You may be tired of reading, but I am not tired of writing, because the subject is of extraordinary importance. The last article I wrote on the issue of reconciliation with Syria in Harici was entitled ‘Et Tekraru Ahsen, Velawkane Hundred and Eighty’. Recently, President Erdoğan’s statements on reconciliation with Syria have given me hope again.

The reason I was more hopeful this time was that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who met with Russia’s special envoy to Syria, Lavrentiev, said he was in favour of a reconciliation process with Turkey within the framework of his country’s effective sovereignty over all its territories. When Erdoğan responded to a question about these statements with very positive and appropriate phrases, my hopes increased that this time it would go further. At least as important as these statements were the speeches of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who emphasised the need for reconciliation/agreement with Syria and a joint fight against terrorism. It has to be admitted that such speeches of Bahçeli are mostly like a declaration of the new policy of the government/state.

The content is very appropriate

When analysing the content of President Erdoğan’s response to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s statement, a number of points immediately stand out. For example, the absence of any poisonous element in Erdoğan’s words is striking at first glance. The absence of the word “regime”, for example, is in itself a very important difference. It goes without saying that this term, which until recently was constantly used by Turkish officials, has a very negative connotation on the other side. Years ago, when we had informal diplomatic meetings with Greece, we objected to their statements about the Turkish occupation of Cyprus and they objected to the Cyprus peace operation.

The statements that start with the word “regime” are also hurtful and critical remarks that are made for the Syrian side in order not to compromise, and I have always expressed this both in the Harici and on my social media account (@hasanunal1920). For example, after Erdoğan’s first meeting with Russian President Putin on Syria in Sochi in early August 2022, he said that Putin had always advised him to act jointly with Syria in the military operation against the PKK/PYD, that he was now of the same opinion, that there would be no permanent enmity between states and that he could shake hands with Assad, and although he continued to make similar statements in the following days, the bureaucracy at that time insisted on making statements such as “regime etc.”, almost undermining the process, which almost undermined the process instead of speeding it up.

This time, Erdoğan’s speech did not contain such elements, and his preference for the term ‘Syrian President’ in relation to Assad is also promising, because despite Erdoğan’s statements in early August 2022, the bureaucracy at that time still implied that we did not consider Assad and his government legitimate. I think and hope that Erdoğan’s insistence on calling the Syrian president this time removes all question marks.

Another important emphasis in Erdoğan’s speech was that we have no intention of interfering in Syria’s internal affairs. Following Erdoğan’s statement after the Sochi meeting with Putin, Turkish officials, especially the then foreign minister, talked about the need for a new constitution in Syria, starting with the word ‘regime’ and insistently referring to the opposition and questioning how they would participate in governance. In fact, what they were doing was tantamount to ignoring President Erdoğan’s statements on reconciliation/agreement in Sochi and in the following days. Turkey’s policy in 2013-2015 had nothing to do with our national interests.

To sum up, first there would be a cessation of hostilities, a new constitution would be drafted and imposed on Syria, Assad would step down and a new and provisional government would be formed in which the opposition would participate (even whether Assad would participate or not was a question mark for Turkey, Ankara was more inclined to say “maybe”), then elections would be held under the strict supervision of international observers and a new government would be formed according to the results. This policy had nothing to do with Turkey’s national interest, because imposing a new constitution on a national and unitary state like Syria would mean dragging it into a federation or forcing it into an unnamed federal structure. In such a structure, it was clear that the PKK/PYD would be one of the federal units.

However, we fought to prevent the PKK/PYD from becoming such a puppet unit/state, but as in this example, in a policy that has not been fully thought through, on the one hand you carry out armed struggle to protect national interests, and on the other hand you indirectly help the structure that you oppose with weapons to achieve what it wants. It was rather strange that some professional diplomats in charge of such a policy accepted these demands on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, because while we rightly did not implement a series of UN Security Council resolutions on the Cyprus issue (pointing out Israel’s disregard for UN resolutions), treating this resolution as a divine order was in fact nothing more than watering down Erdoğan’s instruction to “reconcile with Syria”. In fact, according to this policy, the election of Assad should be prevented by the approximately ten million Syrians in our country and in Syria, together with the PKK/PYD, the population east of the Euphrates with the American forces and those living in the Idlib region, because these three large population groups outnumber those living under the control of the Syrian government.

Erdoğan’s statement that we do not intend to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs is both in line with our national interests and looks like a new policy proposal. In other words, we are giving up the fantasy of a new constitution for Syria, which removes one of the most important obstacles between us. This must also mean recognising how compatible the preservation of Syria’s national and unitary constitutional structure is with Turkey’s interests, because the risk of a Syria forced into a federal structure, in which the PKK/PYD would be a federal unit, disintegrating and threatening Turkey’s national integrity cannot be underestimated.

Looking forward

If President Erdoğan’s statement means a definite political change, it should not be watered down in the bureaucracy. Since Erdoğan said “we used to meet as a family, we will meet again”, he must not be talking about an ordinary and cold peace with Syria. In order to establish peace, the two states must first sign separate agreements on the return of refugees and the joint fight against terrorist organisations. There is no doubt that there are major problems in both areas. Therefore, in addition to the Memoranda of Understanding, it will be necessary to prepare working groups and make rapid progress.

The main problem at this point will be the political Islamists, the media and the official or unofficial pro-American groups that support the government. For example, they have been shouting ‘Assad wants us to leave Syrian territory’ for a long time, and they will continue to do so. But it is quite normal for the Damascus government to ask us to leave the areas under our control. What do you mean, the Syrian government did not want to leave its territory to us?

One of the biggest problems in the way of reconciliation is the creation of an air of conquest in Syria and the unrealistic air that has been pumped out by the government’s own media for years. However, our biggest advantage here is that these groups can quickly change their positions in the face of Erdoğan’s decisions and behaviour. The Americanists, both within the institutions and informally, are losing influence as multipolarity takes hold. This must be one of the advantages of rapprochement this time. In addition, the issue of rapprochement can be managed directly through leaders’ diplomacy, against the risk of being slowed down or watered down by leaving it to the bureaucracy this time, and the compromise/agreement can be given as instructions to the bureaucracy.

The end of the PKK/PYD

The normalisation of relations between Turkey and Syria means the end of the PKK/PYD. America’s open support for these terrorist organisations does not change this fact. Especially in a multipolar world, America’s attempts to establish a puppet state in the Middle East through these organisations and its attempts to change borders directly or indirectly cannot be sustained in a multipolar world. A reconciliation between Ankara and Damascus will have a psychological shock effect on the PKK/PYD and Washington, which are trying to hold on to the eastern Euphrates by carrying out a large-scale ethnic cleansing with the support of American troops, because until now this dirty duo has been acting on the assumption that Ankara would not give up its political Islamist policy and therefore would not reconcile with Syria, which they call Assad. As soon as Turkey reconciles with Syria, this assumption will begin to crumble like a skyscraper built on the foundation of a slum and will quickly collapse. Reconciliation with Syria will bring with it the opportunity to either coordinate operations against this terrorist organisation with Damascus, or to secure results through a policy of strategic patience that will cause the other side to leave without carrying out any operations.

Dr Hakan Fidan, who for many years headed Turkey’s intelligence service, became Turkey’s foreign minister a year ago. Dr Hakan Fidan has never been so much on the world’s agenda in his more than 1 year as Foreign Minister. So what happened to make Minister Fidan the focus of attention from America to Asia, from the Middle East to Latin America? The reason was Fidan’s extensive visit to China and Russia and his participation in the BRICS meeting. As a result of these visits, many questions have been raised both in Turkey and around the world.

First of all, if we take the China visit into consideration, Minister Fidan held critical meetings. Fidan met with Chen Wenqing, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and chairman of the CPC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and gave a speech entitled “Turkey-China Relations in a Changing World Order” at an important think tank. Minister Fidan then met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and clearly presented Turkey’s views at the press conference:

1) One China principle

2) Support for China’s fight against terrorism

3) High level of economic and cultural cooperation

4) Full support for China’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty

5) Opposition to encirclement of China

6) Full support for the Belt and Road Initiative

7) Western peaceful acceptance of rising powers and new competition

8) Common stance on Gaza and Ukraine

Following these messages, Minister Fidan visited the Chinese cities of Kashgar and Urumqi, important centres of the Turkic world and Islamic civilisation. This visit, the first at such a high level by a former head of intelligence in 12 years, caused a stir in Turkey and around the world. The fact that Fidan spoke and interacted with many Uighur Turks during his visit surprised our Western partners and many in Turkey. There were other surprises too. We all witnessed the cultural vibrancy and prosperity of these cities. The children in Urumqi and Kashgar laughing and using Turkish names is very precious when we think of what is happening in Gaza.

While the impact of Minister Fidan’s surprise visit to China was being discussed, his visit to Russia was also being discussed. Minister Fidan, who travelled to Russia to attend the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held critical meetings in Russia as well as in China. Just 2-3 days before Turkish Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar attended the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. There he met with the head of Gazprom and the Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Environment. Minister Fidan, on the other hand, had important meetings with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu and the Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Narishkyn. However, it was Minister Fidan’s reception by Russian President Vladimir Putin that captured the world’s attention. Two former intelligence officers, Dr Hakan Fidan and Vladimir Putin, sat at the same table and became the focus of the world’s press. These meetings were the crowning glory of exceptionally good relations. The main axis of Turkish-Russian negotiations:

1) Increasing trade between the two countries to $100 billion

2) New investments and joint projects

3) Energy and military cooperation

4) Situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia

5) Syria and Libya

6) Common position on Gaza

7) Ukraine crisis

Just as Minister Fidan did not forget the Uighur Turks in China, he did not forget the Meskhetian Turks in Russia. Minister Fidan, who received the Meskhetian Turks, also met with Turkish-Russian businessmen. In addition to these valuable meetings, I think that Turkey should pay special attention to Chechnya and the Chechens.

The last link in Minister Fidan’s never-ending chain of events was the BRICS meeting. Turkey participated in the expanded format of the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Russia. However, the BRICS meeting was held with the participation of more than 20 countries. Minister Fidan delivered a speech at this meeting. In his speech in China, Minister Fidan had already stated that BRICS was an important alternative and that Turkey wanted to participate in it. Minister Fidan said that they value cooperation with BRICS and that the diversity within BRICS is an important tool to increase development and stability. During this process, Minister Fidan had interesting meetings. Minister Fidan met separately with Cuba and Belarus, which are sanctioned and considered enemies by the US and Western countries. In addition, while Israel was condemned in the final declaration of the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations was supported by all countries, including India.

Turkey’s participation in the BRICS+ foreign ministers’ meeting under the auspices of Dr Hakan Fidan revealed the changing strategic vision of Turkish policymakers. This is because Turkey’s experiences in Ukraine and Gaza have taught it that the US-based Western civilisational system no longer works. Moreover, the inclusion in the BRICS of regional powers in the Middle East, such as Egypt, Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with which Turkey is in competition, has created a situation that needs to be taken into account. Moreover, today we have Russia building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, China building Turkey’s bridges and railways, Brazil selling us the first floating oil production platform, which Turkey needs, and South Africa opening the trial against Israel, in which Turkey is involved. Obviously, there is a community of BRICS countries with which Turkey is deepening and strengthening its relations in all fields. Because the BRICS countries are providing the high technologies and huge infrastructure projects that our European-American allies have not been providing for years. Moreover, the fact that a NATO country, a member of the OECD and a country waiting to join the EU was present at the BRICS meeting had a great impact not only in our country but also in the world.

Today it is also clear that reading these events as a shift in Turkey’s axis is not understanding the spirit of the times and is not able to read the future. Because Turkey is building its own axis with these moves. It would be impossible for Turkey, which maintains its relations with the West in this construction process, not to take into account new centres of power and civilisation. After all, the Republic of Turkey is a central country and a civilisation state. If we take into account the Organisation of Turkic States, we can better understand the Turkish axis that Turkey wants to build. Because Turkish leaders do not limit Turkey to geographical definitions. In fact, concepts such as West, East, North or South are insufficient for today’s global system. Definitions such as the division of the world into blocs are outdated ideas from the mindless Cold War mentality. In order to understand today, presenting the world in terms of poles or blocks is a tasteless and unsalted outdated description.

I can easily say that Dr Hakan Fidan’s trip to China, his visit to Russia and his participation in the BRICS meeting have shown the whole world, especially our Western friends, Turkey’s position on China’s rise, Russia’s partnership and the future of BRICS. In fact, for Turkey, China and Russia are not seen as enemies or threats, and BRICS is not anti-Western or hostile. This situation has not confused Turkish foreign policy, on the contrary, it has enlightened those who were confused. It was also understood that Turkey’s travel and participation was not only a message to the West. The main reason for this is that the negotiations are not limited to trade and investment. The lengthy discussions, especially on security, military and intelligence issues, suggest something else. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s invitation to Chinese leader Xi Jinping to visit Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reception of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Hakan Fidan’s meetings with Chinese and Russian security, military and intelligence elites also provide answers. As a footnote, while Minister Fidan was speaking at the BRICS meeting, the President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, established on China’s initiative, was received by President Erdoğan and new agreements were signed. In addition, the visit of the Brazilian Foreign Minister to Turkey after the BRICS meeting and his reception by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was of great importance. After this meeting, it was announced in the Brazilian media that Brazilian President Lula would visit Turkey.

In the Turkish foreign policy roadmap drawn up by Dr Hakan Fidan, we must see that the importance of BRICS and BRICS members will continue to grow. The economic flexibility and alternatives offered by BRICS will increase the strategic autonomy of Turkish foreign policy. A multilateral and multifaceted Turkey will be able to act more easily. This will help Ankara to become a more effective and visible regional and global power centre. Our Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan’s statements in China, Russia and at the BRICS meeting show that we are determined in this process. Of course, there was an immediate warning from our American allies. Speaking to Reuters, the US ambassador in Ankara expressed his hope that Turkey would not become a member of BRICS. This clearly showed us that Dr Hakan Fidan was in the right place at the right time.

Obviously, Turkey is in the process of building a Turkish foreign policy on its own axis, no longer a follower but a leader in the emerging multi-centre, multi-civilisation, democratic global system. This process has many economic, commercial, political, cultural, scientific, diplomatic and military aspects. Of course, many difficulties await us in this process. However, it is necessary to see that our Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan has opened a new method and a new way for a just world order. This method and path is the vision of the Ankara-centred Turkey axis.

Dr. Duygu Çağla Bayram

The results of India’s election, which came in on the evening of Tuesday 4 June after the votes had been counted, showed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had surprisingly secured a third term in office. The surprise was not that Modi had secured a third term; that was expected. The surprise was that he did it in such a way that he would need coalition partners to form a third term government. The 73-year-old Modi won three consecutive terms, matching Jawaharlal Nehru’s record as the first prime minister, but despite his party’s “landslide” victories in the first two terms, his third term – despite even greater expectations – fell far short of the 272-seat threshold for a clear majority, leaving Modi and his team frustrated. Although Modi had announced on his X platform on the day of the vote count that “we have won a historic/major victory”, this was not the case. While his party, the BJP, secured 240 seats, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which he leads, retained the right to form a government with 53 seats. However, this will be Modi’s first experience of leading a coalition government. Modi’s party, the BJP, has lost ground and will now have to rely on its partners in the National Democratic Alliance, in particular the Janata Dal (United) Party and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Nevertheless, despite the setbacks, the BJP won 36.56 per cent of the national vote, only one per cent less than in the 2019 elections. In any case, it must be said at the outset that these election results in India are important in demonstrating democratic vibrancy against the possibility of the country drifting towards one-party rule.

The fact that the opposition almost doubled its vote share surprised everyone in India, everyone outside India and even the opposition itself. The opposition alliance INDIA, led by Rahul Gandhi’s Congress party, won 232 seats, 99 of which were won by the Congress, a sharp increase from 2019, when the Congress and its allies won only 52 seats in 91 constituencies. Rahul Gandhi, 53, heir to the Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty, appears to have a new chance to revive a party and family name that has long been at the centre of politics in the world’s largest democracy, unlike in 2019, when he suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the BJP and resigned as Congress president, a post he was appointed to in 2017. Like his father Rajiv Gandhi, a commercial pilot who was forced into politics after his mother Indira Gandhi, a former prime minister, was shot dead by two bodyguards, Rahul Gandhi was originally a reluctant politician. The legacy of the assassination of his grandmother Indira Gandhi and father Rajiv Gandhi, both prime ministers, forces Rahul Gandhi and his Italian-born mother Sonia Gandhi, a senior Congress leader, to live under tight security. So it remains to be seen how and whether this opportunity will be used by the Congress or by the opposition, which in general does not seem to show much promise… In fact, the Congress, although doing much better than expected, is second only to the BJP and Rahul Gandhi is not seen as an alternative to Modi as prime minister. It is important to recognise that Modi is a hugely popular, globally recognised, oratorically powerful leader and, more importantly, at the helm of a huge party with resources, connections and influence across Indian society. “If there is one thing missing in my life, it is a good opposition,” Modi told a news channel during the election campaign. So a strong opposition seems to be on the cards, but only time will tell whether it will be a “good opposition” or not.

First, it is clear that the surprise election results – in an equation where the Congress and Rahul Gandhi mobilise in the name of secularism, equality, inclusiveness and liberal democracy – are an indication of dissatisfaction with the BJP on economic grounds such as unemployment and inflation, and also on grounds such as Hindu nationalist divisive harsh rhetoric. As a result, much has been written, drawn and said in this short time about Modi’s third term, i.e. the policies of the new government he will form with his coalition partners. There have been views that it will have an impact on domestic and foreign policy, and views that it will not. My view is that it will not have a direct impact, but there is a possibility of a very limited indirect constraint. We need some time to observe this. However, it is not very difficult to draw conclusions and make predictions, even if we look at the new cabinet. In the coalition government announced by Modi on Monday, you can see that the old guard of his party is at the top of the list and their important positions remain unchanged. The first thing I have to say is that 7 of the 71 ministers are women, two of them in the senior cabinet. This is still low for India, which has made efforts to bring women into politics… And the first thing to say about the previous sentence is that this is a clear signal of political continuity. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Home Minister Amit Shah, Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar remain in their posts. All of them are BJP loyalists and all of them are names whose frequencies are very much in tune with Modi. Meanwhile, BJP president Jagat Prakash Nadda has been appointed health minister.

However, I would like to devote a separate section to Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, who is considered by many in the country to be a “jewel” whose popularity stems from the fact that he has made diplomacy an issue of interest to the common man. Although, as the election results show, foreign policy and diplomacy still do not hold much sway with Indians, I have to say that at least public awareness has begun to emerge. Jaishankar’s books The Indian Way and Why Bharat Matters have put forward a new diplomacy for India. At this point, much of the credit for replacing India’s old tradition of “non-alignment” with the formula of “multilateralism” goes to Jaishankar. The diplomatic rhetoric of Modi and his top aides is taking on a new tone, replacing earlier leftist, anti-colonialist references to ‘non-alignment’ with other terms such as ‘strategic autonomy’ and references to ‘Bharat’ instead of ‘India’. And, more importantly, Jaishankar’s “India is not Western, but it cannot be anti-Western” approach is receiving more praise. He was able to convince Prime Minister Modi, who was once banned from entering the US, that New Delhi could work with Washington, and over the past decade India has built a relationship with America that was once unimaginable. Jaishankar is a pragmatist: no rising power in the last 150 years has succeeded without the West, so India should work with it… I wrote a more detailed assessment of Jaishankar’s worldview in Harici about four months ago. Anyone interested can take a look.

Speaking of the Foreign Secretary, let us turn to foreign policy. The first thing to say is this: A BJP emboldened by the election results is likely to be more modest about its Hindu nationalist ideology and more pragmatic with its coalition partners. But when it comes to India’s foreign policy, strong nationalism is extremely popular beyond the BJP faithful, and it is difficult to see exactly where Modi’s worldview diverges from Hindu nationalism. Another problem: Elections in India are never fought primarily on foreign policy, but their results have consequences. That is, they can influence the policy-making process, the ideology and the worldview of the government in power. In the current situation, the question is whether the coalition partners will force the BJP to return to some semblance of normal parliamentary order, or whether they will instead exercise their power through direct negotiations with the BJP. If normal parliamentary order is restored, the BJP could face new and sustained scrutiny, for example, over controversial national security initiatives such as the Agnipath plan for military recruitment and major defence procurement deals with the US and other foreign suppliers. Budget and procurement decisions, for example, were largely avoided even during Modi’s first two terms and often became the focus of serious political wrangling over allegations of corruption or mismanagement. So Indian ministers and bureaucrats responsible for signing big deals, such as bold investments in defence or the ambitious trade and investment agreements needed to advance Modi’s ambitious agenda on the world stage, may need to think twice.

But foreign policy and national security are unlikely to be priorities for Modi’s coalition government; the BJP’s coalition partners are much more interested in regional and livelihood issues. The coalition leaders have also been given smaller ministries such as heavy industries, food processing and fisheries. The civil aviation ministry, however, belongs to 36-year-old Kinjarapu Ram Mohan Naidu of the TDP, the BJP’s biggest ally. The TDP, originally from Andhra Pradesh, is led by veteran politician Chandrababu Naidu, who began his political career in the Congress. And the next largest party, Bihar’s Janata Dal (United), is led by Nitish Kumar, who has a history of switching allegiance to the BJP to suit his own interests; he was one of the founding members of the opposition alliance that ran against Modi in this year’s elections, but switched sides just weeks before the polls. The point is that the BJP’s dominance in the cabinet far outweighs the need for policy continuity in a coalition government, but at the same time Modi is likely to have to build more consensus in this parliament. Incidentally, unlike the last two governments formed after the BJP won a majority, there are no Muslim MPs in the third term.

All in all, after a decade of stability and predictable politics, India seems to be drifting back into the uncertainty of coalition politics, but it can be predicted that this will be a minor uncertainty. Although the country has been ruled by the NDA coalition for the past 10 years, the ruling party has had an absolute majority on its own. The current NDA alliance will be different from previous ones as the BJP is limited to 240 seats. However, it is important to recognise that the significant reform agenda pursued by the Modi government, as well as the ambitious foreign policy outlook of the last decade, may encourage more parties to volunteer to support it, thus providing greater stability to the government. In the meantime, however, the victory of at least three independent candidates with separatist ideologies should not be overlooked. Two of them, Amritpal Singh and Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa, open supporters of the Khalistan ideology, won from Punjab, while the third, Kashmiri separatist Abdul Rashid Sheikh, popularly known as Engineer Rashid, was elected from Jammu and Kashmir. Amritpal Singh and Engineer Rashid won the elections from jails where they were detained for anti-India activities. The last time a separatist voice entered the Indian parliament was in 1999, when Simranjit Singh Mann was elected from Sangrur in Punjab. In short, the third victory of the Modi-led coalition is a parliamentary record in India, but the current situation calls for more compromise and responsible politics. It is worth noting that Mahatma Gandhi, who first introduced coalition politics in India’s pre-independence era, attributed his success to humility and courtesy.

Finally, India’s election results cannot be viewed through the prism of China and America, with whom India has a bipolar relationship:

One of the short-term consequences of Modi’s relative loss of power may be related to India’s troubled relationship with China. The long-awaited return of China’s ambassador to New Delhi in May seemed to signal that Beijing and New Delhi were ready to resume normalised relations after the Indian elections. Perhaps anticipating another landslide victory for Modi, China may have preferred to strike a deal to reduce bilateral tensions during his five-year term. At the same time, expecting a solid victory, Modi could have used his unchallenged political standing at home to gain an advantageous position in negotiations with Beijing. But if China now perceives that Modi is in a difficult political position, it may rethink its negotiating calculations and take a tougher line. Modi, in turn, may postpone any overtures to Beijing to avoid criticism from his domestic political rivals. In short, the difficult India-China relationship will continue to be difficult and the focus for India will continue to be on China.

India’s election results may also affect American and Western perceptions of India and Modi. In today’s murky world, America positions New Delhi as a natural strategic partner and counterweight to authoritarian China because of India’s democratic credentials. This is unlikely to change, at least under current circumstances. However, there already seems to be a section in the West that is stressing that the unpredictability of the Indian elections and the fact that Modi and the BJP, whose authoritarian tendencies have imposed increasingly serious political commitments on India, have been punished by the Indian electorate is proof that Indian democracy is alive and kicking, that it reduces the risk of the country sliding into autocracy and that it promises to change India for the better. While this is a typical case of “I change my mind when the facts change”, the China factor will remain the common denominator, at least for the foreseeable future.