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The formula of Türkiye-Egypt relation: “The past should remain in the past”

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The foreign policy priorities of Turkey, after the presidential elections, can be divided into two categories: to find a position in new Asian initiatives while lowering tensions with the West. The primary factors promoting Turkey’s normalization with its neighbors and Middle Eastern nations are the economic challenges that require this foreign policy direction.

In the normalization train of the Arab states, who assessed the damage after the Arab Spring, Turkey believes there is a wagon set out for it. Following the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, a final settlement in Syria will take up a sizable portion of Ankara’s post-election foreign policy agenda.

On the other side, relations with Egypt have a greater impact, the contacts between Ankara and Cairo are extensive, encompassing Turkey’s contacts with the West in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In this context, we interviewed Dalia Ziada, Director of the Center for Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Studies  regarding how Egyptians considered about the Turkish election process.

  • Egyptian President congratulated President Erdogan. What can that say about a new era which has begun between the two countries?

The Egyptian and Turkish presidents’ phone call in the wake of the elections is an important indication of the sincere intentions of the top policymakers in both countries to start a new page in their relationship. Honestly speaking, there are some giant differences between the perception of each of the two presidents on crucial regional and domestic policies. That includes for example the situation in Libya, the complex maritime conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Islamists’ right for political participation. However, we are seeing an unprecedented determination by both sides to get over these differences and focus on the common ground of economic and geopolitical cooperation.

Ironically, many observers had expressed their pessimism about the potential of the rapprochement process between Turkey and Egypt to succeed as long as the two heads of state, El-Sisi and Erdogan, remained in power. Yet, in December 2022, the two heads of state met in Doha, warmly saluted each other, and then spent 45 minutes talking about the next steps they should take to overcome the obstacles that kept their countries separated for too long. The friendly encounter between the Turkish and the Egyptian presidents cannot be seen as a standard act of courtesy that happened out of sheer coincidence. It was the climax of a year of backstage arrangements by dedicated diplomatic missions and concerned civil society organizations in both countries.

Since then, the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers have been exchanging visits and making public promises about implementing the reconciliation process as soon as the general elections in Turkey are completed. As the election in Turkey has been completed successfully, this week, the two countries need to continue working on completing the reconciliation process for their mutual benefit and the entire region’s benefit.

Mending broken ties between Turkey and Egypt is not only beneficial for the political well-being of the two states. It is equally important for the personal image enhancement of each of the two presidents before their peoples and also before observers from the international community. Egypt is having a presidential election in less than a year. Improving his relationship with President Erdogan will dramatically increase President El-Sisi’s support among the huge Islamist-biased voter base.

  • How the Turkish elections resonated in Egypt. What are the prominent evaluations in the Egyptian press?

In general, the Egyptian people are so impressed and inspired by the democratic process in Turkey and the political maturity of the Turkish people who massively participated in the voting at the parliamentary elections and the two rounds of the presidential elections. We wish – we dream – to see a similar democratic process in the coming presidential election which is expected to happen in mid-2024. In other words, the successful democratic practice in Turkey has set the bar high for election processes in Middle East countries, in general, in countries where people are yearning for democratization, such as Egypt and most North Africa countries, in particular.

On another level, the street reaction to President Erdogan’s victory varies greatly from one citizen group to the other. The majority of the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who are mainly characterized by their religious piety, are so excited. They are celebrating President Erdogan’s victory, as they perceive it as a victory of a Muslim idol over the opposition party leaders who exhibited hatred towards Muslims and Arabs.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian intellectual elite, who are mostly secular, are expectedly not so happy with President Erdogan’s victory. Some of them warned that he will encourage the political Islamist groups – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – to seek political competition in Egypt once again and renew the state of political instability in the country. But, in my opinion, that is a little too exaggerated, especially in light of improved ties between the Egyptian and Turkish presidents in the past few months.

On the political stage, most members of the government, political parties, and media agree that it is time for Egypt to reconcile with Turkey and with its elected president. “The past should remain in the past;” they say. That is a healthy attitude, I think, because it will pave the way for a lot of mutual benefits for Egypt and Turkey in the future, and will also be beneficial to the regions of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

  • How do you consider the normalization process between the two countries to proceed after the election? Which steps could be taken initially?

In their first phone call after the successful completion of the Turkish presidential elections, presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi agreed to immediately proceed with their reconciliation process by elevating their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level. That is a very significant first step for two reasons:

First, it fixes the rift that had been broken between the two states in 2013 and had kept the two countries estranged for ten years. The ambassadors were the first scapegoats to be slaughtered during the dramatic breakup between Egypt and Turkey, then. Each of the two countries immediately declared their mutual ambassadors as persona non grata. Therefore, the return of the ambassadors today is like an official declaration of the end of the decade-long conflict and the beginning of the negotiations phase.

Second, upgrading the diplomatic missions to ambassadorial levels is so crucial to accelerate and facilitate the discussions on critical bilateral and regional issues that represent a conflict of interest between the two states. Right now, the mutual diplomatic missions in both countries are limited in size and scope to the level of chargés d’affaires. Therefore, most negotiations between the two countries had to happen through security channels and intelligence bureaus more often than they happened between diplomatic missions. This caused the reconciliation process to go very slowly in 2021.

The rapprochement process only started to leap when the Turkish ambassador, Salih Mutlu Şen, got hired as charges d’affaires in Cairo, in the second half of 2022. He exerted a tremendous effort to wake the embassy from the dead by directly engaging with ordinary citizens in the Egyptian streets and reaching out to media personnel, civil society organizations, and political groups. That paved the way for a successful meeting between the two presidents, El-Sisi and Erdogan, in November 2022 in Doha. After the presidential meeting, the reconciliation process took a whole new turn.

Therefore, I believe that raising the diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level will allow diplomatic channels to take the lead in the negotiation process, thus accelerating the rapprochement process and improving the quality of the outcomes of future negotiations.

However, that is not enough. There must be direct and personal talks between presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi, at the nearest time possible. It is not a secret that the two leaders adopt divergent – if not contradicting – political ideologies. For example, El-Sisi’s political image is mostly built upon his role in removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013. In contrast, Erdogan’s legacy is entirely based on his image as a successful Muslim leader, coming from a political Islamist party, in a secular democratic system of governance. How the two presidents are going to compromise their ideological differences is so important for the success of the reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey and for ensuring its sustainability in the long term. Such a compromise can only happen through direct face-to-face and heart-to-heart conversations between the two presidents over the coming weeks or months.

In parallel to that, the senior policymakers and government officials from Egypt and Turkey should engage in lengthy discussions about enhancing their areas of cooperation and limiting their areas of conflict. For example, Egypt and Turkey already have a successful record of economic cooperation that can be further improved. In the meantime, there are a lot of areas of potential cooperation between our two militaries, building upon the history of cooperation in the defense industry sector between the two countries. They will also need to discuss their conflicting foreign policies in the Levant region, and the Eastern Mediterranean region, keeping into consideration the concerns and the interests of other key players in these regions, such as Libya, Syria, Greece, and Israel.

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US and Israel weigh Iran strikes after midterm vote, reports say

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22/10/2026

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The US and Israeli defence ministries have drawn up plans for a fresh assault on Iran, with the envisioned offensive under consideration to launch after the US Congressional midterm elections on 3 November.

Citing sources, The New York Times reported that the blueprint anticipates a brief but intense campaign.

As military units step up their drills, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed prospective strike options with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The list of targets encompasses Iran’s nuclear sites, its energy infrastructure, and its arsenals of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Several officials who spoke to the newspaper argued that a new wave of attacks could deal a heavy blow to the Iranian economy, forcing the leadership in Tehran into concessions.

Conversely, other sources doubt whether a resumption of fighting would prove any more successful than the earlier campaign conducted between February and April.

That previous offensive drove energy prices higher and drained US stockpiles of interceptor missiles.

It remains unclear whether US President Donald Trump will authorise the operation.

Domestic political calculations in Israel could also influence the trajectory of the plans, given that the country faces general elections on 27 October.

While some experts speaking to the newspaper contended that Netanyahu could leverage the threat of war to form a national unity government, others pointed to the opposition’s distrust of the prime minister.

Washington fears regional spillover

The US administration also harbours concerns that the fighting could engulf the wider region. On Wednesday, the US State Department ordered non-essential government personnel and their family members to leave Saudi Arabia following attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.

A US military build-up, comprising three aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, and special forces units, is slated to be fully deployed to the region by early November.

The targets under review include the deep underground nuclear facility code-named “Pickaxe”. Trump suggested that the high-yield GBU-43/B bomb, known as the “mother of all bombs”, could be deployed against the site, though experts doubt whether the ordnance can destroy a complex buried so deeply.

For its part, Tehran is preparing for a potential escalation, threatening to broaden its target list. Retaliatory options under consideration by Iran reportedly include data centres and subsea internet cables, in addition to shipping and energy facilities.

Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to an Iranian negotiator, dismissed US hopes of wrapping up a new campaign within 72 hours as a “fantasy”. Mohammadi warned that Tehran’s response would be more severe and unpredictable.

The Financial Times previously reported that an Israeli strike on Iran set for 10 October had been called off because the US president was unwilling to risk a broader conflict ahead of the Congressional midterms.

According to that report, the Israeli military had prepared a multi-day assault on nuclear sites, Iranian government targets, power plants, and civilian infrastructure on Netanyahu’s orders. The strikes had been designed to exceed the intensity of the campaign begun in February.

Washington seeks to secure an agreement from Tehran covering both the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear programme.

“It will either be a deal or a strike,” one source told the Financial Times, adding that an operation could get under way in the coming weeks.

Another official who spoke to the paper suggested that Israeli preparations might serve as leverage to squeeze Iran in negotiations.

Axios also reported that the Pentagon had issued orders to prepare for renewed strikes, though the directive contained no specific date and Trump has yet to take a final decision.

The US and Israel launched their offensive against Iran on 28 February. Iran hit back by targeting US and Israeli assets across the region and curbing vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

Although both sides signed a memorandum of understanding in June that provided for a ceasefire and talks to lift the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, reciprocal attacks between the US and Iran have persisted.

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Netanyahu trails Eisenkot in Israeli polls despite Trump backing

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21/10/2026

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As general elections scheduled for 27 October approach in Israel, the opposition camp led by former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot continues to lead Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in public opinion polls.

Survey data published in the Israeli press on 19 and 20 October reveal that the governing coalition has failed to catch the opposition, despite explicit backing from US President Donald Trump.

However, the current distribution of votes documents that neither wing can reach a governing majority on its own.

Neither bloc reaches the 61 seats needed to form a government

According to a survey conducted by Channel 13, if an election were held today, Eisenkot’s bloc would win 51 seats, while the Netanyahu coalition would take 50.

A Channel 12 poll indicates that the gap has widened slightly, projecting 55 seats for Eisenkot’s alliance and 51 for the governing bloc. A minimum of 61 seats is required to form a government in the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat parliament.

A key factor deadlocking the political arithmetic is the refusal by both sides to form a coalition with parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel. This stance stands as the most tangible obstacle to securing a parliamentary majority after the election.

Channel 12 data shows that overall voter turnout is expected to remain at 72%. The inclination to head to the ballot box climbs to 81% among opposition voters, compared with 74% measured among Netanyahu supporters.

The same poll notes that Eisenkot has widened his lead over Netanyahu by two further points in prime ministerial preferences.

Yashar party climbs after Gantz bows out

A survey published on the Walla news site shows that the balance shifted after Benny Gantz decided to withdraw his Blue and White party from the race. Following that move, Eisenkot’s Yashar party increased its projected tally to 23 seats, while Netanyahu’s Likud dropped by one seat to 19.

Eisenkot’s party and the “Zionist Opposition” bloc it anchors have remained atop the polls for several months.

In an earlier message of support, Trump praised Netanyahu as “a great fighting prime minister and an even greater partner for peace.” Public opinion polls document that this diplomatic and political backing has not proved sufficient to tip the preferences of the Israeli electorate in favour of the incumbent government.

Support for Ben Gvir rises among young voters

Although Netanyahu’s alliance trails in overall strength, far-right figures within the coalition appear to be expanding their grassroots base. Gauged interest in the Jewish Power party of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir is climbing, particularly among younger voters.

Speaking to a study conducted by Agam Labs, affiliated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an 18-year-old student described his shifting preference: “I used to think he was a bit crazy, but then I actually looked at what he was saying, and it all made sense.”

Another Israeli citizen stated that Ben Gvir’s push to arm West Bank settlers gave them “room to breathe.”

Ben Gvir is known for leading settler incursions into the Al-Aqsa compound and distributing military-grade rifles to tens of thousands of settlers since 7 October 2023.

Criticized for escalating violence against Palestinians, Ben Gvir has called for starving Gaza, maintaining military operations in Lebanon, and bombing Beirut. The far-right minister’s militaristic stances also find a political constituency across several opposition parties in Israel.

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Netanyahu unveils security doctrine and regional alliance map

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20/10/2026

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shared an updated security doctrine with the public ahead of general elections scheduled for 27 October.

Announced by the Prime Minister’s Office on 18 October and shaped with contributions from the National Security Council, the work includes a detailed map classifying Israel’s regional allies, adversaries, and spheres of influence.

The new doctrine aims to eliminate elements defined as threats directly through pre-emptive military interventions rather than containing them, to expand buffer zones, and to establish new regional partnerships.

Al Jazeera points out that this approach has effectively been put into practice during Israel’s recent military operations and strikes against neighbouring countries.

Regional blocs and allies classified on the map

The map presented by Netanyahu classifies not only sovereign states into blocs, but also armed groups, de facto administrations, and territories controlled by various forces.

The terms “alliance” and “friend” used on the map do not imply that formal and binding partnerships have been established with all these entities.

The “Hexagon Alliance” on the Israel-United Arab Emirates (UAE) axis and parties considered “friends” of this bloc are shown in blue and light blue shades.

This group includes Azerbaijan, Greece, southern Cyprus, the Druze in Syria’s As-Suwayda province, eastern Libya under Khalifa Haftar’s control, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, areas in Yemen held by the UAE-backed former Southern Transitional Council, and territories controlled by the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.

The “Sunni Diamond Alliance”, formed by Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, alongside peripheral actors, is distinguished by green and light green shades.

This cluster marks Azerbaijan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, areas in Yemen controlled by the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, Eritrea, Sudan, the West Bank, Jordan, the Lebanese government, Northern Cyprus, and Somalia. In Libya, both the Tripoli-based western administration and the Haftar-dominated eastern administration are shown as linked to this bloc.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are defined in red and pink colours. Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, eastern and southern parts of Lebanon where Hezbollah is active, Ansar Allah-controlled areas in Yemen, and Hamas-administered Gaza find a place within this axis. Russia is marked on the map in pink under “friend” status to this bloc.

Orange and yellow markings are also used around NATO members, alliance partners, and actors with friendly relations with Washington. The lines also illustrate the permeability between blocs.

For instance, Azerbaijan is presented with two-toned stripes as a friend of both the Israel-UAE axis and the Türkiye-led bloc, while India stands out as the only actor classified as a “friend” to all parties.

The map in question was reportedly prepared in May by Marc Saxer and Marcus Schneider for the Germany-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which has engaged with Israeli governments since 1978.

Pre-election rhetoric of the “indispensable leader”

Netanyahu is facing voters in a bid to retain power amid ongoing corruption proceedings and continued criticism over his management of the 7 October 2023 attacks and subsequent conflicts.

According to Al Jazeera’s analysis, releasing the security doctrine and map on the eve of elections rests on Netanyahu’s strategy of establishing himself as the only capable leader who can protect Israel.

Backed by electoral support from US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu pointed during his presentation to a potential change of administration in the White House.

Arguing that an administration distant or hostile to Israel could take office in Washington within two years, Netanyahu said his country must expand its network of alliances and become an attractive regional partner because of that possibility.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, noted that this presentation, built on rival blocs and security corridors, deepens existential anxieties within society.

According to Hage Ali, this approach reinforces voters’ perceived need for a tough leader, and Netanyahu is attempting to rally support from populations wary of uncertainty through this reassurance.

Fierce backlash from the Israeli opposition

The publication of the document provoked reactions in Israeli domestic politics.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar Party and former chief of general staff, criticised the work as consisting of “two empty pages filled with slogans that have nothing to do with an actual security doctrine”.

Emphasising that the Netanyahu government was responsible for the “gravest failure and disaster in Israel’s history” on 7 October, Eisenkot said subsequent escalating regional clashes had also left every front engulfed in flames.

Eisenkot argued that the document exposes a lingering strategic vacuum, while the prime minister is reviving fears to divert attention from misleading claims in his election pledges.

Yesh Atid leader and former prime minister Yair Lapid also described the text as superficial.

“Even by Netanyahu’s current standards, which are defined by exhaustion and detachment from reality, this document looks as if it was written using a free version of an AI chatbot,” Lapid said.

Lapid added that a text consisting merely of bulleted headings cannot be deemed a doctrine, and that the effort is nothing more than an attempt to cover up the disasters caused by the prime minister.

The buffer zone model

The buffer zone concept featured in the strategy document is based on Israel establishing direct military control over cross-border territories.

Al Jazeera notes that the current occupation conditions in Gaza and southern Lebanon are practical reflections of this policy.

Mohanad Hage Ali warned that a plan based on making military control permanent could bring fresh conflicts and the risk of ethnic cleansing.

Hage Ali also noted that portraying actors such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar’s forces within the Israel-UAE axis could damage their legitimacy in the Arab world.

Arguing that this choice reflects Netanyahu’s domestic priorities, Hage Ali observed: “What Israelis think becomes more important than the reputation of your allies and the sustainability of these alliances.”

Netanyahu’s proposal for a “hexagon of alliances”, raised at the beginning of the year and covering India, Greece, southern Cyprus, and unspecified Arab, African, and Asian nations, has yet to be formalised.

While international analyses describe the initiative as a diplomatic branding exercise rather than a binding defence pact, observers recall that actors such as India prioritise commercial interests and non-alignment over rigid blocs.

Finally, Hage Ali stated that the presented map will provide propaganda material for the Tehran government and its allies, reinforcing arguments that Israel harbours regional expansion and domination ambitions.

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