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A new chapter in the ill-fated destiny of the Caucasus: Notes from J.D. Vance’s diplomatic foray into Baku and Yerevan

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The Strategic Partnership Charter, signed between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and United States Vice President J.D. Vance, has elevated the relations between the two states from a mere declaration of intent to the level of a formal, unshakable “covenant.” This document symbolizes not only a rapprochement between the two nations but also the definitive entry of the region into the strategic orbit of the NATO axis. As the American Embassy in Baku has articulated, Washington is acting with a resolute determination to “transform the dormant, gargantuan potential” of the South Caucasus into a lived reality.

The signed charter functions as a foundational instrument, regulating not just the current state of cooperation but its trajectory for decades to come. Among the core pillars of the document is the mutual and unconditional recognition of “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” This constitutes a high-level certification that the era of “frozen conflicts” in the region has reached its conclusion.

Provisions such as the development of transport routes and the establishment of partnerships in strategic sectors signal that the text will not remain a mere paper exercise; rather, it heralds a massive surge in ground-level infrastructure and an onslaught of American capital into the South Caucasus.

A Logistical Revolution: The Middle Corridor and the “Trump Route”

The concrete provisions of the charter focus heavily on regional connectivity. Two monumental projects take center stage here: the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity).

The Middle Corridor is a commercial artery originating in China and extending through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to Turkey and Europe—completely “bypassing” Russia. According to 2025 data, cargo flow along this route has seen a staggering 62% increase compared to 2024, reaching 4.5 million tons. For Western logistics firms, this path has become a far more profitable and secure alternative to the “Northern Route” passing through Russia. Indeed, the target is for cargo originating in China to reach Europe via this route in a mere 12 days.

The most critical link in this vast network is the 44-kilometer Zangezur Corridor, which will traverse Armenian territory. Following an agreement mediated personally by Donald Trump at the White House on August 8, 2025, the management of this corridor was transferred to the United States for a term of 99 years. This passage, dubbed the “Trump Route,” will connect Nakhchivan with the Azerbaijani mainland, thereby ending the geographical discontinuity of the Turkic republics—or, conversely, resulting in the encirclement of Russia from the south. This derelict line, where tracks had been uprooted since 1991, is now being reconstructed under the control of an American company, with an ownership structure where 30% of profits go to Armenia, 30% to Azerbaijan, and 40% to the American operator.[1]

The Influx of American Capital into the Caucasus

The economic dimension of the charter can be read as something far beyond conventional trade agreements—it is an all-out influx of American capital into Baku. A “digital transformation” is planned with the direct participation of both public and private sector capital from both nations. While cooperation is envisioned in high-tech fields such as artificial intelligence, data processing centers, and the aerospace industry, this process will be bolstered by joint research and development (R&D) activities and innovation platforms. Furthermore, technical support initiatives aimed at cultivating a skilled workforce will transform Azerbaijan’s human capital.

Under the heading of energy security, Azerbaijan’s diversification of supply routes and the support for the transit of mineral resources to global markets are vital for Europe, which has largely abandoned Russian oil and gas due to unilateral sanctions. In the realms of defense and security, there is an unprecedented convergence: the direct sale of defense industry products, joint military exercises and studies, the strengthening of cybersecurity, and humanitarian demining activities all aim for the Azerbaijani military’s “full alignment with NATO standards.”

Nuclear Rupture in Yerevan: The End of Metsamor and Dependence on the West

J.D. Vance’s visit to Yerevan, just one day prior to his arrival in Baku, represents the heaviest blow dealt to Russia’s presence in the Caucasus. The civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed between the US and Armenia fundamentally undermines Yerevan’s energy ties with Russia. The US has pledged up to $9 billion in investment for the Armenian nuclear sector. The primary focus of this investment is the replacement of the Soviet-era Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant (VVER-440 reactors)—long the subject of safety debates—with American-designed “Small Modular Reactors” (SMRs).

While Metsamor meets 40% of Armenia’s electricity needs, this partnership with the Russian company Rosatom had begun to be viewed as a “strategic burden” for Yerevan. In his briefing in Yerevan, Vance noted that an initial $5 billion in exports and $4 billion in long-term technical support were on the way.

On the other hand, the “North-South Corridor” project, nurtured by Russia with great hope, has effectively been rendered obsolete with the transition of Zangezur to American control. Moscow had initially envisioned that the control of this corridor would remain with its own border guards, but that plan collapsed with the declaration signed in Washington in August 2025.

The roots of Russia’s current defeat extend back to the 2004 Adjara crisis and the subsequent vacillating stances. Those who remained silent when Saakashvili seized Adjara in 2004, and those who failed to protect the 12th Military Base in Batumi, have today completely lost their influence over Karabakh and Zangezur. Adjara is an autonomous region located in southwestern Georgia, on the Turkish border. Aslan Abashidze, who governed the region from the 1990s until 2004, had established a pro-Russian feudal administration independent of the central Tbilisi government. Mikheil Saakashvili, who came to power in Georgia following the Western-backed “Rose Revolution” of 2003, re-established central authority over Adjara in 2004, forcing Abashidze to seek asylum in Russia.

Had Russia pursued a more assertive diplomatic and military line at that time, the 2014 Maidan events might never have occurred, nor would the Caucasus have shifted so drastically toward the Western orbit. Just as the 1940 British and French plans to bomb Baku (Operation Pike) posed a threat then, the American private military companies now establishing themselves in the region represent an equally “horrific” security vulnerability for Russia and Iran.[2]

The signatures penned at the White House on August 8, 2025, began to bear fruit at the start of 2026. Construction of the 224-kilometer Kars-Dilucu railway line was commenced by Kalyon Construction, while Azerbaijan completed the Horadiz-Ağbend line. The 1,000-strong American private military force to be stationed in the region is likely the precursor to much larger military bases, air defense systems, and radar networks.

It may be useful here to refer to the statements of Russian politician and diplomat Nikolay Platonkin, published in recent months in Moskovsky Komsomolets. According to Platonkin, who notes that Azerbaijan’s stance toward Russia is not new but the result of decades of policy that Moscow chose to ignore, the current situation between Moscow and Baku resembles “a typical Turkish soap opera scenario where the head of a respectable family is revealed to have been a mafia leader with a secret second life for years.”

Platonkin, who served as the head of the Armenia desk at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1998 and 2003, stated that Russia has made the same mistake with Azerbaijan as it did with Georgia.

“When Heydar Aliyev came to power, replacing the ultra-nationalist Abulfaz Elchibey, everyone in Moscow rejoiced. Yet throughout this time, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy remained consistently anti-Russian. Within the CIS, there were two groups from the beginning: those who wanted integration (Belarus, Armenia, Central Asia) and those who were anti-Russian and sought to strengthen ties with the West. This second group formed the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) alliance. Azerbaijan was always a part of this group,” Platonkin said.

According to Platonkin, the reason Azerbaijan had not joined NATO until now was not a lack of desire, but rather its exclusion due to the Karabakh conflict. The diplomat recalled that Baku, with Western assistance, built infrastructure to export Caspian Sea energy resources by bypassing Russia and eventually forced Moscow out of the vital Gabala Radar Station by demanding exorbitant rent.

Arguing that Armenia, by contrast, had always been a loyal ally, Platonkin made the following claims:

“We have a joint air defense system with Armenia. The Armenians transferred their defense industry facilities to us in exchange for their debts. Armenia’s entire energy sector was privatized by Russia. We saved the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, built during the Soviet era and producing half of the country’s electricity, despite Western demands for its closure. There was even a time when Yerevan paid the salaries of Russian soldiers and officers from its own budget so the base could remain when Moscow was not making payments.”

He further claimed that the plan to place the Zangezur corridor under US control was not new; a similar plan was signed in 2001 at Key West between then-leaders Robert Kocharyan and Heydar Aliyev, but Russia had blocked it.

Platonkin concluded by saying: “NATO is already in the Caspian. Militarily, Azerbaijan is a part of Turkey, and Turkey is a NATO country. Meanwhile, our people are still muttering, ‘Britain wants to infiltrate the Caspian.’ They are already there! Let us impose a tax on the money Azerbaijani workers send home, just as Trump did to the Mexicans. Let’s see how they treat us then.”


Notes:

[1] Rail gauges are not standardized globally. 1435 mm (Standard Gauge): Used in Turkey, most of Europe, the US, and China. 1520 mm (Russian Gauge): Used in former Soviet Union countries (Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, etc.). This discrepancy creates a logistical bottleneck, as trains must wait at borders for their wheelsets (bogies) to be swapped.

[2] The 1940 Anglo-French Plan to Bomb Baku (Operation Pike): A secret military plan prepared by Britain and France in the early stages of WWII (during the period when Germany had not yet attacked the USSR, but had signed a non-aggression pact). The Allies planned to bomb the oil fields in Baku to sever the flow of Soviet oil to Nazi Germany. The plan was shelved following the German invasion of France.

Diplomacy

India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets

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India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.

According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.

Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.

That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.

Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.

India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.

However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.

Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.

According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.

A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.

Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.

Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.

According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.

New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.

Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.

Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.

Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.

However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.

Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.

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EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor

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Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.

The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.

In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.

The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.

Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.

Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road

The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.

Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.

The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.

During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.

Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact

One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.

The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.

In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.

The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.

By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.

Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.

Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.

China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.

The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.

Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition

In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.

These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.

Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.

The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.

The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.

However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.

The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership

EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.

In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.

During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.

The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.

That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.

EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

‘America First’ in Africa

The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.

In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.

An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.

For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.

Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.

Germany in Africa for the energy transition

Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”

The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”

Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.

The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.

Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.

German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.

Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.

In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.

Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.

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EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts

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The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.

German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”

Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.

As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.

The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.

Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.

Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.

In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.

Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.

As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.

Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.

“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.

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