Opinion
After the Wagner’s revolt

The Wagner revolt ended with Lukashenko’s intervention.
Two main views attract my attention. One group is more or less in favour of the following attitude: “Oh dear, it’s Russia, these things happen, it’s no big deal.” Another version of this is: “Do you think that a coup can succeed in a big country like Russia?” The other group is roughly saying: “It is very important, if this military coup succeeds, the Kremlin will fall.”
I too think it is very important, but from a completely different perspective.
Informational non-barriers to the coup attempt
Let me begin by re-stating the following. I have persistently and repeatedly argued that many of the claims made about Russia and used as the basis for intellectual activity in the West do not reflect reality. That Russia is authoritarian and totalitarian, the Russian people are warlike (or war-averse), the Russian leadership is Russian nationalist are completely wrong. They are not objective, but fabricated, distorted views about society, state and politics. These are pseudosciences, just like “Kremlinology”, which was all the craze during the Soviet Union (and is now being stewed again), and even if they sometimes offer seminal propositions, their foundations are too flimsy to be taken seriously.
In reality, Russian society is uniquely open. Paul Craig Roberts, Reagan’s undersecretary of the treasury, said as much at the turn of the millennium. Despite widespread intellectual and cultural degeneration, there is sometimes a naive hunger for information. The issue is not the claim that “there are no barriers to information in the information age”. What I mean is that there is a qualitative difference in the quantity of those who need the flow of information. In Western societies, there is more “many-sidedness” and more of it is not needed, but it is certainly intra-systemic. In Russia, no matter how much many-sidedness there is, more of it is sought.
The events of yesterday confirmed this observation. A continuous and multidirectional flow of information, the like of which is impossible to find elsewhere: anyone who wished could find any opinion he wanted on the telegram channels, on the websites and even on the television screens, and, moreover, the audio, video, and written messages of Prigozhin, who had been declared a traitor only in the morning, were widely circulated. So too were the calls to subdue and even destroy the Wagnerians at the point of the bayonet.
Unpredictable spontaneity
The history of Russia is full of spontaneous, sudden, and unpredictable upheavals. Almost all the social, political, military, etc. movements that have shaken Russia have been completely unpredictable and spontaneous. There is one single and great exception: The October Revolution.
Unpredictability does not mean political independence of the actors. On the contrary, actors act by sensing hoe the wind blows and establishing relations with potential allies to the extent that they do not narrow their room for manoeuvre. Considering that the day before he was almost an angel of peace for the Kiev regime, Prigozhin’s action was clearly a digging in the ground for possible relations. The support of the defunct oligarchs, the strange and meaningful silence of the existing oligarchs, the fact that the financial arm of the government, unlike the siloviki arm, carefully avoided statements of support for Putin and played it out over the weekend should be taken as evidence that Prigozhin was digging in the right place.
I actually touched upon this when I commented on Putin’s speech the previous morning.
The reminder of “1917” in this speech may refer to two things: the February revolution, or the Kornilov putsch.
“We know only a single science: the science of history,” Marx wrote. One of the greatest tragedies of the age should be that the left is losing its historical consciousness to a considerable degree. When they think of 1917, they do not remember February, July or Kornilov; all they think of is October.
Putin’s anti-revolutionary stance is well known, but the context of the speech attributes much more to him than that.
If Putin was referring to Kornilov, there is a solid internal coherence, since the Kornilov putsch after the July uprising was the real beginning of the collapse of the provisional government. But in this case, Putin is drawing a parallel between himself and Kerensky.
If he meant the February uprising, the problem is more complicated. February was not just a spontaneous uprising. The uprising itself shows that a state of paralysis of state power had long since emerged, but in the process that led to and resulted in the tsar’s abdication, there was a power conflict that had been brewing since 1915, and behind it was a conspiracy involving the grand prince and a number of front commanders. So, if February is what is meant here, the problem is much more serious.
I will not discuss which assumption is correct.
Spiral history
It is one of Marx’s well-known sayings: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.”
How many times it repeats itself is a question mark. This is related to the spiral development of history, each new historical period repeats similar events of a sub-segment in a new, highly degenerated form.
Mussolini travelled to Milan on 27 October 1922. On the same day, in Perugia, the National Fascist Party’s appeal to the Italian people that the “march to Rome” had begun was published.[1] The “squadristi” (squad) marching columns, estimated at 10-30 thousand in total, mobilized under the direction of “quadrumviri” (quattro-four; four leaders of the march). The squadristi began to arm themselves, either by raiding army depots along their route or by volunteers from local army units. Prime Minister Luigi Facta declared that the country was on the brink of rebellion and prepared to declare a state of emergency. On 28 October, the king held talks; despite the army’s declaration of loyalty to the king, he refrained from declaring a state of emergency and dismissed the prime minister. Mussolini opposed a coalition government in which the fascists would participate and demanded the premiership. The squadristi were within 50 kilometers of Rome. On 29 October, the king surrendered to the blackmail of Mussolini. On 30 October, Mussolini and his squadristi entered Rome more or less simultaneously. Mussolini, supported by the army and the grand bourgeoisie, received authorization from the king, and the fascist government was formed. The king remained on his throne, but as a hollow puppet, a straw, impotent scarecrow.
Prigozhin called his action a “march for justice” against “corruption, lies and bureaucracy”. Who could oppose such a demand? Who could oppose the black shirts demanding justice?
A perfect choice of slogan for the fascist movement
As always, history proved Marx right again. Prigozhin appeared on the scene as a runt Mussolini and withdrew, fearing the possible consequences of his action, namely that he would not be able to obtain the consent of the people and would fall into disaster. Mussolini had risen on the promise of raising Italy, which had managed to emerge, albeit muddy, from the mire of disaster, while Prigozhin was a candidate to drag Russia, far from disaster, into the gutter. Mussolini had nothing to lose, Prigozhin had everything to lose.
I should make a note here, which I will refrain from dwelling on for the moment. Let us remember that Zhirinovsky died on 6 April last year. Zhirinovsky functioned as an air cushion from which potential unrest could crash and take the momentum away. His death created a vacuum in politics. All the conditions were ready for the petty-bourgeois rightism he represented to shift to another center. How voluntary it was is debatable, of course, but the nature of things was such that Prigozhin emerged as one of the main candidates to fill this vacuum.
This is how the danger of petty bourgeois rightism, a political tendency that is actually quite close to the left, given the material conditions that created it, evolving into a fascist movement emerged.
Why was it not suppressed? One: fundamental reasons
The question of why the armed forces did not take action against the Wagnerians is a legitimate one. It must be answered from two different perspectives.
The first is the reasons below ground.
It is worth going into detail because the dynamics continue to work.
In his first speech on the morning of 24 February, Putin said that they would not be caught unprepared as in 1941. Let us recall the exact wording:
“We know that in 1940 and early 1941 the Soviet Union went to great lengths to prevent war or at least delay its outbreak. To this end, the USSR sought not to provoke the potential aggressor until the very end by refraining or postponing the most urgent and obvious preparations it had to make to defend itself from an imminent attack. When it finally acted, it was too late.”
This means that the Ukrainian conflict, as I have mentioned in all my articles on the impending conflict from November 2021 onwards, was considered a kind of “winter war.” In other words, it was not planned as an aggressive war at all, but as the only means of preventing a bigger war.
That is, the discourse of “we intervened to stop the war that started in 2014” reflected a genuine, sincere belief, even if its (in)accuracy was debatable. However, the discourse naturally included the emphasis on “we will not make the mistake of 1941, we will not delay”, whereas, as Putin admitted for the first time last autumn in a meeting with women who had lost relatives at the front, they had delayed.
One could argue that this delay has a political content, that is to say: yes, but we were not caught unprepared militarily, which is contrary to the nature of things. The development of the war industry and the output of modern weapons and technology undoubtedly meant preparation, but many problems also arose in the organization of the army in terms of supply, logistics, personnel, troops and command. These problems had to arise; nothing more natural than these problems arising when an army that has not been in combat begins to fight.
The problem is that in 1941 these problems were solved with much greater speed, because the state and society had been mobilized down to the core, because they could be mobilized, because the state did not have to calculate in the face of the bourgeois greed for profit. However, as I wrote in March: “… so many and difficult problems arose, from the provision of equipment for the soldiers to the establishment of unity of command and even the transport of those summoned to their posts, that this dynamic was inevitably transferred to Wagner.”
There is therefore no point in roundabouts and clichés about the general tendency of capitalism towards mercenary companies and how this is a sign of political decay. These clichés seem to say a lot, but they do not recognize that the current situation is not caused by a tendency, but by a concrete and burning problem.
Such are the “experts” on the left. As for the “experts” on the right, who are always on the TV screens in Turkey, they have finally learnt that there is such a thing as a Wagner (although they have never learnt why it is called a Wagner, but one should not expect them to, since each of them is a jar of intelligence, history and politics, and since the jar is full to the brim, it cannot hold much); therefore, there is no need to go into the history of this mercenary company.
In passing, it is worth mentioning the legal side of the matter. According to the Constitution, mercenary labour is prohibited in Russia. But there is a loophole in the legislation, military companies are not considered mercenary companies. They are considered as “private detective and protection activities” established according to the corporate law.
In fact, a loophole in the legislation is a ridiculous phrase; in bourgeois law, the legislation is written for the sake of a loophole. This gap is closed in different ways depending on the threat or advantage.
Two: root causes
Let’s come to the technical, “cyclical” (but not unimportant) answer to the question “Why did this happen?”. I emphasized this several times during the day yesterday.
Firstly, by the very nature of things, no army, except the armies of colonial countries, which are mainly organized against a possible civil war, develops serious strategies based on the possibility of confronting another army (regular or guerrilla army) inside the country. (This is precisely what made colonial countries a paradise for military coups for more or less the entire second half of the 20th century).
Secondly, in the current situation, with probably all the experienced combat troops at the front, in border areas and bases, only the following forces are left to intervene against another armed army inside: police, gendarmerie, intelligence and air force. The Russian equivalents of the second and third are the Rosgvardiya, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, and the Federal Security Service (FSB).
Stopping heavily armed professional units, advancing in tanks and armour, armed with stinger-type air defense weapons and having recently undergone a major combat experience, is very difficult, even if their personnel numbers are relatively small, and perhaps almost impossible without heavy bombardment by the air force. It is necessary to isolate the advancing enemy army from the civilian population. But this, too, is close to impossible, because the situation has developed so rapidly that normal life goes on in a strange, almost surreal way. Civilian casualties are therefore inevitable.
More important are the difficulties of capturing a city that has actually fallen, not of stopping the incoming. Moreover, this city, as in the repeated experiences of 1919 and 1942, is of strategic importance; it is the gateway to the south. The targeting of this city by Wagner points to serious strategic work and recalls tragic historical experiences.
The most important thing is the political consolidation of the masses. At the present stage, this coup army has not interfered with the administrative and municipal organs. It has not even intervened in the military-law enforcement organs. It is enough only to stop them from implementing the orders they have received or to make it clear that it will stop them. Moreover, the coup army has achieved tremendous successes on the front (this expression does not mean affirmation) and these successes have brought it great prestige in the eyes of the masses. Moreover, this prestige has been reinforced by the government itself through television adverts, giant billboards, and praising speeches at official receptions.
In other words, there are all the conditions for a rapid escalation of the conflict, but there are also conditions for keeping it under controlled tension.
These are very serious, deadly problems. No one can easily predict the military and political consequences. It is no coincidence, therefore, that throughout the day, especially from the Russian left, there have been discussions of the possibility of a chain reaction effect of the conflict, which (1) could lead to a moral breakdown at the front; (2) might require a shift of troops from the front to stop the coup army; (3) in either case could lead to a setback at the front; (4) could result in political defeat vis-à-vis NATO; (5) political defeat could lead to internal turmoil, etc.
Independence tendencies
The main subject of my article in March was the following (I summarize it in the roughest outline): There have been many times in Russia when insignificant men have gained enormous importance. Prigozhin is also trying to become an independent political force. This tendency is also gaining strength elsewhere. The process will inevitably end in liquidation.
One of the underlying causes of the capitalist restoration and the resultant localized civil wars in every sense of the word in 1990 was the decision in September 1989 by a plenum of the CC of the CPSU to cede its powers to the union republics: “The most important sentence in the resolution, quoted by Putin, is this: ‘The highest representative bodies of the union republics may, on their territory, protest and stop the implementation of the decrees and instructions of the union [USSR] government.’ It is difficult to find another example of any government declaring its own existence meaningless. In any case, this would mean the disintegration of the Soviet nation.” It meant that Moscow was handing over its legitimacy to someone else.
It is as ironic as it is tragic: It was this decision of the CPSU that brought about the end of the Soviet Union as a state, where, in Putin’s words, “borders were fictitious and decisions were centralized”, but it was Putin’s hesitation to suppress tendencies towards autonomy that has been his method of governing on the ruins of capitalist restoration, while at every opportunity accusing Lenin, who founded the unity of modern Russia, of breaking up “historical Russia”.
Now an upheaval is inevitable. Firstly, there will be an upheaval that will suppress the tendencies towards independence, and this process will proceed step by step, but with determination. It is not only Wagner, but everyone and everything like Wagner, and they are particularly strong in the local organs of power.
Yesterday’s events have clearly shown that if the central authority is content with the function of coordinator among the subordinates, it will disintegrate; the central power must suppress the independent will of the subordinates and make them dependent on itself.
[1] This event is translated into Turkish (and other languages) as “march to Rome”, and into Russian as “campaign to Rome”. Maybe “marcia” in Italian also means “campaign” in our language, I don’t know. But “campaign” better reflects the spirit of the action.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
Opinion
Trump’s Iron-Fist Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Further Tears Apart American Society

As of June 13 (Pacific Time), one week had passed since a conflict erupted following a raid on illegal immigration sites in California by federal agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This conflict not only showed no signs of abating but rather spread like wildfire from Los Angeles, the capital of California, to 24 cities across the United States, including San Francisco, Dallas, Austin, New York, and Washington. Although protesters strongly oppose the federal government’s forced deportation of illegal immigrants, President Trump, who has already deployed the National Guard and some Marine units, has threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act, authorizing armed forces to suppress protesters more forcefully.
That same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals suspended a federal judge’s previous night ruling requiring Trump to return control of the National Guard. This undoubtedly gave Trump’s iron-fisted action a legal umbrella. The “alternative civil war” sparked by immigration policy reveals the complex realities and interest struggles of American society and puts Trump and the Republican Party’s governance prospects to the test. Although this unrest is unlikely to lead to a real American civil war as depicted in the 2024 Hollywood political prophecy film Civil War, it will undoubtedly further tear American society apart.
On June 6, federal law enforcement officers carried out a raid in Los Angeles County targeting illegal immigrants, storming at least seven locations and arresting 44 people. That evening, 500 protesters gathered in downtown Los Angeles, where law enforcement used tear gas, flashbangs, and rubber bullets to suppress them. On June 7, violent clashes erupted between federal law enforcement and protesters in the city of Paramount, California. As the crackdown on illegal immigration met resistance, Trump signed a presidential memorandum to “liberate Los Angeles,” bypassing California Governor Newsom and deploying 2,000 state National Guard troops to Los Angeles.
This marked the first time since 1965 that a U.S. president activated a state’s National Guard without a request from the state’s executive authority. On June 8, Trump further threatened to deploy 700 Marines to California to “protect federal property.” Trump’s administrative pressure campaign against California ignited the fuse of this “domestic unrest” and triggered a new constitutional crisis.
On June 9, Governor Newsom and California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the federal government from using the state’s National Guard and Defense Forces for law enforcement, but a federal judge in California rejected the motion and scheduled a hearing three days later. On June 10, due to ongoing arrests, Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass announced a curfew in a one-square-mile area of downtown. Shortly after, Spokane, the second-largest city in Washington State, also declared a curfew in response to protests against ICE…
A review of public statements and public opinion over the past week shows that this national dispute over the handling of illegal immigration reflects deep-rooted contradictions and power struggles, directly illustrating America’s political polarization and social fragmentation.
First, this is a clash of beliefs about the rights and wrongs and merits of immigration. The United States is a multiethnic federal nation built through immigration and sustained by continuous immigration that supports its development, prosperity, innovation, and vitality. Without massive immigration waves, America wouldn’t have come into being. Without long-term immigrant contributions, America wouldn’t be strong. Trump himself is a descendant of German immigrants. On June 5, when new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made his first visit to the U.S., he gave Trump a symbolic gift: a framed German birth certificate of his grandfather Friedrich Trump from Karlstadt.
Neither Merz’s subtle persuasion nor Trump’s own immigrant heritage can mitigate the serious rift in U.S. society over immigration. Trump and other conservatives, represented by the Republican Party, who adhere to market economy principles and social Darwinism, believe that the U.S. has too low an immigration threshold, allowing large numbers of low-quality or illegal immigrants to enter. They argue this not only takes away Americans’ jobs and dilutes welfare benefits but also erodes loyalty to America and causes the continued decline of the social status and influence of white Americans. Therefore, in his second presidential campaign, Trump promised to expel all illegal immigrants if elected, to reclaim the jobs and benefits lost by Americans—especially white Americans.
However, opponents—especially Democrats who advocate for cultural diversity and universal human rights—argue that immigrants revitalize the U.S. economy. They provide abundant cheap labor that supports the service, transportation, construction, and manufacturing industries. Thus, immigrants should not be discriminated against, let alone expelled. Moreover, even if some immigrants entered illegally, many have since settled down, abide by the law, work hard, and even build families, becoming an inseparable part of American society. Forcibly deporting them harms not only the economy and industries but also causes humanitarian crises like broken families and displaced children.
Secondly, this is a partial game in the overall struggle between federal and local interests. The crisis first broke out in California, reflecting the misalignment and differing calculations between the federal government and this economically powerful state. Previously, trade-dependent California had clearly opposed Trump’s tariff policy; the immigration dispute is merely a continuation of existing conflicts and has intensified past antagonisms. California is the largest economic state in the U.S., contributing 14% of national GDP. Its economic development has long relied on various types of immigration, making it a stronghold long seen as a sanctuary for illegal immigrants. According to unofficial statistics, California has up to 2.3 million illegal immigrants—around 20% of the U.S. total and 5.9% of the state’s population, higher than the national average—with 74% of them being of working age. If large numbers of illegal immigrants are expelled, California businesses will face skyrocketing labor costs or labor shortages, potentially leading to economic stagnation or even decline. Therefore, California’s political and business elites have consistently resisted federal immigration enforcement measures. The trade war has already cost California over $40 billion and intensified conflicts between immigrant laborers and native workers. Expelling immigrants would undoubtedly worsen California’s economy.
California is both a major contributor of federal taxes and a major recipient of central fiscal transfers—mutual dependence is high. Yet, to break this “sanctuary fortress” of illegal immigrants and promote new immigration policies nationwide, the Trump administration plans to sharply cut federal funding to California starting June 13, citing its “anti-energy, criminal-coddling, and illegal immigrant-sheltering” policies. Governor Newsom emphasized that California pays over $80 billion annually to the federal government—much more than it receives—and threatened to stop sending federal taxes. Long-standing tensions between the federal government and California were further inflamed by Trump’s radical immigration policy and ultimately exploded due to federal agents’ forced arrests.
Thirdly, this is a power dispute between federal law enforcement and local autonomy. The United States is a federal state with a clear division of powers between central and local governments. In principle, the federal government is responsible for foreign affairs and national defense, and controls borders and ports, thus holding absolute jurisdiction over immigration. However, as the largest immigration-receiving state, California is known for emphasizing independence and autonomy, particularly opposing federal interference in immigration, environmental, and educational matters. In 2017, California passed the California Values Act, refusing to share immigration data with federal authorities and resisting federal deportation cooperation.
This conflict also represents a clash between sentiment and law, power and legality. Californians emotionally and logically reject the federal government’s inhumane, ahistorical, and rights-violating deportations. They further question the incomplete procedures, rough tactics, and broad targeting during enforcement. Notably, Newsom accused Trump of unconstitutionally deploying the National Guard without his request. The deployment of Marines was also considered a violation of the constitutional principle barring military involvement in civilian affairs. The California Attorney General’s office stated that using military force was “illegal,” stripped the state’s authority over its National Guard, and escalated tensions.
Fourthly, this is a contest of power between strongmen—Trump and Newsom. Both are charismatic leaders in this democratic society, though Trump is Republican and President, while Newsom is a Democratic heavyweight. Newsom comes from a prominent family, was twice mayor of San Francisco, and has served two terms as governor of California since 2018. He is a rising radical within the Democratic Party with vast experience and connections, and a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. For the ambitious and relatively young Newsom, the White House is his next and only step. His confrontation with Trump is seen as a preview of the next presidential race.
Trump’s hardline style is well-known, and some analysts suggest Newsom is using Trump’s own methods to become “the next Trump.” The rivalry between these strongmen didn’t start today—it began during Trump’s first term. Since Trump returned to the White House, Newsom, representing a powerful autonomous state, has opposed him repeatedly. In January, when wildfires broke out in California, Trump blamed Newsom and threatened to cut federal disaster aid. Newsom retorted that Trump politicized climate issues. In April, Trump launched a tariff war; Newsom strongly condemned it and instructed the state attorney general to sue the federal government—launching the first legal salvo among U.S. states. In response to Trump’s threats of arrests, Newsom loudly challenged him, seemingly daring Trump to act—knowing that if arrested, he and the Democratic Party would gain widespread sympathy.
Fifthly, this is a prelude to the midterm election battle between Democrats and Republicans. Trump’s crackdown on illegal immigrants drew heavy criticism from Democratic lawmakers, as expected. California has long been a Democratic stronghold and key vote base—also the toughest challenge for Republicans. Trump ordered a crackdown on California to fulfill campaign promises, assert authority, suppress Democratic momentum, weaken their vote base, and build on his previous electoral dominance. This aims to secure Republican victories in the 2026 midterms and clear obstacles for the next presidential election.
Border security was one of Trump’s most popular issues in the 2024 election. His overwhelming victory suggests both he and the Republicans enjoy broad public support, and now must take decisive immigration action to keep campaign promises. They also need to give voters a reason to support the GOP again in the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential race.
Whether bypassing the governor to deploy troops is legal will be debated along political lines. Observers will recall the 1957 Little Rock incident: when a segregationist governor used the National Guard to block Black students from entering school, President Eisenhower federalized the Guard and sent in the 101st Airborne Division to protect those students.
That moment became iconic in the U.S. civil rights movement; photos were once hung in American embassies as both reminder and boast. Over half a century later, the role of the National Guard and federal troops has again become central to America’s domestic crisis response—but political and societal divisions are arguably worse now than in the 1950s. America’s inclusiveness and confidence, openness and progress, now appear to have reversed course.
California’s sharp backlash made it the epicenter of this round of conflict, but that doesn’t mean all U.S. states share its immigration stance. Still, it is clearly a microcosm of American society. Trump’s aggressive immigration policy is a systematic project serving his “Make America Great Again” agenda. How it ends—only time will tell.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
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