Opinion
What opportunities await Ethiopia through BRICS collaboration?
Aweke Getahun, Senior News Editor at Ethiopian News Agency
Ethiopia is a landlocked nation in the Horn of Africa that is strategically crucial for a number of reasons, including its location, population density, regional power, potential for economic growth, and others. As a result, it has become a hub for other nations looking to exert influence over the area. Ethiopia is a vital center for trade and communication because of its advantageous location at the intersection of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. It shares border with Kenya, South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. It is a vital connection in international trade because of its closeness to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which give access to important marine trade routes. International powers acknowledge Ethiopia’s role in preserving security in the area and guaranteeing continuous access to these crucial economic routes.
Along with hosting the African Union (AU), Ethiopia is a member of other regional and continental organizations, including the African Union (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).With a population of over 120 million, Ethiopia is the second-most populous country in Africa. With more than 70% of the population under 30, it has one of the youngest populations in the world. There is a lot of room for economic development and expansion with this sizable and youthful workforce. Ethiopia is an ideal leader in the area because of its cultural and historical links to the Horn of Africa. It has been vital in supplying security forces to secure the area, encouraging regional collaboration, and settling disputes. Global powers see Ethiopia as a useful partner in combating common issues like piracy, illicit trafficking, and terrorism while also preserving regional stability.
The latest downturn in the economy
Ethiopia’s economy has grown at one of the quickest rates on the continent and with the largest population, averaging about 10% annually. Although it still depends heavily on agriculture, the government has made a concerted effort to industrialize and diversify the economy. Numerous causes, such as increasing investment in the industrial, services, infrastructure, and agriculture sectors, have contributed to this expansion. Ethiopia is now facing several issues that jeopardize its social cohesion and economic stability, despite a number of noteworthy economic successes in recent years. About 80% of Ethiopia’s population depends on agriculture for a living, making the country heavily dependent on it. Ethiopia’s economy has been severely impacted by the continuous conflict in many regions of the nation. The worry expressed by the US and the EU indicates that the problem has garnered attention on a global scale. The severe lack of foreign exchange that Ethiopia has been experiencing has made it challenging for the nation to import necessities. Foreign exchange shortages have been caused by a combination of declining export revenue, declining diaspora remittances, and restricted access to international financing as a result of the epidemic. Because of this, Ethiopia is finding it more and more difficult to pay the coupons on its sovereign bonds and to service its foreign debt.
Joining the BRICS bloc
In 2023, a significant turning point in Ethiopia’s foreign policy was reached when it joined the BRICS alliance as a full member, joining five other nations: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Argentina, and the United Arab Emirates. The rising economies that make up the BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—represent around 27% of the world’s geographical area, 42% of its population, and 33% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Ethiopia’s bid was strengthened by its favorable relations with the key BRICS nations, notably China and India, alongside its substantial population, impressive economic expansion, and bright prospects. It is anticipated that Ethiopia’s inclusion in the BRICS group will have a major positive impact on its international collaboration, regional integration, and economic growth. According to economists, Ethiopia will have access to the New Development Bank (NDB), a global financial organization that was founded in 2014 by the BRICS nations to assist with projects related to sustainable development and infrastructure in developing and rising nations. With a capital of US$100 billion, the NDB has authorized loans of more than US$30 billion for a range of industries, including urban development, energy, transportation, water, health, and education. Through the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a structure for mutual support among the BRICS nations in times of balance of payments issues or short-term financial stress, Ethiopia’s membership in the BRICS will benefit the Horn of Africa.
With a total value of $100 billion, the CRA can augment the current global financial safety nett. Participation in the BRICS basket reserve currency is a proposal to establish a single currency among the BRICS nations, therefore lessening their reliance on the US dollar and other major currencies. As a unit of account, a means of exchange, and a store of value, the basket reserve currency would be made up of a weighted average of the BRICS member countries’ respective currencies. Originally established in 2006 as a loose platform for communication and collaboration among its members, the BRICS group has subsequently grown into a more official institution with a wider range of objectives. The BRIC group was established in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China. South Africa joined the organization in 2010, adding the letter S to the acronym. In addition to accounting for 30% of the planet’s landmass and over 42% of its people, the bloc also contributes 23% of global GDP and 18% of global commerce.
Opportunities
Ethiopia’s geopolitical power is anticipated to increase as a result of its BRICS membership, allowing it to take part in important talks on world issues. Ethiopia now has a forum to discuss issues and interests with other major rising markets, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS). Ethiopia can more successfully advocate for regional and continental goals, such as advancing economic integration, sustainable development, and peace in Africa, by increasing its influence. Ethiopia is anticipated to benefit commercially and economically from membership in the BRCS. The union has prospects for enhanced bilateral commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI) since it includes some of the biggest economies in the world. Joint projects, research partnerships, teacher exchanges, and technology innovations provided by other members can all be advantageous to Ethiopia. This partnership may help close development gaps and support a number of industries, from manufacturing to agriculture. Ethiopia’s ambitious infrastructure program is receiving more assistance, as seen by China’s engagement in BRICS infrastructure development. The enhancement of ports, trains, power plants, road networks, and digital connections might all benefit from this funding. These advancements have the potential to promote economic expansion, ease commerce, and unite formerly disconnected areas, culminating in a society that is more wealthy and cohesive. Being a part of BRICS gives Ethiopia the chance to benefit from the experience, skills, and technology of other countries that have made strides in fields like manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and renewable energy. Ethiopia would have a stronger voice and more influence in international political and economic matters as a member of the BRICS alliance. This might give the nation a stage on which to promote its interests, open up foreign markets, and present chances to establish strategic alliances with other superpowers. Ethiopia’s participation in the BRICS group might motivate other African nations to pursue similar affiliations, potentially leading to the establishment of regional blocs that could transform the global economic landscape.
Challenges
The BRICS membership of Ethiopia presents challenges regarding power relations within the organization. Ethiopia, the BRICS country with the lowest GDP, must make sure that its interests and voice are fairly reflected. It might be difficult to make sure that the decision-making process is fair and takes into account the individual requirements of each member. Ethiopia should work to strengthen its strategic partnerships and diplomatic negotiating abilities with other BRICS members in order to keep its worries from being eclipsed. Balancing its connections with its traditional partners and friends, such as the United States, the European Union, and the African Union, who may have worries or misgivings about Ethiopia’s growing relationships with the BRICS nations, might be another problem for the East African nation.
As dynamics and expectations change, the BRICS group is evolving from an unstructured forum to a more formal organization. Its membership has grown as a result of this transformation, which has also placed more emphasis on tackling a range of internal problems and issues, including social inclusion, political stability, environmental protection, security risks, and poverty reduction. Between the BRICS nations, there are notable economic differences; Ethiopia’s economy is far less than that of China or Brazil. For Ethiopia, this means that it could be difficult to participate in and gain equitably from bloc-wide efforts and collaborative projects. The BRICS countries can help handle Ethiopia’s economic problems by increasing investment and development support, but Ethiopia’s over-reliance on these nations might jeopardize national sovereignty and lead to a power imbalance.
In conclusion, Ethiopia is a significant player in the Horn of Africa because of its population, geographic location, potential for economic growth, influence in the area, energy resources, and participation in geopolitical rivalries. It attracts the attention of global powers seeking to maintain peace in the area, resolve shared concerns, and obtain access to markets, resources, and strategic assets. The country will become even more strategically significant over the coming years, and its ability to balance the interests and influence of several foreign powers will have a significant impact on both its own development and the stability of the Horn of Africa. However, there are certain difficulties involved as well, which Ethiopia’s society and government must carefully consider and handle. A problem for Ethiopia may be striking a balance in its relationships with traditional friends and partners like the US, EU, and African Union, who could be wary of Ethiopia’s growing links to the BRICS nations.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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