On April 23, while visiting India, U.S. Vice President Vance declared to the media that Washington had made a “very clear proposal” to Russia and Ukraine to reach a peace agreement, and threatened that “the time has come for either both sides to agree or for the U.S. to withdraw from mediation.”

This so-called “peace plan” actually presupposes that Ukraine would cede large swathes of territory and abandon joining NATO. It can be regarded as a mediation plan resulting in Ukraine suffering heavy failures and losses, and Russia achieving its objectives, ultimately proving that the U.S., with its intentions laid bare, has brazenly and historically betrayed Ukraine and its European partners.

According to reports, Vance emphasized that both Russia and Ukraine must make territorial concessions, giving up parts of the territories they currently control. Although the final borders might not be drawn exactly along the current battle lines, both sides need to lay down their arms, freeze the conflict, and turn to building a better Russia and Ukraine to stop the killing.

The U.S. official in charge of security affairs also expressed optimism about the negotiations, believing that all parties have so far been negotiating sincerely.

Later that evening, following Vance’s “either-or” stance, U.S. President Trump once again publicly slammed Ukrainian President Zelensky’s statements about refusing to give up Crimea, accusing him of fueling the fire and making negotiations more difficult.
Trump warned that Zelensky’s rejection of American terms “would only prolong the killing.”

Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump complained: “Zelensky can have peace, or he can fight another three years and lose the entire country. We are very close to reaching an agreement, but this man, who has no cards in his hand, must now draw a conclusion.”

White House spokesperson Leavitt also chimed in, saying Trump was “frustrated and running out of patience… President Zelensky seems to be going in the wrong direction.”

According to a scoop from Axios News Network on the 22nd, last week the U.S. submitted to Ukrainian officials in Paris a “peace plan” that was only one page long, emphasizing that it was the Trump administration’s “final proposal” to turn the Russia-Ukraine war into peace.

Observers believe that if this proposal is implemented, it would mean a complete victory for Russia’s “special military operation” and permanently exclude Ukraine from NATO; Ukraine would lose about 20% of its territory, Europe’s investments in Ukraine over the past three years would be utterly lost, and the U.S. would profit from it.

Reportedly, this “ultimate” mediation proposal was drafted after U.S. Middle East Envoy Whitcoff held about a four-hour meeting with Russian President Putin last week, highlighting that the U.S. had fully conceded to Russia’s demands.
In other words, this hasty end to the Russia-Ukraine war is little more than a unilateral Russian ceasefire agreement written in English.

According to the plan, Russia emerges as the biggest winner of the Russia-Ukraine war:

• The U.S. would “legally” recognize Russia’s control of Crimea;
• It would “de facto” recognize Russia’s control over nearly all of Luhansk, parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia;
• The U.S. would promise that Ukraine could join the EU but not NATO;
• It would lift sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014;
• Russia would strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in areas like energy and industry.

According to this plan, Ukraine becomes the biggest loser of the Russia-Ukraine war:

• It will receive strong security guarantees through a temporary security mechanism composed of European countries;
• It will regain a small part of Kharkiv region currently controlled by Russia;
• The Dnipro River in the southern conflict zone will remain unobstructed;
• Ukraine will receive compensation and aid needed for reconstruction;
• The largest nuclear power plant in Europe — the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant — will belong to Ukraine, but it will be operated by the United States and will supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine;
• Ukraine’s mineral resources will be developed based on agreements signed between the United States and Ukraine.

According to other American media reports, even though the U.S. plan “de facto” recognizes Russian control over most of the four eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, it does not require Russian troops to withdraw.

In addition, a “flexible force” would be established, or a “joint committee” composed of Russia, Ukraine, and a non-NATO country would be set up to supervise the ceasefire and urge implementation of the peace agreement.

The U.S. might participate but would only provide funding, not ground troops.

Russia has publicly opposed the appearance of any NATO troops on Ukrainian soil.

On April 21, Trump revealed that this “peace plan” would be announced within three days. The New York Times reported on the 18th, citing a U.S. official, that Ukraine seemed “willing to give up 20% of its territory,” provided that such territorial concessions are only a “factual acknowledgment” of Russian control, not a permanent “legal recognition.”

A “factual acknowledgment” simply means objectively accepting the reality that Ukraine has lost parts of its territory, while “legal recognition” would signify Ukraine permanently giving up the right to reclaim it.

The one-page proposal exposed by U.S. media and the latest statements from Vance and Trump all indicate that the U.S. is determined to sacrifice Ukraine’s interests to please Russia, while profiting from the situation — this mediation proposal is already a foregone conclusion.

On April 21, Putin told Russian state television that although military operations had resumed after Easter, Russia remained open to any “peace initiatives” and hoped Ukraine would adopt the same position.

If this plan was finalized after U.S.-Russia consultations, Putin has no fundamental reason to oppose it, because it basically fulfills all of Russia’s demands for launching military operations against Ukraine:

• Seizing large parts of southeastern Ukraine, including Crimea, and
• Obtaining a Western commitment not to admit Ukraine into NATO.

The only difference is that Russia may eventually give up part of the territories within the “four regions incorporated into Russia.”

Although Ukraine once invaded Russia’s Kursk region and controlled part of it, after a marathon war of attrition, the Russian army has now recaptured 99.5% of the lost territory.

With just about 30 square kilometers remaining, Russia will soon focus on negotiating to secure 20% of Ukraine’s land. However, no matter what, victory belongs to Russia, while defeat falls to Ukraine and its European partners who firmly supported continuing the war.

On September 23, 2022 — seven months after Russian troops invaded Ukraine and controlled large parts of southeastern Ukraine — Russia organized a four-day “referendum” in the occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.

All four regions voted with over 90% support to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, covering an area of 90,000 square kilometers, about 15% of Ukraine’s territory, roughly the size of Portugal and Jordan combined.

Three days later, Putin signed treaties with the leaders of the four regions to formalize their incorporation into Russia.

On October 4, the Federation Council of Russia unanimously approved the treaties, and the legal documents for accepting the four regions into Russia as federal subjects were fully ratified.

On the same day, Putin signed orders completing all legal procedures for the regions to join Russia, and the process immediately came into effect.

The vast majority of sovereign states, including Russia’s friendly countries, refused to openly accept Russia’s illegal annexation of the aforementioned Ukrainian territories.

Subsequently, with NATO informally intervening directly in the war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict evolved into a battle of offense and defense with mutual advances and retreats, a tug-of-war, and a war of attrition.

Ultimately, the balance of the war gradually tilted in favor of Russia, leading to Russia effectively controlling most of the territories of the four aforementioned regions.

On the 22nd, Zelensky made it clear regarding the U.S. peace plan that Ukraine would not recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea.

After a ceasefire, Ukraine is willing to sit at the negotiation table “in any form,” but it will never recognize the occupied territories as belonging to Russia.

According to reports, due to Ukraine’s firm stance, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio boycotted the originally scheduled U.S.-U.K.-etc. ministerial meeting on Ukraine to be held in London on the 23rd, forcing the meeting to be postponed and downgraded to a lower-level meeting.

The media reported that Russia is willing to relinquish part of the Ukrainian territory it controls in exchange for U.S. recognition of its control over Crimea.

Analysts believe that the Trump administration is eager to extricate itself from the quagmire of the Russia-Ukraine war and rapidly restore U.S.-Russia relations.

Therefore, it exerted strong pressure and even open coercion on the Ukrainian government, even accusing Zelensky of having lost the legitimacy of the presidency, demanding that Ukraine quickly hold new presidential elections to force Zelensky to accept this humiliating peace agreement or to replace him through elections so that the newly elected president could sign the document.

Although Ukraine and other European countries generally oppose the Trump administration’s imposed peace plan and are trying to persuade it to change its position, the Trump administration’s bullying style, arrogance, and the adverse prospect of the U.S. abandoning the Russia-Ukraine conflict have placed Ukraine and its European partners in a highly passive situation.

While the Trump administration’s peace plan will undoubtedly experience twists and turns from proposal to implementation, the three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war, regardless of the exact outcome, will result — due to the U.S., this “weak teammate,” betraying and undercutting its allies — in Russia ultimately becoming the big winner.

The only suspense is how much Russia wins and how soon.

The United States, as the instigator of the Ukraine crisis, from long manipulating and deceiving Russia, which wholeheartedly sought to embrace the West, to encouraging NATO’s continuous eastward expansion and intensifying Russia-Europe tensions, to finally at the last moment making it clear it would not militarily intervene against Russia’s deployment of forces, enticed or incited Russia to decisively launch a “special military operation,” dragging both sides into a “European version of the Afghan war” and eroding mutual trust.

Eventually, it abandoned Ukraine and its European partners.

The U.S., as the leader of the West and NATO, has shattered its political integrity, allowing the East, West, and even the entire world to witness the selfishness, ruthlessness, and injustice of American politicians.

This latest reality also reconfirms the new iron rule: the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy, and undependable.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Hamas stands at a pivotal juncture in Palestinian history—one that goes beyond the devastation of aggression and genocidal war on Gaza. This moment raises existential questions about continuity, Hamas’s role within the Palestinian national landscape, and the redefinition of national action amid significant shifts in regional and international conflict dynamics.

The al-Aqsa Flood operation delivered a profound shock to Israeli consciousness. This shock was exploited by the extreme Zionist right to justify a zero-sum war targeting the entire Palestinian population. At the same time, it laid bare the deep structural and political challenges threatening the Palestinian national project. These include a deepening political division that now transcends elite circles and touches the core of Palestinian society—fueled by the comprehensive nature of the war on Gaza and the geopolitical constraints that weigh heavily on grassroots movements.

Compounding this crisis is the institutional deterioration affecting Palestinian factions—possibly even preceding the weakening of official Palestinian institutions. This has led to the absence of a collective political vision capable of forging a unified national strategy that integrates both political efforts and resistance, thereby bridging the harmful divide between legitimacy and armed struggle.

The current events can no longer be framed simply as a war to uproot Hamas or a campaign to degrade its military capacity. The limitations of military means in shifting the broader conflict dynamics or in restraining Israeli aggression have become clear. These means have proven ineffective in halting Israeli efforts to force a decisive resolution that threatens to erase the Palestinian people and their cause.

Today, the war is increasingly used as a pretext to prolong hostilities and to implement Israeli plans to fragment Palestinian geography, dissolve demographic unity, and undermine national identity. This is especially evident in the manipulation of negotiations surrounding the prisoner exchange file, which has exposed Israel’s deceptive tactics.

Moreover, it is no longer acceptable to view this moment as “just another chapter” in a long-standing struggle. The immense human and political costs borne by the Palestinian people, combined with the absence of any clear end to the war, make this an unprecedented and defining moment. It demands a comprehensive national reassessment of all available strategies and tools.

From solo resistance to comprehensive national partnership

Experience has shown that while resistance is both legitimate and necessary, it cannot replace a comprehensive national project. Nor can it be effectively carried out outside the framework of national partnership or through unilateral decision-making. This principle applies equally to political processes dominated by a single faction that excludes other national forces.

What is required is a unified approach—one that addresses the complexity of the conflict across cultural, regional, and international dimensions. This demands full national partnership in decision-making, with careful consideration of regional realities, international contexts, and a precise assessment of the balance of power and resources.

Given its significant influence on the ground and its popular support, Hamas must embrace a multi-level strategic transformation that includes:

1) Transition to collective leadership

Hamas must shift from an individualistic resistance model to collective leadership within a unified national framework. This would re-establish Palestinian politics on a foundation of integration and partnership. Hamas should commit to national legitimacy, align with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and contribute directly to policy formulation—either through its representation in the PLO’s Executive Committee or by supporting consensus-based figures in a transitional phase leading to democratic elections for the Palestinian National Council.

2) Political and organizational renewal

Hamas needs to reposition itself politically through a balanced foreign policy that enhances regional relationships based on constructive neutrality. This includes a commitment to Arab national security in service of the Palestinian cause and a clear rejection of external dependency.

3) Adoption of international law

International law should serve as the political reference point for advancing Palestinian national interests. This principle was clearly stated in Hamas’s 2017 political document, which endorsed an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. This represents the minimum consensus among Palestinians and identifies Israeli occupation as the fundamental obstacle to peace.

4) Transparency and accountability

Hamas must adopt a more transparent and participatory political approach and demonstrate readiness to take responsibility for any past misjudgments or unintended violations.

The continued depletion of Palestinian resilience in a prolonged, aimless struggle—with no political horizon in sight—risks weakening the Palestinian cause both regionally and globally. This diminishes opportunities for real national achievements, especially amid the growing danger of regional and international escalation and foreign efforts to shape Gaza’s future while sidelining Palestinian national decision-making.

This reality necessitates an expansion of resistance tools, strengthening Palestinian influence in regional and international arenas, enhancing institutional capacity, and diversifying resistance methods to include popular, legal, and diplomatic strategies. It also calls for internationalizing the issue of Gaza and maintaining political and media pressure.

At the same time, it is essential to activate political confrontation with the occupation through a comprehensive national approach that builds momentum, limits losses, and revitalizes the Palestinian national project at this critical juncture.

Options and pathways for exiting the war

In light of these challenges, four interconnected pathways can help Hamas—and the broader Palestinian national movement—navigate a path out of the current war and toward a renewed national horizon:

1) Initiate an inclusive, unconditional national dialogue

All national and Islamic forces must be brought together in a dialogue that transcends factional divides. The goal is to build a new national consensus, which includes:

— Developing an immediate, unified Palestinian plan to end the unilateral war.

— Addressing the challenges of “the day after” with cohesive national responses.

— Considering initiatives such as Beijing’s proposed emergency technocratic government or the societal support committee proposals discussed in Cairo.

— Preceding these steps with a declaration from Hamas withdrawing from Gaza’s administrative responsibilities.

— Agreeing on the nature and mechanisms of the Palestinian national project, explicitly defining the role of armed resistance as supportive—an integral part, but not a political alternative.

2) Empower the PLO as the sole negotiating body

The PLO should be reaffirmed as the sole legitimate and comprehensive political framework for Palestinians. It must lead negotiations with a clear vision that demands:

— An immediate end to the war.

— Lifting the blockade on Gaza.

—A permanent ceasefire.

— International guarantees for reconstruction.

—A genuine political process based on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

3) Engage regional and international efforts

Hamas and the broader Palestinian leadership should engage with regional and international efforts aimed at halting the war. These include:

— Rejection of displacement plans proposed under the Trump administration.

— Active participation in the Egyptian-Arab initiative.

— Alignment with Saudi-led international coalitions supporting the two-state solution.

— Engagement with the Arab-Islamic summit’s seven-member committee to ensure Palestinians have a unified, balanced, and internationally supported negotiating position.

Ultimately, this moment allows no room for hesitation or political maneuvering. It either becomes a turning point for a meaningful transformation of the Palestinian national project—rebuilt from the wounded heart of Gaza—or it will perpetuate the flawed structures that have led to the current impasse.

Given its field strength and political capacity, Hamas now faces a historic opportunity to redefine its role—not just as a resistance group, but as a vital part of a collective national leadership committed to achieving the historical and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

The repercussions of the new global trade war initiated by Donald Trump continue. In early April, he announced “reciprocal tariffs” on countries worldwide, ranging from 10% to as high as 49%. In this scenario, almost all countries would face a 10% tariff when selling goods to America. However, some specific countries, including India, experienced a special tariff shock. While Trump imposed a 34% tariff on China, for example, he announced tariffs exceeding 40%, almost reaching 50%, for some other Asian countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Laos. For India, this tariff was 26%. This means that even New Delhi, which had lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, recommended tariff reductions on half of its $23 billion imports, initiated trade talks, increased imports by $3 billion, and created nearly 500,000 job opportunities with over $40 billion in investment, could not escape the 26% (discounted) Trump tariff.

Tariffs are taxes imposed by a country on goods imported from another country. Donald Trump believes that American goods are unfairly tariffed by trade partners, which harms American companies. This is why he announced these controversial new tariffs to level the playing field. He escalated the trade war by increasing customs duties on China, which retaliated with a 125% tariff, to 145% (and announced today – April 16 – that he has raised it to 245%), while giving the rest of the world a 90-day pause. Yes, Trump’s trade war is now a duel between America and China. And now, Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a Southeast Asia tour to take measures against Trump’s tariffs. When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Yes, I know; the elephant is a favorite metaphor for India, but in this duel, the question is: Will India be the grass? Or, alternatively: Will it be a winner as a major swing country in the duel between these two? Let me state at the outset what I will conclude with: Frankly, this duel between America and China has opened up many possibilities for all swing countries, but New Delhi is one of the biggest and most important of them. Frankly, Delhi seems to be in a more advantageous position against Beijing, its biggest rival in trade. To be a winner, it needs to recommit itself to that Covid-era reform idea.

While evaluating crises often seems like a facile approach, it is generally a rational strategy in world politics. However, Delhi has not fully capitalized on such opportunities recently. Especially after Covid, many of the promises remained unfulfilled, and there were no tangible results from the proposed agricultural laws and labor codes. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2021 that the government would unconditionally transfer all business areas except strategic ones to the private sector, but there has been no mention of any privatization other than the Air India sale, which has been ongoing since 2017. There is still no word on the long-awaited reforms in the country. The Indian government had proposed a new economic agenda around two ideas: Atmanirbhar (self-reliance) and Make in India (domestic production model). Under this economic agenda, large amounts were allocated to production-linked incentives, and ease of doing business was promised. The first was partially implemented because production stagnated. However, some production-linked incentives were received, the most prominent being for iPhones. In the midst of the US-China trade war, this could strengthen New Delhi’s hand. Apple may now start shifting its production from China to India. This is at least a good example of a “plus one” against China. Taiwanese-based Foxconn has already moved some of its factories in China to India and started iPhone production. When it comes to ease of doing business, yes, India’s ranking has risen, but at a snail’s pace.

At least, given the Trump tariffs, there may be opportunities for New Delhi in American markets where China cannot compete. We mentioned Apple phones as the first example. However, when you look at the list of products Beijing exports to America, it is not difficult to estimate that there will be tens of billions of dollars worth of export possibilities available. The questions are: How quickly can India ramp up new production to turn this duel to its advantage? If customs duties are significantly reduced, is Indian production robust enough to survive? And what does the Indian government plan to do to ensure this? While subsidies are the first thing that comes to mind, they are expensive, and Trump may find them unfair and object. I am quoting the view of the US Trade Representative’s office on this matter verbatim: “India provides a wide range of subsidies and support to the agricultural sector, including credit subsidies, debt waivers, crop insurance, and input subsidies (such as fertilizer, fuel, electricity, and seeds) at both the central government and state government levels. These subsidies, which are a significant cost to the government, reduce the cost of production for India’s producers and have the potential to distort the market where imported products compete.”

Anyway, America was generally a duty-free economy, which provides Delhi with a $45 billion trade surplus. It is also true that America produces very little that it can export to India. The top two items in the export basket are mineral oils and precious stones. Manufactured goods, machinery and appliances, electrical, and optical equipment have a value of less than $8 billion. In contrast, India exports electrical and pharmaceutical products, which are the top two products on the export list, and the value of these products is more than three times higher, at $26.5 billion. Most of the rest that Delhi buys from America are agricultural products. This is exactly what Trump wants to boost. This directly benefits his farmer base as well. Everything Delhi grows on farms, from walnuts to edible oil, is tariffed at significant rates. Fish, meat, and dairy products are taxed so high that it is almost impossible for America to export them. And this is the only thing America produces in exportable surpluses.

The trade issue seems to be almost entirely limited to manufacturing and agricultural products, which means that services, which account for about 40% of India’s exports to America, are not included. Since none of them cross the border, they are not subject to customs duties. Somewhere in the article, I said that Delhi, which lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, could not escape the Trump tariff. Agriculture is critical for Trump, and Delhi must have realized that it cannot conduct trade by neglecting agriculture and lowering taxes on machinery, boilers, electronic devices, and precious stones, I think. If you look at the India section in the US Trade Representative’s report on restrictive practices of different countries, you can see that agricultural products are marked as non-tariff barriers. Also, the idea that India is an important partner and that the personal friendship between Modi and Trump will bring a special exemption to Delhi is often thought or repeated; however, looking at Trump’s attitude towards his other allies, I don’t think he thinks that way at all. Trump is playing hardball and is very likely to continue playing hardball. Lowering customs duties on non-agricultural goods was the easy part. However, considering Delhi’s traditional insecurities and protectionism, can India open up to milk and meat imports, for example? Furthermore, is milk and dairy production or meat production self-sufficient? Considering Delhi’s production protectionism and historical hesitations regarding agriculture, its task seems difficult. Perhaps the opportunity for agricultural reforms missed during the Covid crisis deserves a second chance for Delhi, and perhaps this superpower trade war, where its best friend and worst rival are showing their hands, is telling it that now is the perfect time.

Rhetoric such as being the fastest-growing major economy or the fifth largest and soon to be third, surpassing Japan and Germany, and the discourse of a manufacturing revolution that has been said to be coming for the last decade but has not yet materialized – or even gone backward – is certainly noteworthy. However, New Delhi, which seems to have moved away from the hard-won economic freedoms of the early 90s, appears to have returned to the belief that growth can be achieved through top-down methods. Higher tariffs have been seen returning in the last decade. You might be buying the world’s most expensive steel from India, for example. In the late 90s, the finance minister of the time said he had brought tariffs down to almost ASEAN levels. Increasingly powerful oligarchs are dividing market share and sectors. Does it work? Is the idea that state patronage will lead India to a manufacturing and export utopia coming to fruition? Take a look at government data: Despite the Make in India domestic production model, where Delhi invested over $26 billion in strategically important sectors to benefit from the exodus from China, the share of manufacturing in the Indian economy has declined compared to the service and agricultural sectors. Or, after the 10-year period of the Make in India initiative, you see that the share of manufacturing in India’s GDP in 2023-24 is exactly the same as in 2013-14: 17.3%. And it tends to be even lower this year. The contribution of manufacturing to job creation was slightly lower in 2022-23 compared to 2013-14; it was 10.6% in 2022-23 while it was 11.6% in 2013-14. Furthermore, while the real success in smartphone production may deserve celebration, the share of exports in its GDP has fallen from 25% in 2013-14 to 22.7% currently. Consequently, the growth rate of Delhi’s share in global exports has also slowed down.

Praveen Khandelwal, a Delhi-based businessman and ruling party member of parliament known for his lobbying activities, may be saying that the high tariff imposed on imports from China to America presents a significant opportunity for India’s trade and industry, and that they want to use this advantage against Beijing in most sectors, including electronics, auto parts, textiles, and chemicals. However, Delhi is dependent on Beijing for parts and equipment, lacks skilled labor, and incentive programs are also insufficient in many sectors where Delhi is competing with Beijing. The Chinese economy, which is five times larger than the Indian economy, is still a formidable competitor. In India’s case, Trump’s tariffs could be softened, or perhaps even completely removed (?); but in return, Delhi may need to offer more than the “tiny concessions” I mentioned in a previous article. It is clear that America expects more than “tiny gains.” While other countries that experienced a special tariff shock are trying to enter into negotiations for reciprocal tariff reductions during the 90-day grace period, New Delhi has already been at the negotiating table with America for some time, but this time Trump is a tough friend. The scale of Indian strategic vulnerability will be revealed by time.