Recent U.S. sanctions targeting Chinese missile technology suppliers are seen as a potential risk to the longstanding defense ties between China and Pakistan.

The U.S. State Department has imposed sanctions on the Beijing Machinery Manufacturing Industry Automation Research Institute, accusing the company of supplying equipment used to test missile engines in Pakistan. The sanctions were extended to three additional Chinese companies—Hubei Huachangda Intelligent Equipment, Xi’an Longde Technology Development, and Universal Enterprise—along with Pakistan-based Innovative Equipment, owned by Chinese national Luo Dongmei. These entities are alleged to have transferred equipment regulated under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Washington claims the sanctioned companies provided materials for Pakistan’s Hawk 3 and Ababil ballistic missile programs. The Hawk 3 is a medium-range missile capable of reaching targets up to 2,750 kilometers, posing a strategic threat to neighboring India and parts of the Middle East. The Ababil missile, with a range of 1,800 kilometers, serves a similar tactical purpose.

Part of broader U.S. strategy

Security analysts argue the sanctions are part of a broader U.S. effort to curb China’s rising influence rather than a direct action against Pakistan. “This is more about containing China’s growth than targeting Pakistan specifically,” said Syed Muhammad Ali, a security expert based in Islamabad, in an interview with Nikkei Asia.

Ali emphasized that there is limited evidence linking China directly to Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile programs. He noted that the majority of China-Pakistan defense cooperation centers on conventional weapons, aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s air force, army, and navy, rather than its missile development capabilities.

The Pakistani government quickly condemned the sanctions as politically motivated. “It is no secret that certain countries, while professing strict adherence to non-proliferation standards, selectively overlook licensing requirements for advanced military technologies when it suits their strategic interests,” said Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch.

Enduring China-Pakistan defense ties

China remains Pakistan’s largest arms supplier, accounting for 44% of Pakistan’s major arms imports between 2000 and 2023, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The two nations have a deep history of defense collaboration, including the joint development of the JF-17 fighter jet and the Al-Khalid main battle tank. Recent procurements include J-10C aircraft, Wing Loong II drones, and Hangor-class submarines.

While the sanctions may not immediately impact Pakistan’s missile programs, experts warn of long-term consequences for defense cooperation. “Pakistan has no other significant partner for missile development if China continues to face U.S. sanctions,” said Michael Kugelman, director of the Wilson Center’s South Asia Institute.

Future challenges

The sanctions could complicate future defense transactions between China and Pakistan, as the dominance of the U.S. dollar may compel Chinese companies to comply with U.S. restrictions. Ayesha Siddiqa, a senior research fellow at King’s College London, pointed out that such financial dominance could make Chinese firms more cautious in future dealings with Pakistan.

Experts also warn that continued U.S. sanctions could strain Pakistan’s role in the broader U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry. “If China becomes less accessible due to these sanctions, Pakistan may be forced to look elsewhere for defense partners, a process that could take years,” Kugelman added. Pakistan’s past involvement in nuclear proliferation may further complicate its search for alternative suppliers.

Siddiqa noted that the sanctions are likely aimed at reassuring U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, emphasizing Washington’s commitment to countering the perceived threat of missile proliferation in the area.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) held a public debate to select a new prime minister. The candidates shared their views on economic growth, security issues and political reform.

The most striking statement among the candidates was the call by leading candidate Shigeru Ishiba for the establishment of an Asian NATO, starting with Japan’s accession to ANZUS.

In previous press conferences, Ishiba has frequently expressed his desire to create an ‘Asian version of NATO’ and to bring parity to the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement. Ishiba often referred to the Ukraine issue during the meeting, saying: “Why is deterrence not working in Ukraine? Because there is no official NATO presence there”.

Ishiba served as director-general of the Japan Defence Agency in the cabinet of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi between 2002 and 2004. He then served for one year as defence minister under Yasuo Fukuda in 2007-2008. A senior figure in the LDP, Ishiba is one of those who believe that Japan should abandon its pacifist constitutional defence strategy.

In a debate with nine other candidates that focused on their economic and development plans, Ishiba said: “Asia’s security structure is gradually changing under the influence of existing relationships and value systems. This requires us to rethink the concepts of international cooperation and self-defence”.

On security policy, Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi pointed out that the ‘Asian version of NATO’ advocated by former Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba was unrealistic. “It is theoretically possible to start with countries with similar environments,” Ishiba replied, referring to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.

Motegi then recalled that this was a constitutional process, independent of party agendas, and said: “I think Ishiba will be the founder of the Asian version of NATO. Although the essence of NATO is being proposed, it is a system to protect member states from external aggression. Collective security and the right to self-defence are increasingly dependent on the LDP. This comprehensive study is about the constitution. Yes, Asia is a continent with different value systems. Very different from Europe in particular. For example, our relations and positions with China are on a different level. I wonder if this discourse has matured to support the progressive process in the relationship. On the other hand, will Singapore, Thailand and India be included in this group? I also think that this is unrealistic. What do you think, Mr Shiba, please respond?”

Ishiba argued that the understanding of collective security in Asia affects the relations of countries, which creates uncertainty about how regional security mechanisms will be shaped, and said: “The symbol of collective security is the United Nations. But is it possible to join the United Nations forces and use force? I advocate the Asian version of NATO because it is a different concept from the right of self-defence. We need to clarify everything, including the constitutional debate. I am fully aware of that, but which countries will be involved? This is only because there are various security mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Japan and the United States, the US-Korea Security Treaty, the ANZUS Treaty and the Five Eyes Alliance under the United Kingdom. Yes, the earliest way to combine them is to add Japan to AZUS,” he said.

The alliance between Japan and the United States is an important factor in the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. This creates the need to strengthen cooperation with other Asian countries. So much so that Ishiba’s statement that ‘Japan is the symbol of collective security’ shows the effort to establish hegemony in the Asia-Pacific with the US by establishing the epicentre in Japan to surround China and Russia in the region. When Ishiba was secretary general in the Abe cabinet, he argued for the need to pave the way for these constitutional changes.

Ishiba also announced that he would consider revising the Statute of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which governs US military operations in Japan.

The agreement was signed in 1960 when the US-Japan security treaty was revised and remains unchanged.

Many in Japan describe the SOFA as ‘unequal and occupying’, especially when it comes to accidents and crimes involving US military personnel.

Ishiba, as LDP leader and therefore prime minister, emphasised the need for closer military ties between the two countries and said that Japan wanted to establish a base in the US to train its Self-Defence Forces.

He then argued that the SOFA should be at the same level as the agreement that would be reached if such a Japanese military base were established in the United States.

If we are going to revise the SOFA, it should be something that strengthens the alliance and improves the regional security environment,” Ishiba said.

Crises often define presidential legacies. Jimmy Carter had the Iran hostage crisis, Bill Clinton the Balkans, George W. Bush the September 11 terror attacks, and Donald Trump the pandemic. Across decades, Americans may easily forget Afghanistan, given its small size and relative isolation. Still, the country has nevertheless played an outsized role in shaping American presidential legacies, both before and after the United States’ two-decade direct military involvement in the country.

A Look Into the Past: America and Afghanistan

Carter had to react to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan less than two months after Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Fearing that events in Afghanistan would reinforce the growing perception that he was weak and America humiliated, Carter responded by boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

President Ronald Reagan’s willingness to arm the Mujahedeen ultimately allowed him to celebrate a second-term victory much needed after the Iran-Contra Affair tarnished his legacy.

President George H.W. Bush appointed Peter Tomsen to be ambassador to Afghanistan, but he did not send him after the country descended into civil war. Bush may have considered that neglect prudent, but history does not treat the American withdrawal from Afghan affairs kindly. While the Mujahedin were not the Taliban, both Reagan and Bush now face criticism for unleashing Islamists, deferring Afghanistan’s future to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and being oblivious to or ignoring the consequences of their decisions.

Clinton continued to neglect the country; he believed that he could contain the growing Al Qaeda threat emerging from Afghanistan with an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism mission best represented by one-off missile strikes on Al Qaeda camps and Taliban facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan following the August 1998 Al Qaeda attacks in Kenya and Tanzania.

9/11 and Afghanistan

The September 11, 2001 terror attacks returned Afghanistan to the forefront of American policy attention, where it would remain for the next 20 years. Each of the four presidents who oversaw U.S. policy made significant blunders. President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq created a distraction that hampered and politicized the war effort.

President Barack Obama leveraged his successful killing of Osama Bin Laden into an excuse to seek closure to the war on terror, failing to recognize that the scourge of extremism in Afghanistan extended beyond a single man. He followed his June 4, 2009, Cairo “New Beginning” speech and pledge to close the Guantanamo Bay prison with secret negotiations that led to the Doha process. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s quip, “You don’t make peace with your friends. You have to be willing to engage with your enemies,” reflected an unwillingness to consider how engagement and financial incentives could actually empower the Taliban.

Donald Trump was little better. Ending “the forever war” became a mantra. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster unsuccessfully tried to tame Trump’s urge to cut and run. Trump appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as special envoy to find a way to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan.

A Turning Point: Joe Biden and Afghanistan

Following his decision to curtail his re-election bid, Biden released a statement highlighting his achievements; he did not mention Afghanistan despite his earlier self-praise about ending America’s longest war.

While it is easy with the benefit hindsight to criticize his predecessors’ approach to Afghanistan, how does Biden compare?

Biden harbored a decades-long disdain for Afghanistan. During a lunch President Hamid Karzai hosted for visiting U.S. senators, then-Senator Biden dismissed Karzai’s assessment of the role of Pakistan in providing sanctuary to the Taliban by boasting, “Pakistan is 50 times more important than Afghanistan to the United States.” Biden left the lunch angrily and abruptly. As vice president, Biden criticized the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. He not only opposed Obama’s troop surge, but he also considered resigning in protest. Upon rising to the presidency, Biden promised to undo almost all of Trump’s agenda but maintained the flawed Doha deal.  Unlike the previous presidents who recognized sacrifices Afghans made on behalf of their own and American security, Biden has repeatedly criticized Afghanistan and its people, declaring, “Afghanistan is not predisposed to unity.”  He was shameless in his inconsistency. In 2001, for example, he voted for the U.S. military intervention but two decades later said he was against “that war in Afghanistan from the very beginning.” Biden then elevated the Taliban as U.S. security partner, by selectively ignoring almost everything the Taliban did or said.

The Afghanistan of 2024

Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan was a poor but relatively peaceful, developing nation. The U.S. intervention allowed Afghanistan to resume its trajectory as a developing, modern polity. Millions of Afghan girls and women enrolled and matriculated at schools and universities, rose to public office, served in the military or opened private business. Today, under Taliban control, Afghanistan is a living hell and has once again become a global terror hub.

As the 2024 campaign continues, previous U.S. missteps in Afghanistan and a refusal to acknowledge their own mistakes have deterred both presidential candidates from articulating their own Afghan strategy. This is unfortunate. As with other totalitarian regimes, the Taliban’s rein of terror, misogyny and oppression will give rise to liberation and resistance movements. The new US strategy must be to empower democratic groups, and both women and human rights defenders.

Only a democratic Afghanistan can align Afghans’ needs for a responsible government with the broader demand for a terrorism-free Afghanistan.

The author is Dr. Davood Moradian. He is the founder and the first director-general of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS). He earned a doctorate degree from University of St Andrews (Scotland). His doctorate thesis was on the conception of punishment in ancient Greece, Islam and International Justice.