OPINION
Will Israel’s move against Haniyeh change the balance in the Middle East?
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on
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Ma Xiaolin![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Prof.-Ma-Xiaolin-2.jpeg)
Prof. Ma Xiaolin
Zhejiang International Studies University, China
Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies
On 1 August, a solemn funeral was held for Ismail Haniyeh, the leader of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, who was killed in an attack in the Iranian capital, Tehran. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is reported to have ordered direct retaliation against Israel. That night, more than 60 revenge rockets were fired by Lebanese Hezbollah into northern Israel. Despite Israel’s deliberate efforts to inflame the Middle East crisis, Haniyeh’s death was not enough to bring the situation out of control.
On the night of 31 July, Haniyeh, who was in Tehran to attend the swearing-in ceremony of Iran’s new president, Mohammad Pezeshkian, was killed in a surprise attack on his residence. The Iranian government claimed that Israel was behind the assassination. The Israeli government’s press office published a portrait of Haniyeh with the words ‘wiped out’, and Prime Minister Netanyahu euphemistically declared that he had ‘dealt a devastating blow to Iranian proxies’. The Jerusalem Post quoted Israeli intelligence sources as saying that Haniyeh had been killed by a remote-controlled bomb prepared by Israelis and that Tehran had been chosen as the site of the attack to humiliate Iran.
Haniyeh’s death showed that Israel has once again flagrantly violated Iran’s sovereignty, territory and airspace, grossly violated the norms of international law and deliberately provoked a violent conflict between countries, and violated humanitarian law by physically eliminating the leader of the enemy group without due process. The Chinese Foreign Ministry strongly condemned it, as did Iran, Russia, Turkey and others. The United States claimed it had nothing to do with the incident and, together with the UK and France, blocked the adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning Israel.
Haniyeh’s assassination comes as no surprise, as Haniyeh has long been someone Israel has put a price on, hounded and officially described as a ‘walking dead’. Since 2004, Israel has killed two generations of Hamas leaders in Gaza, Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Lantis, and other Hamas military and political leaders are on the death list.
Intelligence officials say Haniyeh’s death was “specifically orchestrated in tightly secured Tehran to make it more visible and embarrassing for Iran”.
Since the start of this round of hostilities, Israel has vowed to “root out” Hamas, “cut off its branches” and even made it clear that Qatar is the only place where senior Hamas officials are “exempt from death”. In April this year, the Israeli army blew up Haniyeh’s three sons and four grandchildren, including three girls. Haniyeh was not impressed by the news. Sources say that more than 60 members of his family have died at the hands of Israel, just a fraction of the tens of thousands of Palestinians who have been killed.
Haniyeh, one of the founders of Hamas and its first Prime Minister after being elected to an autonomous legislature in 2006, is known for his relative moderation and determination and has been the leading Palestinian negotiator pushing for a ceasefire since the outbreak of the current conflict. Israel’s physical elimination of the key negotiator in the face of repeated setbacks in the talks is a clear rejection of peace talks and to keep on continuation of the state of war.
A week before Haniyeh’s death, 14 Palestinian factions had signed the landmark Beijing Declaration, in which Hamas and other radical groups announced their acceptance of the two-state solution and their recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This was a powerful sign that, after 18 years of accepting the Oslo Accords and contesting the leadership of the autonomous institutions through elections, Hamas had once again demonstrated its willingness to reconcile and accept Israel’s legitimate existence. Israel’s current insistence on eliminating Haniyeh is an attempt to block the path to intra-Palestinian reconciliation and to further divide and weaken the Palestinian camp in order to exploit it in the long term, maintain the status quo and reject the two-state solution.
After Haniyeh’s assassination, Hamas announced a freeze on ceasefire and hostage exchange talks, reiterated that it would “never recognise Israel” and would fight to the end, which is exactly what the Israeli government expected, justifying its insistence on “cleansing, disarming and de-extremising Hamas” in Gaza.
After these twists and turns, it is expected that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will be the main battleground in Gaza, that the war will remain low-intensity and protracted, that Hamas and other armed groups will continue to use guerrilla warfare to attack Israel, that its regional allies will continue to hunt Israel, and that Israel’s state of war will continue and the opposition’s “showdown” with Netanyahu will be postponed indefinitely.
Israel’s pursuit of Haniyeh in Tehran, following its air strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria in April this year, is another blatant violation of Iranian airspace, territory and sovereignty, openly provoking, threatening and even humiliating the Iranian leadership. The Israeli cross-border bombing of the consulate triggered symbolic and punitive Iranian long-range air strikes, but the two sides settled the score and applied the brakes in time to prevent the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from spreading to the entire Eastern Mediterranean region and then to the Persian Gulf, “the world’s oil depot”.
Israel’s attack was a step too far, which made Iran want to stop and made the international community worry about whether Israel and Iran would again come into direct confrontation. In addition, the day before, Israel bombed and killed Fouad Shukr, one of the most senior members of Lebanese Hezbollah. Hezbollah has vowed to avenge Shukr and Haniyeh, and the Houthis have made similar statements. Israel is creating a major incident by stirring up several hornets’ nests at once.
However, Hamas does not have the power to fight fire with fire against Israel, Iran will not impulsively enter into a full-scale war with Israel, and Hezbollah will refrain from triggering a third Lebanon war. Nor does Israel have the will or the ability to launch a large-scale “northern campaign” and get into an even bigger quagmire. The US has reaffirmed its commitment to protect Israel as it enters a critical phase of the elections, but has also urged Israel not to “add fuel to the fire”. In short, Haniyeh’s death will not significantly alter the regional situation.
Haniyeh is a key figure in Hamas and the last name on Israel’s “hit list”. But in the grand scheme of the Middle East conflict, Haniyeh is a minor figure who died an unnatural death, and many leaders have died before him: King Abdullah of Jordan (1951), President Sadat of Egypt (1981), President Gemayel of Lebanon (1982) and Prime Minister Karami (1987), PLO number two Abu Ghad (1988), President Mouawad of Lebanon (1989), Prime Minister Rabin of Israel (1994), Prime Minister Hariri of Lebanon (2005)…
Haniyeh will be neither the first nor the last leader to die in the region.
The question is: how long can Israel, which is not a great power, survive against the “Axis of Resistance” made up of Iran and four regional armies?
* Prof. Ma, who knows the Middle East well, has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq. His academic studies focus on the Middle East, Arab geography and China-Middle East relations.
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OPINION
The secret of lasting friendship and co-operation between Africa and China
Published
4 days agoon
06/09/2024By
Ma Xiaolin![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Ma-Xiaolin-1.jpeg)
The three-day “The 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)” ended on 6 September in Beijing. China and the leaders of 53 African countries and the African Union jointly released two important documents, the ‘Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era’ and the ‘Beijing Declaration and Action Plan for strengthening China-Africa cooperation (2025-2027)’. These two documents brought an excellent end to the summit themed ‘Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future’.
This summit is of great significance and attracts the world’s attention as it is the largest major diplomatic event organised by China in recent years with the largest number of foreign leaders attending, the fourth summit in 24 years since the establishment of the FOCAC and the third summit held in Beijing, as well as the first time in six years that more than 50 China-Africa leaders and 400 China-Africa entrepreneurs have gathered in Beijing.
The summit also marks the 70th anniversary of China’s formulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 60th anniversary of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s first visit to Africa and his proposal of the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, the 50th anniversary of President Mao Zedong’s formulation of the ‘Three Worlds’ theory, and at the critical stage of serious changes in the world landscape, the impasse in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the prolongation of the China-US game, the general depression of the global economy, and the collective awakening and rise of the Global South. Therefore, it is certainly an important global event and a turning point that the bilateral leaders of China, the world’s largest developing country, and Africa, the continent with the largest concentration of developing countries, once again come face to face and jointly discuss the development and progress of 2.8 billion people in China and Africa and one-third of the world’s population.
During the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China has upgraded its diplomatic relations with all African countries to the level of strategic relations and upgraded the overall description of China-Africa relations to ‘China-Africa Partnership with a Shared Future for the New Era’. Xi Jinping stressed that China and Africa will jointly build modernisation with six key characteristics: ‘just and reasonable, open and profitable, people-oriented, multicultural, ecology-friendly and peaceful’, and announced the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’. These include civilisation exchange, trade development, industrial chain cooperation, connectivity, development cooperation, health, agriculture and welfare, cultural exchange, green development and security cooperation.
Xi Jinping announced that in the next three years, China will provide 360 billion RMB (about 50 billion US dollars) to support the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’ and provide food aid and zero taxation to African countries, implement 30 infrastructure connectivity projects, 1000 small but effective life projects and 500 public benefit projects. It also pledged to send 2000 medical personnel and 500 agricultural experts to Africa, create 60,000 training opportunities in China for African women and youth, and create 1 million jobs in Africa.
During the summit, the Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres, President Ghazouani of Mauritania, Head of the African Union, and President Macky Sall of Senegal, co-chairman of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, highly appreciated the development of China-Africa relations and emphasised the great changes that China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative has brought about in Africa. They also believed that the new definition of China-Africa relations and the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’ will lead the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to a new stage.
The achievements made during the 24 years of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have set a model in international relations, exemplifying win-win relations with mutual respect, mutual benefit and co-operation. These 24 years represent a quarter of a century of Africa’s self-development and united progress, regardless of periods of ‘despair’ and ‘Far East sick man’, and a historical period in which the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has transformed from a ‘street gang meeting’ to a cornerstone of the Global South.
According to official data, in 24 years, China-Africa trade has increased nearly 26-fold to $282.1 billion. China’s investment in Africa has increased 80-fold to more than $40 billion. China has been Africa’s number one trading partner for 15 years, and its trade volume with almost half of African countries has increased by more than 10 per cent annually, with trade volume consistently breaking records. Over the past 10 years, Chinese companies have signed RMB 700 billion worth of contracted projects in Africa, achieving a turnover of RMB 400 billion, and investment co-operations have spread to many fields such as agriculture, processing, manufacturing, trade and logistics, with projects covering various fields such as transport, energy, electricity, housing and social services, promoting Africa’s economic and social development. China’s share of Africa’s debt is only one tenth.
More than half a century of Sino-African relations have achieved remarkable successes, although it has been quite a difficult journey, and the experiences need to be reviewed and summarised. Because this is a great story, a successful story and a unique example of China establishing friendly relations with a great continent. The 54 member countries of the African Union, except for Eswatini, all other African countries have diplomatic relations with China and maintain friendly relations. Almost all African country leaders visit Beijing regularly or irregularly, which is a major event in the history of international relations. It has become a standard pattern for the Chinese Foreign Minister to make his first visit to African countries every year, and Chinese President Xi Jinping has visited Africa five times, showing China’s deep interest in Africa.
The successful development and stability of China-Africa relations confirm the four general rules of country relations, and can even be regarded as a new textbook model of country relations to correct, supplement or overthrow the traditional international relations theories, experiences and practices of Western countries.
First, same or smilar historical experiences build empathy and loyalty. China and African countries, colonised and occupied by Western powers and having lived the lesson that ‘to be left behind is to be beaten’, are clear against foreign intervention.
Second, same or smilar political goals ensure cohesion and support. China and African countries seek independence, autonomy and empowerment and work towards the goals of development, prosperity and comprehensive modernisation.
Third, same or smilar understanding of relations strengthens common values. China and African countries value friendship and trustworthiness, believe in the principle of ‘going fast alone, going long together’, and adhere to the principles of mutual assistance and mutual benefit.
Fourth, same or smilar development conditions bring a common future and long-term commitment. China and African countries used to be economically backward, poor in basic infrastructure and backward in education and training. However, they both agree that ‘development is a difficult path’ and ‘people’s well-being is the greatest human right’ and respect their chosen development paths.
The successful and remarkable development of China-Africa relations also embodies the unique charm and exemplary significance of contemporary Chinese diplomacy, a Chinese experience and contribution that has evolved from diplomatic ideas and concepts to diplomatic principles and practices, and from these principles and practices to innovations in the theory and paradigm of international relations.
First of all, different civilisations and cultures can fully coexist and co-develop. China and Africa belong to different civilisations, but China has never used the differences between civilisations as a basis for judging friend and foe or for determining distance and proximity, and has emphasised the principles of ‘Each is beautiful in its own way, all people are beautiful; the beauty of people is beautiful in its own way, the whole world is the same’ and ‘Long live the unity of all the people of the world’. We resolutely oppose the theory of the clash of civilisations or the theory of the superiority of civilisations.
Secondly, even if we are thousands of kilometres away from each other, we can be as close as neighbours. Distance produces not only beauty, but also friendship and love. China’s traditional concepts of friendship such as ‘it is always a pleasure to make friends from afar’ and ‘all brothers and sisters in the four seas’ have ensured that China-Africa friendship transcends geography and space and remains constant.
Third, there are large and small countries that can get along with each other on an equal footing. Objectively speaking, China’s population, area and economic volume are indeed far beyond any African country, and even comparable to the entire African continent, but China has never practised jungle law and bullying policies, not to mention emphasising the so-called ‘power determines status’ distortion, on the contrary, in line with the principle of equality among countries regardless of their size, strength and weakness, wealth and poverty, we have made friends all over the world, including a large number of ‘big and small’ African countries. On the contrary, on the basis of the principle of equality between countries regardless of their size, strength, weakness, wealth and poverty, we have made friends all over the world, including many African countries that are ‘natural friends’.
Fourth, it is entirely possible for rich and poor to make progress together. In the half-century of China-Africa relations, especially in the quarter-century since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the world and Africa have witnessed China’s rapid transformation from standing still to prospering and then to strengthening, and China’s assistance to other developing countries in making progress. Moreover, China emphasises that it will always belong to developing countries and will always share the same destiny and make progress hand in hand with developing countries, including African countries, and countries of the global South.
The China-Africa Summit was once again triumphantly concluded in Beijing, but it is only a summit but not a climax. Because China-Africa friendship and co-operation is a journey, and it is a long walk with no end in sight. The result is not the best, it is only on the way to getting better and better.
*Prof. Ma, Dean of the Institute of Studies for the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR ), Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He knows the world affairs well, especially the Islamic and Middle East politics. He has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Serhat-Suha-Cubukcuoglu.jpeg)
Dr. Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu
Director of Türkiye Program at TRENDS Research & Advisory, Abu Dhabi-UAE
serhat_suha@trendsresearch.org
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s long-awaited visit to Türkiye on 4 September 2024 marks a major cornerstone in the evolving regional complex. El Sisi’s first visit to Ankara to meet with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds a symbolic meaning amidst the ongoing war in Gaza and sends a clear signal of rapprochement between the former adversaries. The meeting comes on the heels of President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo earlier in March, leaving a decade of political tensions between the two capitals behind.
Managing their differences over a range of geopolitical flashpoints from Libya to East Africa with occasional frictions, Türkiye and Egypt sides pursued a policy of de-escalation and fence mending for the past few years based on a mutual understanding of shared interests, reassessment of geopolitical risks, and economic pragmatism. After many rounds of negotiations, they appointed ambassadors to each other’s capitals in August 2023 as a clear indication of the normalization of diplomatic relations, even if not a realignment on all issues of contention.
This was not a straightforward outcome. Since the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, Cairo and Ankara have supported rival factions in Libya, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean, vying for regional influence to further their political and economic interests. The tide began to turn in 2020 with initial signs of a thaw in relations as both countries signaled their willingness to engage in dialogue. The Turkish government approved Egypt’s development of partnership with the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and made public statements suggesting that they were open to restoring ties with Egypt, particularly in the context of regional issues like the Eastern Mediterranean.
Türkiye’s steps to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood and limit its presence in the country were a major catalyst in revitalizing the bilateral relationship with Egypt. In addition to a mutual desire to enhance economic cooperation amid shifting geopolitical currents in the region, Ankara’s strategic motive aimed to neutralize perceived threats against its core interests in the Mediterranean and draw Cairo closer in the regional standoff in the face of a then-growing energy-defense alliance around Athens and Nicosia.
As steady efforts by both Türkiye and Egypt to move past their differences and restore their ties progressed, Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi put aside their personal feuds and prioritized economic practicalities and prudence over dead-end geopolitical gambits. Initial rounds of exploratory talks between respective intelligence agencies and foreign ministries paved the way for a breakthrough under Qatari mediation at the FIFA World Cup in Doha in November 2022, with a symbolic handshake between the two leaders.
The pace of normalization increased after El Sisi’s phone call to Erdoğan to offer his condolences for the earthquakes that hit Türkiye’s southeast in February 2023, followed by the-then Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s visit to Cairo in March to meet his counterpart, Sameh Shokry. The two presidents had last met at the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India, in September 2023 before Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Cairo in August 2024 to finalize the agenda for the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” in Ankara.
Moreover, the Turkish Navy’s ADA-class corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) made a port call at Alexandria and participated in a joint exercise with the Egyptian Navy’s Gowind-class corvette ENS El Fateh (971) last month to highlight growing bilateral military ties. Finally, Türkiye’s first indigenous training and light combat aircraft, Hürjet, flew to El Alamein airport near Alexandria on 2 September 2024 to participate in the Egypt International Airshow, a rare event in the history of bilateral relations. While Türkiye sees an opportunity to showcase its abilities and access the regional market, Egypt is known to be interested in Turkish defense products to diversify its supplier base and hedge against political risks.
The mutually hurting stalemate of the previous era was unsustainable for several reasons, but most conspicuously due to the worst economic crises for both countries in their recent history. Türkiye, for its part, needs closer cooperation with its largest trade partner in Africa to find areas for partnership in energy, defense, and tourism. Turkish businesses look for export opportunities as tax rises, high interest rates, and eye-watering inflation bite deeper into pockets of low-wage earners and dampen domestic demand. High-tech defense sector exports are on the rise to partially fill in the gap. Turkish firm Baykar’s potential sale of battle-proven TB2 Bayraktars to Egypt is a case in point that offers a viable, cheaper alternative over Western systems but without the conditionalities or political strings attached.
Similarly, Egypt needs to diversify its trade partners and draw direct investment to overcome high indebtedness and the foreign currency crunch. Revenues from the Suez Canal fell by US$2.2 billion, or by 25%, over the last year as attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea forced shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa. This gives a stronger rationale for Cairo to build on Turkish investments in Egypt that have reached US$3 billion and to increase the volume of bilateral trade from US$8 billion to US$15 billion in the next five years.
Both Erdoğan and El Sisi are interested in maintaining stability against criticism and popular unrest. To gain more supporters among their people also requires finding political solutions to conflicts in Gaza, Libya, and East Africa, and mitigating the risk of a wider war in the Middle East through closer cooperation via intelligence sharing, mediation, and shuttle diplomacy. As the U.S.-led unipolar world order evolves into multipolarity, middle powers like Türkiye and Egypt have more autonomy and maneuverability to influence outcomes in their neighborhood. The meeting in Ankara is an opportunity to re-emphasize the importance of regional interdependence, shared interests, and mutual respect for sovereignty against divisive currents of religious sectarianism and micro-nationalism. It coincides with Türkiye’s frustration with the lack of progress in its bid for EU membership and aspirations to join the BRICS, an ascendant economic group that counts Egypt among its members.
At a time of war fatigue and deteriorating political stability in the Middle East, the historic meeting between Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi signifies a profound interest toward collaborative problem-solving amid ongoing conflicts and economic challenges. This renewed partnership not only strengthens their respective national interests but also enhances their influence in shaping a more balanced and multipolar international order.
OPINION
The US policy towards China remains ‘big stick, small carrot’
Published
1 week agoon
01/09/2024By
Ma Xiaolin![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/8462e88c-fe90-40f8-8ec3-726ff09c8533.jpeg)
On August 29, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Jake Sullivan, the U.S. President’s National Security Advisor, in Beijing and gave an important speech on China-U.S. relations. Earlier that day, Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, also met with Sullivan. This high-profile reception reflects China’s significant emphasis on maintaining stability in China-U.S. relations as Sullivan concluded his first three-day visit to China. However, on the same day as Sullivan’s visit, the U.S. announced sanctions against some Chinese entities and individuals involved in trade with Russia and revealed plans to implement new tariffs on China. This combination demonstrates that the Biden administration’s policy towards China remains a “new bottle with old wine” and a “carrot and stick” approach, with the “stick” being bigger and the “carrot” smaller, which does not help improve bilateral relations.
Sullivan’s visit to China is noteworthy for three reasons: First, this visit, which was invited by Wang Yi, director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, marks the fourth strategic consultation between China and the U.S., following previous meetings in Vienna, Malta, and Bangkok. Second, Sullivan’s visit to China for the first time in nearly four years shows that China-U.S. relations under Biden have warmed up slowly and to a limited extent. Third, the fact that the U.S. National Security Advisor visited China after an eight-year hiatus indicates that strategic trust and institutional dialogue mechanisms between China and the U.S. have seriously deteriorated and become dysfunctional; this is not solely the responsibility of one American party or faction but a collective responsibility of both Democrats and Republicans.
Nevertheless, adhering to China’s philosophy of good intentions and “doing our best and waiting for the outcome,” and in the spirit of Xi Jinping’s famous statement that “there are thousands of reasons to improve China-U.S. relations, but no reason to worsen them,” as well as implementing the consensus reached at the China-U.S. summit in San Francisco last November, China invited the U.S. security official to continue strategic communication. Throughout this process, China has consistently and coherently maintained its stance.
During the six sessions of strategic communication totaling eleven hours after Sullivan’s visit, China-U.S. relations, sensitive issues, and major international and regional hot topics were discussed, and some concrete agreements were reached, including timely video calls between the two countries’ military region leaders. Both sides, in their post-communication reports, acknowledged that there were many differences and disputes but deemed the process to be “candid, substantive, and constructive.”
Analysts point out that Sullivan’s visit to China at the end of Biden’s term has a significant mission of facilitating an invitation for Biden to visit China, thus filling the diplomatic gap created by the President’s lack of a visit to Beijing, providing the Democratic Party with a bargaining chip for the White House race, and boosting Vice President Kamala Harris’s chances of success. China-U.S. relations have always been a focal point in U.S. elections, and Trump has recently begun discussing his future China policy. Even if Biden does not visit Beijing, maintaining stability in bilateral relations during this critical two-month period could at least prevent the Democratic Party from losing ground in this area.
However, Biden has become a “lame duck” president by not seeking re-election. Although he still holds decision-making power in foreign policy, Biden is unlikely to fundamentally alter his hardline China policy or change his hypocritical diplomatic style; thus, China is not obliged to meet his visiting expectations. Furthermore, considering the uncertainty of the White House’s future occupant and China’s principle of non-interference in U.S. internal affairs, China is unlikely to invite Biden and reward him in this way.
Biden’s China policy is a mix of Obamaism and Trumpism. Although the initial three-part framework of “competition, confrontation, and cooperation” was adjusted to “investment, alliances, and competition” early in his administration, the underlying tone and essence of weakening, limiting, and containing China have not changed. While the Trump administration preferred direct confrontation with China, the Biden team is more adept at using gloves and forming alliances to counter China.
In terms of strategic security, the Biden administration continues to build and reinforce a “fence with four posts” strategy to contain and encircle China. This strategy consists of the Indo-Pacific Strategy and its four main pillars: the U.S.-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue (QUAD), the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral alliance, the U.S.-UK-Australia nuclear submarine alliance (AUKUS), and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Additionally, the Biden administration places great importance on the toolization, expansion, and globalization of NATO and views China as its number one strategic competitor.
In terms of trade and technology exchanges, the Biden administration has inherited the high tariff policies from the previous administration, implemented measures to restrict investments in China, and exerted extensive efforts to contain Chinese high-tech and innovative companies like Huawei and TikTok. It has also imposed strict controls on Chinese students studying in the U.S., aiming to maintain a decisive technological advantage over China.
Moreover, the Biden administration has used the Russia-Ukraine crisis to levy new accusations against China and impose new restrictions. Specifically, it has tried to disrupt and hinder China-Russia trade using financial hegemony, disregarding Russia’s strong resilience to sanctions. On August 23, just before Sullivan’s visit to China, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a new round of sanctions, targeting 400 entities and individuals, including those from China, for evading U.S. sanctions on Russia. The U.S. continues to wield a new “bullying stick” against China, while the “carrot” presented by Sullivan during his visit is relatively weak and disproportionate. The dual-role performance of Sullivan and Blinken is a typical example of Biden’s diplomatic style.
As the White House race heats up, Biden and the Democrats are facing Trump and the Republicans, who vow to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict swiftly. This highlights the anxious reality of the war’s prolonged duration and Ukraine’s slim chances of victory. Such a situation inevitably accelerates U.S. attempts to create problems in China-Russia relations and trade, making it challenging for the U.S. to fulfill its promise of “responsibly managing” China-U.S. relations, and even causing it to go in the opposite direction.
Sullivan’s visit, within the tense framework of China-U.S. relations, was merely an insignificant stabilizing measure and a performative process. China must consider how to address the risk of adding new wounds to old ones in China-U.S. relations, especially as the U.S. continues to exacerbate issues and worsen bilateral relations by using the Russia-Ukraine conflict to provoke new China-U.S. conflicts.
*Prof. Ma, Dean of the Institute of Studies for the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR ), Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He knows the world affairs well, especially the Islamic and Middle East politics. He has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.
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