Opinion
Israel’s airstrike on Qatar has major and far-reaching consequences
On September 9, Israel brazenly dispatched 15 fighter jets to carry out a supersaturated precision bombing of a residence in Doha, the capital of Qatar, killing six civilians. Although Israel’s tactical goal was to “wipe out” key figures such as Hamas chief negotiator Khalil al-Hayya, this cross-border military action once again “committed a heinous crime against the world,” exposing the Israeli government’s continued militarism to achieve political aims, breaking multiple red lines, reflecting the complete “collapse of ritual and music” in international relations and regional order, with grave and far-reaching consequences. Outrageously, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu even threatened afterwards to continue launching similar attacks on Qatar to hunt down Hamas members. If Israel’s behavior is not quickly and strictly regulated and constrained, peace and security in the Middle East and the world will face severe tests.
First, Israel’s brazen invasion of the sovereign airspace of Qatar and bombing is tantamount to an undeclared war. This is a blatant trampling on the UN Charter, principles of international law, and norms of international relations. It marks Israel’s combat reach as covering the entire Middle East and will inevitably provoke strong indignation from the international community, including its allies. On the 11th, the 15 members of the UN Security Council issued a statement strongly condemning Israel and expressing support for Qatar without naming it. The United States rarely cast a vote in favor.
Qatar is a small, moderate country and has never been a frontline Arab state or hardliner advocating the “elimination of Israel.” On the contrary, Qatar established low-level diplomatic relations with Israel very early, serving as a pioneer in reconciliation for Gulf Arab states to normalize relations with Israel. It is true that Qatar sympathizes with the Muslim Brotherhood and supports Hamas, but nearly all aid funds flowing into Gaza from Qatar were delivered to Hamas only after being approved by the Israeli government and transferred through Israeli banks. In other words, Qatar has objectively cooperated with Israel’s national strategy of “eradicating but not annihilating” Hamas, constructing two power centers to divide Palestinian strength. Moreover, it was at the request of the United States and Israel that Qatar provided the platform in Doha for negotiations with Hamas.
Qatar’s status in relation to both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that of a neutral country under the law of war. Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention V clearly stipulates that the territory of a neutral country shall not be violated. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law explicitly establish the “prohibition on the use of force” as a basic principle of international law. In the past, Israel often emphasized that its actions against Palestine were based on the so-called “preventive self-defense measures against terrorism.” This position was rejected in the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion regarding Israel’s construction of the separation wall in Palestinian territory. The ICJ, as the authoritative interpreter of international law, explicitly rejected Israel’s attempt to arbitrarily expand the concept of self-defense to justify its illegal use of force. Therefore, Israel’s public attack on Qatar violates both fundamental principles of international law and obligations of neutrality, with no legal basis whatsoever.
Second, Israel deliberately chose to strike at the moment when Hamas negotiators were meeting to discuss ceasefire conditions, once again proving that it is the key party responsible for perpetuating the flames of war in Gaza, disregarding international morality, rules of war, and international credibility. “When two states go to war, envoys shall not be killed”—this is an eternal rule of warfare and baseline of diplomacy. Yet Israel, driven by its political decision to eradicate Hamas, carried out a sneak physical elimination of negotiating opponents in the capital of a friendly state, which is truly disgraceful. Previously, Israel’s “wipeout” of Hezbollah leaders in Lebanon was also accomplished by tracking and locating the Iranian envoy who went there to persuade them to accept a ceasefire.
The treacherous nature of Israel’s attack can also be confirmed from the perspective of the law of armed conflict. Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibits killing an enemy through perfidy. Perfidy refers to acts “inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” The prohibition of perfidy is a fundamental rule of the law of armed conflict; thus, perfidy is recognized in international criminal law as a form of war crime. Hence, Israel’s attack on Hamas negotiators lacks legitimacy under both the law of armed conflict and international criminal law. Given that the International Criminal Court has confirmed its jurisdiction over the situation in Palestine and issued arrest warrants for Netanyahu and other political and military leaders, this move further demonstrates the Israeli leadership’s contempt for the basic order of warfare and international criminal justice. By airstriking Doha to eliminate Hamas negotiators, Israel once again shows itself as a state actor that utterly lacks military ethics, integrity, and even acts in open defiance of international norms.
Third, Israel launched a surprise attack on the Arab ally of its biggest backer, the United States, endangering America’s political and diplomatic image and U.S.–Arab relations. This also constitutes a serious betrayal of the long-term trust and steadfast protection of its strategic ally, once again highlighting that Israel has become a “strategic liability” for the United States, playing the increasingly destructive role of a “bad friend.” Qatar not only provides the United States with the largest air force base in the Middle East, purchases large amounts of U.S. weapons annually, holds a significant amount of U.S. treasury bonds and investments, but has also in return obtained America’s security guarantees. Even so, Israel did not inform Washington in advance of its surprise attack plan. Only when the U.S. military detected the airstrike fleet through its air defense system and sought confirmation did Israel reveal its hand, claiming it was too late to cancel. Israel’s unilateral attack and deception resulted in Doha receiving Washington’s warning ten minutes after the bombing had already occurred.
From the Eastern Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, it is hardly possible for Israel’s air fleet to evade the U.S. military’s land, sea, and air early-warning systems along the way. Therefore, whether Israel deliberately concealed it or the United States pretended not to know, the early-warning and air defense system that the U.S. uses to protect its many oil-producing Gulf allies completely failed. No matter how Washington tries to justify it, Israel left the U.S. government utterly embarrassed this time, caught in the awkward situation of being “hit while lying down” and “taking the blame” for indulging Israel’s reckless behavior. It fundamentally undermined the “Middle East NATO”-style security cooperation mechanism that the U.S. and Israel had established with Gulf Arab states. Of course, U.S. President Trump, while expressing dissatisfaction with Israel’s attack on an ally, also said that eliminating Hamas “is a valuable goal” and “believes this attack may become an opportunity to promote peace.” Thus, it seems the U.S. and Israel are in collusion, and America being dragged down by Israel appears only natural.
Fourth, Israel’s pursuit of so-called absolute security and unilateral security at the expense of the national and citizen security of other sovereign and even friendly states reflects a thoroughly regional hegemonism, military adventurism, and even characteristics of state terrorism. This will intensify turmoil and instability in the Middle East, stimulating the rampant spread of anti-Israel and anti-Semitism, extremism, violent ideologies, and terrorism. Since a member state of the United Nations can disregard all rules and taboos, constantly setting vile precedents, not only can regional sovereign states follow suit and act unscrupulously under the pretext of their own security, but non-state actors will also have more excuses and reasons to act recklessly. Radical, violent, and even terrorist organizations in positions of weakness are more likely to launch “asymmetric” attacks against state actors, as power is imbalanced, rules lack binding force, and morality is not respected. They may even openly attack soft targets, including innocent civilians, ultimately leading to global chaos, rampant violence, and the replacement of civilized norms and codes of conduct with the law of the jungle.
Fifth, without going through formal legal procedures and without open, fair, and transparent judicial processes, Israel attempted to directly “eliminate” Hamas negotiators, seriously violating humanitarian principles, the spirit of the rule of law, and the values of civilization. This constitutes a grave deviation from modern civilization and international legal order. As a resistance organization in occupied territory, Hamas is in a state of war with Israel, and Israel has the right to physically eliminate its members in a wartime situation. However, for those non-combatants it targets—particularly Hamas members residing in other countries with civilian identity and civilian status—Israel, as a state that claims to adhere to modern democracy, law, and respect for human rights, resorted to the extreme means of carrying out “state lynching,” depriving them of any rights or opportunities to appeal and defend themselves. In doing so, Israel has degenerated into a violent entity devoid of the spirit of law and unrestrained by legal norms, rather than acting as a sovereign state.
In fact, since its founding, Israel has always placed its own security interests above international law and has never considered or respected the jurisdiction of other sovereign states or the basic human rights of wanted persons. The case that made Israel’s intelligence agency famous—kidnapping the “Doctor of Death” Eichmann from South America, bringing him back for trial and executing him—did indeed deliver justice for the victims of the Holocaust, but the kidnapping itself damaged the sovereignty and judicial authority of the country involved. After the “Munich massacre” of 1972, Israel’s intelligence agency hunted down “Black September” terrorists worldwide for nearly 10 years. Except for one injured woman who was imprisoned, all the others died violently. From the perspective of respecting the sovereignty of other countries and the basic rights of criminal suspects, Israel’s overseas revenge killings, this so-called “legend,” was nothing more than a series of extrajudicial executions, and also triggered diplomatic crises. Israel’s overseas assassination cases against Hamas members are also not rare, and take various forms: in 1994, two agents were sent to assassinate Hamas representative Khaled Mashal in Amman, the capital of Jordan, but the assassins were exposed and captured alive, nearly leading to the severance of diplomatic ties between Jordan and Israel; in 2020, Israel sent 26 agents using forged passports from more than ten Western countries to assassinate Hamas weapons procurement official Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai, sparking strong protests from many countries… To this day, Israel has become increasingly unrestrained and fearless, openly driving the war machine to kill in the capitals of other countries. Its habitual lawlessness and barbaric practices can be said to have reached their peak.
Sixth, Israel’s airstrike on Doha was a heavy blow to those mediating Middle East conflicts and disputes, bound to frustrate the mediation efforts of the international community, damage the credibility of security guarantees of relevant countries, and make it difficult for conflicting parties to find a safe third-party platform for dialogue in the future. As is well known, Qatar, though a small Gulf country, is famous as a “great mediator.” Doha once witnessed the agreement between the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban on ceasefire and withdrawal, and it became the only communication channel with Israel for Hamas after losing other overseas shelters. Now, with Hamas negotiators being hunted down by Israel beyond all taboos, Doha has suffered bloodshed for providing negotiation convenience. The deterrent effect of this evil consequence is enough to make other Middle Eastern countries like Jordan, Oman, Egypt, and even Turkey—who are willing to play the role of “peacemakers”—think twice before providing Israel with dialogue channels in the future. Israel’s move of “tearing down the bridge before crossing the river” not only completely blocks its own “Doha channel” for negotiating with Hamas, but also closes off one of the future options for dialogue with the Houthis, and even makes any potential negotiations with Lebanon and Syria possible only with security guarantees provided by more powerful and credible major powers.
Seventh, Israel’s sudden attack on Gulf states that have long enjoyed peace and security, after having spread the flames of the “Sixth Middle East War” to the Persian Gulf by blitzing Iran, now shifts the blame onto oil-producing Gulf states that had not seen war since 1991 and were called an “oasis of peace and prosperity.” This caused oil prices to soar, threatening the world’s energy supply and global economic development. If Israel is allowed to continue its brutal military ravaging of Qatar, which country will be the next to suffer an undeclared war from Israel? The generally “small in size and population” Gulf Arab states will undoubtedly bid farewell to their era of peace of mind, with everyone living in fear. This will plunge this wealthy, investment- and shipping-active “land of peace” into panic and turmoil, and may lead to major changes in global capital flows, triggering large-scale financial turbulence.
Eighth, Gulf Arab states, including Qatar, although they have long supported the Palestinian cause for independence in terms of public opinion, morality, and funding, are also the “pioneers of the era” who achieved normalization with Israel after the Cold War, maintaining open and semi-open high-level exchanges and close economic, trade, investment, technological, and even security cooperation. In recent years, Bahrain and the UAE, despite enormous domestic pressure, cast aside the historical burden of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and took the lead in signing the Abraham Accords to establish normal relations with Israel, driving two Arab states in Africa—Sudan and Morocco—to follow suit. If Saudi Arabia, which supported Bahrain and the UAE in taking the lead, completes the reshaping of its triangular relations with the U.S. and Israel, this would achieve comprehensive normalization of relations with Israel among the six Gulf states. However, Israel’s aggression and bombing of Qatar, a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, violated the collective security interests of this regional organization, rendering its collective defense mechanism useless, humiliating the collective dignity of the six states and their peoples, and ultimately eroding the foundation of public opinion and triggering stagnation or regression in the peace process with Israel.
Ninth, Israel’s heavy-handed strike against Qatar exposes the arbitrariness of “Greater Israel-ism” and the arrogance of the “chosen people,” as well as a national strategic orientation and behavior characterized by bullying the weak and shifting burdens onto neighbors. This is bound to further worsen the regional and international image of Israel and even of Jews, and may even revive the dying Arab nationalism, leading to renewed large-scale tensions in ethnic, religious, and geopolitical relations in the Middle East, causing Israel to lose more Western allies. Israel’s long-term iron-blood, scorched-earth, and starvation policies toward Gaza have already drawn universal condemnation and blame. Now, by imposing war on Gulf Arab states and their peoples, Israel demonstrates an extreme selfishness: “I would rather wrong the world than have the world wrong me.” This situation not only burdens the governments of Arab states that reconciled with Israel with a heavy moral and public opinion cross, but also forces Western allies to take countermeasures against Israel, such as arms embargoes, trade restrictions, or preparing to recognize the State of Palestine. On the 11th, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the EU’s 27 member states to “consider recognizing Palestine, in order to realize the two-state solution.” By acting unjustly, Israel has cut itself off from the international community, moving toward the diplomatic abyss of becoming an “international orphan” and “international pariah.”
“As long as Qingfu is not dead, the troubles of Lu will not end.” Israel has never been able to achieve lasting and stable national security, and the fundamental cause lies in its refusal to return Arab territories including Palestine (limited to the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem), its long reliance on America’s bottomless protection and its own militarization and belligerent policies, and the unchecked growth, greed, and zero-sum thinking of the far-right. With more than six million Jews as its main ethnic group, Israel may now be invincible in the Middle East, able to freely enter and exit the airspace and territory of neighboring countries. But how long can this national security, supported by the military machine, these international relations built on fists, and this peace and stability built on countless innocent lives last? How much benefit can it bring Israel? The answer is undoubtedly clear: it is like climbing a tree to catch fish, running south when you want to go north. Some sharp observers have even pointed out that Israel, in the name of a “war of national defense,” is in fact waging a “war of extermination.” From a broader and longer-term perspective, if the international community allows Israel to continue its wrongdoing, not only will the Middle East remain mired in wars, but global governance and the international order will also become increasingly unmanageable as bad money drives out good.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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