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Lebanon between the prospects of Zionist aggression and the limits of open confrontation

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Khaled al-Yamani, Lebanese political commentator

Amid the gradual escalation on the southern front, the specter of Zionist aggression against Lebanon once again looms over the political and security scene. This raises legitimate questions about the nature and limits of this potential aggression, and whether it will remain confined to targeting Hezbollah or expand to include the Lebanese state and its infrastructure, as has happened in previous wars.

Available information indicates that the Zionist enemy [a term used by opponents of Israel] is experiencing a complex strategic predicament. On one hand, it has failed to achieve its objectives in Gaza; on the other, it is facing an active northern front that has imposed new equations of deterrence. In this context, the enemy’s leaders are brandishing broad military options against Lebanon in an attempt to restore their lost “prestige of deterrence.”

The nature of the aggression: A limited strike or a comprehensive war?

The scenarios under consideration range from a limited aggression focused on targeting Hezbollah positions or field commanders, to a comprehensive war that could expand to strike Lebanese infrastructure, including ports, airports, power grids, and telecommunications networks. However, past experiences—most notably the July 2006 war—show that when the enemy fails to achieve a direct military victory against the resistance, it resorts to a scorched-earth policy, applying pressure on the resistance’s popular base and the Lebanese state as a whole.

The fundamental question remains: does the enemy have the capacity to bear the cost of a comprehensive war? Indicators suggest otherwise, given the internal divisions within the Zionist entity, its economic crises, and fears that the confrontation could expand regionally.

Hezbollah’s deadline to the state: Politics before the battlefield

In this context, one cannot overlook the political step taken by Hezbollah in granting the Lebanese state a clear deadline to pursue political and diplomatic action. The goal is to achieve three key points stipulated in the ceasefire agreement from over a year ago, namely:

  1. The complete withdrawal of the Israeli army from occupied Lebanese territory in the south;
  2. The release of Lebanese prisoners;
  3. The reconstruction of the destroyed southern villages.

This deadline is not a minor detail; rather, it reflects the party’s [Hezbollah’s] commitment to prioritizing the role of the state and its institutions. It also serves to remove pretexts from Lebanese factions opposed to the resistance—factions that have long blamed Hezbollah’s weapons for tensions and aggression and have called for their removal under the banners of sovereignty and stability.

Through this approach, the party sought to state clearly that the resistance is not an alternative to the state, but at the same time, it is not a bargaining chip that can be negotiated away or relinquished.

The weapons of the resistance: A red line

Conversely, those who assume this deadline signals Hezbollah’s readiness to give up its weapons are mistaken. The issue of disarmament is categorically rejected by the party and is unacceptable in any form, as it is intrinsically linked to a defensive role that has proven effective in protecting Lebanon and deterring the enemy.

Hezbollah understands that any new aggression will be met with a direct and painful response. It has declared its full readiness for confrontation, presenting the enemy with a clear equation: the cost of a war on Lebanon will be no less for the Zionist entity; in fact, it may be far greater and more extensive.

One of the possible scenarios that Hezbollah might implement in the face of an Israeli aggression could be as follows: in the event of an Israeli ground incursion into southern Lebanon, the response would be carried out by small units aiming to inflict the maximum possible casualties on Israeli soldiers and military vehicles. This would be accompanied by the use of drones to strike northern settlements in occupied Palestine and targets deep inside Israel. There is also the possibility of launching rockets from certain areas in Lebanon, whether from the south or other regions. Furthermore, there is a larger and more serious scenario: the insertion of assault units into the interior of occupied Palestine.

Could the war escalate regionally?

The most dangerous aspect of the current situation is the possibility that any aggression against Lebanon could become the spark for a regional confrontation. The “axis of resistance” [a term for the alliance including Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and other groups] is interconnected, and any large-scale attack on Hezbollah could prompt the involvement of allied regional forces, either directly or through other fronts. This is well understood by the enemy, as it is by the United States, which has so far sought to control the tempo of the conflict and prevent a major explosion.

Conclusion

Lebanon today stands at a sensitive crossroads. Caught between the logic of Zionist aggression, which is based on fleeing forward [attempting to solve internal problems by creating an external conflict], and the logic of resistance, which is based on deterrence and strategic patience, the Lebanese state faces a real test. It must either succeed in capitalizing on the available political window or once again leave the arena to the logic of force.

What is certain, however, is that any forthcoming aggression will not be a walk in the park for the enemy, and the equations that follow it will not resemble those that preceded it—neither in Lebanon nor in the region.

Middle East

UNDP estimates $1.38 billion in building damage across southern Lebanon

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The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research have released a rapid assessment report on building damage in southern Lebanon.

According to Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, the study relied on satellite imagery and geospatial artificial intelligence (GeoAI) technologies to assess externally visible damage to buildings along the southern border between October 23, 2025, and April 29, 2026.

The report found that a total of 11,095 buildings had been completely destroyed in the areas surveyed. Based on an assumed average apartment size of 150 square metres, these destroyed structures are estimated to correspond theoretically to 17,891 housing units.

The volume of debris generated in the region is estimated at 3,107,756 cubic metres.

In addition to the buildings that were completely destroyed, the assessment identified partial damage to 2,242 buildings and minor damage to 9,311 others.

At the housing-unit level, the report estimates that alongside the approximately 17,891 units that were completely destroyed, around 5,219 homes sustained partial damage and 18,282 suffered minor damage.

The report stressed that these housing figures are not based on direct field surveys but on mathematical modelling using average floor-space assumptions and therefore constitute theoretical estimates.

Preliminary cost of building damage estimated at $1.38 billion

The report calculated reconstruction costs using a standard benchmark value of $450 per square metre. On that basis, the total preliminary cost of building damage was estimated at $1.384 billion.

Geographically, Nabatieh Governorate accounted for the largest share of the damage, estimated at $1.053 billion, while losses in South Governorate were assessed at $331 million.

At the district level, preliminary costs were estimated at $688 million in Bint Jbeil, $333 million in Marjayoun, $315 million in Tyre, $32 million in Nabatieh district and $16 million in Sidon.

The report emphasised that these figures cover only external physical damage to buildings and do not represent the final cost of reconstruction or the total economic losses caused by the war.

In Bint Jbeil district, the highest levels of destruction were recorded in Aitaroun, where 1,658 buildings were destroyed, followed by Bint Jbeil city with 1,076, Ayta al-Shaab with 539, Beit Lif with 371, Yaroun with 242 and Ainata with 227.

In Marjayoun district, 969 destroyed buildings were recorded in Mais al-Jabal, 824 in Taybeh, 285 in Houla, 199 in Markaba, 184 in Blida and 174 in Deir Siryan.

In Nabatieh district, 71 buildings were destroyed in Yahmar al-Shaqif, 69 in Zoutar al-Sharqiya and 37 in Kfar Sir. In Tyre district, 370 buildings were completely destroyed in Burj al-Shamali, 216 in Naqoura, 162 in Abbassiyeh, 80 in Tyre city and 65 in al-Mansouri. In Sidon district, destruction was concentrated mainly in Zirariyeh, where 65 buildings were destroyed, and Arzi, where 62 buildings were levelled.

The report also outlined significant limitations that prevent the findings from being treated as a definitive final assessment.

The study did not cover entire administrative districts but was limited to areas where clear satellite imagery was available.

As a result, the area south of the Litani River constituted the main focus, while only limited data from areas north of the river were included. Some municipalities were fully surveyed, while only selected sections of others could be examined.

For example, all cadastral zones in Bint Jbeil district were surveyed. In Tyre district, 74 of 75 cadastral areas were fully covered, while one was only partially included.

In Marjayoun, 17 of 33 areas were fully surveyed and 21 partially covered. In Nabatieh, only four of 52 areas were fully analysed, while 15 were partially examined. In Sidon, none of the 77 areas underwent a complete survey, with only five areas partially included in the assessment.

The report listed several additional limitations:

Critical infrastructure damage, including roads, bridges, electricity networks, water systems and telecommunications facilities, was not assessed.

Damage to underground shelters, basements and non-visible interior sections of buildings could not be detected.

No clear distinction could be made between residential, commercial and industrial structures.

Buildings with minor damage were excluded from debris-volume and cost calculations.

Structural density, shadows and narrow streets introduced potential margins of error in satellite analysis.

No field visits or on-site inspections were conducted to verify the findings. The assessment was carried out entirely through desk-based analysis of satellite imagery.

Given the scale of destruction and confidence in the methodology employed, no on-site verification procedures were undertaken in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces or the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).

UNDP said the findings should be regarded as preliminary planning data and that the scope of the assessment would be expanded as additional satellite imagery and field information become available.

Officials noted that once excluded categories and infrastructure losses are taken into account, the true cost of the destruction in southern Lebanon is likely to be significantly higher than the estimates contained in the report.

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Middle East

Iran makes Lebanon ceasefire prerequisite for final agreement with US

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Assessments that efforts to restrain Israel in Lebanon are being shaped less in Beirut or Tel Aviv than in closed-door talks between Iranian and American negotiators resurfaced ahead of negotiations in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock.

Unlike the current approach adopted by the Lebanese government, Iran continues to pursue a strategy of leveraging its influence on the ground to secure diplomatic gains.

The Lebanese government, meanwhile, remains committed to a separate negotiating track that critics say facilitates concessions to Israel at the negotiating table in Washington that could not be achieved on the battlefield.

US Vice President JD Vance, who arrived in Switzerland to participate in the latest round of talks, confirmed that efforts to make the ceasefire in Lebanon permanent would be among the negotiations’ top priorities.

According to CNN, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the matter, the US and Iranian delegations agreed to convene an emergency session on the situation in Lebanon as the first item of discussion, placing the issue at the top of the agenda.

US says it faces difficulties over Israeli withdrawal

According to diplomatic sources cited by Al-Akhbar newspaper, US officials informed the Iranian side that Washington had made intensive efforts to persuade the Israeli government to complete a full withdrawal from Lebanon but had encountered significant difficulties in the process.

US officials requested Iranian support in facilitating Hezbollah’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon as part of efforts to enable an Israeli pullout.

The Iranian delegation responded that Hezbollah was an internal Lebanese matter. While indicating that Tehran did not oppose an agreement by the Lebanese authorities on a timetable providing for a rapid Israeli withdrawal, the delegation outlined what it viewed as its own area of responsibility.

Iranian representatives said both Tehran and Washington had committed to implementing measures aimed at ending the war across the region, including in Lebanon, and argued that the United States should exert pressure on Israel not only to uphold a ceasefire but also to withdraw quickly.

Iran reiterates Lebanon condition for final agreement

An Iranian official also told CNN that ending the conflict in Lebanon was the most important item on the Iranian delegation’s agenda.

During the talks, Vice President Vance said Washington would continue working toward peace between Lebanon and Israel and expressed hope that the temporary ceasefire could be transformed into a permanent agreement capable of delivering long-term stability.

Speaking before the session, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Tehran would not begin negotiations on a final agreement with Washington unless the war in Lebanon was halted, as stipulated in the US-Iran memorandum of understanding.

In a post on X, Baghaei wrote: “It is not possible to move to the negotiation stage for a final agreement unless these provisions are implemented, foremost among them the first clause, which calls for ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon.”

Military and diplomatic developments ahead of the Bürgenstock talks threatened to undermine the understanding reached between the parties. Following Israeli attacks in Lebanon and what Iran described as an escalation of military tensions in violation of the US-Iran agreement, Tehran announced that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz to traffic.

In a statement, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters said the closure of the strait was only the first step in a series of measures planned by Tehran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry subsequently announced the suspension of the Geneva negotiations with the United States.

Following those developments, reports indicated that Washington intervened and increased pressure on Israel, leading Israeli military commanders to issue definitive orders for a complete halt to military operations in southern Lebanon for the second time within 24 hours.

Israeli media reports said the decision was not taken solely on Tel Aviv’s own initiative and that military operations were curtailed as a result of intense US pressure following Iran’s move in the Strait of Hormuz.

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US lifts naval blockade of Iran after ceasefire memorandum signed

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The United States has lifted its naval blockade of Iran on the orders of President Donald Trump, ending restrictions on vessels entering and leaving Iranian ports.

Announcing the development, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the US military was no longer blocking maritime traffic to Iranian ports and had halted all operations related to enforcing the naval blockade.

The statement added that US warships would remain in the region to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.

The decision to lift the blockade follows the memorandum of understanding signed by the United States and Iran on June 18, aimed at ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic.

After signing the document in France, where he was attending the G7 summit, Trump sent the agreement to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for approval.

In a statement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said a formal signing ceremony between the two delegations, previously scheduled to take place in Geneva on June 19, would no longer be held.

Negotiations to continue in Switzerland

According to Axios, citing sources familiar with the matter, the signing process for the memorandum of understanding was accelerated in order to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping as quickly as possible.

A planned meeting between US and Iranian representatives in Switzerland has not been cancelled. The talks are expected to focus on launching negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, with US Vice President James David Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf set to take part.

According to CNN, the 14-point memorandum calls for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts, the lifting of the naval blockade, the resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of oil sanctions on Iran and the withdrawal of US troops from areas surrounding Iran.

The agreement also includes the allocation of $300 billion for Iran’s economic reconstruction, the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets and a 60-day negotiation process aimed at reaching a final agreement on the nuclear programme.

In return, the authorities in Tehran pledged not to develop nuclear weapons.

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