The repercussions of the new global trade war initiated by Donald Trump continue. In early April, he announced “reciprocal tariffs” on countries worldwide, ranging from 10% to as high as 49%. In this scenario, almost all countries would face a 10% tariff when selling goods to America. However, some specific countries, including India, experienced a special tariff shock. While Trump imposed a 34% tariff on China, for example, he announced tariffs exceeding 40%, almost reaching 50%, for some other Asian countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Laos. For India, this tariff was 26%. This means that even New Delhi, which had lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, recommended tariff reductions on half of its $23 billion imports, initiated trade talks, increased imports by $3 billion, and created nearly 500,000 job opportunities with over $40 billion in investment, could not escape the 26% (discounted) Trump tariff.

Tariffs are taxes imposed by a country on goods imported from another country. Donald Trump believes that American goods are unfairly tariffed by trade partners, which harms American companies. This is why he announced these controversial new tariffs to level the playing field. He escalated the trade war by increasing customs duties on China, which retaliated with a 125% tariff, to 145% (and announced today – April 16 – that he has raised it to 245%), while giving the rest of the world a 90-day pause. Yes, Trump’s trade war is now a duel between America and China. And now, Chinese President Xi Jinping is on a Southeast Asia tour to take measures against Trump’s tariffs. When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled. Yes, I know; the elephant is a favorite metaphor for India, but in this duel, the question is: Will India be the grass? Or, alternatively: Will it be a winner as a major swing country in the duel between these two? Let me state at the outset what I will conclude with: Frankly, this duel between America and China has opened up many possibilities for all swing countries, but New Delhi is one of the biggest and most important of them. Frankly, Delhi seems to be in a more advantageous position against Beijing, its biggest rival in trade. To be a winner, it needs to recommit itself to that Covid-era reform idea.

While evaluating crises often seems like a facile approach, it is generally a rational strategy in world politics. However, Delhi has not fully capitalized on such opportunities recently. Especially after Covid, many of the promises remained unfulfilled, and there were no tangible results from the proposed agricultural laws and labor codes. For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2021 that the government would unconditionally transfer all business areas except strategic ones to the private sector, but there has been no mention of any privatization other than the Air India sale, which has been ongoing since 2017. There is still no word on the long-awaited reforms in the country. The Indian government had proposed a new economic agenda around two ideas: Atmanirbhar (self-reliance) and Make in India (domestic production model). Under this economic agenda, large amounts were allocated to production-linked incentives, and ease of doing business was promised. The first was partially implemented because production stagnated. However, some production-linked incentives were received, the most prominent being for iPhones. In the midst of the US-China trade war, this could strengthen New Delhi’s hand. Apple may now start shifting its production from China to India. This is at least a good example of a “plus one” against China. Taiwanese-based Foxconn has already moved some of its factories in China to India and started iPhone production. When it comes to ease of doing business, yes, India’s ranking has risen, but at a snail’s pace.

At least, given the Trump tariffs, there may be opportunities for New Delhi in American markets where China cannot compete. We mentioned Apple phones as the first example. However, when you look at the list of products Beijing exports to America, it is not difficult to estimate that there will be tens of billions of dollars worth of export possibilities available. The questions are: How quickly can India ramp up new production to turn this duel to its advantage? If customs duties are significantly reduced, is Indian production robust enough to survive? And what does the Indian government plan to do to ensure this? While subsidies are the first thing that comes to mind, they are expensive, and Trump may find them unfair and object. I am quoting the view of the US Trade Representative’s office on this matter verbatim: “India provides a wide range of subsidies and support to the agricultural sector, including credit subsidies, debt waivers, crop insurance, and input subsidies (such as fertilizer, fuel, electricity, and seeds) at both the central government and state government levels. These subsidies, which are a significant cost to the government, reduce the cost of production for India’s producers and have the potential to distort the market where imported products compete.”

Anyway, America was generally a duty-free economy, which provides Delhi with a $45 billion trade surplus. It is also true that America produces very little that it can export to India. The top two items in the export basket are mineral oils and precious stones. Manufactured goods, machinery and appliances, electrical, and optical equipment have a value of less than $8 billion. In contrast, India exports electrical and pharmaceutical products, which are the top two products on the export list, and the value of these products is more than three times higher, at $26.5 billion. Most of the rest that Delhi buys from America are agricultural products. This is exactly what Trump wants to boost. This directly benefits his farmer base as well. Everything Delhi grows on farms, from walnuts to edible oil, is tariffed at significant rates. Fish, meat, and dairy products are taxed so high that it is almost impossible for America to export them. And this is the only thing America produces in exportable surpluses.

The trade issue seems to be almost entirely limited to manufacturing and agricultural products, which means that services, which account for about 40% of India’s exports to America, are not included. Since none of them cross the border, they are not subject to customs duties. Somewhere in the article, I said that Delhi, which lowered tariffs on thousands of goods, could not escape the Trump tariff. Agriculture is critical for Trump, and Delhi must have realized that it cannot conduct trade by neglecting agriculture and lowering taxes on machinery, boilers, electronic devices, and precious stones, I think. If you look at the India section in the US Trade Representative’s report on restrictive practices of different countries, you can see that agricultural products are marked as non-tariff barriers. Also, the idea that India is an important partner and that the personal friendship between Modi and Trump will bring a special exemption to Delhi is often thought or repeated; however, looking at Trump’s attitude towards his other allies, I don’t think he thinks that way at all. Trump is playing hardball and is very likely to continue playing hardball. Lowering customs duties on non-agricultural goods was the easy part. However, considering Delhi’s traditional insecurities and protectionism, can India open up to milk and meat imports, for example? Furthermore, is milk and dairy production or meat production self-sufficient? Considering Delhi’s production protectionism and historical hesitations regarding agriculture, its task seems difficult. Perhaps the opportunity for agricultural reforms missed during the Covid crisis deserves a second chance for Delhi, and perhaps this superpower trade war, where its best friend and worst rival are showing their hands, is telling it that now is the perfect time.

Rhetoric such as being the fastest-growing major economy or the fifth largest and soon to be third, surpassing Japan and Germany, and the discourse of a manufacturing revolution that has been said to be coming for the last decade but has not yet materialized – or even gone backward – is certainly noteworthy. However, New Delhi, which seems to have moved away from the hard-won economic freedoms of the early 90s, appears to have returned to the belief that growth can be achieved through top-down methods. Higher tariffs have been seen returning in the last decade. You might be buying the world’s most expensive steel from India, for example. In the late 90s, the finance minister of the time said he had brought tariffs down to almost ASEAN levels. Increasingly powerful oligarchs are dividing market share and sectors. Does it work? Is the idea that state patronage will lead India to a manufacturing and export utopia coming to fruition? Take a look at government data: Despite the Make in India domestic production model, where Delhi invested over $26 billion in strategically important sectors to benefit from the exodus from China, the share of manufacturing in the Indian economy has declined compared to the service and agricultural sectors. Or, after the 10-year period of the Make in India initiative, you see that the share of manufacturing in India’s GDP in 2023-24 is exactly the same as in 2013-14: 17.3%. And it tends to be even lower this year. The contribution of manufacturing to job creation was slightly lower in 2022-23 compared to 2013-14; it was 10.6% in 2022-23 while it was 11.6% in 2013-14. Furthermore, while the real success in smartphone production may deserve celebration, the share of exports in its GDP has fallen from 25% in 2013-14 to 22.7% currently. Consequently, the growth rate of Delhi’s share in global exports has also slowed down.

Praveen Khandelwal, a Delhi-based businessman and ruling party member of parliament known for his lobbying activities, may be saying that the high tariff imposed on imports from China to America presents a significant opportunity for India’s trade and industry, and that they want to use this advantage against Beijing in most sectors, including electronics, auto parts, textiles, and chemicals. However, Delhi is dependent on Beijing for parts and equipment, lacks skilled labor, and incentive programs are also insufficient in many sectors where Delhi is competing with Beijing. The Chinese economy, which is five times larger than the Indian economy, is still a formidable competitor. In India’s case, Trump’s tariffs could be softened, or perhaps even completely removed (?); but in return, Delhi may need to offer more than the “tiny concessions” I mentioned in a previous article. It is clear that America expects more than “tiny gains.” While other countries that experienced a special tariff shock are trying to enter into negotiations for reciprocal tariff reductions during the 90-day grace period, New Delhi has already been at the negotiating table with America for some time, but this time Trump is a tough friend. The scale of Indian strategic vulnerability will be revealed by time.

After spending three days at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) as part of the Harici team, I returned with critical impressions regarding both the direction of Turkish foreign policy and the state of the world. Beyond Jeffrey Sachs’s headline-grabbing statement that “Syria was a US-Israel project,” the forum’s most crucial aspect, rather than sensational statements stirring things up, was that global and regional actors – who often struggle to come together or find environments for dialogue – saw Türkiye as a hub in this multipolar world where they could exchange a few words. The number and level of participants helped us better understand the countries Türkiye wants to do business with, and those that want to do business with Türkiye. Ministers and even heads of state from many countries – from the Balkans to the Caucasus, from Africa to Asia – found themselves having tea with counterparts not necessarily considered to be “on the same side.” This sets the ADF apart from similar global diplomatic summits.

A new hub in multipolarity

Whichever panel we attended, the main theme was clearly “multipolarity.” From economic policies to artificial intelligence, from war to the search for trade partners, all discussions revolved around the dissolution of the unipolar world that persisted since the end of the Cold War, and how 19th-century-style geopolitically-driven foreign policy finds resonance today. However, unlike Davos or a BRICS summit, many states that have chosen different paths found a voice at this forum.

For instance, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, who made headlines with the “foreign agent” law and faced protests for allegedly steering his country away from the European Union, was sitting side-by-side with Montenegrin President Jakov Milatović, who was explaining how wonderful and easy joining the EU would be. While we were downstairs requesting an interview with the Iranian delegation, whose militias fought alongside Assad in the Syrian Civil War, Ahmed al-Shara [also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, a key figure aiming to overthrow Assad in Syria] walked right past us just a few steps away. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke in an opposite room just a few hours after his Ukrainian counterpart. Even the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan held a panel discussion together.

Such a scene is not something you encounter in many parts of the world. In this period where the world faces the risk of trade or military conflicts, being recognized as a place where anyone can initiate dialogue when needed is a significant advantage for Turkish diplomacy. When we discuss our regional and global interests with other states, the potential cost of alienating Türkiye —losing access to such a diplomatic middle ground— will score points in our favor in all consultations.

Furthermore, the high level of participation primarily from the Balkans, Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia indicates Türkiye’s ambition to become one of the smaller poles that could form outside the Western or BRICS axes. While Türkiye’s early recognition of multipolarity and its positioning accordingly – unlike many Western states – is a plus, not everything is so positive. Although Türkiye’s relationship with the EU gains significant importance during this period of serious security vulnerabilities for the bloc, it was both saddening and surprising that during the forum, Turkic states other than Azerbaijan and Türkiye bowed to the EU’s wishes regarding the TRNC [Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus]. EU states, facing energy shortages and watching their industries shrink after their conflict with Russia, have sought solutions by focusing on Central Asia. Despite their somewhat desperate position, they managed, merely with the promise of investment, to get Kazakhstan to open an embassy in the Republic of Cyprus, and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to declare their respect for its territorial integrity. Türkiye “conceding such a goal” [suffering a diplomatic setback] to the EU during a period when its geopolitical hand is strong has opened up debate on how effectively we are leveraging our advantages.

Of course, alongside this, there is the Gaza issue. Netanyahu’s claim that some major powers could be persuaded by Trump’s alleged plan to expel Palestinians from Gaza had turned eyes towards Türkiye before the forum. However, the Gaza issue became one of the most discussed topics throughout the forum. While keeping the issue on the agenda is hopeful, uncertainty remains about whether Trump and Netanyahu can carry out their potentially disastrous plan for Gazans.

One notable detail was the relatively low participation from Western Europeans or Americans at the ADF. Although Stephen Doughty, the UK’s Shadow Minister responsible for Europe and North America, attended, it’s fair to say that the bloc we know as the collective West wasn’t particularly enthusiastic about the ADF. Of course, they have quite a bit on their plate. The Trump tariffs, which stirred things up before the forum, also became one of the main topics at the ADF. The tariffs announced almost hourly on a reciprocal basis put participating ministers and heads of state in a rather difficult position. While many hoped their countries wouldn’t suffer severe damage from the tariffs, they stressed that global trade could grind to a halt.

Jeffrey Sachs was also among those heavily criticizing Trump’s tariff policy. I asked Sachs whether Trump’s policy could succeed in bringing back the industries the US had sent abroad years ago under the pretext of globalization. Sachs replied that the way to bring back industries is not to impose tariffs on 150 countries, but to take steps within the country to motivate companies. He also stated that the US does not have to fight countries like China. Perhaps Sachs delivered his most crucial line here:

“Fortunately, diplomacy is cheap. That’s why we are at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, not the Antalya Military Forum!”

Between Israel’s massacres in Gaza, Trump’s tariffs, and the uncertainty over whether the Ukraine War will end, a bleak picture emerges regarding the direction of the world. However, not everything is so pessimistic. In his speech, Sergey Lavrov replaced the usual phrase collective West with “Europe and the UK.” Except for a couple of jabs at Biden and Obama, Lavrov avoided harsh rhetoric towards the US. Unlike last year, this time he spoke in English, not Russian. Apparently, Russia now sees a need to communicate its position to the English-speaking world. And this shows us the following: even as trade wars, regional crises, and Israel’s genocidal actions continue to grow worldwide, perhaps there’s a positive shift compared to the last few years dominated by global fears of nuclear war; at least now, there is dialogue!

On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the media at the White House that he had set a final deadline for Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the U.S. If Iran does not abandon its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. will “definitely” take military action, and Israel will be deeply involved and become a “leader” in this. Clearly, “Trump 2.0” has added more military threat to Iran, but overall, this pressure resembles drawing a bow without fully pulling it—extreme pressure that may reignite the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” set seven years ago.

Trump met with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which the U.S. announced it was holding direct negotiations with Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed on April 8 that indirect high-level talks would take place on April 12 in Oman, but denied any direct talks as claimed by the U.S.

Analysts believe the summit focused not only on bilateral trade tariffs and the Gaza situation, but also on coordinating a unified stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on Trump’s statements, Israel is expected to strike Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold—i.e., acquires actual nuclear weapons—by targeting its nuclear facilities. The U.S. seems to want to keep military action as “Plan B,” exerting heavy pressure through negotiations first and resorting to military means only if talks fail, possibly in coordination with Israel.

Iran, long accustomed to U.S.-Israeli military threats, seems unfazed by this war intimidation. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran “does not seek nuclear weapons,” emphasizing the country’s long-term need for nuclear science and energy. On April 10, Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated on platform X that if external threats persist, Iran may suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expel inspectors, and consider relocating enriched materials to secure domestic sites.

Less than 100 days into “Trump 2.0,” the administration is in full attack mode, waging economic war on all trade partners in the name of “Make America Great Again.” By attempting to open the “Pandora’s box”of disrupting the global trade system, he seeks to force all trading partners back into a corner. While global attention is focused on avoiding U.S. economic coercion and “public robbery,” geopolitical conflicts are momentarily overshadowed.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Trump’s return focuses on two major battlefields: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East, with the latter’s key goal being the subjugation of Iran—a goal unfulfilled in his first term. Thus, the new U.S. Iran policy under Trump centers on threats and coercion, supplemented by engagement and negotiation, with gradually increasing pressure and strategic encirclement, avoiding military action unless absolutely necessary.

Currently, the Trump administration is “riding the momentum,” fully cooperating with Israel to weaken and dismantle the “Axis of Resistance.” Following actions against Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and resistance forces in Iraq, efforts now focus on resolving the Gaza issue, with military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis, while maintaining pressure on Iran to achieve “Middle East peace under Trump”: expanding Arab-Israeli normalization and isolating Iran—the region’s long-standing anti-U.S. and anti-Israel force.

For some time, the Trump administration has unconditionally supported Israel, using transactional strategies like promoting “clearing Gaza” or “taking over Gaza” to pressure Arab states into aiding Israel. It aims to usher in a “post-Hamas era” and reshape the political and geopolitical ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it strikes Yemen’s Houthis under the pretense of protecting Red Sea routes and portrays Iran not just as a partner but as the master of the Houthis, seeking justification for continued suppression of Iran.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Trump is displaying a more aggressive war stance than during his first term, publicly declaring “if talks fail, we will strike,” openly supporting Israel in bringing war to the Persian Gulf. The U.S., in collaboration with Israel, is exerting high pressure on Iran, and clearly enjoys three advantages:

First, Iran has suffered major setbacks in over a year of the “Sixth Middle East War,” and its bottom line of avoiding full-scale war has been thoroughly exposed. The “Axis of Resistance” is also scattered and fragmented.

Second, U.S.-Russia relations have drastically reversed. After suffering a strategic diplomatic failure in the Middle East, Russia is now focusing on dividing up Ukraine’s land and mineral resources with the U.S.

Third, although Russia and Iran still maintain good relations, Russia has openly stated that it has no intention of intervening if Iran is attacked.

When Trump first took office in 2017, after half a year of observation and bargaining, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, I wrote that Trump didn’t withdraw just for the sake of it. Unlike other withdrawal actions rooted in isolationism, America-first ideology, and anti-globalization/multilateralism, Trump’s move was strategic — “retreating in order to advance.” By dismantling the nuclear agreement, he aimed to start anew or add terms, in an attempt to solve the broader Middle East issue in one go and serve America’s core interests and Middle East policy.

On May 21, 2018, the U.S. State Department proposed a complete “Plan B,” not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat but also to bury Iran’s painstaking geopolitical achievements in the Middle East and reshape regional dynamics and U.S.-Iran/Israel-Iran relations. This plan was essentially a replica of the U.S. strategy toward North Korea — a typical “carrot and stick” approach. However, compared to U.S. demands on North Korea, this plan was stricter, more comprehensive, and far-reaching — aiming to resolve historical and current contradictions in the Middle East and return the region to a relatively balanced framework.

Therefore, Trump’s renewed focus on Iran’s nuclear issue is merely a rehash of old issues, and hasn’t yet reached the high-pressure levels or demands of seven years ago. At that time, the U.S. policy toward Iran was a well-prepared, strategic combination — probably now forgotten by many — known as the “Pompeo 12 Conditions.” It is thus worthwhile to revisit this list in evaluating today’s Trump-style Iran policy.

Pompeo’ 12 Conditions

 In his speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo emphasized that Iran must meet 12 demands in exchange for the lifting of all U.S. sanctions and a full restoration of bilateral relations. Otherwise, Iran would face “the most severe sanctions in history.” These 12 conditions fall into categories, urging Iran to completely abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, release detained individuals, stop supporting terrorism, and halt interference in the internal affairs and security of regional countries.

The four demands related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were:

-Iran must declare all military nuclear activities to the IAEA and permanently and verifiably abandon them.

-Cease all uranium enrichment, never pursue plutonium reprocessing, and shut down heavy water reactors.

-Allow unconditional IAEA inspections at any site.

-End the development and launch of ballistic missiles, and halt development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

Even from a nuclear non-proliferation standpoint, these conditions go far beyond those in the Iran nuclear deal and aim to completely strip Iran of its ability to acquire nuclear weapons or deliver them via long-range missiles.

The Remaining Eight of the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” and Their Implications

Three of the conditions relate to non-state actors. They require Iran to:

-Immediately cease support for so-called “terrorist organizations” in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad;

-Stop supporting “terrorist forces” such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, and cease sheltering senior al-Qaeda leaders;

-End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (especially the Quds Force)’s support for “terrorists” and “armed groups” around the world.

The U.S. believes Iran is the patron or ally of various extremist organizations in the Middle East, especially a stumbling block and root cause preventing Palestinian and Arab concessions to Israel. It sees Iran as a troublemaker hindering peace in the region. Thus, resolving the Middle East issue thoroughly must start with Iran.

Four conditions relate to Iran’s relations with regional states:

-Respect Iraq’s sovereignty, allow Iranian-backed Shia militias to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society;

-End military support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels and work toward a political solution for the Yemen conflict;

-Withdraw all Iranian military forces from Syria;

-Cease threats to destroy Israel, missile launches at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threats to international shipping, and cyberattacks.

Additionally, the U.S. demanded Iran release all “detained” American citizens and those of its allies and partners.

These eight conditions, unrelated to nuclear weapons or missile programs, go far beyond nuclear issues. They show the U.S.’s intent to comprehensively constrain and curb Iran’s military and diplomatic activities in the Middle East and globally. This is a strategic countermeasure against Iran’s regional expansion, which threatens U.S. allies like Israel and Gulf states and intensifies sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It aims to pressure Iran to halt foreign influence and give up the gains it made during its expansion.

As a “reward” for complying with these 12 conditions, the U.S. promised to sign a new nuclear agreement with Iran if it made real, visible, and sustainable changes. It would also lift all sanctions, gradually restore diplomatic and economic ties, allow Iran access to advanced technologies, and support its economic modernization and integration into the global economy.

Clearly, this is the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy—a roadmap to comprehensively resolve the U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel hostilities and reshape the geopolitical landscape. It includes both the “spiked club” of pressure and the tempting “carrot” of incentives. The aim is to downgrade Iran from a “regional superpower” back to a normal state, as it was before the Islamic Revolution, to eliminate all of the U.S. and its allies’ security concerns.

Iran completely rejected the “Pompeo 12 Conditions,” seeing them as an ultimatum demanding total surrender. To accept them would mean abandoning the grand vision and sacrifices of the Islamic Revolution and returning to a submissive, ordinary state. The Trump administration followed up with more sanctions. But Iran endured until Biden took office—and now again under Trump’s return.

From “Trump 1.0” to “Trump 2.0,” eight years have passed. The nuclear deal hasn’t been revived, and the nuclear crisis hasn’t escalated into war. But the current geopolitical and security landscape is clearly more unfavorable to Iran: it suffered military defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean, lost the strategic western flank of the “Shia Crescent” due to Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Damascus regime.

In Israel’s large-scale raid in October 2024, it successfully opened an aerial corridor from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, launched warning strikes deep into Iranian territory, and exposed Iran’s weak bottom line of lacking will to retaliate symmetrically. Now, as “Trump 2.0” begins, Iraq—the key node of the “Shia Crescent”—faces diplomatic pressure to break away from Iran and rejoin the Arab world. Overall, Iran’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating, while U.S.-Israeli control of Eastern Mediterranean airspace increases the risk of military escalation. The pressure Iran faces now exceeds that of “Trump 1.0.”

Although Pompeo is no longer on the “Trump 1.0 chariot,” the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” reflect the core thinking of Trump’s national security team regarding the Middle East and remain the foundation of U.S. policy toward Iran. Far from being discarded, these conditions may be gradually revived under “Trump 2.0,” tightening the strategic bowstring to pressure Iran toward compromise.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.