INTERVIEW
‘Georgian membership is not on the agenda tomorrow, this is a long-term process’
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Toivo Klaar, the European Union’s (EU) Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, assessed Tbilisi’s relations with Brussels and the EU accession process: “These accession negotiations will last for many years. Georgia’s accession is not on the agenda tomorrow or the next day. This is a long-term process.”
Georgia applied for EU membership in March 2022 and was granted candidate status in December 2023, on the understanding that Georgia takes the relevant steps set out in the European Commission recommendation of November 2023.
So how will Georgia’s EU accession process work? What are the challenges ahead? Where are relations with Russia in this process? We spoke to Toivo Klaar, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia.
Georgia did not impose any sanctions on Russia regarding the Ukraine crisis. What do you think Georgia’s view of Russia as a country that went to war in 2008 and now not sanctioning?
Well, we, of course, are in constant contact, in constant discussion with Georgia. We have a very close relationship with Georgia. And for our point of view, the important thing is that we do not see a circumvention of sanctions. That is, that Georgia is not a conduit for large-scale circumvention of sanctions. And this is important for the EU. We believe that the sanctions are essential. And we are looking to our partners to make sure that their territories cannot be used for circumvention of sanctions. And in that regard, I think we have a good working relationship with Georgia.
Tbilisi is committed to the EU accession process now. So, what are the obstacles and challenges? How do you assess Brussels’ attitude towards Georgia given that it took a lot of time to reach that point?
Well, in the end, the fact that we did agree that Georgia and we did announce that Georgia can become a candidate country and the member states decided so, is only the beginning of a process. In the end, it is down to each applicant country to, then, prove that they fulfill the criteria, first of all, to start accession negotiations and then, of course, to actually finish accession negotiations. So, in that sense, we have opened the door. Now it is up to Georgia to step into the entrance way and then to start working towards actually being ready for membership.
What are those challenges?
I think there’s a lot of challenges. And I think, well, first of all, it is important to fulfill the criteria to start to open the accession negotiations. And then the question is then to start fulfilling all the criteria required for membership. And that’s not an easy process. So, all candidate countries have had a fairly hard time in preparing for membership. And this is no different for Georgia. Therefore, it will be incumbent on the Georgian authorities to take this seriously and to recognize that it is now really for the Georgian authorities to prove that Georgia is ready to proceed first to the next phase and then to actually succeed in the accession negotiations.
Newly appointed Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said that further rapprochement with China is one of his government’s priorities. How does Georgia benefit from a rapprochement with China, according to you, while walking this road towards the EU?
Well, I think that every country has, of course, a right to be able to develop relations with third countries. And the same goes for Georgia. The question is that when it comes to alignment of foreign policy, that is obviously something that we’re looking for from a candidate country that we believe it is important that in the end. The EU and its member states talk with one voice and have a similar approach to third countries and to issues in world politics. And so, in that regard, I think, it is perfectly all right for Georgia to develop a relationship with China, which is all the EU member states have relationships with China. But the important thing is that we expect that the overall Georgian foreign policy approach will be more and more harmonized with that of the EU at large.
Tbilisi also sees economic cooperation with Russia as “highly beneficial”. How would you interpret the West’s reactions to Georgia on this issue?
The important thing again is that there is no circumvention of sanctions. That in that sense, there is no situation where a third country provides or allows the transit of goods or provides the supply of goods that we believe should not be supplied to Russia because of its war with Ukraine. And in that context, again, I think it is important that we see that Georgia does make sure that no sanctioned circumvention is taking place in the context of trade with Russia.
Do you think this is going to be a criteria for the EU to consider Georgia’s membership?
Well, again, first of all, Georgian membership is not on the agenda tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. This is a long-term process. It’s the process of accession. First of all, there has to be a decision to open the accession negotiations. And secondly, those accession negotiations are going to take many years. So, in that regard, I think it is purely theoretical to start talking about whether something is somehow a condition or not for actually joining. But I mean, something specific, in general terms, of course, what we do expect, again, what I mentioned before, is that a candidate country does ensure that its foreign policy becomes more and more harmonized with that of the European Union.
Under what conditions do you think it’s possible to unite with Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Could you tell us about the recent steps taken to resolve this issue? What is your perspective?
Well, I don’t think that this is an easy process. I think the key actor in this regard is, of course, Russia. And Russia should abide by the six-point agreement of 2008, where it committed itself to withdrawing its troops to the positions that were held prior to the conflict with Georgia. So, if Russia does that, if Russia also withdraws its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and actually starts playing a constructive role in helping Georgians, Abkhaz and South Ossetians to overcome their conflict, then, I believe, it is possible to resolve this. As long as Russia remains obstructionist and the way it is right now, not keeping its troops in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and insisting on not fulfilling its obligations under the six-point agreement. As long as that’s the case, it will be difficult to actually resolve those conflicts. Russia is a major hindrance in this regard.
There’s a judgment that Georgian society is caught between the Soviet culture, the Soviet heritage and Western influence. As a part of the Western alliance like EU and also being an observer at the same time would you agree with that judgment? Do you think is there such polarization in the country among people?
Well, I think we see that an overwhelming majority of Georgians want to join the European Union. Obviously, there will be cultural differences and different views in this context in the context of this process. But I believe that this is a process of harmonization that will last for some time but that will ultimately end with coming closer and with also society accepting and learning to value the norms that the European Union is living by. And that is, I think, also an important aspect for the Georgian government to ensure and to promote that European values and understandings are promoted in Georgian society. And I think that probably more can be done in this regard also as far as pluralism, as far as really encouraging divergent views and tolerance for minorities is concerned. I think that’s a very important aspect of European culture. And I think there is still some work to be done in Georgia.
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Hanno Pevkur, Minister of Defense of Estonia spoke to Harici: “It’s still too early to talk about final peace, we all understand that before the peace, there has to be a ceasefire. We want to be part of these negotiations if that comes onto the table.”
Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur answered Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions about the latest developments in the Russia-Ukraine war and the ceasefire and peace negotiations.
Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna, in a statement, said that European leaders should be ready to send military forces to Ukraine in support of any peace deal Donald Trump devises between Kyiv and Moscow. Have Estonia and its allies taken any concrete steps in this direction?
Well, of course, we all understand that it’s still too early to talk about final peace, and we see that the battlefield is not in this moment yet. Of course, we’ve always said that we have to help Ukraine as much as we can and as long as we need. Regarding the peace, of course, we all understand that before the peace, there has to be a ceasefire. When the ceasefire is there, it has to be guaranteed. And we also understand that it has to be guaranteed together with the international allies. So, this is why we have not excluded anything at the moment. We want to be part of these negotiations if that comes onto the table. It’s not on the table yet, but, of course, we always said also that there cannot be any peace negotiation or any peace without Ukraine. And if Ukraine is ready for this, then, of course, we are ready to support them.
Would you be ready to send any troops to Ukraine for help?
When we talk about guaranteeing the peace, we have not excluded that. But also, we have said very clearly that before these peace negotiations start, Ukraine has to have a stronger position. And when Ukraine wants to have a stronger position, then all the Western allies have to send as much help as we can. And we have to deliver all the possible equipment that is in our position in order to help Ukraine and also to train the Ukrainian soldiers. So, as I said, it’s still a bit too early, but we all understand and see that there are rumors going on about different options. But our position is very clear: that no peace can happen without Ukraine. And if there will be some kind of guarantee or peace and guarantee mission, then, of course, all the Western allies together have to be part of that.
As part of Estonia’s recent education reforms, all first graders will be taught in Estonian. Russian language is totally banned from Estonia, and the authorities will begin inspecting schools to ensure compliance with the new law on the transition to Estonian language education. What is your reaction to the reactions from Moscow regarding the situation of the Russian minority in the country? Because it is their mother tongue, and if you think about some constitution of human rights and education rights, it is kind of some contradictory position. I know it is not your field, but I think you can comment because this decision is coming out of the clash with Moscow.
We have also Ukrainian minority, we have Finnish minority, we have Latvian minority, we have many other minorities—tens and tens of nations who are living in Estonia. So the state educational system is in the Estonian language, and this is the point. Of course, we have also international schools—for instance, European school—which is giving the studies in English. But when we talk about the national school system, then this is in Estonian and will be also what we would like to see in the future is that it continues. Regarding any reactions from someone, Estonia is an independent country. We are making our decisions on our own, and this is the answer. There is no other understanding.
With the election of Mr. Trump, statements and road maps for a negotiated settlement in Ukraine have begun to be exchanged. From Tallinn’s point of view, what kind of solution do you envisage for the establishment of peace in Ukraine?
As I said in the beginning, there cannot be any peace without Ukraine. Secondly, what is very, very important is that Russia has to take responsibility for all these war crimes: deporting the children, killing civilians, raping women, etc. This is what we see in Ukraine. This is what has been also proven by facts and collected evidence. And Russia has to take responsibility. So that means that the peace, when it’s done or when it’s concluded, has to be a fair peace. Also, Russia has to pay for all these war crimes—not only about the crimes, but also the destruction they have done in Ukraine. That means, you know, I believe it will be quite a long peace negotiation if it will be conducted one moment. But again, our position is very, very clear. So when I put it into three, like bullets: Firstly, no peace without Ukraine. Secondly, Russia has to take the responsibility. Thirdly, this peace has to be a fair peace with all these different elements.
What could the “fair peace” be?
As I said, first, Russian responsibility. Russians have to pay for the destruction. But also, of course, the Western countries will never accept the occupied territories because this is about the Ukrainian territorial integrity. This is about their right to be and to use their own land. Russia cannot choose one moment from history and say that this is the true history. Because in history, also, Turks have been much more into Russian territory. We’ve seen the Lithuanian-Polish Kingdom being much further, etc. So, it’s not the point that you can choose one specific moment from history and say that this is the only right moment. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the territory of Ukraine was put on paper as it is today. We can never accept that someone is coming to take a piece of your land by force.
In the Baltic Sea, Estonia was the first country to start searching and observing the Shadow Fleet of Russians, which are trying to carry Russian oil to Europe using so many different straits and seas in Europe. Estonia was raising this question and trying to catch international attention and support from Europe, and finally, Russia got the 15th level of sanctions. In Tallinn, there was a summit participated in by Nordic-Baltic 8 countries, and the decision came out that other European countries will support this initiative, too, to search for Russian Shadow Fleets. Now, you have more substantial decisiveness on this topic. Would you like to give any comments after what happened in the summit?
Again, when we talk about the Shadow Fleet, this is one more proof of Russia not respecting international law. We all know that the Baltic Sea is important for Russia transporting the oil out of Russia. But nevertheless, we see that they are doing that not according to international maritime law but they are using exactly the Shadow Fleet, etc. So, it is important that the international community will react to that and then say very clearly that if there is something which is against international law, then we have to react.
How do you find and how do you understand that it is Russian oil?
When it comes from Russia and Russian ports, which oil is it?
There has been damage to telecommunications cables under the Baltic Sea. The failure of the C-Lion1 cable on the Finland-Germany line has fuelled suspicions of sabotage. Who do you think is responsible for this incident? Do you think it is an accident or sabotage?
First, we have to wait for the official investigation outcome. Of course, we have some doubts. Of course, there are some rumors circulating around the news. But when we really want to point the finger to someone who is guilty, we need to have proofs, we need to have evidence. And this is exactly for the investigation to find out. So, let’s wait for the investigation results. At the moment, the understanding is that behind the destruction of the cable in the Finnish Gulf a year back, and now between Finland and Germany and between Sweden and Lithuania, these both vessels—or both ships—were belonging to Chinese companies. So now it’s up to the investigation to find out all the details behind these.
Don’t you have an assumption or suspicion?
We might have many assumptions, but as a minister, I cannot go into the rumors or speculations. So I might have a personal opinion, but at this very moment, it’s not relevant.
In September, Major General Andrus Merilo, Chief of the Estonian General Staff, told the Helsingin Sanomat newspaper that the Finnish and Estonian commands intended to develop a plan to prevent the Russian Navy from operating in the Baltic Sea in the event of an ‘extraordinary situation’. How realistic is the prospect of war in the region?
Well, we see that Russia is hostile toward its neighbors. We saw that in 2008 in Georgia. We saw that in 2014 in Crimea. My understanding is that this was a preparation for a larger war—what we see at the moment, already close to three years, in Ukraine. And of course, we understand, and when we look at Putin’s speech in Munich about 15 years ago, a bit more, then from there you can see the intentions. There should be, from the Russian perspective, a gray zone between NATO and Russia, that there should be no enlargement of NATO, etc. So, when you read this speech, then you understand what the ambitious goals of Putin are.
On the other hand, when we also take the officially approved plan from the Ministry of Defense of Russia, the reality is that close to the Estonian and Finnish border, Russia wants to put a new Army Corps—approximately 50,000 to 60,000 troops, a lot of new tanks, a lot of new equipment. So, when this is not an escalation toward NATO and Western countries, what is it? And this is why, of course, we have to prepare. We have to send a very clear message to Russia: don’t even think about attacking NATO, because NATO will act as one, and NATO is stronger—definitely together as Russia.
Tell me—why does Russia have to use the buffer zone outside of Russia? Russia can also build the buffer zone inside of Russia. Why do they think that the buffer zone can be taken by force, by military force, from the other country, from the other nation?
Maybe they think that Russia doesn’t have to pay for it. The country that has to be in a nonaligned position is preferring a military international organization, to be a member of that organization. Then that country needs to pay—maybe this is the Russian perspective, I don’t know.
Look, NATO is a defensive organization, not an offensive organization. NATO has no intention to attack Russia. NATO is defending its members, and it should be each country’s sovereign right to decide on which side of the civilization they want to be. Do they want to be on the side of Western civilization or Russian civilization, where you don’t have any human rights, any freedom of the press, where people are put in jail just for coming onto the streets? So, this is the choice, and every nation should have the free choice. And again, if Russia wants to build the buffer zone between the NATO countries and Russia, it can definitely do that inside of Russian territory—no problem.
Coming to this PYD issue—Türkiye is a very strong member of NATO, has a very powerful army, and was the only country that fought ISIS on the ground face to face. All other countries were providing aerial support but Turkish soldiers were fighting against ISIS on the ground. Now still, Pentagon and the U.S. still advocating that the YPG is a very good option to fight with ISIS. And our correspondents asked about this: Türkiye is giving you guarantees to fight ISIS with its full presence. Don’t you trust Türkiye? Why do you have to keep an organization that Türkiye sees as a terror group? Why do you still keep supporting them? They said, ‘We are not changing our strategy to fight against ISIS.’ What do you think about NATO? Jens Stoltenberg, the previous Secretary General, was always very supportive of Türkiye. But the members of NATO—including Germany, France, and the U.S.—these countries who say ‘Türkiye is a very good ally,’ leave Türkiye alone in this YPG terror issue.
No, again, we have to separate each member state or each country’s actions outside of their own territory and what NATO is doing as an alliance. NATO as an alliance is strictly focused on defending its member states and its territories. So, this is the focus of NATO. When we talk about also—and when we take the new approved regional plans for NATO—then these plans are defense plans, not offense or attack plans. This is why I believe that we have to keep it separate: what NATO is and NATO tasks, compared to the member states’ individual foreign and defense policy. Because when we take also the United States and Estonian troops in Iraq at the moment, then we are there together with our allies on Operation Inherent Resolve. So, Operation Inherent Resolve is led by the United States. This is why we have to keep it separate—it’s not a NATO mission. Yes, we also have a NATO mission in Iraq where Estonia is also contributing, but we have to keep these issues separate. This is why I don’t want to go into bilateral relations between Türkiye and the United States, but I’m happy to elaborate and happy to discuss what NATO is for and what NATO stands for.
But what is NATO? NATO is composed of states.
Yeah, but you know this is exactly what we have to understand that there are differences. When we talk about also, for instance, Poland—Poland was attacked by migrants coming from Belarus. So, this is not the question of a defense alliance or the question of NATO. This is the question of police forces, border guards, etc. Also, terrorism is not considered as a military problem at the moment. Terrorism is dealt with as an internal affairs matter, also in the United States, for instance. So, this is why, of course, we have to understand and separate very clearly the different tasks of different organizations.
Türkiye is also a member of many organizations. Estonia is part of many organizations. And, for instance, we can also say that, let’s say, the European Union. The European Union has 27 member states. Why is it not defending against military threats? Because it has been very clearly stated that NATO is taking care of the military’s defense posture and the defense, and the European Union is mainly for freedom of trade, freedom of people, etc. This is why we have to make the difference, and I believe also every person—doesn’t matter if this person is in Türkiye or in Estonia—we have to make a difference why different organizations are formed.
You’re traveling to Northern Iraq. Can you tell us the reason for your travel? What is your defense and military cooperation with the Central Iraq or Northern Iraq government? What’s happening there? Why do you have your troops there?
Yes, as I said, we are participating in the mission called Operation Inherent Resolve. We know that this operation will be reformed. Of course, we have to wait because the lead country is the United States. We’ll see when the President Trump administration starts its term, then probably there will be a change in the mission. But at the moment, yes, Estonia has around 100 troops in Iraq on this mission, and we are helping to secure the peace in this region. So, this is what the allies are doing. We are not there because we just went there. We are there because the Iraqi government asked us—or actually asked the United States—to provide that kind of service, that kind of security guarantee. And this is why the United States formed Operation Inherent Resolve.
After the anti-EU post-election and pre-election legislative initiatives in Georgia, there was a strong reaction from the Baltic states to the authorities in Tbilisi. I think you also sanctioned some of their politicians. In light of the events in Georgia, what do you think of the comments about a short-term escalation of tensions in Russia’s neighborhood, such as in the Baltic and the Caucasus?
Well, as we see also from Syria, that Russia is not able to handle many crises at one moment. So, of course, Georgia is different because they’ve been manipulating the Georgian nation and Georgian people for a long time already. We’ve seen many proofs about the violation of election freedom. Unfortunately, the regime today in Georgia is not ready to conduct or to bring new elections onto the table. And, of course, this is something that the Western countries are not approving because we get a lot of information about different violations of the elections. So, this is why, of course, first and foremost, it’s for the Georgian people to come out and say that this is not the way they want to live and this has not been the election result they voted for. And, of course, this is very clear proof of how Russia is trying to affect different neighbors by also intervening in elections. We saw that in Romania lately. We saw that in Moldova. Also, during the Estonian Parliament elections, we had one party that got some orders from Russian services. So, this is, unfortunately, what we see. And, of course, again, this is very clearly showing that Russia is not respecting the freedoms of its neighbors. And, you know, the only way to fight this is to come out openly with this and to show what Russia is actually doing—how they are influencing not only European elections but also, as we’ve seen, trying to manipulate U.S. elections.
Very shortly about the Suwalki Corridor—it was very much spoken about in recent months. When I came to Tallinn, I spoke with Mr. Marko Mihkelson. Do you still see the Suwalki Corridor as a threat, as an open risk for Russia because of this Belarusian case? Like, it is a very, very small place, but it can cut all the connection with the NATO region and the European Union region. Do you seriously have such hesitation, or is it just one more place to be protected from Russia?
Well, we all understand that Belarus is fully under Russian control, especially when we talk about military actions. So, we see that during this ongoing war of aggression in Ukraine, and as Russia also has the Kaliningrad enclave, then, of course, we all understand that the corridor called Suwalki in between Lithuania and Poland is critical for us. It is an important connection, and as it is so, of course, we need to do everything we can in order to keep it free.
But do you believe there is really a risk? Because not so many people in Russia speak about it, but officials in the Baltics speak about it.
You know, when we come to this neighborhood, and as we are here in Istanbul at the moment, when you talk about the Turkish Straits or Bosphorus Strait—so, is it a problem for Türkiye when it will be closed? I believe it is. It’s the same with the Suwalki Corridor. So just put it in local conditions, local understanding, and you will understand how important it is.
INTERVIEW
‘What we need from HTS is not to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs’
Published
1 week agoon
22/12/2024Ziad Makary, Minister of Information of Lebanon spoke to Harici: “What we need from HTS is not to interfere in Lebanon’s internal problems or affairs.”
After two months of intense and destructive fighting, Israel and Lebanon have reached a ceasefire. Within 60 days, the ceasefire was to be implemented. According to the agreement, Israeli troops will withdraw from the designated areas, the Lebanese Army will deploy in the areas vacated by Israel and ensure security. A large-scale reconstruction work will be carried out due to mines, unexploded ordnance and destruction of infrastructure in the region. United Nations UNIFIL forces will maintain a presence in southern Lebanon in accordance with UN resolution 1701.
However, Israel has violated the ceasefire more than 100 times so far, which is considered unacceptable by Lebanon. Lebanese Information Minister Ziad Makary answered Dr Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the latest situation in Lebanon.
I would like to start with the latest situation in Lebanon. Even though there is a temporary ceasefire, Israel is not implementing what was promised. Can you tell us about the latest situations, and I’ll ask my other questions?
Well, as you know, we had a deadly war for about two months. As a government, we negotiated a ceasefire for long weeks, and in the end, with the help of the Americans, we reached an agreement to have a ceasefire and to implement it 60 days after the announcement.
In the meantime, there is a military plan: the Lebanese Army will start deploying where the Israelis will withdraw.
There is a lot of work to do. The army will handle this mission because there are many mines, unexploded munitions, destruction, closed roads, displaced people, and a sensitive military situation between Israel and Lebanon.
Israel has violated this ceasefire more than 100 times, and this is, of course, unacceptable. Lebanon is respecting the ceasefire, and we count on the committee formed when the ceasefire was announced.
I am talking about the Americans, French, Lebanese, UNIFIL, and Israelis. Their first meeting was held this week on Monday, and we hope this ceasefire will be implemented seriously as soon as possible because we have a lot to rebuild after the destruction we faced from Israel.
If Israel cancels the ceasefire and continues attacking Lebanon as it did recently, what is Lebanon’s current position? Hezbollah is stepping back from Syria. Maybe more of their troops will return to Lebanon. What about Lebanon’s own army?
I don’t think this ceasefire will be broken. We will have incidents daily, but I believe it will be a serious ceasefire.
I suppose we will have a complete withdrawal in about 40 days from all Lebanese territory. The Lebanese Army will deploy its forces, and we will apply 1701 as required, including southern Lebanon.
Of course, this especially applies to southern Lebanon because 1701 states that weapons are forbidden in southern Lebanon, and the only weapons will be with the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL.
What do you think about the latest situation in Syria? Now Bashar Assad has gone to Russia, and there is a so-called interim government trying to prepare for a transition period. Hezbollah is back. Iran is stepping back. There are no more Russian soldiers, and now a group called HTS is a candidate to shape Syria’s future. What will Lebanon’s position be toward Syria?
So far, we don’t have any relationship with HTS. What I would like to say is that the people of Syria must choose whoever will rule Syria.
What we want in Lebanon is to have good relations with the future government of Syria because we have many interests. We don’t need a fanatic government there.
We need a neighbor who respects Lebanon’s sovereignty and diversity. This is all what we need.
We will do everything to maintain the necessary relationships to continue ties between our countries as neighbors. We have a lot of interests in the economy, trade, social, political, and even border issues to resolve.
We have millions of Syrian refugees and many problems that need solving with whoever rules Syria. We don’t and should not interfere in Syria’s affairs and at the same time we will not let them interfere to us, too.
I hope and will work to ensure a decent and fruitful cooperation with the future Syrian government.
HTS is on the terrorist group list of the United Nations, and several countries have designated this group as terrorist. But in the near future, things may change. Turkey has appointed a charge daffairs for its embassy to continue diplomatic relations.
What will Lebanon’s position be? Do you consider HTS a terrorist group, or are things changing as they lead the country toward elections?
We don’t have a system of considering groups as terrorists or not. I already mentioned that we will assess the aims of Syria’s future government. What we need from HTS is not to interfere in Lebanon’s internal problems or affairs. Till now, as I told you, we are not the only country that cannot predict how the future of Syria will unfold.
The system theoretically should continue. We are continuing to deal with what we have—for instance, the embassy of Syria in Lebanon, the borders, and other matters. We are waiting for the new state, the new administration, and the new government to emerge, and we will proceed from there.
Will you run your diplomatic mission in Damascus?
Currently, it is not active due to everything that has happened. We will wait, but we hope to have good relations with whatever government emerges because it is in both countries’ interests. After Assad’s departure, Israel has invaded more of the Golan Heights. What is Israel’s position in the region? Many believe their presence may not be temporary.
For Lebanon, it is essential that Israel withdraws from the territory it has conquered. As you said, Israel is not only in the Golan Heights or southern Syria but has also destroyed Syria’s army, air and naval forces, and everything.
This puts Syria in a difficult position. We don’t know what kind of army or security forces the new Syrian government will have or how they will deal with Israel. Everything is unclear now. It’s been just five or six days since all this happened, and we need time to see how things settle down.
One question about Lebanon’s internal politics. After the port blast, you had difficult times with economic problems, and the presidential issue is still ongoing. How did it affect the current situation?
The system in Lebanon is not designed to facilitate such processes. It’s a complex system involving parliament, religion, political groups, and more, making electing a president challenging. It is not easy to elect a president because of our law which is causing things happen late, especially the elecion of president. However, we have a session on January 9, and we hope to have a president soon. We cannot rule a country without a president. Yes, we can manage it; it will continue, it won’t die, it won’t vanish, and it won’t disappear. But it also won’t have prosperity. We cannot develop our country, we cannot build it, and we cannot establish a new, modern administration that reflects the aspirations of young Lebanese people those who are ambitious and want to create a modern country with the protection of freedom and the beautiful Lebanese culture, along with the admirable image of Lebanon.
We hope to have a president, a new government, and renewed relations with Syria, as well as a ceasefire with Israel. In the long run, personally, I am somewhat optimistic about what will happen to Lebanon.
Last question: Do you think remaining without a president during this period makes it harder for Lebanon to address these challenges?
Of course, it has a serious impact. As a caretaker government, we cannot make major decisions, recruit new talent, or pass laws. The system cannot function without a president. We are losing talented young people who are leaving Lebanon, which is not in our interest.
INTERVIEW
‘China will be the primary international issue for the second Trump term’
Published
2 weeks agoon
18/12/2024Guy B. Roberts, one of the most influential figures in the Trump administration, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and former Deputy Secretary General at NATO, spoke to Harici: “China will be, I think, the primary international issue for the United States. The various statements by the leadership in China indicate that there will continue to be a strong push to fully integrate Taiwan within the Chinese political structure. I think that will be one of the big challenges in the first year of the Trump administration.”
Under former President Donald Trump, Guy B. Roberts served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and was former Deputy Secretary General at NATO for weapons of mass destruction defense.
Guy B. Roberts answered Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the expectations for the second Trump term in terms of foreign and domestic policy.
I know that you have been closely working with Donald Trump in his previous cabinet as you were Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense. You know how his policies were before, and you may foresee how it’s going to continue from January. What is your primary expectation at this point?
Well, it’s actually quite exciting because I think that President Trump has really made it clear that he intends to follow through on all of his campaign promises. He’ll likely focus almost immediately on the immigration issue—the illegal immigration into the United States—and also on revamping the tax structure to maximize tax reductions for middle-class Americans.
On the international side, I fully expect him to put pressure on allies and partners to do more for their defense and meet the commitments they’ve made regarding spending 2% or more of their GDP on defense. That was a key element in his first administration, and I actually was with him at NATO headquarters, where we talked at length about the need for our allies to step up. Once he gets his team in place, I see those things being critical upfront. Of course, the U.S. system is such that it’ll take probably six months before that happens.
Let’s talk about Ukraine. Trump promised to end the Ukraine war, stating he could do so in 24 hours. His aides continue to repeat this claim today. Considering the war is taking a negative turn for Ukraine in recent months, will Trump be able to bring peace to Ukraine? Also, do you think Russian President Vladimir Putin will accept a ceasefire or a peace deal?
That’s the real challenge. I think it’s unrealistic to expect that he can resolve this in 24 hours, as President Trump claims. It’s much more complicated than that. However, I do think he will engage directly with President Putin. I can see that happening, where he’ll pressure Putin to agree to a ceasefire and take steps toward resolving this issue.
Ukraine may not be enthusiastic about giving up territory, but I do think that given the situation in the situation such as the introduction of new weapons systems, the recent intermediate ballistic missiles that Russians fired on Ukraine, Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk region of Russia can set the stage for quid pro quo type of negotiation where each side gives up something at least at the beginning in return for a ceasefire. Peace, I believe, is going to take much longer than 24 hours.
President Biden, nearing the end of his term, has made some significant moves that could complicate things for Trump. For instance, he signed a bill allowing Ukraine to use U.S.-made long-range missiles against Russia. Secondly, he sanctioned Gazprombank, which is crucial for Russian international money transfers and energy trade. Several other banks are placed in sanction list. What is Biden trying to do just before leaving his post? Is he leaving some bombs in the hands of Trump?
I believe that’s certainly in the back of his mind. He’s setting the stage for successful negotiations, whether he wants to give Trump the credit or not. His administration will probably deny that. I do think that given the kinds of things the long-range fires that he’s now authorized in, the additional increases in military hardware that he’s agreed to and his encouragement by other allies to do the same, is helping and will help in arriving at a successful ceasefire negotiation.
About Trump’s upcoming second term presidency, European leaders were not really enthusiastic and they’re not happy. Some of them are not happy that president-elect Trump is going to return to White House. What kind of reorganization do you anticipate from Europe to a new Trump era? From an alliance standpoint, the Secretary General Rutte has been a very enthusiastic supporter and a campaigner, if you will, just like his predecessor, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to see that the Allies do more. I think overall they have been doing more. I mean, we’ve had, I believe, over 21 countries now meeting the 2% military spending on GDP, and the others are on the road to doing so. The newer allies, like Finland and Sweden, have shown very robust spending on defense and training, even to the point of producing manuals for the population to undertake certain activities in the event there should actually be a war. That, I think, has deterrence value. The message being sent by the alliance is that we are an alliance, and that if you cross that line and attack any of us, you have to face all of us. Likewise, we have seen in the Indo-Pasific region reaching out to building a coalition with partners in the region including of course Australia and New Zealand but also Vietnam. We just recently sold them some training jets and other countries as well. The Trump Administration will probably be less focused on Alliance building and more focused on one-on-one relationships that are self-supporting in terms of defense. That might be a shift in what we’ll see happening between the Trump and Biden administrations.
You mean that Trump will prefer a personal diplomacy instead of a corporate diplomacy.
Yes, I think whereas Biden administration has been building coalition for example we have The Five Eyes, a group of countries reaching out to build a new interconnected relationship very similar to similar actually to what was attempted back in the late 50s and early 60s of something called SETO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization which was tried to mimic the NATO alliance. For a variety of reasons SETO didn’t work out and it fell apart.
But now that be in light of the Chinese aggressive behavior and it’s claims over the South China Sea and other areas, its belligerency against Taiwan and its refusal to agree to or accept the opinions by the international court of justice on the law of sea claims, the Hostile relationship they’ve had with the Philippines, so outlining islands all of that makes that particular region a potential hotspot. The recognition that the only way that there’s going to be an ability to stop and deter China from continuing and acting in that way is to build these relationships. And I think you’ll see a lot of enthusiasm for doing so.
Talking about personal diplomacy and personal relationships how would you describe a potential relationship between Trump and Xi Jinping, Trump and Macron, Trump and President Erdogan?
That’s a very important area, and I’m not sure exactly how the Trump Administration is going to proceed. However, I believe that President Trump places a lot of value on personal relationships with national leaders. That’s why I think he’s more comfortable and will be more comfortable building one-on-one relationships as opposed to forming large partnerships.
I would expect to see much more of this one-on-one approach, with Trump meeting with various presidents and prime ministers throughout the region that he considers key to establishing strategic stability, whether it be in Southeast Asia, the alliance partnership, the Mediterranean, or elsewhere. I think we can expect him to be much more proactive in building personal relationships than we saw in the Biden Administration.
Okay, talking about Trump and Erdoğan, and the cooperation and challenges between the US and Turkey, let’s discuss that a bit. Especially the PYD issue, which is a significant issue for Turkey. The US is trying to beat one terror group by using another, particularly as Turkey is a NATO ally but the US still ignores regarding Ankara’s concerns about the PYD. That’s Turkey’s number one issue.
What do you think about the F-35 issue? Could Turkey rejoin the F-35 program? What do you think about those main issues? And finally, how do you see Turkey’s role as a facilitator in the Middle East, especially in bringing peace to Palestine and ending the war with Israel?
Well, you have just asked me a question that could take the entire day to answer.
Looking at the relationship with Turkey and its leadership, I believe Turkey is a critical partner in ensuring peace and stability in the region. At the same time, there is a lot of turmoil. One major issue is the apparent strengthening of Turkey’s relationships with Russia and China in term long term, which is inconsistent with NATO’s position on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Iran’s support for Russia by providing drones and missiles that we’ve already seen used on the battlefield. There’s also significant political turmoil within Turkey at the moment, you know better than I. One unresolved issue is what to do with the two million displaced people as a result of various wars in the region. I think President Trump would be very interested in meeting with Erdoğan to discuss resolving the Syria problem. Trump is likely looking for an exit strategy that would allow US forces to leave that particular area of the Middle East. During the campaign, he referred to such areas as “Forever Wars”, where the US is militarily involved in various regions globally. Regarding Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups, those are major challenges. I was very hopeful that the Abraham Accords would be the approach that the whole region would take. This, again, was a Trump initiative during his first administration, involving countries like Israel, the UAE, Sudan, and I believe Morocco. They signed a peace treaty in which they promised to work together to develop economically, scientifically, and in engineering, as well as to maintain and create an environment for peace and security in the region, free from terrorist activities and hatred that have plagued the past several decades. To the point where I saw a country like Saudi Arabia even considering joining this process, it is now all on hold as a result of the Hamas attack on Israel and the response by Israel, which many people consider far excessive to what had happened.
It’s really interesting. I interviewed you in Ankara before, as you may remember. It was a one-hour interview, and we discussed this topic. I don’t want to repeat the same thing; perhaps our audience can watch that episode again. But again, like all the Western discourse, they repeat the same thing as if everything started with the Hamas attack on October 7th. Nobody talks about what has been happening since 1948. Okay, I’m the moderator and the presenter but I want to contribute to this discussion. I really don’t understand why, if the US government is willing to make peace in the region with the Abraham Accords and bring everyone together for a peaceful period, the US does not address Palestine’s need for freedom according to UN resolutions. Under these oppressions since 1948, Palestine has not been given that freedom. The two-state solution is still pending. How many people were injured or killed on October 7? I don’t know the exact number. But now, according to international organizations’ reports, almost 100,000 people have died in Gaza, including those in the West Bank. The West Bank is still witnessing numerous settlements. What do settlements mean? They are taking people’s lands and homes, creating a situation where peace cannot exist. Why doesn’t the US push Israel to implement the two-state solution to bring peace to the Middle East?
Well, that’s a very good question and needs to be addressed. The challenge is that I wouldn’t go back to 1948; I’d go back to 1917 and the Balfour Declaration, which created the environment we are in today. That declaration guaranteed a Jewish homeland. The problem is that you’ve got groups like Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and others with charters stating that their goal is to exterminate Israel. When that’s a primary goal, it’s very difficult to sit across the table and negotiate a peace agreement. If we got beyond that and all players in the region agreed to Israel’s right to exist, I personally believe that all the issues you mentioned would be subject to negotiation. I think the Israelis would give up quite a bit to have a guarantee that there wouldn’t be hundreds of rockets fired into their territory and that there wouldn’t be terrorist attacks all the time.
Recognition of Israel as a legitimate state with a right to exist would open the door to negotiations. I think everything else would be subject to negotiation, and I think they’d give up a lot. But when you’re at that particular point, and again, you have groups engaging in massive human rights violations—and I certainly wouldn’t put it past the fact that both sides have committed law of war or humanitarian violations—it creates an environment where people are consumed with hatred. As a result, that attitude gets passed on to the next generation, and 10 years from now, we’ll have another intifada or a similar kind of situation where people are already at each other’s throats. To sit here and say, ‘We can come up with a solution’ is absolutely right—we can come up with a solution. But there’s no willingness on the part of anybody to sit down and say, ‘Okay, let’s come up with a good deal.’ And that just doesn’t seem to be happening. I wish it would. I think the Trump administration, again, with President Trump’s personal intervention, has a great opportunity to negotiate some of the things you mentioned as enticement to bring everyone to the table. We’ve had people come to the table before. In the past, we sat down and tried to hammer out agreements regarding weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East or arms control. We came up with some great ideas—they’re all out there. It just takes political will to implement them.
Unfortunately, there is no political will to do it. So, we just have to keep trying and build consensus among the region’s leaders that it’s in their best interest—and the people’s best interest—to sit down and craft a lasting peace. But whether that will happen, I have to say, after 40 years of looking at this issue, the likelihood is that we’ll face another cycle of violence in 10 years. That’s just the way it is in that region.
But we have the reality in the International Criminal Court, which announced an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, because of war crimes. This is the reality—we’re talking about dozens of thousands of people. We always say 50,000 people, but it is almost 100,000 people, and that is really insane. If you don’t want war in the region, the main issue is: with whom do you have war? With Iran, Lebanon, Hezbollah? You don’t like the Muslim Brotherhood, etc., but all of these are connected to the issue of a free state of Palestine. It’s not happening this way. It’s not going to happen. I don’t want to go deep into this discussion because it has no end.
So, in our last five minutes, I’d like to go back to Trump’s foreign policy. He was really pro-Israel in his first term and moved the embassy to Jerusalem. But later on, he also had negative moments with Netanyahu. For the 2024 campaign, he has garnered greater Israeli support this time around. How will this affect his policies towards Iran and the Middle East in general?
Well, yes. I mean, the primary player in the area right now is, in fact, Iran, because it is recognized as the number one supporter of international terrorism. This has been recognized by the Gulf Cooperation Council. They support Hamas and Hezbollah, both identified as international terrorist organizations. Coupled with the firing of rockets from Iran into Israel, which in turn creates an Israeli response, the spiral of violence continues. This needs to be stopped, and there are ways to work towards peaceful coexistence. But as we know, the rhetoric in Iran is “death to Israel, death to the United States.” That kind of attitude does not make peace negotiations conducive. I wish I could give an answer that says, “This is the solution, and it will be embraced by everyone.” But, as you said, we could talk for hours about the problems and challenges in the Middle East. For example, in Lebanon, I’m watching what’s going on, and I’m actually thinking back to 1982 when I was in Lebanon. We had an attempt to maintain peace among the various groups, and then we had the Israelis invading Beirut, creating a siege situation, cutting things off. It feels like déjà vu all over again. How can we stop the cycle of violence? It really is beyond me. I’ve been dealing with this issue for a long time, and every time we came up with solutions, those solutions were quickly ignored. Hatred then became prominent. So, we just have to keep trying and, hopefully, someday we’ll get to that point.
Okay, let’s hope. My last question is on relations with China. Trump’s cabinet has hawkish figures who are strongly against China. Trump promised a 60% tax on China, which is a big concern. How do you think U.S.-China relations will progress under a second Trump term?
China will be, I think, the primary international issue for the United States. China’s long-term strategy is clear, and President Xi has made no secret of his ambition for China to become the world’s hegemon by 2049. They made statements to that effect and don’t hide it. They have a very aggressive policy of reaching out to multiple countries to build relationships through loans and various other economic incentives. They have also made claims in the South China Sea, which are very destabilizing. These claims are inconsistent with recognized international law of the sea. They have tried to harass many countries in the region over their territorial sea claims.
This has resulted in countries like Vietnam building a strong relationship with the United States. During one of my last trips as Assistant Secretary of Defense to Hanoi, I found the Vietnamese very enthusiastic about working with the U.S especially on defense sector. Other countries in the region feel the same way due to Chinese encroachment and bullying. China has also built a strong global network, acquiring port facilities in the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal area, the Straits of Malacca, and other choke points. They have created a very strong presence which in a hostile environment could be a way to strangle the world economy. We see these kinds of things happening and recognize within the United States that there are activities on the part of China that have a negative impact on national security and the collective security relationship around the world. I think we’ll see a much more active and proactive confrontation of China on these issues. There are some very big flashpoints or hot points, with Taiwan probably being the number one at the moment. The various statements by the leadership in China indicate that there will continue to be a strong push to fully integrate Taiwan within the Chinese political structure. I think that will be one of the big challenges in the first year of the Trump administration.
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