Connect with us

Middle East

Lebanon between the prospects of Zionist aggression and the limits of open confrontation

Published

on

Khaled al-Yamani, Lebanese political commentator

Amid the gradual escalation on the southern front, the specter of Zionist aggression against Lebanon once again looms over the political and security scene. This raises legitimate questions about the nature and limits of this potential aggression, and whether it will remain confined to targeting Hezbollah or expand to include the Lebanese state and its infrastructure, as has happened in previous wars.

Available information indicates that the Zionist enemy [a term used by opponents of Israel] is experiencing a complex strategic predicament. On one hand, it has failed to achieve its objectives in Gaza; on the other, it is facing an active northern front that has imposed new equations of deterrence. In this context, the enemy’s leaders are brandishing broad military options against Lebanon in an attempt to restore their lost “prestige of deterrence.”

The nature of the aggression: A limited strike or a comprehensive war?

The scenarios under consideration range from a limited aggression focused on targeting Hezbollah positions or field commanders, to a comprehensive war that could expand to strike Lebanese infrastructure, including ports, airports, power grids, and telecommunications networks. However, past experiences—most notably the July 2006 war—show that when the enemy fails to achieve a direct military victory against the resistance, it resorts to a scorched-earth policy, applying pressure on the resistance’s popular base and the Lebanese state as a whole.

The fundamental question remains: does the enemy have the capacity to bear the cost of a comprehensive war? Indicators suggest otherwise, given the internal divisions within the Zionist entity, its economic crises, and fears that the confrontation could expand regionally.

Hezbollah’s deadline to the state: Politics before the battlefield

In this context, one cannot overlook the political step taken by Hezbollah in granting the Lebanese state a clear deadline to pursue political and diplomatic action. The goal is to achieve three key points stipulated in the ceasefire agreement from over a year ago, namely:

  1. The complete withdrawal of the Israeli army from occupied Lebanese territory in the south;
  2. The release of Lebanese prisoners;
  3. The reconstruction of the destroyed southern villages.

This deadline is not a minor detail; rather, it reflects the party’s [Hezbollah’s] commitment to prioritizing the role of the state and its institutions. It also serves to remove pretexts from Lebanese factions opposed to the resistance—factions that have long blamed Hezbollah’s weapons for tensions and aggression and have called for their removal under the banners of sovereignty and stability.

Through this approach, the party sought to state clearly that the resistance is not an alternative to the state, but at the same time, it is not a bargaining chip that can be negotiated away or relinquished.

The weapons of the resistance: A red line

Conversely, those who assume this deadline signals Hezbollah’s readiness to give up its weapons are mistaken. The issue of disarmament is categorically rejected by the party and is unacceptable in any form, as it is intrinsically linked to a defensive role that has proven effective in protecting Lebanon and deterring the enemy.

Hezbollah understands that any new aggression will be met with a direct and painful response. It has declared its full readiness for confrontation, presenting the enemy with a clear equation: the cost of a war on Lebanon will be no less for the Zionist entity; in fact, it may be far greater and more extensive.

One of the possible scenarios that Hezbollah might implement in the face of an Israeli aggression could be as follows: in the event of an Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, the response would be carried out by small units aiming to inflict the maximum possible casualties on Israeli soldiers and military vehicles. This would be accompanied by the use of drones to strike northern settlements in occupied Palestine and targets deep inside Israel. There is also the possibility of launching rockets from certain areas in Lebanon, whether from the south or other regions. Furthermore, there is a larger and more serious scenario: the insertion of assault units into the interior of occupied Palestine.

Could the war escalate regionally?

The most dangerous aspect of the current situation is the possibility that any aggression against Lebanon could become the spark for a regional confrontation. The “axis of resistance” [a term for the alliance including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and other groups] is interconnected, and any large-scale attack on Hezbollah could prompt the involvement of allied regional forces, either directly or through other fronts. This is well understood by the enemy, as it is by the United States, which has so far sought to control the tempo of the conflict and prevent a major explosion.

Conclusion

Lebanon today stands at a sensitive crossroads. Caught between the logic of Zionist aggression, which is based on fleeing forward [attempting to solve internal problems by creating an external conflict], and the logic of resistance, which is based on deterrence and strategic patience, the Lebanese state faces a real test. It must either succeed in capitalizing on the available political window or once again leave the arena to the logic of force.

What is certain, however, is that any forthcoming aggression will not be a walk in the park for the enemy, and the equations that follow it will not resemble those that preceded it—neither in Lebanon nor in the region.

Middle East

US waives human rights terms on $320m military aid to Egypt

Published

on

The US State Department stated that it has waived human rights conditions on more than $300 million in military aid to Egypt.

The statement emphasised that this decision was taken in consideration of Cairo’s “helpful role” since the outbreak of the war against Iran.

Egypt began receiving substantial support from the US after signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

Since the late 1980s, the country has received approximately $1.3 billion annually in US military assistance.

A portion of this aid is subject to conditions related to human rights and democracy, which can be waived on national security grounds.

Withholding funds, including during the administration of former US President Joe Biden, has caused tension between Cairo and Washington in the past.

A letter dated 21 September and addressed to various congressional committees, obtained by Reuters, stated that Secretary of State Marco Rubio “decided to waive the certification requirement under the fiscal year 2025 Foreign Military Financing programme for Egypt of $320 million.”

This waiver was subsequently confirmed by the State Department.

An accompanying memorandum justifying the decision stated that this portion of military aid was “essential for counterterrorism, border security, or non-proliferation programmes, or otherwise important to the national security interests of the United States.”

The memorandum, dated 4 September and bearing Rubio’s signature, stated: “Exercising this waiver authority is critical to the US-Egypt relationship and to US national security priorities, particularly given the helpful role Egypt has played in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury.”

“Operation Epic Fury” is the designation used by the US military for the campaign launched jointly with Israel against Iran in late February.

The State Department memorandum, whose authenticity was confirmed by two sources in Washington familiar with the letter, did not provide detailed information regarding what was termed Egypt’s “helpful role”.

The State Department’s annual decision on military aid to Egypt typically covers funds allocated for the preceding fiscal year, which ends on 30 September.

A State Department spokesperson stated that Rubio waived the certification in the interest of US national security and that the US continues to cooperate with the Egyptian government across a range of issues.

In an emailed statement, the spokesperson said: “This waiver recognizes the importance of maintaining security cooperation with Egypt at a time of significant security challenges in the region.”

The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not immediately comment on the matter.

The spillover effects of the Iran war have imposed a heavy toll on US security partners, including Egypt.

Owing to rising fuel prices and other disruptions, the Egyptian economy is passing through a difficult period.

Under the Biden administration, the US withheld portions of the annual military allocation on multiple occasions over Egypt’s human rights record.

In 2024, following the Hamas-led 7 October attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, the Biden administration set aside human rights conditions, disbursing the entire $1.3 billion allocation to Egypt for the first time in its tenure.

Human rights organisations have long accused Egypt, under the administration of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, of widespread human rights abuses, including torture and enforced disappearances.

This week, Egyptian police detained six journalists from a fact-checking and investigative media outlet, accusing them of spreading false information on behalf of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.

Egyptian authorities state that they have taken steps to address human rights issues. Sisi said stability is paramount and that the government supports human rights by working to provide for basic needs.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Britain expands curbs on arms exports to Israel over Gaza risks

Published

on

Britain has significantly broadened its military export restrictions targeting Israel, suspending or rejecting more than 80 licences for items the IDF could use in Gaza.

This figure is nearly triple the number affected when the policy was first introduced in September 2024.

United Kingdom Minister of State for the Middle East Stephen Doughty said that as part of what he described as a “tighter system” for assessing exports to Israel, more than 50 further export applications have been refused since approximately 30 licences were initially suspended.

Under the initial decision taken in September 2024, 30 of roughly 350 licences were suspended after the British government concluded there was a “clear risk” that certain military exports could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza.

The affected equipment included components for military aircraft, drones, naval systems, and targeting gear.

Doughty said additional measures adopted this month established what he termed a “double safeguard” mechanism within the approvals process.

Export applications must now be assessed both against existing international humanitarian law criteria and in light of Britain’s position on the legality of Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territories.

“We have so far suspended or refused more than 80 licences,” Doughty said, adding that he had personally examined each licence.

Despite the wider restrictions, British-origin parts entering the international F-35 fighter jet supply chain continue to be largely exempt.

The UK government argues that preventing British-made components from entering the global F-35 pool could undermine the programme as a whole and have serious consequences for the security of the UK and its allies.

Direct exports of F-35 parts intended specifically for Israel remain suspended.

Doughty defended maintaining the supply of components via the international programme, arguing that halting it could have severe ramifications for the broader European and allied security architecture.

Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Emily Thornberry challenged this position, arguing that the issue was political rather than purely legal.

Thornberry suggested adopting an approach similar to the Dutch model, under which components entering the international supply chain could be flagged as “not intended for aircraft bound for Israel”.

The initial suspension was implemented in September 2024 by then Foreign Secretary David Lammy.

Lammy stressed at the time that the measure did not constitute an arms embargo and applied solely to items assessed as usable in military operations in Gaza.

Since then, the policy has been tightened further under Prime Minister Andy Burnham.

The expanded export restrictions follow the Burnham government’s adoption of a more confrontational policy toward the Israeli government.

Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband drew sustained applause at the Labour Party’s annual conference in Liverpool after delivering a sharp critique of the Netanyahu government’s policies and defending the decision to ban trade with Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Accusing Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza, Miliband stated that the British government heard public outrage over the conflict, telling delegates: “We hear you. You were right.”

Continue Reading

Middle East

Netanyahu holds secret UAE talks with Saudi Arabia and Arab officials

Published

on

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with representatives of Gulf and Arab nations that lack diplomatic ties with Israel, including Saudi Arabia, during his weekend visit to the United Arab Emirates.

Sources close to the gathering told the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth on Monday that representatives from Morocco, Libya, Jordan, and Qatar also took part in the meeting.

Netanyahu made a unannounced visit to Abu Dhabi on Sunday, where he met with the country’s leader, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

According to Israeli media, this marked the first time the United Arab Emirates officially confirmed a visit by Netanyahu.

The meeting was arranged by Mossad Director Roman Goffman “at the request of Saudi Arabia, which asked for Israel’s assistance against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea region,” according to Yedioth Ahronoth.

The discussions addressed Iran and the Houthi militia. The newspaper added that the Arab states heard from Israel that “Israel is prepared to assist countries in the region with air defence systems, just as it aided the UAE during the conflict with Iran.”

Conflict in Yemen intensified in September when Ansarullah militiamen launched a rapid offensive that seized Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, including the vital maritime corridor of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

The Yemeni resistance also imposed a blockade on Saudi Arabia’s energy exports and staged multiple attacks against the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia reportedly sought military assistance from the US to counter Ansarullah.

Washington declined to attack the Houthis directly, but announced that it would provide intelligence and targeting support.

Reporting on the same visit, The Jerusalem Post said Netanyahu spent six hours in the UAE and that the principal subject of his discussions with MBZ was Iran.

Citing sources familiar with the matter, the newspaper added that the trip came “after Netanyahu exerted heavy pressure on the United Arab Emirates to arrange a meeting ahead of the Israeli elections on 27 October.”

Separately, the Associated Press, citing a person with direct knowledge of the meeting, reported that Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE was arranged in part to ask MBZ to deny reports that he had warned the Israeli prime minister of an impending Hamas threat prior to 7 October 2023.

According to Israeli media, Netanyahu’s office denied the AP report, issuing the following statement:

“Fake news. The visit focused solely on strengthening ties between the two countries and on regional issues.”

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey