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Areas of cooperation in Turkish-Chinese relations: Is it better late than never?

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The fact that global production and the resulting shift in values towards Asia has led all countries in the world to revise their policies towards the region, especially towards China. While the US under former President Barack Obama was defined as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ country, the attitude towards China in national security documents has gradually shifted from cooperation to competition. In line with a policy that the US interpreted as an attempt to mitigate risk and China as an attempt to ‘encircle’, the Washington administration preferred to build alliances with regional actors while raising tariff walls and accelerating the technology war. As a result of this preference, platforms such as AUKUS and QUAD were witnessed, while discussions on NATO’s expansion towards Asia or Asia’s NATO gained momentum.

Europe’s response to the rise of China, which has traditionally been part of the security architecture built by the US, has oscillated between competition and cooperation. While powers such as France, which defends European autonomy, and Hungary, which is on the periphery, have adopted a more cautious approach, Berlin is pointing to competition, provided that economic interests are protected.

The approach of the countries of the Global South to the rise of China has so far been in the opposite direction to that of the US and its allies. Countries that were founded as a result of the struggle against colonialism, that do not want to imitate the development prescriptions of Western countries, that come from different historical backgrounds and have different forms of governance, have seen China as a window of opportunity. China, which is seeking more friends in different parts of the world in the face of US policies of repression, would not only make more generous offers to these countries, but would also give them room to manoeuvre against Washington.

A new phase in China and Turkish-Islamic relations

It can be said that the Middle East and Central Asia are among the regions that are adapting to this reality, which has been described as a multipolar world. In the Middle East, the Sino-Arab Summit, the first of which was held with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia in 2022, and the Sino-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Forum, the tenth of which was held this year, are seen as symbols of politically institutionalised cooperation, while the expansion of BRICS with the countries of the region sums up the dimensions of the growing economic bond. It is also noteworthy that China has been given the role of “quarterback” in regional conflicts, in line with its growing political prestige and economic weight. Having hosted the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, China’s weight is also felt in the Palestinian issue. While the foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation preferred China as the first address on their Palestine tour, Hamas and Fatah sat down in Beijing for unity negotiations. It is known that the Palestinian factions, which made goodwill statements at the first meeting, decided to continue their meetings in China.

Central Asia retains its special position among the regions where relations with China are deepening. China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (C-C5), which have been meeting at foreign minister level since 2020, met in Xi’an, the starting point of the historic Silk Road, to raise their cooperation to the level of heads of state in 2023. Economics was not the only topic on the agenda at the summit, which heralded investment in the Central Corridor, which runs from China to Europe and includes Turkey. Announcing a $3.8 billion grant to the countries of the region, the Chinese side also stressed that they were a “community of shared destiny” with Central Asia, while the five countries underlined their support for Beijing’s foreign policy narrative.

Is Turkey too late?

Although Ankara has acknowledged China’s growing global influence, especially in regions that are among Turkey’s main areas of interest, the policy development process has been relatively slow. In 2019, Turkey launched a process called the ‘Re-Asia Initiative’ in the region, where China plays a central role, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained the need for this policy by saying that ‘the pendulum of history has shifted to Asia’. Moreover, President Erdoğan, like other countries of the Global South, expressed the fact that the international system does not give them enough representation with the words ‘The world is bigger than five’ and did not hesitate to say that multinational platforms are insufficient to solve acute global problems.

Despite the accuracy of Turkey’s observations, which have become globally recognised, it has become clear in the meantime that the steps taken by Ankara do not correspond to an improvement in the institutional order. Turkey’s engagement with the Western world, as opposed to the Middle East and Central Asian countries, as well as its lowered economic expectations and disputes over the Uighur issue, have played a role in such a picture. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu expressed this difference at the end of 2022, stating that the Turkish delegation did not want to go to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, as China had planned. In addition, the fact that most of the Turkish media’s coverage of China consisted of Western-based translations and that Turkey was not sufficiently recognised in China and China in Turkey were among the factors affecting the policy-making process.

Can Minister Fidan forge a new equation?

Like other developing countries around the world, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey still has time to adjust its relations with China to the new realities. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China on 3-5 June can be seen as a valuable start in announcing Ankara’s position on issues of interest to China.

In his statement here, Minister Fidan said that Ankara and Beijing overlap on many aspects of international relations, including contentious areas such as Palestine and Ukraine; that Turkey supports China’s constructive relations with Asian and Middle Eastern countries; and that Turkey appreciates China’s role as a mediator, such as in the Saudi and Iranian peace processes.

Perhaps more importantly for China, Minister Fidan said of the arm-wrestling between Washington and Beijing: ‘The fact that the markets established by the dominant powers in the last century are changing hands again under fairer, more competitive market conditions is an outcome that must be accepted. Minister Fidan’s assessments that there is a global transfer of power and that it should be peaceful, as well as his reiteration of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, were seen as positive factors.

What are the areas of cooperation?

While Minister Fidan’s presentation of Turkey’s position sets the framework for relations in the new era, the main external developments that require cooperation between Ankara and Beijing are the Palestinian and Ukrainian crises, and the risks and opportunities that arise on trade routes.

On the Palestinian issue, Turkey and China, which advocate a ceasefire in the short term and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital based on the 1967 borders in the long term, could play an active role in uniting the Palestinian factions to mature this solution. It is not known whether Turkey and China are coordinated, but it is obvious that they are taking parallel steps in this direction. Indeed, the Hamas delegation that travelled to Beijing for merger negotiations with Fatah had issued a statement to the international press from Istanbul the day before, saying that they wanted to unite under one roof.

Ukraine is also on the list of crises where Turkey and China can play an equation-changing role. Ankara and Beijing, which can simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Russia and Ukraine, have converging views on opposing the sanctions policy, representing Russia in peace negotiations and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries. China, which has been conducting shuttle diplomacy between Moscow, Kiev and European capitals with a 12-point road map, and Turkey, which previously brought the two countries to the brink of peace in Istanbul, could play a mediating role if the warring parties, especially Ukraine, show the will to do so.

The wind blowing in Turkey’s favour on global trade routes also stands out among the dimensions of cooperation in the new period. Indeed, after the Ukraine crisis, the Northern Corridor from China to Europe via Russia lost its popularity, while the Southern Corridor, which includes Iran, became more fragile as a result of geopolitical tensions. On the other hand, the Central Corridor, centred on Turkey, has become more attractive as the Central Asian countries have largely completed infrastructure works and simplified customs procedures. The Caspian Central Corridor, which cuts the distance between China and Europe by 2,000 kilometres compared to the Northern Corridor, will remain on Turkey’s agenda in the new period. In addition, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underlined Turkey’s comparative advantage by expressing the expectation that the Belt and Road Initiative will be harmonised with the Development Road. By stating that the Belt and Road will also provide opportunities for China, Ankara has made clear its position that China should become a partner in global trade rather than an outsider as desired by the West.

The address for cooperation: BRICS, committees, international summit and leaders’ meeting

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s speech during his visit to China, while not as clear as Ankara’s position on hot topics and the listed areas of cooperation, also provides clues as to the platforms that can be used.

Minister Fidan’s statement that he will attend the BRICS meeting in Russia can be seen as a turning point in the institutionalisation of economic relations. BRICS, which came to the fore with President Erdoğan’s statements in 2018, represents 31 per cent of the global economy with the latest participation and includes 6 of the 10 largest oil producers in the world. The fact that BRICS, which is gaining weight every day against the G7, the so-called club of the rich, can respond to some of Turkey’s urgent needs with instruments such as the New Development Bank is one of the facts that Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek cannot ignore. In fact, in a statement he made in 2017, Minister Mehmet Şimşek said, “In order to benefit from the projects they are going to give, you have to be a member. For this reason alone, we are seriously considering becoming a member’.

The ‘intergovernmental working committee’ announced by Minister Fidan during his visit to China is the second notable step in the context of institutionalisation between Ankara and Beijing. The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek, Turkey’s Minister of Treasury and Finance, to head this committee will help achieve results in many areas, such as correcting imbalances in the huge volume of trade, increasing investment in nuclear energy and new technologies, and further activating the Middle Corridor.

While the first meeting of the intergovernmental working committee is expected to be held in the coming months, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Turkey. Announcing Turkey’s invitation, Foreign Minister Fidan said: “We would like to host Chinese President Xi Jinping in Turkey this year. I have once again conveyed our president’s invitation to our Chinese colleague. Xi’s invitation to visit Turkey may serve to open a new page in terms of regional order as well as bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the Uighur issue may complicate the parties’ engagement, which has been delayed compared to the Middle East and Central Asia. Minister Fidan’s visit added the definition of the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar to the disagreement over terms such as ‘crime, criminal, freedom and separatism’ that has been a problem between Turkey and China for some time. While Minister Fidan defined these two cities as Turkish and Islamic cities during his contacts, this thesis is not accepted by China. According to the White Book published by the Beijing administration, the region is presented as a continuation of ancient Chinese culture, while it is argued that the Uyghurs have separated from the Turks over time.

Although there has been no official or unofficial (through the media) reaction to Minister Fidan’s preference for a different definition from China’s, it would not be surprising if it caused some discomfort.

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Israel on the brink

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Israel’s nearly year-long operation in Gaza to oust Hamas and rescue hostages has yet to produce its full results, but it appears to have started a war with Hezbollah. At the time of writing (in the early hours of Wednesday 25 September) it had not yet launched a ground operation. Indeed, it did not seem certain that it would, as Hezbollah continued to respond to the intense air strikes on southern Lebanon over the weekend as if it had not been affected.

Although not fully reported in the mainstream media, there were reports that Hezbollah had intensively shelled northern Israel, particularly military targets and the city of Haifa, forcing Israel to evacuate (or shelter) civilians from a significant part of the northern region. In addition, Tel Aviv was also attacked with rockets in response to Israeli air strikes, all without the effectiveness of Israel’s much-vaunted Iron Dome air defence system.

Hezbollah is no pushover

In short, Hezbollah is no pushover, as it has proved in every armed conflict with Israel, and is unlikely to be this time. This organisation, which was born/strengthened in the early 1980s when Israel invaded Lebanon and has repeatedly clashed with Israel, is neither a regular army nor an ordinary guerrilla organisation. Hezbollah, which can use both methods depending on the course of the war, has always forced Israel to retreat by inflicting heavy losses on it, and did so again in the last war in 2006.

If Israel were to launch a full-scale ground operation now, the result would probably be similar. But we see that it is avoiding this as much as possible. In the last clashes between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, which lasted 33 days, Israel started its operation with an intense aerial bombardment, without paying any attention to civilians, children and infants, as it is doing now; but as soon as it started a ground operation, it withdrew with great losses.

So much so that Hezbollah destroyed many Israeli tanks, shot down Israeli helicopters, made it difficult for the helicopters to operate, and was rumoured to have shot down some of the F-16s. On one occasion, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah even went on live television and announced that ‘right now our resistance forces are going to hit an Israeli warship’, at which point a Hezbollah missile quickly neutralised the Israeli warship. As Israel continued its intensive aerial bombardment of civilian settlements despite all warnings, Hezbollah began to attack Israeli settlements, and Hezbollah attacks, first on towns/cities near the Lebanese border, eventually reached Tel Aviv, which Israel never expected. Meanwhile, many of its soldiers were captured by Hezbollah and Israel was forced to withdraw from the war in silence.

The current military-political situation is even more in Hezbollah’s favour

What is the military and political situation now compared to 2006? Hezbollah seems to be in a better position in a war that is starting now than it was in 2006. First of all, it cannot be said that Israel achieved the desired results from its operation against Hamas, which turned into a genocide in Gaza. Genocide against civilians does not necessarily mean achieving the political-diplomatic results of using military force. For example, none of the stated aims of the war, such as rescuing hostages or eradicating Hamas, have been achieved. It is clear that a terrible genocide has taken place, but Hamas is still operational in Gaza and will and will try to harm Israel through ambushes and other methods, taking advantage of a ground operation that Israel will launch against Hezbollah.

On the other hand, another event/development that the Turkish media has almost persistently ignored provides other clues. A few days before Israel remotely detonated the pagers and radios used by some Hezbollah members, the Houthis in Yemen, who have become an important part of the axis of resistance forces, managed to hit Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile from two thousand kilometres away.

This was particularly important because hypersonic missiles are not even in the West’s inventory. The most advanced missiles in the world are in the inventories of Russia and China, but Iran has also managed to build one. This missile, fired from Yemen, travelled more than two thousand kilometres across the Red Sea, probably passing through or close to the American navy, and hit Tel Aviv in eleven minutes. The reason for the ineffectiveness of Israel’s air defence system, Iron Dome, is that such missiles are virtually invisible on radar and/or the West does not have missiles fast enough to counter them. In the event of a ground war with Hezbollah, it is highly likely that the Yemeni Houthis will launch more of these missiles, putting Israel in a difficult position. We know that the Western naval force deployed against the Houthis is hardly effective.

It should also be noted that there are elements of the Axis of Resistance in Iraq and Syria. We must expect them to take part in the war to some extent, with drones in their hands, and to side with Hezbollah against Israel. From a political point of view, the conditions are much less favourable for Israel than they were in 2006. First of all, Israel, and especially Netanyahu’s government, has become a pariah in the eyes of world public opinion and many governments. Even in the United States, both public opinion and a significant part of the American elite are highly critical of Israel.

At first glance, this would not have much impact in a land war between Hezbollah and Israel, but it would undoubtedly have a negative psychological impact on Israeli citizens. It should be noted that since the Hamas attack of 7 October and the subsequent operations in Gaza, a significant number of Israeli citizens, many of them also citizens of other countries, have left the country. This process must have been accelerated by the rockets fired by Hamas and the ease with which Hezbollah can fire rockets at Israel, especially in low-intensity conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. Regionally, perhaps the only change in Israel’s favour since 2006 is that the Syrian state has been weakened by a dirty war that Turkey has supported against its own interests. And in the coming days we will have a better idea of how this will affect a war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Multipolarity and the stabilisation of the collective West

The inevitable emergence of multipolarity as the new world order will have important consequences for the region and for Israel, because multipolarity means balancing the superiority of the collective West, primarily in the military sphere, but also in the economic and technological spheres, the first signs of which we are already seeing. Particularly at a time when the United States is engaged in a power struggle with Russia on the one hand and China on the other, its aid and support for Israel may not be as extensive as it is during election periods. In fact, as some Jewish organisations have noted, issues such as the rapid change in the profile of the American electorate and the focus of voters on the economy, which is not doing well, may have a serious impact on Israeli-American relations in the near future.

It may not be possible for Israel to continue its current policies of genocide, massacre, ethnic cleansing, war, etc. in the medium term if it is squeezed between the forces that define themselves as the Axis of Resistance, led by Hezbollah, on the one hand, and the Arab states that are waging a political/diplomatic struggle against the current Israeli government, which rejects a two-state solution, on the other. In short, Israel is moving rapidly towards its own demise.

There is no doubt that in order to reverse this process, a complete ceasefire in Gaza is needed, followed by serious and comprehensive steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. For example, if Israel had fully implemented the two-state model in the Oslo peace process, the Hamas issue would have remained an internal matter for the Palestinian state and the Palestinian political leadership. And Hezbollah and the other Axis of Resistance forces and Iran would have lost legitimacy, which is the most important element in the struggle against Israel. But the question is: can a forward-looking, visionary government in Israel, with the support of the people, initiate such a peace process? At the moment, unfortunately, we are going through a period in which hopes are very low.

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China-Africa summit and the collective West: Alas, China has Africa in its grasp

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China’s diplomatic moves over the past year have set alarm bells ringing in the collective West. First, the normalisation of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries on both sides of the Gulf last year (May 20-23), after decades of conflict, was a major diplomatic achievement, even if the West tried to underestimate this big splash… Because at the time of the Shah, a close friend of the US, Iran was on one side of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and the Arab states on the other, and almost all of these states were allies of the US (except for Iraq under Saddam Hussein), but the Washington administrations could not reconcile these friends/allies and did not even try to do so properly…

Since US strategies are not based on reconciling states and sharing resources according to the principles of justice, they did not try to do so between Turkey and Greece. It was more in line with America’s geopolitical logic to exploit the contradictions between its allies in the Gulf, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. We can clearly see that they are still doing so between Turkey and Greece.

China’s achievements in regional diplomacy were not limited to this. In May this year (2024), China and the Arab League countries met in Beijing at the level of foreign ministers. Some Arab states, notably Egypt, attended the meeting at the level of heads of state. China’s appeal to the Arab countries and especially to the Palestinians as an ‘oppressed nation’ seemed to be enough to win their hearts. China’s harsh criticism of Israel and the West’s collective sins in Gaza not only represented a line consistent with its previous policy, but also helped win the hearts of all Arabs. Moreover, the fact that China looked at the Palestinian issue from the perspective of the Arab side and had no hidden agenda of its own made these diplomatic initiatives both possible and fruitful.

About two months later (23 July 2024), the news broke that China had brought together and reconciled fourteen Palestinian resistance organisations, mainly Fatah and Hamas, to put aside their differences and fight together. In media terms, the news was a bombshell. None of this could/could have been done by the US or any other Western country, because it was almost impossible for Washington to achieve such a success, as the US has never respected the legitimate rights of the Arabs/Palestinians and has always been thought to act with the idea of forcing or deceiving the Arabs/Palestinians.

Africa Summit disturbs the collective West

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which came on top of all these successful diplomatic moves, seems to have disturbed the peace of the former colonialist Western countries, especially America. In fact, the summit in question has been held eight times since 2000, the ninth in Beijing (4-5 September 2024). There is no doubt that one of the main reasons why this summit has become so prominent in the media is the extraordinary strain on the collective West caused by the establishment of a multipolar system and the fact that the American-led unipolarity is inevitably coming to an end. Another reason must be the above-mentioned consequential diplomatic moves by China, which will play a decisive role in the multipolar world order.

To put it bluntly, the collective West’s analyses and assumptions about both China and Africa over the past three decades have been completely wrong. What we were told about China and Africa in 1996, when I first went to the US for about a month on an American government programme, seems to describe quite well what is happening today… Throughout our trip, which included a week in Washington, a week in San Jose, the capital of Silicon Valley, which was very famous and important at the time, then five days in Minnesota and five days in New York, the briefings we received in both official institutions and think tanks and lobbying firms, we were told that Africa was not on the West’s radar, that China was a country that produced socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc. that China is a country that produces socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc.; that it is a free market economy. China is a country that produces socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc.; if it continues to develop with a free market economy, it will experience great changes and transformations, and it will not be able to sustain the current planned economic system.

However, in the thirty years that have passed, China has not remained a country producing cheap textiles and children’s toys as expected, nor has Africa continued to struggle in its own way, off the world’s radar. In particular, China’s investments in Africa and its economic and trade relations with African countries have put the continent on the world’s radar. African countries whose resources had been largely exploited by the former colonial powers, France and Britain, and whose regimes were ruled by dictatorships supported by these states, were introduced to a new international trade and economic practice by the new opportunities offered by China and the political pressure it did not exert.

China, once thought to be a country of simple textiles and light industry, and now thought to be ethnically fragmented, has become one of the world’s giants. Its economic and planned development programme, based on manufacturing and exports, has not only made it the world’s second largest economy, but has also made China a world leader in high-tech production and innovation. As many experts have pointed out, China is no longer competing with the United States and Europe, because China has won this race by a landslide.

One of the most important factors favouring China over Western countries in Africa is the fact that Beijing does not make political demands when granting loans or building infrastructure facilities. Moreover, it does not exploit the disagreements and contradictions between states, as the Western powers have always done, and it does not organise minorities within each state and incite them against their own states under the pretext of democracy, human rights and freedoms. These dirty methods, which have been used everywhere except in the states of the collective West, have cost many countries dearly and have even caused turmoil that has led to the disintegration of some of them.

China’s thesis that there should be cooperation between civilisations, intensive contacts between peoples, and that each civilisation should learn from the other, in contrast to the West’s insistence that one civilisation and culture is superior to all others, is also appreciated by Africans. When this civilisation initiative, which is one of the most important factors behind China’s successive successes in its Middle East initiatives, is taken together with the global security initiative and the global development initiative developed by Chinese leader Xi, one can better understand why Beijing has a complete advantage over the collective West in Africa.

Ninth forum

This year’s ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) also witnessed new initiatives from Beijing, which has built tens of thousands of kilometres of roads, thousands of kilometres of railways, numerous schools, hospitals and factories on the continent. For example, China announced that it had allocated fifty billion dollars in new investment/financing to Africa. On the other hand, it has announced that it will allow Africa and the world’s poorest countries to sell their products to China at zero tariffs, both of which represent serious investment in the real economy and indicate that the areas of cooperation between China and Africa will broaden and deepen.

Just as a strong, developed and consolidated China has emerged, while Washington has squandered its own resources and wasted trillions of dollars on wars led by the American deep state and largely instigated by the Israeli lobby, which in the last thirty years, under the pretext of democratisation, has made many countries, notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, vomit blood under the guise of democratisation stories, African states have discovered that they have an alternative. It is likely that Africa, where states such as Russia on the one hand and Turkey on the other, in addition to China, are trying to create a sphere of influence, is now on the world’s radar and will not go away.

But this radarisation will take place in a way that excludes the patronising attitude of the collective West that says ‘Africa is not on our radar’. As one Zambian analyst succinctly put it, American officials are landing at Chinese-built airports, driving on Chinese-built roads and holding meetings in Chinese-built buildings to tell Africans why they should not cooperate with China. The African peoples, now on the world’s radar, seem to be putting the propaganda of democracy, freedoms, etc. into the mouths of Westerners, especially those who turn a blind eye to Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and will continue to cooperate with China in real economic areas with increasing volume and enthusiasm.

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Israel does not leave Lebanon alone

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In different parts of Lebanon and even in Syria, pagers belonging to Hezbollah members were blown up simultaneously, followed the next day by radios. This new generation of attacks, organised on an unprecedented scale, caused astonishment and horror not only in Lebanon but throughout the world. Although Israel made no statement on the matter, Hezbollah blamed Israel for the attacks and said it would retaliate.

Similar assassinations have been carried out by intelligence services in the past, but never on the scale of the attacks on Hezbollah members.

Considering the psychological damage caused by this attack, which disregarded the rules of international law and led to the injury and even death of many civilians, these attacks can be described as an act of terrorism. So much so that these acts have caused a serious sense of horror throughout the world, including in our country.

Not only the Lebanese, but people all over the world have become reluctant to use mobile phones, tablets, computers and even baby monitors, which are an integral part of their lives.

Israel has not specifically claimed responsibility for these attacks. First of all, targeting people without distinguishing between civilians and combatants is a problematic attack even for a lawless country like Israel. Although it is the usual suspect, it may not be possible to link Israel to these attacks on the basis of the evidence.

On 8 October, Hezbollah opened a new front from southern Lebanon to northern Israel in support of Gaza. The mutual attacks have been going on for almost a year, with increasing loss of life and property on both sides. So far, despite all the Israeli provocations, Hezbollah has been very cautious and diligent, avoiding a large-scale war while maintaining fierce resistance.

So, what is Israel, which has not refrained from daily conventional attacks and assassinations since 8 October, up to with a new generation of attacks?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under domestic and international pressure. At home, Netanyahu is facing mass protests over judicial reforms aimed at increasing his control over the government. Many in Israel see Netanyahu’s efforts to weaken the independence of the judiciary as an authoritarian trend. Meanwhile, in the face of widespread protests, his foreign policy achievements, particularly his ability to deal with Hezbollah, are becoming a trump card that he can use to boost his popularity at home. Netanyahu does not want Israel to appear weak in the face of Iran and Hezbollah. He wants to show Israelis a tangible success against Hezbollah and the Iranian threat, with the image of a strong leader. This is exactly the show of strength he needs, as the anniversary of the heavy blow dealt by Hamas in the 7 October Aqsa flooding operation and the weakness in intelligence gathering are approaching.

The new generation of attacks against Hezbollah is a strategic move by Netanyahu to demonstrate his intelligence capabilities and fend off domestic criticism. With these operations, Netanyahu is trying to show the Israeli public that the government is pursuing a deterrent and effective policy against regional threats. Netanyahu uses such attacks as a strategic tool to reduce political pressure at home and to remain a strong leader abroad. However, if the situation in the region escalates further, an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon will remain on the table as an option.

Perhaps one of the most important reasons for these attacks is to target Lebanese society in order to undermine support for Hezbollah and strengthen the hand of opposing groups. There is a serious possibility that Lebanese society, with its multi-sectarian structure and lack of nationhood as we know it, will be dragged into chaos rather than unity in the face of external threats. Undoubtedly, in such a scenario, it would be difficult for Hezbollah to engage in a more intense or prolonged struggle with Israel, and its resistance could be broken.

Israel’s use of high technology to target Hezbollah indicates that the conflict has entered a new phase. It is not yet clear whether such operations are a prelude to a wider war or an attempt to contain the conflict without turning it into a full-scale war. Netanyahu’s strategy is focused on dealing with both internal and external threats, but the risk of these tensions escalating into a wider regional war is still on the table.

Israel may expect Hezbollah to retaliate harshly after these attacks. Since it is difficult for Hezbollah to respond in the same way with a new generation of attack, it may want to respond with a heavier conventional response. In such a situation, especially in the case of a Hezbollah attack with civilian casualties, Israel could easily portray itself as the victim, as it did after Operation Aqsa Flood. By claiming to be exercising its ‘right of self-defence’ to the US and European countries, which have already been subjected to such a fiction, Israel could lay the groundwork for a major attack or ground operation in Lebanon.

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