Connect with us

Opinion

Lavrov’s visit and the latest situation in Armenia: Balance or drifting?

Avatar photo

Published

on

Erkin Öncan, journalist

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently made a critical visit to Armenia.

Visiting Yerevan officially for the first time in several years, Lavrov met with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and President Vahagn Khachaturyan during his visit.

In a joint press conference with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Lavrov described Western-led security initiatives as ineffective and biased, and proposed a multipolar, inclusive security order based on international law.

In Yerevan, Lavrov reminded Armenia of its historical alliance with Russia and warned Yerevan about the possible consequences of rapprochement with the West.

Lavrov also harshly criticized France and the European Union (EU) in particular, suggesting that these actors were pursuing a destabilizing and anti-Russian agenda in the Caucasus.

However, it is also noteworthy that Lavrov did not address US-Armenia contacts and refrained from harsh criticism of Washington. This is, of course, related to the dialogue established with the Trump administration.

Lavrov’s visit took place at a time when relations between the two countries were tense. There is a palpable increase in discontent towards Russia in Armenia due to Moscow’s perceived inaction/insufficient reaction regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

In addition, Yerevan recently suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and expanded its diplomatic, economic, and military relations with France, the European Union, and other Western actors.

A ‘new page’ in Russia-Armenia relations?

This visit was followed by interpretations that ‘a new page had been turned’ in Russia-Armenia relations, which have deteriorated since the 2nd Karabakh War. However, this picture also clearly shows the ‘dilemma’ in Armenian politics.

Although Armenia’s ‘dual’ policy between Russia and the West is defined by circles close to Pashinyan as a ‘multi-vector foreign policy,’ this oscillation was actually a natural consequence of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ that brought Pashinyan to power and aimed for the Caucasus’s separation from Russia.

The political course of this country, which historically leaned towards the Russia-Iran axis and appealed to ‘Moscow’s arbitration’ on regional problems, especially Karabakh, changed irreversibly after the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in the spring of 2018, which brought Nikol Pashinyan to power.

With the Velvet Revolution, a classic color revolution, Armenia, like other former Soviet countries in the color revolution belt, was introduced to the concept of rapprochement with the West, European Union (EU) values, and ‘democracy.’ The leader of the Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan, had rejected the ‘color revolution’ analogy during the protests, stating that the movement was solely related to Armenia’s internal affairs and that there would be no change in Armenia’s foreign policy. However, when all the steps taken since the Velvet Revolution are examined, it is clear that today’s ‘multi-vector foreign policy’ actually means a pro-Western foreign policy.

This policy has undergone a significant transformation in recent years in the context of relations with Russia:

In February 2024, Yerevan announced that it had effectively frozen its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In May of the same year, it stopped paying its membership dues, in June it openly expressed its intention to formally withdraw, and last month (April 2025) it announced it would not participate in budget planning.

At the root of Armenia’s stance lies a growing dissatisfaction that the CSTO is not meeting Armenia’s security expectations. Yerevan expected Russia and the CSTO to help it in the Karabakh war.

However, Russia and the CSTO did not want to get involved in the Karabakh issue, which was ‘outside the legal borders of the alliance.’ Of course, the real reasons were discomfort with the Pashinyan government’s pro-Western course and the desire to maintain balanced relations with Azerbaijan.

Armenia’s EU path

Yerevan, criticizing Russia for the military power not provided when needed, was chronologically taking the following steps during the same period:

— April 2024: Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan signed a judicial cooperation agreement with Eurojust [the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation] in Brussels, aiming for ‘judicial unity among EU member states.’

— September 2024: Armenia and the EU launched a visa liberalization dialogue for Armenian citizens to travel to the EU for short stays without a visa.

— February 2024: At the fifth meeting of the EU-Armenia Partnership Council, a 5.5 million euro humanitarian aid agreement was made for Armenians displaced from Karabakh.

— April 2024: At the EU-US-Armenia Trilateral Summit held in Brussels, the EU adopted a Resilience and Growth Plan of 270 million euros for Armenia for the period 2024-2027.

— January 2025: The Armenian government approved a bill initiating the EU accession process.

— February 2025: Armenia joined the EU’s Cohesion Policy family and became a partner in the Interreg Black Sea Basin Programme, which aims to strengthen cooperation with countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and the Mediterranean basin.

— April 2025: Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan signed the law initiating the EU accession process, putting it into effect.

Undoubtedly, Armenia stepping up its pace in its transformation is also related to the ‘loss’ of Karabakh. The loss of Karabakh was a major defeat for Armenia, but at the same time, for the Pashinyan administration, it also signified ‘getting rid of’ another historical burden.

However, the history of Armenia’s relations with the EU goes back much further.

Armenia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 1996 and became a member of the Council of Europe in 2001. Yerevan was also included in the TACIS program [Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States], a grant and technical assistance program provided by the European Commission to former CIS member countries since the 90s for ‘adaptation to a market-centered economic system,’ and received aid for a long time.

Armenia developed its relations with the EU under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, joined the Eastern Partnership initiative in 2009, and despite joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2013, it ratified the EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2017, and ‘democratic reforms’ accelerated with the Velvet Revolution.

What does the EU want from Armenia?

For Europe, Armenia’s importance is determined more by its geographical proximity to Russia and Iran than by Yerevan’s commitment to ‘European values.’

European Union membership, on the other hand, is an arduous process for which countries wait at its doors for many years, a process that only three former members of the Soviet Union – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – have been able to complete.

Besides these three countries, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are also former Soviet countries in the color revolution belt whose politics have long been shaped by ‘EU membership,’ experiencing fierce political struggles domestically between ‘pro-Russian’ and ‘pro-EU’ factions. These similarities indicate that Armenia’s membership could also span many years.

The European Union’s primary goal seems to be the continuation of the membership process and the realization of its strategic interests during this process, rather than Armenia’s full membership. What a ‘European’ Armenia would bring to the EU is directly proportional to the goal of Russia’s geopolitical defeat.

What does Russia want from Armenia?

It is well known that one of the most important reasons for Armenia’s loss of Karabakh was the ‘lack of Russian aid.’

Although Azerbaijan’s military force ended the 28-year Armenian occupation, the most important reason for the change in this long-standing crisis in the region was neither solely Azerbaijan’s ‘Karabakh cause,’ nor Turkish UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], nor Israeli weapons. The biggest factor leading to the region’s transformation in favor of Azerbaijan was undoubtedly the Pashinyan government and its political line.

From these perspectives, the Karabakh crisis, like all existing crises in the former Soviet space, was ‘now international,’ and its dynamics could not be considered independently of US imperialism, the famous ‘containment of Russia’ strategy, and ‘color revolutions.’

Considering the international reflection of the crisis in the region, for years we faced, in the most general terms, an Armenia-Russia-Iran versus Azerbaijan-Israel-Turkey equation. However, this equation was shaken with the Pashinyan administration.

Therefore, when looking from Moscow to Yerevan, Armenia’s place in the strategy of containing Russia is as decisive as the level of bilateral relations and Armenia’s internal political dynamics.

Looking from West to East; Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Armenia, and more… In almost every country sharing the historical legacy of the Soviet Union era and having geographical proximity to the Russian Federation, color revolutions have occurred, military conflicts have taken place, and the political climates of these countries have been shaped on a ‘pro-Russia vs. pro-West’ basis.

However, despite all tensions, geographical proximity, shared history, and economic necessities have prevented these two countries from completely breaking away.

As of 2024, the trade volume between Armenia and Russia reached a historic record of 12.4 billion US dollars. This represents a 56.5 percent increase compared to 2023. In the first half of 2024, Armenia imported approximately 66 tons of gold, almost all of which came from Russia. Similarly, trade in agricultural and food products increased by 16.2 percent in 2024.

However, at the same time, figures show that Armenia’s imports from Russia have significantly increased, but its exports have decreased. While this situation is defined as ‘dependence on Russia’ by pro-Western circles in Armenia, pro-Russian circles blame the decline in exports on Pashinyan’s pro-Western policies.

Although Russia’s view of the Pashinyan administration is primarily a security issue, the Kremlin, relying on the historical and economic ties between the two countries, intends not to lose another important region in the South Caucasus to the West. This is the underlying motivation for Russia giving positive messages at the end of the day, despite all tensions.

What will happen next?

The most important agenda item on the new page Lavrov’s visit to Yerevan sought to open is the upcoming Armenian elections.

The elections, expected in 2026, will be the biggest test for the Pashinyan administration.

In a poll conducted last month by MPG ‘Politring,’ Gallup International’s official representative in Armenia, when asked “If elections were held this Sunday, who would you vote for?”, 11.5% of participants answered Prime Minister Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party, 8% Robert Kocharyan’s ‘Armenia’ bloc, and 3.7% Serzh Sargsyan’s ‘I Have Honor’ Alliance.

Although Pashinyan came in first again in the telephone poll of 1100 people, more than twice the number of those who said they would prefer Pashinyan (23.7%) said they would not participate in the elections.

According to MPG President Aram Navasardyan, Pashinyan’s party has lost votes again, albeit slightly. In contrast, Kocharyan’s bloc has significantly increased its vote share.

Although the real picture will become clear 2-3 months before the elections, the 23.7% ‘hopeless’ segment is of a nature that will determine Pashinyan’s fate.

Armenia’s dual foreign policy in this uncertain domestic political climate has two outcomes: Moscow’s security umbrella versus the EU’s political and economic promises…

The Pashinyan administration is pursuing a kind of balancing act by keeping both doors open. However, a policy of balance and ‘sitting on multiple chairs at the same time’ points to very different outcomes in terms of results.

Armenia, whose options are dwindling day by day, faces the biggest task of determining which of the dual paths it is treading will lead to a more solid outcome.

The outcome will be determined at the point where Armenia’s interests and Pashinyan’s interests conflict.

Sources:

  1. https://armenpress.am/en/article/1220023
  2. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-adopts-law-launch-eu-accession-process-2025-04-04/
  3. https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2020/10/why-russia-is-biding-its-time-on-nagorno-karabakh?utm_source=chatgpt.com&lang=en
  4. https://ecfr.eu/article/a_captive_ally_why_russia_isnt_rushing_to_armenias_aid/
  5. https://www.eurasiareview.com/09112020-russia-and-the-second-nagorno-karabakh-war-analysis/
  6. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-armenia-launch-visa-liberalisation-dialogue-2024-09-09_en
  7. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/armenia-adopts-law-launch-eu-accession-process-2025-04-04/
  8. https://caliber.az/en/post/armenia-joins-russia-s-top-10-trade-partners-in-2024
  9. https://tass.com/economy/1936739
  10. https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=91289
  11. https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/05/23/lavrov-russia-armenia/

Opinion

India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

Published

on

Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

Continue Reading

Opinion

Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

Avatar photo

Published

on

In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

Continue Reading

Opinion

The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

Published

on

BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey