OPINION

In the first year of the intervention in Ukraine; the West and the Rest

Published

04.03.2023 14:19

The first year of the Russian Federation’s intervention, justified by Article 51 of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, has come to an end following the military tensions that started at the Ukrainian border, accompanied by the rejection of the Minsk agreement approved by the UN Security Council and the rejection of the two treaty proposals to the U.S. and NATO. The outlook for the international relations system is blurry. Having established a monopoly to unilaterally violate international law arbitrarily and in line with its interests through its military power, the U.S. is now facing a challenge from Russia, after touching their sore point both historically and politically this time.

It is clear that the U.S. has consolidated its hegemony in Europe within a year, thanks to the crisis it started in Kiev in 2014 by triggering a civil war with a coup d’etat, which was interrupted under Donald Trump and then reignited with the return of the Democrats to power. But as the conflict has steadily escalated by mobilizing NATO, a front of ‘disobedience’ or ‘reluctance’ emerged in the rest of the world. While the ‘collective West’ is engaged in what it calls a ‘life-and-death war’ for its neoliberal economic and political model, the rest of the world does not seem to ‘embrace’ this perspective.

At the UN General Assembly, countries that have seen violations of international law in the last 30 years by the West, especially the United States, have condemned the Russian Federation for its military actions in Ukraine. There are analyses that draw attention to the size of the population represented by the countries that voted against or abstained in the symbolic votes at the General Assembly. It is debatable how meaningful this is. Whether they agree with the condemnation or abstain, countries that disagree with the unilateral economic sanctions of the United States and the EU, which do not have UN approval, present a more striking picture. In an environment of continued U.S. dollar-based fiscal hegemony, this is forcing the ‘collective West’ to threaten to ‘put pressure on those who try to remain in the two camps, maintaining trade ties with both Russia and the West.’ This situation is so reminiscent of the ‘you are either one of us or one of them’ approach adopted after 9/11 attacks by the Bush administration while carrying out its military actions in the invasion of Iraq, based on false intelligence.

In the Western media, there is an ongoing view that is formulated as ‘The West and the Rest.’ In particular, the concept of ‘multipolarity’, which the U.S. has been pursuing with reckless disregard in recent years, seems to have accelerated.

‘THE WORLD IS EITHER NEUTRAL OR LEAN TOWARDS RUSSIA’

‘The West and the Rest’ formula has been the subject of a lot of research in the past year.

Cambridge University researchers ‘matched’ data from surveys conducted in 137 countries in the eight months following the start of Russia’s military intervention on February 24, 2022, they came up with an interesting result. According to the study published in late October 2022, 66 percent of the 6.3 billion people living outside the West think positively about Russia and 70 percent think positively about China. 75 percent of participants in South Asia, 68 percent in Francophone Africa, and 62 percent in Southeast Asia express a ‘positive sentiment’ towards Russia.

The research yielded similar results in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Vietnam.

Of course, Cambridge researchers analyzed the results from the perspective of the division between the ‘liberal and democratic world’ and the ‘illiberal and anti-democratic world’. In Germany, it does not seem that people question how this conflict that leads to criminal laws that prosecute people for their opinions can be put into a ‘liberal’ framework.

In late January, The Economist published a graphic map of the world’s stance on the conflict in Ukraine. According to the newspaper, two-thirds of the world’s population tends towards either neutrality or Russia’s position. The reasons for this are, of course, controversial. The newspaper was based on GDP and population ratios. According to GDP, those who condemn Russia form 61 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 9.3 percent. The neutral form 10.1 percent. 16.8 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 2.6 percent support Russia. On the population chart, those who condemn Russia form 16.1 percent. The West-leaning camp accounts for 20.3 percent. The neutral form 32.1 percent. 27.6 percent represent Russia-leaning camp. 3.9 percent support Russia.

The headline of the report illustrates that ‘the small number of Russian supporters’ is not a consolation. At this point, commentators appear to be sniffling at the Rest which ‘may represent more than half of the world’s population, but they make up the underdeveloped and poor half.’ And, of course, ‘the combined GDP, economic power and geopolitical weight of the West’ is highlighted, which ‘far outweighs the influence of countries that refuse to condemn intervention and impose sanctions on Russia.’

The latest report, released on the occasion of the Munich Security Conference held on February 17-20, found that countries, which make up half of the world’s population based on their positioning, oppose the isolation of Russia. Many governments in Africa, Asia and Latin America are reluctant to take action against Russia and isolate it both economically and diplomatically, the report said.

Clearly, this shows that the aforementioned states are prioritizing their own economic interests and conditions, which have become more challenging after the pandemic. Developing countries face many challenges, ranging from high debt costs and the climate crisis that has created environmental devastation, to poverty, food shortages, drought and high energy prices. For example, while the geography called ‘Global South’ has repeatedly asked for the sharing of the intellectual property rights of vaccines to save lives during the pandemic, none of the Western states seemed interested. On the other hand, Russia, China, and India rushed to the aid of many from Algeria to Egypt and from African countries to Argentina. It should also be considered that the West’s ‘colonial past’ still linger in memories. The West may try to wash it away, but today we are looking at a picture in which former colonial powers have reunited as members of the Western alliance on the front against Russia.

CLAMPING DOWN

The unilateral embargoes imposed by the U.S. and the EU on Russian oil and gas have affected not only Russia, but also some countries and companies that trade with Russia and supply energy and food products from Russia. For some, it yielded lucrative results. Hazal Yalın, author and researcher focusing on Russia, points to the capital outflow from Russia over the course of a year, while highlighting the huge decline in natural gas and oil revenues. However, he says, the West has not succeeded in destroying Russia’s economy. Indeed, the Central Bank of Russian Federation has managed to support the value of the ruble and keep the financial markets stable. In this sense, Yalın believes that the European economy is more deeply affected.

Two examples can be given from Continental Europe: Germany and the United Kingdom that has left the union with Brexit.

At the end of January, the IMF estimated that the UK economy would shrink and be worse than other advanced economies, including Russia, as the cost of living continued to hit households. The UK is projected to shrink by 0.6 percent, making it the only country in the G7 to shrink. Of course, the IMF thinks Britain is ‘on the right track.’

In Germany, Marcel Fratzscher, head of the Institute for Economic Research (DIW), said about 100 billion euros had been lost in 2022 due to the conflict in Ukraine. Surely, the recession debates take place but the industrialized vanguard of Europe and the world, Germany, will not ‘sink.’ But there are costs to losing cheap energy. According to Allianz Trade, German industry will pay 40 percent more for energy than before the crisis. Although the crisis was prevented and the electricity bills were controlled, the outlook of the German economy is described as ‘bleak.’ Allianz Trade says that rising labor costs and tighter financing conditions are putting more companies under pressure, especially in sectors exposed to energy and input prices, in response to improved expectations with increased government support. He finds the fear that the crisis will create ‘deindustrialization’ exaggerated.

The outcome will ‘not be the deindustrialization of Europe, but the militarization of European industry and its political consequences,’ Hazal Yalın anticipates. In fact, all evaluations fail to mention the ‘acceleration in the war industry.’ The West is not worried about this trajectory, but the fact that, as the New York Times put it, ‘Moscow is able to escape Western punishment with the help of its friends.’

All countries that impose an embargo on Russia are either members of the EU and NATO or close allies of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. In contrast, most countries in Asia (excluding Japan, South Korea and Singapore) and all countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America (excluding the Bahamas) have good relations with both sides.

French historian Emmanuel Todd told Le Figaro, “If the Russian economy shows long-term resistance to Western sanctions, the European economy will perish. The ability of the United States to finance monetary control over the world and the massive trade deficit will collapse.”

This extravagant assessment aside, if the neocon administration in the U.S. tends to ‘clash on two fronts’ and insists on a tough stance against China, it is of course difficult to predict the results soon.

DEMOCRACY-AUTOCRACY DUALITY

The ideological and psychological repercussions of economic and political upheavals are inevitable. At the beginning of the Russian intervention, U.S. President Joe Biden said that the West would turn Russian President Vladimir Putin into “a pariah” in the international plan. However, this does not seem to have happened for the better part of the world. Russia has developed diplomatic ties with countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America over the past year. In his latest interview with the newspaper Liberation, EU Council President Charles Michel said that these countries have not forgotten Soviet Russia’s support in the fight against colonialism, and also still remember Western interventions in Iraq and Libya. Just Iraq and Libya? What about Syria and, even earlier, the breakup of Yugoslavia, which redrew the map of Europe, and its last link, Kosovo? As you know, Kosovo is still part of Serbia, based on the rules of UN law referenced in the Ukraine conflict today.

While the Western bloc presents the Ukraine conflict through the dichotomy of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’, masking geopolitical and socio-economic objectives, the principled inconsistencies, coupled with economic conditions, present a striking picture. Let’s take a look at regions.

ASIA’S ‘DISOBEDIENT STATES’

The People’s Republic of China, which refrained from condemning Russia at the UN Security Council, has accelerated economic relations with Russia in the last year. Bilateral trade volume exceeded 170 billion dollars. The ‘Power of Siberia’ natural gas pipeline agreement is signed. Beijing imports oil from Russia and also sells Siberian liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe. China, the U.S. administration’s ‘next target’, is openly promoting the slogan of ‘multipolar globalization,’ while rejecting accusations that it has/will ‘supply arms’ to Russia.

Over the course of a year, China’s political discourse has also gradually sharpened. Beijing, which initially emphasized that it “understands the complex and historical causes” of the Ukrainian crisis, is now openly telling the world that “the United States is the biggest factor that started and fueled the Ukrainian crisis.” In calling for peaceful negotiations on the first anniversary of the conflict, the Chinese government unveiled a vision that emphasizes “the protection of the sovereign rights of all countries,” “the indivisibility of security,” and “the suspension of unilateral sanctions.” The tension in the rhetoric challenging the U.S. narrative never lets up.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said: “The US is the biggest saboteur of the international order. The rules-based international order claimed by the US is, in essence, a hegemonic order in which the US dominates the world.” Wang Yi, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, who attended the Munich Security Conference and gave clear messages to the U.S. and Europe, described Russia-China relations as “rock solid” in Moscow. In his meeting with Putin, he emphasized their support for “multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations,” adding that “China is ready to work with Russia to maintain strategic resolve, deepen political mutual trust, strengthen strategic coordination, expand practical cooperation and defend the legitimate interests of both countries, to play a constructive role in promoting world peace and development.”

China’s support for Moscow in the Security Council for the investigation of the September 26, 2022 terrorist attack on the Nord Stream-2 pipeline, details of which were revealed by Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, is also particularly noteworthy. China’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Chiang Tyun, who has repeatedly reiterated China’s commitment to take the lead in building strategically important infrastructure facilities globally and to ‘spread development around the world,’ called for an objective, impartial and professional investigation to ‘find those responsible.’ Referring to the environmental impact of the attack as well as its repercussions on global energy markets, he reminded the UN of its ‘responsibility.’ “If we fail to identify all the circumstances and those responsible for the destruction of Nord Stream-2, it will provide even more opportunities for the conspirators,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang said, all the more remarkable given U.S. President Biden’s threat at the beginning of the crisis that “if Russia invades, we will finish Nord Stream-2.” Indeed, when Nord Stream-2 was exploded, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called it a ‘tremendous opportunity’ to get rid of Russian resources, while Victoria Nuland, the architect of the 2014 coup in Kiev, expressed satisfaction that the pipeline was ‘a pile of metal at the bottom of the sea.’ Radoslav Sikorsiy, Poland’s former defense and foreign minister and current member of the European Parliament, wrote on Twitter, “Thank you, USA,” accompanied by a photo of the explosion reflected on the surface of the sea after the September 26 attack.

In Asia, not only China, which the U.S. sees as a rival, but India, which it sees as an ally against China, is of course more important. India is the country where the U.S. has formulated its Asia-Pacific strategy as ‘Indo-Pacific’ based on its name. New Delhi abstained from the UN General Assembly vote against Russia. One of the most important buyers of discounted Russian oil. India’s Minister for Petroleum, Hardeep Singh Puri, said they had no disagreements with Moscow and it was their ‘moral duty’ to buy Russian oil to lower energy prices in the country. But it’s not just that. New Delhi buys a significant amount of weapons and ammunition from Russia. And it can remain ‘free’ from U.S. sanctions. India is also opposed to discussing new sanctions against Russia at the G20 summit in New Delhi in September 2023.

India is balancing its relations with China through Russia, while continuing its Cold War tradition of ‘non-alignment-neutrality’ policy. Finally, it is noteworthy that it has recently started discussing border issues with Beijing, including mutual troop withdrawals.

India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, recently said that “I think it would not be fair today to reduce a very complex issue, the Ukraine conflict to a binary of are you on this side or that side. Are you for peace or for war?”

“Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems,” he added.

The other countries of Southeast Asia do not seem to be convinced of the anti-Russian sentiment either, despite the intense campaign at the ASEAN summit and the G20 summit sessions last November.

RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The situation in the Middle East seems to be in Russia’s ‘favor’ at the end of the year. Moscow is in contact with Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), their rivals such as Iran and Syria, and all countries in the region, including Israel.

Although most Arab countries condemned Russia’s military intervention in the first UN vote, the Arab League with 22 member states did not do so later. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov addressed the Arab League during a visit to the region at the end of July 2022. Many Arab countries abstained from removing Russia from the Human Rights Council. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt did not impose sanctions on Russia. “The Gulf states continue to conduct an open dialogue with Russia and consider it necessary to maintain contacts,” the Saudi Foreign Minister stressed.

Riyadh embodied this attitude on the economic front through OPEC+. They rejected the U.S. president’s request to increase oil production. Instead, they imported Russian oil for domestic use and/or for ‘blending oil in refineries’ to export more of their own production. They said their assessment was entirely based on ‘market conditions’. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman did not answer Biden’s calls. The U.S. President paid a visit to the prince ‘personally,’ whom he had previously vowed to ‘make a pariah’. The case of Jamal Khashoggi, the man who ‘symbolized’ the liberal ideological principles of the U.S. Democrats in recent years, had to be buried.

The UAE adopted a similar attitude to the Saudis. In fact, trade volume with Russia increased by 68 percent to $9 billion in 2022.

ISRAELI LEADER REVEALS THAT THE WEST IS UNDERMINING PEACE

Israel, which is the backbone of U.S. Middle East policy, did not join the sanctions even though it condemned Russia’s intervention. There is a large Russian immigrant population in Israel. While liberal public opinion leaned toward the Banderist regime in Kiev, which openly embraced a historical legacy that ironically played a role in the Jewish genocide, the government refrained from supplying weapons.

It is not yet clear what kind of policy Israel’s new Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will pursue, who has struck a balance of “non-conflict” with Russia in the face of the imminent threat they have seen in the region in previous years. However, Naftali Bennett, who had been prime minister until recently, revealed that although Kiev and Russia were ready for the mediation trial in March 2022, the solution was completely ruled out by British leader Boris Johnson and blocked by the leaders of the U.S., Germany and France.

BORRELL’S ‘AFRICAN JUNGLE UNABLE TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY’

Britain’s Financial Times reported that at the last Munich Security Conference, the West tried but failed to align African countries against Russia. For many African countries, Russia is seen as the successor to the Soviet Union, which supported them during their anti-colonial struggles.

South Africa, a member of the BRICS Group and the continent’s leading country, has not joined the condemnation of Russia at the UN and is currently holding joint exercises with China and Russia. Russia is favored in the country of legendary leader Nelson Mandela, who said that the Soviet Union’s material and moral support inspired him to overthrow the apartheid regime.

Countries such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Uganda and Mozambique have seen the political and economic support of the former Soviets. The Russian Federation is somehow considered to be an ‘ideological successor.’ For example, in 2022 and at the end of January, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov organized quite colorful African tours. He was greeted with national songs and dances at the Pushkin monument in Asmara, Eritrea. In African countries, banners read: “Putin, come and save us.” The EU’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, who last October compared ‘Europe to a garden and the rest of the world to a jungle’ and was criticized for ‘racism,’ this time claimed that ‘the African mind is not thinking straight because of manipulation’ following the attention Lavrov received during his visit to Mali. Speaking on February 18 at the African Union summit in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, Uganda’s Foreign Minister Jeje Odongo responded to this view: “We were colonized and we forgave those who colonized us. Now, the colonizers are asking us to be enemies of Russia, who never colonized us, is that fair? Not for us: their enemies are their enemies, our friends are our friends.”

Last year, Macky Sall, President of Senegal and the African Union, blamed Western embargoes for the food crisis, while today Russia is negotiating with many African countries to switch to trade in national currencies. The results of the U.S. administration’s December summit on Africa are yet to be seen. The State Department has even produced a video that could be seen as interference in the Nigerian elections, ‘starring’ Secretary Blinken, USAID head Samantha Fox and the ‘black’ Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US permanent representative to the UN.

THE VEIN OF LATIN AMERICA

Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba, where leftist governments are on the target of the United States, have been on the side of Russia, their traditional allies, from the very beginning. However, the region’s two strongest countries, Brazil and Mexico, as well as Argentina, which wants to join the BRICS, and Colombia, did not take a stand against Russia beyond a symbolic condemnation at the UN General Assembly and criticism of general principles.

Instead of the United States, Germany mobilized to convince the Latin front. However, Prime Minister Olaf Scholz returned empty-handed from visits to Brazil, Argentina and Chile, unable to persuade these countries to provide military aid to Kiev. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Ecuador had received Russian-made MiG transport helicopters and in some cases Russian surface-to-air missiles or anti-tank missiles, which are compatible with those of the Ukrainian army. But Latin leaders see the conflict differently from the West.

Brazil’s neofascist Jair Bolsonaro administration, which the United States paved the way for by intervening directly in its democracy during the 2016-2018 period, was on the side of those who condemned Russia in two UN resolutions last year, but did not participate in sanctions against the most important fertilizer supplier. Lula da Silva, the leftist leader who succeeded Bolsonaro after being exonerated and re-elected after being wrongfully imprisoned with the overt intervention of the U.S. Justice Department, was outspoken in his criticism of Scholz and then French President Macron: “Brazil has no interest in handing over ammunition that can be used in the war between Ukraine and Russia. Brazil is a country of peace. Our last disagreement was in the Paraguayan war, and that’s why Brazil doesn’t want any participation in this war, even indirectly. Because I think right now we need to find someone in the world who will seek peace between Russia and Ukraine. So far, peace has hardly been on the agenda. In other words, Brazil has decided not to provide this ammunition. Because we don’t want this ammunition to be used in the war against Russia.”

Lula then reiterated his stance of ‘neutrality’ during his visit to Washington on February 10. According to Brazilian sources, his message to Biden was, “No one wants this war to continue. The parties should form a negotiation team. I don’t want to join the war, I want to end it.” Of course, Lula, who survived the coup attempt on the 8th day of his new term in power, which began on January 1, 2023, has to establish the balance within his country. He has already been accused of playing the ‘Robin Hood’ role by US-linked financial power groups. He is also facing criticism from The Economist over its plans with Argentine President Alberto Fernandez for a ‘bizarre common currency’ for the continent.

Argentina’s leader Fernández also refused to send arms to Kiev in return for his country’s poor financial situation.

But in fact, the attitude of the Social Democratic President, who took office in August 2022 of Colombia, which has been the right-wing stronghold of the United States in Latin America for years, is more interesting. “Even if they end up as scrap in Colombia, we will not hand over Russian weapons to be taken to Ukraine to prolong a war,” Colombia’s leftwing president Gustavo Petro responded “We are for peace.”

Chile’s left-liberal President Gabriel Boric, reflecting his country’s sentiment, said he condemned Russia’s invasion, even though ‘some media and opinion leaders believe that interfering in the politics of other countries is a bad decision.’ But he only offered Kyiv help with clearing mines.

Mexico’s leader, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, took the lead. In March 2022, a meeting of the Russia Friendship Group was held in the lower house of the Mexican Congress, while Obrador called for ‘neutrality’ and a ‘peaceful solution’ throughout the year. He condemned the intervention at the UN, but in his meeting with Biden in July 2022, he stated that Mexico would adhere to the foreign policy set out in its constitution, which includes ‘the principles of self-determination.’ He rejected the embargo on Russia. Without mentioning NATO and the United States, he described the policy of ‘I will supply the weapons, you will supply the dead’ as ‘immoral.’ And finally, commenting on Berlin’s decision to send Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine under U.S. pressure, “Media power is used by the oligarchies in the world to subjugate governments. Germany, for example, did not want to get too involved in the war with Ukraine. They finally gave in” he said.

The neutral stance of Latin America, which has been hit by the increase in global energy and fertilizer prices, is clear. Celso Amorim, who served as foreign minister in the past Lula governments and is still an effective advisor, says Brazil’s reasons are not related to the need for fertilizer. According to Maria Angela Holguín, Colombia’s former foreign minister, the Ukrainian conflict has brought back unwanted memories of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in Latin America. In fact, Holguin said, these countries think that Russia and China could be useful to them in the near future.

THE NEW NON-ALIGNED ERA?

Inflationary pressures and fears of recession are affecting much of the world. The rich West may be able to afford the cost of the embargo on Russia but the rest is struggling. These concerns affect their attitudes.

Of course, the dollar’s reserve currency status is still the pillar of the global economic order. However, the embargoes, the ‘arming’ of the international banking and insurance sectors, including the SWIFT system, the confiscation of assets, and the commodity agreements that had to be canceled are ‘watched with concern.’ Again, many countries are facing currency depreciation, while ways to trade with local currencies are being discussed. The ‘rest of the world‘ facing the West is already weighing the risks of a conflict in which they have no say.

The West’s long-standing ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, the controversial occupation of Iraq, the collapse and fragmentation of Libya and Syria, and the chaotic retreat of the U.S. and NATO and leaving the country to the Taliban after 20 years of fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan are all remembered.

It is noteworthy that the West, which has been marketing liberal interventions around the world for 30 years on the themes of ‘minority rights’, ‘mother tongue rights’, ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom of thought and expression’, has returned to ‘state sovereignty’, which they themselves have violated many times, by referring to the Russians and the Russian-speaking population of Donbass, bombed for eight years for refusing to accept the coup, as ‘Ukrainians’ in the Ukrainian crisis. The poor record of the alleged ‘principles’ is unlikely to go unnoticed. Global propaganda supremacy, accompanied by a heavy ‘iron curtain’ of censorship justified by ‘protecting’ their own communities, is not enough to erase Banderism, which stands out as Kiev’s official ideology. The narrative of ‘Russia woke up one day and suddenly invaded its neighbor’ turns into a tasteless ‘fast food.’ While the Zelensky regime is destroying millions of Russian-language books in the country in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era, the rest of the world is baffled by the justification in the West for attacks on Russians and Russian culture, from vodka to cats, Tchaikovsky to Dostoevsky. In these circumstances, in light of economic realities and historical experiences, it is only natural that ‘the rest of the world’ sees multipolarity as a ground where its voice will be heard more.

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OPINION

Palestinian messages to the Arab-Islamic Summit

Published

3 days ago

12/11/2024

Sadeq Abu Amer

Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.

Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.

Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.

Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.

Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.

Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.

These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.

Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.

In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.

OPINION

Valdai impressions: As the Trump years begin…

Published

4 days ago

11/11/2024

Hasan Ünal

The American elections ended “as expected” with Trump’s victory. The polls were wrong again, often showing Trump and Kamala Harris neck and neck. Trump did well both in the overall vote and in the swing states. At the time of writing, the results for the House of Representatives have not been finalized. If they win a majority there too, the Republicans will have won a huge victory. In addition to the presidency, Trump will give them overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress, state governorships and state legislatures.

What will Trump do and how will he do it?

This time I followed the American election at the annual forum of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia. The annual forum was attended by a group of about fifty to sixty academics, think-tankers, and experts from around the world, and about twenty to thirty experts from Russia, including, as usual, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (second day) and Russian President Putin (closing session on the last day). Deputy Prime Minister Novak and Kremlin Chief of Staff Oreshkin also attended the Forum, speaking at length and answering questions. As was the case last year, Putin’s introductory speech and subsequent Q&A session lasted more than four hours. He spoke with an incredibly clear content and style, without mincing words.

One of the most striking aspects of the Forum, which I attended for the second time (4-7 November), was that all participants were following the U.S. election with great interest. After Trump’s victory became clear, you could hear different comments from participants depending on which country they came from. For example, while those from Russia and other countries welcomed Trump’s arrival with the expectation that he would put an end to the policy pursued so far by the collective West in the war in Ukraine, guests from China and/or those focusing on China thought that there could be fierce winds between Washington and Beijing.

Similarly divergent views were immediately apparent among participants from Middle Eastern countries. For example, while some Middle Eastern participants were somewhat positive about the serious possibility of an American withdrawal from Syria and Iraq under Trump, Iranian participants spoke of the possibility of war between Iran and a Trump administration that is likely to fully support Israel.

On the other hand, Western participants (such as the UK and Canada) tended to see Trump’s arrival as the beginning of the end of the neo-liberal economic order. The neoliberal economic models, which have catastrophically widened the gap between rich and poor and almost eliminated the middle class, the foundation of democracies, are already being harshly criticized by the experts participating in the Valdai meetings.

First assessments

First of all, the Western participants emphasized the beginning of the end of neo-liberal economic policies. It seems that neoliberal economic policies have been rejected in their home country, America. Especially since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic policies, which the U.S. not only implemented but also imposed almost everywhere in the world, have been turned into an opportunity for their own rapid development by countries like China and Vietnam, which have implemented nationalist and planned development models, while in most developed countries, especially in the U.S., these policies have caused great rifts in societies. The consequences for us are perhaps among the worst in the world…

The main reasons for Trump’s exit were the excessive monetization of the entire U.S. system, the massive retreat from industrial production, and the fact that while the economy grew, it had no positive impact on the lives of a large part of the population. What remains to be seen is how much of what Trump says will be translated into policy and action. For example, will it be possible to force companies that have invested in industry and advanced technology in China, other Far Eastern countries, and Mexico for decades to come back and invest in the U.S.? If not, will Trump be able to impose high tariffs on goods from countries that export massive amounts of goods to the U.S., especially China, as he said during the campaign? And will he be able to maintain public support for such measures?

On the other hand, if Trump, who has promised to cut taxes, does so, how will he deal with the rapidly growing budget deficit and the national debt, which has already exceeded 35 trillion dollars and whose annual interest rate is around one trillion dollars (and will probably continue to rise)? I wonder if he will be able to seriously reduce the country’s defence spending, despite the fact that the arms companies, which are the most important part of the structure we will briefly describe as the Deep State, are engaged in a battle with him to prevent him from winning the elections? Perhaps… Maybe he even has to…

Foreign policy options

Trump has tied himself in knots over the war in Ukraine. There is no doubt that Trump, whose words ‘If I were president, I would not have allowed this war to start, if I were re-elected, I would end it with a few phone calls’ are etched in our memories, will take serious steps to end the war in our north. The opposition will be all the components of the American deep state, especially the arms companies, and the governments in Europe. If Trump, who this time seems to be more prepared for a comprehensive struggle with the Deep State, is not assassinated and consolidates his power, he can turn his statements on the Ukrainian war into policy.

The second opposition he is likely to face on the Ukraine war will be the weak governments in Europe. For the Baltic states, which would like to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and then see that huge country torn to shreds, and for the European states that have turned the historical grievances of the former Eastern Europe into their own Russia policy, Trump’s election is a disaster in the truest sense of the word.

They can say to Trump: ‘Let’s continue the war in Ukraine, you can continue your arms and financial aid, we will fully support you in your China policy, and if you want, we can even go as far as recognizing Taiwan as an independent state’. However, such a policy would mean that Trump would be doing the opposite of everything he has said so far – especially on Ukraine. On the other hand, while Trump may be preparing for a trade war with China, we do not know much about his intention to start a hot war, or rather a proxy war, over Taiwan.

It goes without saying that Trump is totally opposed to wars against overseas countries, which have become a concept of hatred in the eyes of a large part of American society and which cause enormous costs. Therefore, we can say that Trump may engage in trade wars with China while focusing on stopping the war in Ukraine, but beyond that he is more likely to stay away from a proxy war that risks setting the entire world on fire.

Middle East scenarios

We know that Trump wanted to withdraw from Syria and Iraq during his first term, but the deep state elements prevented this with many maneuvers, and in the case of Syria, Ambassador James Jeffrey, who was America’s special envoy after 2019, said in a statement after Trump lost the elections that they deceived the president by pretending to withdraw from Syria. It is even possible to speak of Trump’s determination on this issue. It is even easy to say that the same determination is in question for Iraq. All this can create extremely important opportunities for Turkey, which we will discuss in our articles and Strategic Compass broadcastings in the coming weeks.

The question of Trump and Israel undoubtedly requires extensive analysis. There is no doubt that there is a lot of truth in theses such as that he will be strongly pro-Israel, that he will march on Iran or that he will unleash Israel on Iran. On the other hand, it may be misleading to expect that Trump, who has consistently stated that he will not start a new war in the Middle East, will give Israel or Netanyahu, whom he does not like very much, a blank cheque.

This is because we know that he unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which had been reached in the previous period, in order to please the Israeli lobby, whose help and support he needed in his fight against the deep state, especially in his first term, and that he has made the agreement obsolete and turned to a policy of maximum pressure against Iran. However, all this does not mean that he will now start a war with Iran, especially in a multipolar world order… Since the probability of America and/or Israel winning a war with Iran is low and Iran will not be an easy target, we can assume that Trump’s support for Israel will be subject to certain limitations. All this shows that we are/will be at the beginning of a very extraordinary period.

OPINION

Trump’s overwhelming victory to reclaim the White House: Mixed reactions across the globe

Published

4 days ago

11/11/2024

Ma Xiaolin

On November 6, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate and former U.S. president, won the 2024 presidential election by an overwhelming margin, reclaiming the White House after a four-year hiatus and becoming the 47th president of the United States. Concurrently, the Republican Party secured a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The controversial return of Trump as the head of state and the Republican Party’s potential absolute control over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches led global observers to exclaim that “America has changed!” and consequently, “the world is about to change too!”

The 2024 U.S. presidential election was notably dramatic and full of surprises. President Joe Biden, the Democratic incumbent, withdrew from the race mid-campaign due to health issues. Trump, despite facing significant opposition and surviving an assassination attempt, managed a successful comeback. Vice President Kamala Harris, who assumed the Democratic candidacy, initially led in the polls but ultimately suffered a resounding defeat on election day. With this dramatic power shift, prospects of a comprehensive reversal in the established domestic and foreign policies of the Democratic Party have elicited varied reactions—from joy to dismay—within the U.S. and beyond.

Republicans in the U.S. are undoubtedly jubilant, having backed the right candidate in Trump, who, despite initial skepticism during his first campaign, secured at least 312 electoral votes (preliminary figures), cementing a historic victory. Trump is now the second U.S. president to return to the White House through election after previously leaving office. The Republican Party is also poised to secure control over both houses of Congress and numerous state governments, with a Supreme Court already dominated by conservative justices aligned with Republican ideals.

Trump’s victory brings elation to his financial backers, grassroots supporters, industrial workers, and the farming community. These groups resonate with Trump and the Republican Party’s “America First” doctrine and are expected to relish the policies reversing Democratic initiatives and yielding tangible benefits over the next four years.

Conversely, Democrats are facing profound disappointment. Their tenure in the White House was abruptly cut short by the Republican resurgence, culminating in what may be seen as a historic and humiliating defeat, with significant implications for their influence over all three branches of government.

Minority communities, immigrants, leftist progressives, the renewable energy sector, and establishment figures are similarly disheartened by the resurgence of Trump and conservative forces. The return of Trump is expected to stifle minority and immigrant rights, potentially entrenching the U.S. political landscape with a Trumpian ethos. Progressive social movements advocating sexual freedom and the expanding transgender industry are likely to face stringent crackdowns, and the momentum for green and clean energy initiatives may stall. Furthermore, establishment figures fear that the Trump administration could seek to further challenge the American legal system, aiming to consolidate super-executive powers.

Isolationist groups in the U.S. are predictably celebrating, viewing this electoral outcome as a rejection of Biden’s globalist approach and a reassertion of Trumpian and Republican worldviews. The pursuit of “Making America Great Again” and the primacy of “America First” are expected to steer the U.S. away from alliances based on shared values and international obligations, leaning towards mercantilism and self-interest, thus eroding the responsibilities traditionally borne by the world’s leading power and potentially signaling the decline of American hegemony.

In contrast, globalist advocates express profound concern. Trump’s first term already disrupted globalization, alliance networks, and America’s leadership within the Western world. The modest progress made by the Biden administration in restoring these elements is likely to be undone, leaving advocates of “Pax Americana” deeply disappointed.

America’s international allies, too, are split in their reactions, aware of Trump’s policy directions and past actions. Many fear that “Trump 2.0” will push U.S. policies towards greater radicalism and polarization, shunning the compromises and moderation typical of Democratic administrations.

Notably, some U.S. allies and partners who share Trumpian ideology and leadership traits welcome his return. In Europe, far-right movements and Euroskeptics are particularly pleased. Their shared stance on white supremacy, anti-minority and anti-immigrant sentiments, opposition to globalization, and resistance to environmental initiatives align closely with Trump’s platform. Trump’s previous endorsement of Brexit and his initial victory emboldened Europe’s far-right forces. His triumphant return will likely invigorate these groups and even inspire neo-fascist movements with newfound enthusiasm and momentum.

Political leaders in South America who mirror Trump’s ideological style are likely to celebrate his return to power. Among them are Argentina’s President Javier Milei, who came to office a year ago and is often dubbed the “Argentine’s Trump,” and Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro, ousted two years prior but steadfastly strategizing his political comeback. Both leaders anticipate that the resurgence of Trumpism will bolster their political influence and governance models across Latin America.

Traditional European establishment figures, globalists, advocates of European integration, and proponents of transatlantic relations are, in contrast, likely to view Trump’s return with dismay. Memories of Trump’s earlier tenure, during which he undermined the European Union, emboldened far-right movements, pressured NATO members to increase defense spending under the threat of withdrawal, and unilaterally exited various multilateral agreements and international treaties, still linger. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump severed air and sea connections with Europe, effectively abandoning traditional allies. Today, European leaders have two new concerns: Trump could instigate a trade war with Europe through the imposition of tariffs and force European nations to purchase U.S. oil and gas at high prices.

Reactions in Europe to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict are similarly mixed. A second Trump administration might alter the dynamics of U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Europe, and Russia-Europe relations, potentially reducing NATO’s involvement in the conflict and increasing the likelihood that Europe would have to bear greater military responsibilities independently.

Russia, for its part, would likely welcome Trump’s return. Trump has previously expressed admiration for President Vladimir Putin’s strong leadership style and has advocated for a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, aiming for a normalization of U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations. Should Trump reduce military aid to Ukraine or pressure European nations to sacrifice Ukrainian interests, Russia, currently holding battlefield advantages, could see an expedited path to victory. European nations, sensing this possibility, have proactively signed security pacts with Ukraine to ensure collective defense in the event of diminished U.S. involvement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be entering another “darkest hour.” The recently disclosed “peace plan” by Trump, while promising continued military assistance, proposes an 800-mile-long demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine and bars Ukraine from joining NATO for the next 20 years. A potential ceasefire modeled after the Korean Armistice Agreement could see both sides halting active combat along current lines, resulting in a prolonged stalemate.

The U.S.’s partners in the Middle East are similarly split, with one clear beneficiary and several discontented parties. The Middle East today differs from its state four years ago, as regional states increasingly emphasize autonomy and seek intra-Islamic dialogue and reconciliation, no longer placing their hopes solely in U.S. involvement—with Israel being the notable exception.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the powerful Israeli far-right are undoubtedly delighted by Trump’s re-election. Trump’s staunch support for Israel, paralleled by his antipathy toward Iran and Palestine, signals that Israel will find a dependable ally in Washington. This support comes at a critical time, as the Democratic administration’s patience in the region has waned. With Trump back in power, Israel is expected to confidently pursue its objectives across multiple strategic fronts, leveraging U.S. backing for maximum effect. Although Trump is not inclined to entangle the U.S. in Middle Eastern conflicts, he is likely to apply pressure tactics to force concessions from Israel’s adversaries.

For Palestinians, Trump’s return represents a deepening of their plight. They recall that it was Trump who controversially recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, sidelined them with the “Deal of the Century,” downgraded diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, suspended economic and humanitarian aid, and withdrew from UNRWA due to its pro-Palestinian stances.

Iran will also face heightened military, diplomatic, and economic pressure, with an increased likelihood of direct conflict with Israel. Iranians cannot forget Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term in office and the subsequent tightening of sanctions. Trump’s directive in 2020 that led to the U.S. military’s targeted killing of General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which triggered missile strikes against U.S. bases in the Middle East, remains etched in their collective memory.

Saudi Arabia, despite its relatively warm relationship with Trump, may have more reasons for concern than joy. Riyadh faces a complex dilemma between pragmatic and moral imperatives regarding the Palestinian cause. The kingdom has chosen to distance itself from Israel and pursue rapprochement with Iran. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is wary of serving as a “cash dispenser” under U.S. pressure and being coerced into buying American arms, a recurring pattern during Trump’s first term. The potential for a new U.S.-Saudi oil and gas rivalry, spurred by Trump’s plans to flood the market with American energy exports, could exacerbate tensions.

In the Asia-Pacific, responses are similarly mixed, even within individual U.S. partners. Compared to Biden, Trump prioritizes profit over partnership, exhibiting a greater focus on economic and trade benefits for the U.S., while downplaying military alliances and geostrategic commitments.

North Korea may harbor expectations that Trump’s return could lead to a shift from the Biden administration’s policy of strategic neglect, potentially rekindling the momentum of the three summits between Kim Jong-un and Trump. These summits, initially promising steps toward U.S.-North Korea normalization, were effectively stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, mutual distrust, and changes in political leadership. A renewed Trump administration could reignite dialogue that has, until now, remained an unfinished diplomatic endeavor.

In contrast, South Korea and Japan are likely apprehensive about Trump’s potential policies that could undermine their military alliances. Trump’s history of pressuring allies to increase defense spending and imposing tariffs on imported goods might compel these nations to recalibrate their strategic positions amidst U.S.-China rivalry, risking a precarious diplomatic balance.

Countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and India are aware that Trump, known for his transactional approach, might deprioritize their strategic partnerships. This could shift the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, where economic interests are placed above security alliances.

China, labeled as the primary adversary by both major U.S. parties, has already experienced the Democratic Party’s assertive policies and Trump’s aggressive tactics during his previous term. Consequently, Beijing has remained composed in response to the White House’s change of leadership, neither cheering nor fearing Trump’s return. China is prepared for Trump’s strategic maneuvers, especially given his doctrine of caution in military engagements but willingness to escalate trade, technology, and financial confrontations. It anticipates that a second Trump term may not lead to military conflicts but could intensify economic warfare, including trade disputes and restrictions on Chinese investments.

On November 7, President Xi Jinping and Vice President Han Zheng sent congratulatory messages to President-elect Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, reaffirming China’s consistent principles in handling bilateral relations and expressing expectations for continued engagement. The development of U.S.-China relations under Trump’s leadership is poised to be the focal point of global attention, representing a key determinant of world peace and security.

Proponents of Taiwan independence are among the biggest losers in this shift in U.S. leadership. The Republican Party’s platform has remained silent on Taiwan, omitting any mention of its defense. Trump himself previously demanded that Taiwan contribute 10% of its GDP as a “protection fee,” signaling a transactional approach to its security.

With the Biden administration’s push to transition Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) into a “Made-in-America” entity, thereby eroding Taiwan’s core industries, further challenges loom. Elon Musk, who maintains a close rapport with Trump and supports the “One China” principle, recently urged his aerospace suppliers to cease sourcing components from Taiwan. This move underscores his recognition of the Chinese market’s importance and implies that Trump’s Taiwan policy may align with Musk’s strategic interests. Consequently, Taiwanese independence leaders, such as William Lai, are left in a precarious position, facing significant political and economic setbacks.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.