On the evening of November 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in a televised address that Russian forces had conducted a coordinated strike on Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. As part of the attack, Russia tested a new intermediate-range hypersonic missile, codenamed Oreshnik, which was not equipped with a nuclear warhead. Putin accused Ukraine of using Western-supplied weapons on November 19 and 21 to target Russian military installations, escalating the conflict into what he described as a “global confrontation.” He warned that any form of escalation would prompt Russia to take decisive retaliatory measures to safeguard its national security and territorial integrity.

In response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Putin’s remarks indicated Russia’s intent to escalate the war further and broaden the scope of the conflict. Zelensky dismissed the accusations of using Western weapons, asserting that Ukraine had long utilized such systems in accordance with its right to self-defense under international law. Notably, Russia provided a 30-minute advance warning to the United States before the missile test. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed concern over the development, describing the test as a “troubling turn of events.”

The Oreshnik missile, capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 10, currently lacks any known countermeasure in missile defense systems. While Putin’s announcement clarified earlier Ukrainian claims about the use of intercontinental missiles with a range of 6,000 kilometers, it nonetheless sparked widespread alarm within the international community. By testing the Oreshnik missile in a combat scenario, Russia aims to signal its readiness to enforce its newly revised nuclear doctrine. This move is intended as a warning to Ukraine and NATO, underscoring Moscow’s willingness to potentially transition from a nuclear brinkmanship strategy to actual deployment, including the first use of nuclear weapons.

The conflict in Ukraine reached its 1,000th day on November 19, marked by an escalation triggered by Western support. On November 17, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France jointly announced they would no longer restrict Ukraine from using NATO-supplied medium- and long-range missiles to target Russian territory. In response, Ukraine launched six U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) on Russia’s Bryansk Oblast, with five intercepted and one destroyed.

The Biden administration and its allies are well aware of the risks associated with loosening restrictions on Ukrainian missile capabilities. On November 20, the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv issued an emergency closure, citing the likelihood of significant airstrikes and urging personnel to shelter in place. This precaution marked the first such measure by the U.S. since the start of the conflict, prompting similar actions by embassies from Italy, Spain, and Greece.

Although the missile strikes by Ukraine caused minimal physical damage, their symbolic challenge, potential threat, and humiliation carry significant strategic implications. Should such actions continue, Russia risks losing its frontline advantages, and the security of its mainland could deteriorate further. The ATACMS missiles, alongside the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missiles, possess ranges of 300 to 560 kilometers, placing Russia’s western border regions, occupied territories such as Crimea, and even the Black Sea Fleet within reach. If launched from Ukraine’s border areas, these weapons could potentially threaten Moscow’s outskirts.

In response to NATO’s easing of missile restrictions and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian territory, Putin approved a revised nuclear deterrence policy on November 19, setting unprecedented red lines for the use of nuclear weapons. According to this policy, Russia reserves the right to launch a nuclear strike if it or its ally Belarus faces significant conventional attacks threatening sovereignty or territorial integrity. The document also stipulates that any attack by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear-armed state, will be considered a joint assault, and any attack by one member of a military alliance will be treated as an attack by the entire alliance.

This evolving scenario underscores the intensifying dynamics of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and highlights the potential for further escalation into uncharted territories of global security risks.

Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship policy, long a tool of strategic intimidation, now appears to have been unsheathed, explicitly targeting nuclear-armed nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as well as NATO as a collective entity supporting Ukraine’s escalation of the conflict. Moscow has signaled the possibility of initiating nuclear weapon use, even without suffering a nuclear attack, citing the United States’ precedent for employing nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.

To ensure the clarity of its nuclear messaging, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly addressed Western leaders in English, describing the conflict as entering a “new qualitative phase of confrontation against Russia.” Lavrov emphasized the role of U.S. personnel and data in enabling Ukraine’s use of ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, invoking the 1945 U.S. nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as historical context.

In an apparent move to prepare for potential nuclear contingencies, Russia’s Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Research Institute announced on November 18 the mass production of modular, mobile shelters known as Cube-M, capable of protecting 54 people from nuclear explosions, radiation, and other threats. On November 20, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of Russia’s Security Council and a former defense minister, inspected the Sarov Federal Nuclear Center in Novgorod Oblast to review developments related to the “special military operation.”

Tensions escalated further on November 21 when Russia accused Ukraine of deploying British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles in an attack on Russia’s Kursk region. This marked Ukraine’s continued defiance of Russia’s warnings to avoid further lowering the nuclear threshold, prompting Moscow to conduct its first combat test of the Oreshnik hypersonic missile. This missile, which NATO currently lacks the capability to intercept, underscores Russia’s resolve to implement its nuclear brinkmanship strategy as more than mere posturing.

On the battlefield, Russia has made significant gains, including neutralizing Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast and launching large-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. These measures, timed with the onset of winter, are designed to exert maximum pressure on Kyiv to force concessions. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has accelerated military aid to Ukraine, lifting restrictions on long-range missiles just weeks before a potential transition of power in the White House.

The U.S. administration’s push to expand and escalate the conflict appears motivated by a mix of strategic objectives: reinforcing Ukraine’s capacity to sustain its resistance, gaining leverage in future negotiations, and solidifying a political legacy. Additionally, the strategy may serve to undermine the potential policies of a future Trump administration, complicating any attempt to de-escalate the war. Critics, including Donald Trump Jr., have accused the Biden administration of recklessly escalating the conflict, potentially paving the way for a third world war, driven by the interests of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Should Trump reclaim the presidency, his administration is likely to revoke Biden-era missile permissions granted to Ukraine. However, the combined effects of Biden’s policy decisions and Ukraine’s high-risk military maneuvers could provoke Russia into intensifying its attacks, potentially shifting the battlefield dynamics in Russia’s favor before any Trump-led peace negotiations.

While Russia is unlikely to cross the nuclear threshold unless faced with dire battlefield reversals, recent signals indicate that Moscow is prepared to follow through on its threats. These include targeting Ukraine’s key decision-making centers or, in extreme scenarios, employing tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Such measures, even with controlled destructive capacity, would echo the United States’ decision during the final stages of World War II and underline the precariousness of the current conflict.

The trajectory of this war, therefore, depends not only on military developments but also on the political calculus in Washington, Moscow, and Kyiv. Any miscalculation could lead to irreversible consequences, marking a dangerous turning point in global security.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Li Yunqi, Journalist
CGTN Radio

“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?

Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.

But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.

In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.

These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.

This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.

The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.

The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.

This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.

The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.

Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.

On November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.

Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.

Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.

Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.

Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.

However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.

Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.

Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.

Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.

In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.

After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”

It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.

The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.

Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.

With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.

Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.

Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.