who are mainly citizens of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, alongside Tahrir al-Sham.

The United States Department of State, in the explanation it published about this group, introduced it as one of the large groups of Uzbek citizens in Syria that work in close cooperation with Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda. This group has also been recognized as a terrorist organization by the United Nations Security Council and the United States Department of State.

East Turkestan Islamic Movement

According to reliable reports, including the report of the United Nations Security Council, the leadership base of this group is in Afghanistan, but some analysts also confirm the large presence of this group in Syria.

This group consists of Uyghurs who believe that they are fighting for the independence of China’s Xinjiang, which is also referred to as Eastern Turkestan. But the activities of this group show that this issue is just a slogan and in fact it has done the least activity inside or against the interests of China and the majority of its activities are in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria in association with other terrorist groups such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and It has recently been reported alongside Tahrir al-Sham.

The members of this group were widely active alongside the Tahrir al-Sham group to overthrow the Assad government. This group is also on the list of terrorist organizations of the United Nations Security Council and the United States Department of State.

Jaish al-Jihad of Imam Abu Hanifah

This group is composed of citizens of Tajikistan, which works alongside extremist Islamist groups such as Tahrir al-Sham in Syria. Some analysts who have followed the activities of this group say that the members of this group advertise more on social networks to attract and attract people from among the citizens of Tajikistan, and they have become more active in the recent war between Tahrir al-Sham and the government of Bashar Assad.

There is not much information about the activities of this group in Afghanistan or Tajikistan, but so far the most famous jihadist group among the citizens of Tajikistan is the Ansarullah Movement, which operates as one of the supporters of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

What will be the fate of foreign jihadist groups?

With the fall of the Assad government and the presence of extremist Islamist groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the region and the world expect the new Syrian government to form a government based on the people’s vote and remove any threat against the region and the world.

However, a review of the activity records of groups aligned with Tahrir al-Sham and this group itself shows that democratic principles and government formation based on people’s votes are alien to the views of these groups.

Currently, power is in the hands of a coalition of extremist Islamist groups that are listed as terrorist organizations by the United Nations and many countries around the world, mainly because of their subversive activities.

It is clear that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, contrary to its claim, alone and relying only on its human and financial resources was not able to achieve this amazing success and is not able to maintain it even now.

This group owes the cooperation and assistance of its allied groups, which mainly consist of foreign citizens and members of radical Islamic groups, just as the Afghan Taliban owes the cooperation of regional and international terrorist groups such as TTP, al-Qaeda, Ansarullah, Jaish al-Adl, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and … etc…

Considering the dependency and need of the HTS for the support of these groups to achieve victory, this group needs these groups for its survival and will not be able to exclude them from its side.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is well aware of the ability and cruelty of the hearts of each member of these groups and understands that surrendering to any kind of democratic value that is considered blasphemous by Islamists will lose its basic foundations and must then face the allies.

On the other hand, this group knows very well that the establishment of a Taliban-Afghanistan regime in Syria is not acceptable not only for the citizens of this country who have lived in the shadow of freedom with the taste of dictatorship for years, but also its neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Israel cannot have such a regime alongside itself.

The HTS’s leader Al-Jolani, like all radical jihadist leaders, is now at an important crossroads, and choosing any of these paths will create new supporters and opponents for him.

On the other hand, Al-Jolani knows very well that his foreign allies have no foothold in their countries except Afghanistan. Citizens of Central Asian countries, who played an important role in his victory, are not even able to enter their country. The citizens of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be the only ones who, if they receive a rejection, can go back home or unite with ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Middle East, depending on the atmosphere in their country.

On the other side of the story, there are Iranian proxy groups that are approaching their expiration date with the fall of the Assad government. These groups were attracted under the pretext of defending the shrine, but now the shrine is not under their control.

On the other hand, the lack of proper access to disabled people and their families inside Iran (although they have been given some privileges in the media), the possibility of moving them inside Iran and keeping them as a reserve force is very low, because the Iranian government’s treatment of these forces inside without using them is like a worker who must be engaged in hard work.

The breaking of the “Shiite Crescent” in Syria with Tahrir al-Sham gaining power as one of the serious opponents of the presence of Iranian forces in the region and an opponent of the Shia has destroyed the ground for the ground transfer of these forces to Lebanon, unless Iran has transferred these forces to Lebanon by air. And to fill the void in the ranks of Hezbollah with the explosion of Israeli pagers and airstrikes and keep them as a threat to Israel.

The second possibility is to send these forces to Yemen to strengthen the Houthis and use them in the next equations in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab. But this option has little probability, because Iran’s interests are secured more in Lebanon than in Yemen and the maritime region, considering the combat capabilities of these people.

Conclusion

The presence of radical jihadist individuals and groups in Syria, either in opposition or in support of Tahrir al-Sham, can be considered a real and continuous threat to the security of Syria and the Middle East as a whole. It seems that the victory of these groups tomorrow will not taste so sweet for the people of Syria and neighboring countries.

As a whole, the continuous presence of groups supporting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria can be considered a serious problem for the security of the region and an opportunity for Hamas.