Opinion
The Ceasefire Between Palestine and Israel: A Victory Without Any Winner
On January 17, Hamas and Israel formally signed a ceasefire agreement reached two days earlier, which took effect on January 19. This marks the closest attempt to a successful ceasefire in the Middle East since Hamas launched the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which triggered Israel’s intense retaliation and ignited the “Sixth Middle East War” over 460 days ago.
The international community widely welcomes the ceasefire between Palestine and Israel, and Yemen’s Houthi attacks on Israel are also expected to cease, the “Sixth Middle East War” may finally come to an end. However, the ceasefire remains a fragile prelude to peace. Without addressing the historical disputes between the two sides and implementing the “two-state solution,” every ceasefire is merely an interval before the next conflict or war.
According to reports, through multiple rounds of mediation by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt, Hamas and Israel reached a three-phase ceasefire agreement. The first phase, which started on January 19, will last 42 days and includes a complete and total ceasefire by both parties, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip, the release of 33 detainees by Hamas in exchange for the release of hundreds of Palestinians detained by Israel, and the allowance of large-scale humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The details of the second and third phases of the agreement are to be disclosed after the implementation of the first phase. These include permanent ceasefire negotiations, the return of detained personnel’s remains by Hamas, and the initiation of large-scale reconstruction in the Gaza Strip.
Despite the United States, Qatar, and Egypt guaranteeing and overseeing the ceasefire agreement, the implementation of the second and third phases depends on the execution of the first phase. Israel has requested the right to veto the list of Palestinian detainees to be released, and Israel’s security cabinet has delayed approving the first-phase agreement. Additionally, Israel’s far-right security minister has threatened to resign. These developments underscore a severe lack of mutual trust between the two sides, internal divisions within Israel, and the constant risk of the ceasefire agreement being torn apart or disrupted.
Hamas claims the ceasefire agreement is a “great victory for the heroic resistance of the Palestinian people and their indomitable spirit over more than 15 months in Gaza.” Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard also called it “a great victory for Palestine.” Analysts believe such statements are intended to lie to others and also themselves. Compared to previous Middle East wars, this “Sixth Middle East War,” which lasted 15 months and involved more than a dozen regional and external countries and actors, left no true winners. It resulted in a multi-party loss, with only degrees of defeat differing among parties.
Was Hamas or Palestine the victor?
The facts suggest otherwise. The Palestinian people, particularly those in Gaza, suffered immensely under Israel’s over-a-year-long military siege and economic blockade. Nearly 50,000 people died—most of them women and children—over 100,000 were injured or disabled, critical infrastructure was destroyed, and the ecological consequences are far-reaching. Survivors teeter on the edge of life and death. In short, during the war, Gaza became a living hell for civilians, who endured unimaginable suffering. This marks the third catastrophic disaster since 1948 for Palestinians, with unprecedented losses in life and material. Even low-level economic reconstruction and societal recovery will require decades.
Hamas’s strategy of provoking Israel with militant attacks drew disproportionate retaliation, bringing the Palestinian cause into the global spotlight and isolating Israel as never before. Yet, this was achieved at the cost of enormous sacrifices and disasters for Palestinians. It has further entrenched both sides in a vicious cycle of hatred, violence, and bloodshed.
Is Israel the winner of this war?
The facts suggest otherwise. As the strongest military power in the Middle East, Israel appeared to excel in its “seven-front combat,” fighting with overwhelming odds and inflicting fatal blows on Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon, shattering the “Resistance Axis.” However, most of these adversaries are non-state actors whose manpower, equipment, and foreign support cannot compare to Israel, which benefits from long-standing U.S. aid and military readiness. Despite this, Israel failed to eliminate Hamas’ remnants, had to resort to high rewards to secure the return of its detained personnel, and ultimately accepted prisoner exchanges and a ceasefire to resolve the crisis. This war has been a political and economic failure for Israel, costing many lives, destabilizing the nation, damaging its international image, and losing it the support of global public opinion. It even led to its Prime Minister and former Defense Minister being labeled “war criminals” by the International Criminal Court.
If neither Israel nor Palestine emerged as winners, did any other parties involved in the war benefit and become winners? In my view, there were no winners at all. Even for those perceived as winners, a dialectical and long-term perspective is needed.
The United States is undoubtedly a major loser
For the first time in the Middle East conflict, the superpower lost the initiative, playing a marginal role, neither decisive in war nor peace. The U.S. not only lost its decision-making and leadership authority in Middle Eastern affairs but also became a “hostage state” to Israel. It was passive throughout the year-long conflict, offering rhetorical support and military aid but unable to influence the war’s course. In previous Middle Eastern wars, the U.S. had been the dominant power:
– In the 1948 First Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. orchestrated two ceasefires, helping Israel defeat five Arab nations.
– In the 1956 Suez Crisis, the U.S. forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw, solidifying its foothold in the Middle East.
– During the 1967 Six-Day War, the U.S. fully armed Israel, enabling its victory over the Soviet-backed Arab bloc.
– In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. provided emergency military aid to Israel, turned the tide, and initiated “shuttle diplomacy” to secure a ceasefire and disengagement.
– In the 1982 Lebanon War, the U.S. ensured Israel’s military success before again leveraging diplomacy to save the PLO leadership while removing them from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict frontlines.
Iran is also a major loser
As the dual engine of the “Resistance Axis” and the “Shiite Crescent,” Iran was neither willing nor able to protect Hamas and Hezbollah from devastating military strikes. It also failed to shield Yemen’s Houthi rebels from airstrikes by the U.S., U.K., and Israel and eventually abandoned Syria’s regime. These failures have significantly weakened the “Resistance Axis” and the “Shiite Crescent,” with Iran’s influence historically contracting to the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. On two occasions when Iran directly confronted Israel militarily, it preemptively notified Israel to minimize losses, wary of provoking uncontrollable escalation or bringing disaster upon itself.
The “Sixth Middle East War” exposed Iran’s hesitancy and weakness in critical moments. It revealed a self-serving pragmatism prioritizing national and ethnic interests, underscoring that Iran lacks both the moral authority and the capability to fulfill its ambitions as a regional power. This misalignment between its aspirations and actual strength suggests Iran is not ready for the “crown” it seeks to wear. The war also nullified half a century of Iran’s investments and efforts in revolutionary Islamic diplomacy. Iran now faces potential domestic scrutiny over its foreign policy, strategic effectiveness, and even the legitimacy of its regime, which could impact its political stability.
Russia is certainly another big loser
Russia also abandoned the Bashar regime during a critical period, easily relinquishing its last Middle Eastern strategic asset, giving up what it had preserved with significant military and diplomatic resources a decade ago. The Bashar regime was easily and unexpectedly toppled during the Palestine-Israel conflict, showing that as Damascus’ foremost ally, Russia has completely lost its standing as a first-class geopolitical and military power. Its weakness in strategic intelligence, judgment, intervention, and coordination capabilities is strikingly evident. Losing Syria signifies that Russia no longer has the capability to handle two regional wars simultaneously, nor the ability to act as a world-class power exerting influence in the Middle East.
The United Nations: Another major loser
The United Nations also proved powerless in the face of the “Sixth Middle East War,” becoming severely marginalized and even humiliated and provoked by Israel multiple times. Draft resolutions from the Security Council urging a ceasefire between Palestine and Israel were repeatedly vetoed by the United States. Even when reluctantly passed, neither side implemented them. Israel frequently questioned the legitimacy of the United Nations, repeatedly urged the Secretary-General to resign, discredited UN missions, and openly insulted UN peacekeeping forces. Historically, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181 in 1947, granting Israel its “birth certificate” and sowing the seeds of the Palestinian problem. Between 1948 and 1982, despite being manipulated by major powers and caught in opposition and division, the UN was still able to broker ceasefires among warring parties and pass famous Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 338 in 1967 and Resolution 242 in 1973, forming the legal foundation of the “land for peace” framework in the Middle East peace process.
Turkey’s role: A winner?
Some may argue that Turkey emerged as the biggest winner from this war. This is incorrect. Superficially or in the short term, Turkey indeed supported the rebel forces in toppling Bashar and seemed to gain a larger voice in the reconstruction of the new Syrian power structure, as well as suppressing and encircling the Kurds. However, as a regional power, Turkey’s deep involvement in Syrian affairs has plunged it further into the Middle Eastern quagmire, inevitably intensifying its rivalries and frictions with Israel, Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, Russia, Iran, and even the United States. This situation risks reviving the “multi-problem” nightmare Turkey experienced after the “Arab Spring,” leading it to once again face the consequences of being stonewalled on multiple fronts.
The broader implications
On October 7, 2023, when “The Al-Aqsa Flood” launched a successful textbook-style attack on half of Israel via air, land, and sea, no one expected it to evolve into a large-scale, prolonged, multi-party, and devastating “Sixth Middle East War.” No one foresaw that Israeli leaders would be globally wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes. Nor did anyone anticipate that the Syrian government, which had survived a 13-year war to retain power, would collapse so quickly, becoming the most unexpected loser.
From the perspective of global and historical development, the biggest loser of the Palestine-Israel conflict is the peace, development, prosperity, and progress of the entire region. This large-scale multi-party loss is not about the gains or losses of one nation or territory but represents the collective success or failure of dozens of countries and hundreds of millions of people. Across the continents, there is no other region as “cursed” or “toxic” as the Middle East, which has been mired in friction, conflict, and chaos for so long. Likewise, no other people on Earth have had to witness, day after day, year after year, and generation after generation, bloodshed, killing, death, and destruction as their daily reality and even their life’s fate, relying on violent exchanges to sustain national and economic development.
Although the ceasefire after the twists and turns of the conflict deserves celebration, as it embodies rationality and humanity far more than continued slaughter, providing all sides with a chance to breathe and hope for survival, if the parties involved do not fundamentally heal their deeply entrenched zero-sum mindset, violent philosophies, and jungle rules, peace in the Middle East will remain out of reach. This cradle of human civilization is destined to become one of history’s greatest failures.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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