Opinion
Recent Turmoil in China’s Neighboring Countries: Causes and Trends
In handling international relations and diplomatic affairs, China has always adhered to an important strategic principle: “major countries as the key, neighboring countries as the priority, developing countries as the foundation, and multilateral forums as the stage.” Neighboring regions are an important foundation for China’s development and prosperity, a key area for safeguarding national security, a top priority in shaping overall diplomatic strategy, and a critical factor in promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. Therefore, stability and security in the neighboring regions are of vital importance to China, and managing relations with neighboring countries stands as a major focus of China’s diplomacy. On this basis, the recent turmoil in neighboring countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia deserves careful study and attention.
Causes of Recent Political Turmoil in Neighboring Countries of China
Nepal. The decree issued by the Oli government to shut down over 20 unregistered social media platforms directly triggered strong dissatisfaction among Gen Z youth, serving as the fuse that ignited this round of large-scale social unrest in Nepal. The direct causes are as follows:
1) Young people believe that the Nepalese government is stifling their freedom of speech.
2) Young people are extremely dissatisfied with the corruption in Nepal and the phenomenon of “second-generation rich” showing off their wealth online.
3) The unemployment rate among young people is high, and the Internet is their main means of obtaining economic income.
4) The Internet is the main communication channel between Nepalese citizens and overseas citizens.
However, these are only the superficial manifestations of the contradictions. The deeper crux lies in the corruption of government officials, the widening gap between the rich and the poor in society, and the struggles between political parties. In this incident, the Nepalese people did not target a single political party or its leader; instead, they directed their anger at all political parties, the entire government, and the entire elite or ruling class. This dissatisfaction stems from their discontent with national development and government governance. Essentially, the interweaving of economic stagnation, disordered governance, and the neglect of people’s livelihood has trapped Nepal in a vicious cycle of “protest-suppression-more intense protest”.
Indonesia. The fuse of this round of unrest in Indonesia was the bill passed by the Great Indonesia Movement Party-to which President Prabowo belongs-in the parliament in August this year. The bill proposed a 50 million Indonesian rupiah (approximately 3,000 US dollars) housing allowance increase for members of parliament. For context, the monthly salary of an ordinary Indonesian wage earner is only 5 million Indonesian rupiah. Coupled with the nationwide “Free Nutritious Meal Program” launched in February (which involves the military engaging in business activities) and the subsequent passage of the Amendment to the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law by the parliament (which relates to the military’s intervention in politics), this series of events triggered widespread public concern and anger over the government’s fiscal direction. The protest groups, which were previously dominated by students, expanded to include a broad participation of workers, the unemployed, and the middle class. While the protests were targeted at specific “policies”, their core criticism was directed at Prabowo himself and the military forces he represents behind the scenes. This is because the new policies introduced by Prabowo fail to fundamentally address Indonesia’s underemployment dilemma or increase Indonesians’ incomes. Instead, they may trigger new fiscal instability and inject uncertainties into Indonesia’s political, economic, and social sectors. Essentially, Indonesia’s protests and the subsequent unrest are the result of long-standing structural issues combined with the accumulation of a series of short-term incidents.
Thailand. The recent turmoil in Thailand originated from the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, specifically regarding the ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple and its surrounding areas, which subsequently escalated into a military conflict between the two countries. In June, Paetongtarn Shinawatra called Hun Sen, the de facto leader of Cambodia, to discuss the escalating border tensions. However, Hun Sen publicly released the audio recording of their conversation. This “phone gate incident” ultimately led to Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s resignation in disgrace. The territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia is a long-standing issue left over from history, but it eventually evolved into a domestic political problem in Thailand. Although the conflict between the two countries subsided in the end under the witness of China and the United States and with the mediation of ASEAN, the fundamental issue remains unresolved. From the perspective of Thailand’s overall political landscape, the influence of the Shinawatra Family has been weakened. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the military conservatives dominating the political situation, Thailand’s “orange-red-blue confrontation” pattern is unlikely to undergo a fundamental change in the short term. Here, orange generally represents the People’s Party, a radical left-wing political party; red stands for the Pheu Thai Party, which has close ties to Thaksin Shinawatra and advocates reform; and blue symbolizes the right-wing camp that upholds traditional values and holds conservative stances. No matter who becomes the prime minister, they may face impeachment over seemingly minor disputes, or even be forced out of office through constitutional means. This indicates that the phenomenon of frequent prime ministerial changes in Thailand will continue for a period of time in the future.
Myanmar. Myanmar has been trapped in prolonged chaos and instability since the February 2021 military coup, which triggered full-scale clashes between the military junta and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).Currently, Myanmar is grappling with four major predicaments. First, it faces economic hardship due to Western sanctions. Second, conflicts have intensified between the military junta and EAOs, as well as between the junta and the “National Unity Government” (NUG) represented by Aung San Suu Kyi, pushing the country toward civil war. Third, the military junta exhibits poor governance capabilities. Fourth, the junta is mired in a legitimacy crisis and remains unrecognized by the international community. As a result, Myanmar has fallen into a situation of “one country, two governments” and “one country, three armies”. The three military forces are the Myanmar Armed Forces controlled by the junta, the Myanmar National Defense Force (MNDF), and the People’s Defense Force (PDF)-both of which are under the command of the NUG. This chaos is further compounded by multiple factors. These include the power struggles among neighboring major powers, the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in color revolutions, and the tangled interests of gray industries and criminal groups. Together, they have plunged Myanmar into extreme disorder. In the past, conflicts between the Bamar ethnic group and other ethnic minorities were the primary source of tension. Today, however, political oppression and economic distress have shattered the confidence of some Bamar people in the military junta. Coupled with pervasive incitement, Myanmar now resembles a volcano, ready to erupt at any moment.
It is evident that the political turmoil in these countries exhibits the following characteristics. First, prior to the outbreak of unrest, these countries had already been mired in prolonged political instability. Cabinets were frequently reshuffled, and governments constantly faced legitimacy crises. Second, while symbolic incidents triggered the unrest, the protests were no longer confined to local issues or specific policies—instead, they spread to questions about the system and institutional flaws. However, the structural problems inherent in these countries’ institutions cannot be resolved by a single incident. Third, young people and social organizations played an increasingly prominent role in these protests. Fourth, symbolic incidents drove the outbreak of demonstrations and their escalation into violent protests. As seen in the aforementioned countries, all witnessed a shift from peaceful assemblies to actions such as storming public institutions, clashing with police, arson, and looting. This evolution has resulted in severe casualties and economic losses.
Political Outlook for Neighboring Countries in the Coming Months
In the next six months, the aforementioned neighboring countries will either enter a transitional government period, kick off election cycles, or undergo cabinet reshuffles—making further political turbulence highly likely. For example,
- According to Xinhua News Agency, Sushila Karki, former Chief Justice of Nepal’s Supreme Court, was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal’s interim government at the Presidential Palace on the evening of September 12. She will lead a six-month transitional government to pave the way for the national election scheduled for March 5, 2026. Karki’s appointment is the result of negotiations between Gen Z protesters, Nepal’s President, and the military. Many Nepali young people have placed unusually high hopes on her, expecting her to end corruption and drive reform. For Karki, addressing key issues of concern to young people—such as social equity, political reform, and economic development—within just six months will undoubtedly be an immense and challenging task.
- On September 5, Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of Thailand’s Bhumjaithai Party, secured a majority vote in a special session of the House of Representatives and was elected Thailand’s new Prime Minister. As noted in relevant commentary, Anutin took office without the support of the Pheu Thai Party, and his term is expected to be short-lived—leaving his minority government highly vulnerable. Anutin has also explicitly stated that the new government will serve for four months, after which a general election will be held.
- Myanmar has long been trapped in civil war. Since the 2021 coup in particular, Myanmar’s military junta has extended the state of emergency multiple times, drawing dissatisfaction from both the public and the international community. However, Myanmar’s leader Min Aung Hlaing has announced that the country will hold an election on December 28, 2025.
- On September 8, Indonesian President Prabowo announced the first large-scale cabinet reshuffle since he took office in October last year. Among the changes, the removal of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani became a focal point of public attention—an adjustment widely seen as a response to the large-scale public unrest in August.
The aforementioned neighboring countries represent a model of “fluctuating political development”. In other words, they have consistently encountered various challenges during the process of achieving national independence and advancing their political agenda, leading to twists and turns in their political progress.For instance,
- Since gaining independence after World War II, Myanmar has been plagued by political instability, driven by power struggles between the country’s military and local ethnic groups. Entering the 21st century, in addition to the conflict between the military junta and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the rivalry between the military bloc and the so-called “pro-democratic forces” backed by the United States has largely shaped the trajectory of Myanmar’s political development.
- Since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990, Nepal has seen 29 prime ministers and two periods of direct royal rule over the past 34 years. On average, each government has lasted only 13 months, with the shortest-lived administration in office for a mere 60 days. To date, no government has completed a full five-year term.
- The alternation between military coups and dynastic politics has been the defining thread of Thailand’s political development over the past 70 years. In the last two decades, forces aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra have won the prime ministerial election six times, nearly monopolizing the position of popularly elected prime minister. In a sense, Thailand has effectively formed a “dual-core structure” dominated by the King and Thaksin: the prime minister’s office is held by members of the Thaksin family or their protégés, while the monarchy remains with the Chakri dynasty. The recent political upheaval in Thailand is a major setback for the Thaksin family, but it does not signal their decline—they could still stage a comeback at any time.
The fundamental cause of the aforementioned political turmoil in neighboring countries lies in inadequate and unbalanced economic development, coupled with a widening wealth gap. These issues remain unsolvable in the short term, so it is foreseeable that public protests in these countries will continue to emerge from time to time. For example,
- According to the World Bank, Nepal only transitioned from a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country in 2019. Its GDP growth rate stood at a mere 2% in 2023, while the unemployment rate and inflation rate reached as high as 10.7% and 7.1% respectively. Neither traditional political parties nor emerging ones have put forward effective measures or delivered tangible results to boost economic development. Meanwhile, frequent scandals involving these parties have further complicated Nepal’s political landscape.
- During Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s tenure, her administration was mired in the “phone call scandal” and domestic political infighting. Measures to revive Thailand’s economy, boost its tourism sector, and her handling of Thailand-U.S. tariff negotiations were all subject to severe criticism. Her lack of experience and inadequate competence became a focal point of domestic public discourse in Thailand, leading to a steady decline in both the administration’s governing legitimacy and public approval ratings.
- Over the past decade, Indonesia has maintained a relatively high economic growth rate and achieved remarkable results in sectors such as the digital economy and mineral downstreaming. Today, it stands as the largest economy in ASEAN and the only member of G20 from the region. With a per capita GDP approaching 5,000 U.S. dollars, Indonesia has been classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank. Even so, pressing issues remain prominent within the country, including corruption, inadequate safeguards for people’s livelihoods, and insufficient national capacity building—all of which have fueled public dissatisfaction.
The political turmoil in the aforementioned neighboring countries will further invite infiltration, interference, and pressure from the United States and Western nations. Prior to the unrest, the governments of Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal, and Indonesia had mostly adopted China-friendly policies. They actively aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative, engaged in infrastructure development, and saw steady growth in trade volumes with China. Against the backdrop of China-U.S. competition and the 9/3 Military Parade—where Indonesian President Prabowo, Nepali Prime Minister Oli, and Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing were all invited to attend—the U.S. and Western countries, having failed to contain China through nations like the Philippines, turned to targeting China’s neighboring states. Their aim is to destabilize these China-friendly governments, create instability on China’s periphery, and divert China’s attention.
While the unrest in these neighboring countries stems from internal factors, the protests were clearly influenced by external forces during their development. This led to peaceful demonstrations gradually spiraling out of control and turning violent, showing certain characteristics of “color revolutions”. From a historical perspective, regions affected by “color revolutions” in the modern world have generally spread along the trajectory of “Eastern Europe → West Asia → Central Asia → East Asia/Southeast Asia”. Key countries on this path are either China’s strategic pivots or traditional China-friendly nations.
Adverse Impacts of Neighboring Countries’ Situation on China
The most direct impact of political turmoil in neighboring countries is that it hinders the smooth advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Currently, the core concept guiding China’s engagement in Southeast Asia can ultimately be condensed into one word: development. To achieve development, infrastructure serves as a crucial pillar—a principle encapsulated by the saying, “When roads are connected, prosperity follows.” Political instability in neighboring countries may lead to sudden policy shifts, contract breaches, and project suspensions. These outcomes directly threaten the asset security and profit expectations of Chinese enterprises, and impede the progress of the BRI in this region.
Political instability in neighboring countries will undermine China’s strategic goal of building a regional economic hub. ASEAN has surpassed the EU to become China’s largest trading partner, and Southeast Asia also serves as a key region for China to advance both the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Political turmoil will weaken the executive capacity of governments in affected countries, slowing progress on cooperative projects such as the implementation of free trade agreements and cross-border infrastructure connectivity. This, in turn, will hinder the economic development of these countries and the region as a whole, as well as the advancement of regional economic integration.
Against the backdrop of China-U.S. strategic competition, the stability and development of neighboring countries are of great significance to China in competing with the United States. Currently, a “Three-World” structure has emerged around China: China and the U.S. each stand as one pole, with numerous “middle countries” in between. Even countries like Vietnam, Singapore, and South Korea—while once leveraging the U.S.’ so-called “Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy” and “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to pursue their own interests—have maintained a fundamental stance of seeking “balance” between China and the U.S., rather than making an “either-or” choice. As China’s economic strength and political influence further grow, the existence of these “middle countries” and their development trends will become more prominent. Winning over more middle countries will thus become a key part of China-U.S. competition. In a word, China needs a stable, peaceful, and developing neighboring environment, and the stability, peace, and development of countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia are conducive to China.
Yang Chen, Executive Director and Associate Professor, Center for Turkish Studies, Institute of Global Studies, Shanghai University
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
Israel’s influence over the United States and America’s strategic impasse
In remarks to the American media, Israel’s genocidal prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, declared: “The war with Iran is not over. The enrichment facilities must be dismantled, and the highly enriched uranium must be eliminated.” He insisted that the permanent destruction of Tehran’s nuclear capacity was imperative.
The broader picture in the Middle East is this: the United States is simultaneously attempting to make Israel more effective, more powerful, and territorially larger, while also attacking those countries that unsettle Israel or resist its regional influence. It fragments them, destabilizes them, occupies them. What occurred in Libya, Iraq, and Syria, as well as the joint American-Israeli aggression directed at Iran, must be understood from this perspective no less than from any other.
We know that Israel exercises enormous influence over the United States. The effects and reflections of that influence are visible even in Washington’s relations with Türkiye. Israel influences the United States to such an extent that America loves whom Israel loves and rejects whom Israel rejects. American presidents hesitate to take a step in the Middle East without first consulting Israel or securing its approval. For that reason, it is especially noteworthy that, in recent months, many American experts, politicians, and commentators have openly said of the attacks on Iran: “This is not America’s war; it is Israel’s war. It is wrong for the United States to place itself so completely under Israel’s direction and follow in its wake.” For the first time, Israel is being criticized this openly and this loudly within the United States itself. For the first time, America’s limitless and unconditional support for Israel is being questioned so directly.
The extent of Israel’s hostility toward Türkiye
Israel’s influence over the United States, as seen in the joint American-Israeli aggression against Iran, also became apparent during the ceasefire negotiations. Israel did everything in its power to prevent the United States from accepting a ceasefire. Although Pakistan succeeded in persuading both Washington and Tehran to accept a regional ceasefire, Israel immediately pressured the United States and ensured that Lebanon was excluded from the scope of the agreement.
Israel’s hostile posture toward Türkiye is likewise striking. By supporting terrorist organizations operating against Türkiye, Israel seeks to force the country to exhaust its energy and resources in prolonged struggles against armed groups both domestically and along its immediate periphery. In this regard, the most functional and useful instrument at Israel’s disposal is the PKK terrorist organization. The United States also supports the PKK. Accordingly, the American-Israeli axis jointly backs structures affiliated with the PKK, namely the PYD-YPG in Syria and PJAK in Iran. It will be recalled that Israel also supported the 2017 independence referendum organized in northern Iraq under the leadership of the Barzani administration. Israel announced that, should the referendum produce a declaration of independence, it would be among the first states to recognize an independent Kurdish state separating from Iraq.
The American economy Is not on a healthy trajectory
From an economic standpoint as well, the United States is compelled to wage wars, launch attacks, create new customers for its arms industry, and secure fresh military contracts. The American economy has become dependent on war. Within the country’s dominant sectors, the military-industrial structure occupies a singularly privileged and strategic position. U.S. public debt has surpassed 39 trillion dollars. Private-sector debt, including household debt, has reached 42 trillion dollars. The budget deficit approached 1.8 trillion dollars in 2025. Last year, the trade deficit climbed to 901.5 billion dollars. At the same time, the country’s productive capacity and competitive strength continue to erode.
By attacking Iran alongside Israel, the United States sought not only to neutralize Iran’s missile capacity and nuclear capabilities, but also to alter the regime in Tehran and, if possible, even redraw the country’s borders. It inflicted severe damage on Iran and struck heavy blows, yet failed to force capitulation. It achieved neither its military objectives nor its political aims.
Another American calculation was this: by striking Iran, which sells 90 percent of its oil exports to China, Washington hoped to open a serious breach in China’s energy supply chain. China obtains nearly half of the oil it consumes from Gulf countries such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Altogether, 45 percent of the oil China uses passes through the Strait of Hormuz. It should also be noted that the Strait of Hormuz is critically important not only for China, but also for Asia’s major economies such as Japan, India, and South Korea. One must not forget that all three maintain close relations with the United States.
While attacking Iran, the United States also sought to weaken China — and failed
While calculating that Iran would emerge weakened, the United States also intended to batter China in the process. It failed. That failure rendered Washington even more aggressive and drove it into deeper panic. For regardless of what the United States does, the trajectory of history continues to favor China.
Consider the figures. In 1990, China accounted for just 1.8 percent of the global economy. Today, that figure stands at 18.5 percent. In other words, over the past thirty-six years, China’s share of the world economy has increased tenfold. The United States, by contrast, accounted for 34 percent of the global economy in 1985; by 1990, its share had already fallen to 26 percent. Today it has declined further, to 22 percent. As can clearly be seen, America’s share has been steadily diminishing. Across the Atlantic, Europe’s decline has been even more pronounced. In 1990, the European Union accounted for more than 27 percent of the global economy. Today its share has fallen to 17 percent. In other words, over the past thirty-six years, the European Union has contracted by ten percentage points.
This decline in Europe inevitably weakens the European Union’s appeal while simultaneously intensifying internal disputes within the bloc. It has also emboldened those advocating withdrawal from the Union. Following Britain’s departure from the European Union through the 2016 Brexit referendum, similar debates have proliferated across Europe. Those advocating France’s withdrawal speak of “Frexit,” while proponents of Sweden’s departure invoke the term “Swexit.”
These debates are not confined to the European Union alone. Parallel discussions are also emerging within NATO, particularly as President Trump publicly humiliates NATO members and even suggests that the United States itself could leave the alliance. Slovenia, for example, one of NATO’s smaller members, is debating the possibility of putting withdrawal from the alliance to a referendum. For a small-scale country, this is undoubtedly a bold and highly consequential discussion.
What ultimately becomes visible is this: as the United States weakens, the fractures within the Atlantic alliance deepen, and disputes within major Western institutions such as NATO and the European Union grow increasingly severe. The joint American-Israeli attacks against Iran, together with Iran’s resistance, are making those fractures even more visible.
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